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V Abstract 
This  study  is  concerned  with  the  influence  of  regionalism  in  the  Congresses  of 
People's  Deputies  of  the  USSR  and  Russia  between  1989  and  1993  and  its 
implications  for  future  reform  including  the  development  of  federal  relations  in  Russia. 
In  particular,  emphasis  will  be  placed  on  regionalist  tendencies  developed  in  Siberia 
and  the  Russian  Far  East. 
After  perestroika,  the  discussion  of  federal  relations  showed  varieties  of 
possible  developments,  ranging  from  a  unitary  system  to  a  confederation.  Despite 
these  varieties,  it  appears  to  be  generally  perceived  that  stable  and  `genuine'  federal 
relations  are  required  in  Russia.  However,  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  role  of 
the  newly  re-emerging  political  actor,  the  deputies  of  the  central  legislature,  who  are 
directly  engaged  in  the  establishment  of  such  federal  relations. 
This  study  reaches  three  main  conclusions.  First  of  all,  regional  socio-economic 
disparities  affected  the  attitudes  of  deputies  towards  reform,  including  changes  in 
centre-periphery  relations.  Secondly,  the  analysis  suggests  that  at  least  two  main 
streams  of  regionalism  were  developed  during  1989-1993:  one  developed  in  the 
Congresses  by  the  regional  deputy  groups,  and  the  other  outside  the  Congresses  by 
regional  political  leaders.  Thirdly,  despite  growing  regionalist  tendencies  in  Russia  at 
that  time,  regional  political  actors  were  not  strong  enough  to  initiate  a  federal  structure 
of  their  preference,  lacking  horizontal  and  vertical  coordination. 
This  discussion  of  regionalism  in  the  Congresses  leads  us  to  a  further  conclusion 
that  regional  interest  articulation  was  rather  chaotic,  hampering  legislation  of  policies 
and  thus  facilitating  the  regionalisation  of  reform.  Despite  strong  regionalist 
tendencies  in  some  sub-national  units,  particularly  based  on  ethno-nationalist 
sentiments,  such  a  development  may  erode  the  legacy  of  reform  as  well  as  regional 
autonomy  itself. 
Although  further  study  is  required,  the  regions  continue  to  have  a  clearly  defined 
influence  upon  the  legislation  of  federal  relations  in  the  Russian  parliament.  For  the 
legislation  of  not  only  de  facto  changes  but  also  `genuine'  federal  relations,  the  regions 
may  need  to  enhance  the  level  of  their  coordination  on  the  basis  of  the  consensus  on  a 
future  federal  structure. 
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xii Preface  ' 
By  the  time  I  started  my  thesis  in  the  autumn  of  1993,  Russia  was  in  a  new 
round  of  huge  turmoil.  The  Russian  economy  was  staggering.  Politics  evaporated 
when  negotiations  among  political  actors  failed  and  Eltsin  dispersed  the  parliament. 
Just  a  year  before  these  dramatic  developments,  some  observers  of  Russian  politics 
were  even  talking  about  the  possibility  of  the  collapse  of  the  Russian  Federation. 
However,  regional  resistance  appeared  to  remain  strong  only  in  rhetoric,  showing  the 
weakness  of  `checks  and  balances'  in  a  newly  emerging  `democratic'  system.  The 
abrupt-but  quite  predicted  by  the  middle  of  1993-changes  led  many  to  a  criticism  of 
Moscow  for  its  undemocratic  and  violent  measures,  in  which  chaotic  and 
uncoordinated  regional  interest  articulation  that  led  the  country  to  a  ungovernable 
situation  appeared  to  be  buried. 
At  the  time  when  the  parliament  was  dispersed  in  Russia,  I  was  working  on  the 
failed  Land  Reform  of  1861  and  found  a  similarity  between  the  Land  Reform  of  1861 
and  the  reform  implemented  during  the  period  between  1989  and  1993  in  Russia.  In 
both  cases,  the  influence  of  regions  on  the  decision-making  process  based  on  their  own 
regional  interests  resulted  in  regionalisation  of  reform,  distorting  reform  processes. 
These  two  historically  remote  incidents  paved  the  way  to  this  thesis  and  the  regional 
influence  in  the  national  decision-making  constitutes  the  main  focus  of  discussion. 
Despite  the  importance  of  the  regional  influence  on  national  decision-making 
process,  however,  relatively  little  attention  has  been  paid  in  the  Western  literature  to 
deputies  at  the  Congress  of  Peoples'  Deputies  (CPD),  a  `newly'  emerging  political 
actor  where  members  appeared  to  be  rather  independent  from  their  leaders  compared 
with  their  predecessors.  Literature  on  Russian  politics  or  economy  in  this  transition 
period  paid  more  attention  to  regionalisation  of  reform  in  policy-implementation  than 
in  the  decision-making.  Neither  did  the  literature  on  regional  elites  have  drawn 
sufficient  attention  to  the  role  of  regional  deputies  in  the  national  parliament,  although 
they  were  responsible  for  legislation  on  every  aspect  of  reform  including  centre- 
periphery  relations. 
xiii Accordingly,  this  thesis  is  mainly  concentrated  on  regional  interest  articulation 
in  the  CPD  during  the  transition  period  of  1989-1993,  particularly  that  of  the  Siberian 
and  Far  Eastern  (SIBFE)  regions.  This  thesis  seeks  to  make  a  contribution  to  bridging 
a  gap  between  the  analysis  of  Soviet  and  post-Soviet  legislative  working  patterns.  In 
addition,  the  thesis  draws  attention  to  the.  importance  of  coordinated  interest 
articulation  by  the  regions  in  their  effort  to  avoid  an  ungovernable  situation  or  a 
stalemate  which  might  have  precipitated  the  intervention  of  a  strong  centre  that  might 
have  affected  not  only  centre-periphery  relations  but  also  the  whole  reform  itself.  The 
regional  reform  launched  by  Putin  in  2000  leaves  many  arrangements  still  to  be 
defined,  including  the  competence  of  newly  established  administrative  units,  and  thus 
the  question  of  enhancing  the  level  of  regional  coordination  still  remains  as  a  major 
factor  in  the  evolution  of  federal  relations  ten  years  after  the  end  of  communist  rule. 
The  thesis  starts  with  a  brief  literature  review  on  the  question  of  regions  in 
Russian  history  and  of  regional  interest  articulation  patterns  during  the  Soviet  period. 
The  chapter  also  includes  a  discussion  of  general  assumptions,  boundaries  and 
methods  of  analysis. 
In  the  thesis  efforts  have  been  made  to  locate  the  Russian  case  in  a  broader 
context  of  comparative  centre-periphery  relations;  this  is  the  main  concern  of  Chapter 
2.  The  chapter  starts  with  a  discussion  of  the  basic  factors  that  affect  the  development 
of  regionalism  and  centre-periphery  relations.  It  also  includes  a  discussion  of  the 
equilibrium  between  centralising  and  decentralising  forces.  Together  with  a  general 
review,  the  chapter  includes  three  case  studies  of  relatively  'recently'  established 
federal  states:  India,  Spain,  and  Belgium.  The  main  reason  to  select  relatively  'recent' 
federal  system  is  that  the  problems  that  arise  in  the  federalisation  process  may  vary 
depending  on  the  stage  of  development.  Accordingly,  the  experience  of  rather  historic 
or  well-established  federal  states  such  as  the  United  States,  Germany,  or  Switzerland 
could  be  too  specific  (if  current)  or  too  outdated  (if  we  look  for  the  initial 
federalisation  period)  to  be  applied  to  the  Russian  case. 
India  is  selected  because  of  its  multiethnic  diversity,  relatively  poor  economic 
conditions,  and  the  centralised  nature  of  its  federal  system.  Although  the  Indian 
federal  structure  was  officially  established  after  British  colonial  rule,  challenges  to  a 
centralised  federal  system  reemerged  after  the  Emergency  (1975-1977),  and  thus  it  is 
included  in  the  category  of  "recent"  establishment.  Spanish  experience  is  included  in 
this  discussion  because  of  its  unique  strategy  to  cope  with  the  regional  challenge  by 
creating  Autonomous  Communities  (ACs)  after  the  death  of  Franco  in  1975,  a 
xiv transition  from  a  unitary  state  under  the  dictatorship  to  a  decentralised-though  not 
necessarily  federal-system  as  a  part  of  the  democratisation  process.  Putin's  new 
administrative  units  resemble  Spanish  ACs-although  they  were  formed  "from  above" 
in  Russia-and  thus  could  give  an  idea  of  the  possible  evolution  of  federal  relations  in 
Russia.  The  Belgian  case  is  also  interesting  because  of  its  unique  structure-a  mixture 
of  territorial  and  consociational  principles-and  a  series  of  negotiations  in  its 
federalisation  process  that  started  after  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution  of  1970. 
These  three  cases  show  that  the  growing  influence  of  the  regions  in  the  central 
parliament  was  and  is  a  major  factor  in  facilitating  the  evolution  of  a  federal  structure. 
The  cases  also  suggest  that  the  better  a  crisis  management  mechanism  functions,  the 
more  stable  the  evolution  process  becomes.  The  Belgium  and  Spanish  cases  indicate 
that  crisis  management  can  be  more  successful  when  it  is  on  the  basis  of  consensus  and 
a  high  level  of  coordination  of  political  actors. 
Based  upon  these  preliminary  observations,  the  following  chapters  explore  the 
development  of  regionalism  and  its  impact  on  reform  in  the  Russian  context.  In  order 
to  examine  the  strength  of  regionalism  in  the  national  parliament,  the  backgrounds  of 
regionalism  or  the  existence  of  socio-economic  disadvantages  and  `dispersed'  groups, 
representation  of  regions  in  central  decision-making,  and  the  regional  interest 
articulation  patterns  of  deputies  in  the  CPDs  will  be  discussed  in  Chapters  3  to  6.  The 
resources  and  strategies  of  the  centre  and  of  the  regions  affect  the  equilibrium  between 
centralising  and  decentralising  forces,  and  this  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  7. 
Chapter  3  is  mainly  devoted  to  a  discussion  of  regional  socio-economic 
disparities,  particularly  between  the  SIBFE  regions  and  the  European  part  of  Russia 
and  within  the  SIBFE,  and  the  responses  of  the  SIBFE  regions  towards  reform.  In 
order  to  identify  regional  disparities,  regional  clusters  will  be  tested  employing  three 
indicators:  economic  performance,  living  standards,  and  socio-economic  stress.  In  this 
chapter,  Goskomstat  data  and  local  newspapers  published  in  the  SIBFE  regions  that 
were  consulted  in  St  Petersburg  during  my  research  trip  will  be  mainly  used. 
Chapter  4  consists  of  three  main  elements:  the  representation  of  SIBFE  regions 
in  the  CPDs  of  the  USSR  and  Russia,  frequency  of  speeches  made  by  SIBFE  deputies 
in  the  four  Congresses  of  the  USSR,  and  a  content  analysis  of  speeches  made  at  the 
first  CPD  of  the  USSR.  In  this  chapter,  changing  interest  articulation  patterns  of 
SIBFE  deputies  will  be  compared  to  past  Soviet  experience.  For  the  analysis,  the 
composition  of  deputies  (2,250  deputies  of  the  USSR  CPD  and  1,068  deputies  of  the 
xv Russian  CPD)  is  based  on  the  directories  published  by  the  CPDs  of  the  USSR  and 
Russia.  For  the  frequency  and  content  analysis,  stenographic  records  published  by  the 
CPDs  will  be  consulted. 
Chapters  5  and  6  examine  the  influence  of  regional  factors  in  the  decisions  made 
in  the  CPDs  of  the  USSR  and  Russia  respectively.  Although  the  regions  advocated 
their  respective  interests,  it  did  not  necessarily  mean  that  they  formed  a  strong  voting 
bloc  and  thus  an  empirical  analysis  is  required.  Furthermore,  during  this  transition 
period  various  functional  groups  emerged  not  only  in  the  society  but  also  in  the  CPDs, 
which  could  hamper  regional  interest  articulation.  Accordingly,  the  influence  of  three 
groups  of  factors-personal  (gender,  generation,  and  ethnicity),  functional  ('class'  and 
political  affiliation),  and  regional  factors-in  roll  call  votes  will  be  analysed, 
employing  statistical  methods  such  as  ANOVA  and  logistic  regression.  Existing 
statistical  analyses  in  this  respect  tested  the  influence  of  only  some  of  the  variables 
included  in  the  analysis  and  separately,  ignoring  the  danger  of  the  overlapping 
influence  of  variables.  In  this  thesis,  variables  will  be  put  together  into  a  single  model 
to  identify  a  set  of  major  variables  that  had  a  strong  influence  on  deputies'  voting 
patterns,  which  has  not  been  tried  before.  For  the  analysis,  39  roll-call  votes  (17  for 
the  USSR  CPD  and  22  for  the  Russian  CPD)  were  selected.  Deputies'  personal  details 
are  based  on  directories  and  voting  details  are  based  on  the  results  appearing  in  the 
stenographic  records  of  the  CPDs.  A  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  methodology  of 
the  statistical  analysis  appears  in  an  appendix. 
In  Chapter  7,  the  economic  and  political  resources  of  the  centre  and  the  regions 
and  their  respective  strategies  will  be  discussed  in  order  to  explore  the  overall 
influence  of  regional  demands  and  the  limits  of  the  development  of  regionalism  during 
the  period.  Since  the  equilibrium  of  centralising  and  decentralising  forces  involves  at 
least  two  parties-centre  and  regions--discussion  of  both  various  sources  of  weakness 
of  SIBFE  regionalism  (e.  g.  the  diversification  of  regional  goals,  discord  among 
regional  political  actors,  and  performance  of  regional  political  `parties'  and 
movements)  and  the  strategy  of  the  centre  (i.  e.  the  regional  policy  of  the  centre)  will 
constitute  the  main  parts  of  this  chapter.  However,  the  regional  policy  of  the  centre- 
e.  g.  bilateral  negotiations-had  double-sided  effects.  On  the  one  hand,  it  encouraged 
the  development  of  regional  interest  articulation  by  inviting  copy-cat  demands.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  series  of  bilateral  negotiations  hampered  coordination  between  regions 
after  a  series  of  concessions  was  made  as  each  region  sought  more  favourable  terms 
that  were  available  from  bilateral  negotiations.  The  former  effect  will  be  included  in 
xvi Chapter  3  as  a  part  of  the  background  of  regionalism  and  the  latter  effect  will  be 
discussed  in  this  Chapter  despite  the  risk  of  repetition. 
Chapter  8,  the  concluding  chapter,  will  include  a  discussion  of  the  influence  of 
regionalism  on  reform  and  its  impact  on  future  political  and  economic  changes, 
including  federal  relations.  In  this  chapter,  four  scenarios-status  quo,  the  advent  of  a 
strong  centre  or  strong  regions,  and  a  `fourth  way'-for  the  future  development  of 
federal  relations  in  Russia  will  be  briefly  considered.  In  addition,  the  experience  of 
other  countries  included  in  Chapter  2  will  also  be  discussed  in  combination  with  the 
current  development  of  Russian  politics. 
Finally,  a  brief  note  on  conventions.  Citations  are  given  in  full  when  they  first 
appear  in  each  chapter,  and  thereafter  in  a  shortened  form.  For  the  translation  of 
Russian  I  have  used  'i'  rather  than  'y'  for  Russian  combination  vowels  (thus  'ia' 
instead  of  'ya'  for  'A',  and  'iu'  for  'io';  but  'e'  for  both  '3'  and  'e').  Soft  (b)  and  hard 
(ib)  signs  are  translated  into  "'  and  "  with  some  exceptions,  especially  where  they 
are  familiar  in  English:  thus  Eltsin  (rather  than  El'tsin),  and  some  placenames  such  as 
sub-national  units  and  their  regional  centres  (thus  Tiumen  rather  than  Tiumen',  but 
Noril'sk  instead  of  Norilsk).  The  position  of  political  figures  is  difficult,  given  that 
most  of  them  have  changed  over  the  relevant  period.  In  this  thesis,  the  positions  of 
political  figures  are  in  general  based  on  those  held  at  the  time  to  which  the  discussion 
refers.  Finally  I  would  like  to  note  that  I  am  alone  responsible  for  any  inaccuracies 
and  shortcomings  in  this  thesis. 
xvii CHAPTER  I 
Introduction 
The  main  purpose  of  this  thesis  is  to  examine  the  influence  of  the  regions  upon 
Soviet  and  Russian  decision-making  during  the  transition  period  of  1989-1993  and  its 
implications  for  the  development  of  centre-periphery  relations.  With  perestroika, 
socio-economic  disparities  that  developed  under  the  Soviet  system  resulted  in  regional 
diversities  in  response  to  directions  'from  above'  in  the  process  of  democratisation  and 
marketisation,  demarcating  'winners'  and  'losers.  "  The  diverse  impact  of  reform 
policies  and  the  distortion  of  'intended  reform'  in  the  regions,  particularly  in  the 
policy-implementation  process,  has  been  a  focus  of  attention  not  only  among  Western 
scholars  but  also  among  Russian  reformers  themselves.  Many  such  studies  have 
placed  an  emphasis  on  the  need  for  'stable'  federal  relations  for  a  successful  transition 
to  a  market  economy,  blaming  the  centre  for  its  'negligence'  of  this  question.  ' 
However,  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  influence  of  the  regions  at  the  central 
legislature  where  the  legal  basis  of  'genuine'  and  'stable'  federal  relations  would  be 
adopted. 
In  the  course  of  reform,  changes  took  place  in  the  political  environment 
suggested  an  increasing  influence  of  the  regions  upon  decision-making  at  the  centre, 
which  could  have  hampered  efforts  to  establish  `stable'  federal  relations.  '  First  of  all, 
the  centre  was  losing  control  over  the  regions.  This  tendency  was  not  only  because  of 
power  struggles  at  the  centre,  but  also  because  of  the  absence  of  institutional 
mechanisms-for  instance,  the  Communist  Party  of  the  Soviet  Union  (CPSU)  and 
union  ministries  during  the  Soviet  period-whose  influence  could  cross  regional 
borders.  Secondly,  reform  activated  the  regions,  providing  them  with  motives  to 
pursue  their  own  policies  and  to  defend  their  own  interests  in  the  course  of  reform.  "  In 
particular,  changes  in  the  electoral  system  and  in  the  working  patterns  of  parliament 
led  to  a  new  era  for  open  struggles  between  the  conflicting  interests  of  various  socio- 
economic  and  regional  groups.  '  The  interaction  between  diverse  interests,  including (Chapter  n2 
that  between  centre  and  regions,  had  a  profound  effect  upon  the  course  and  speed  of 
reforms  in  the  Russian  Federation. 
The  interaction  between  centre  and  periphery  is  not  a  peculiar  phenomenon 
which  appeared  only  after  Gorbachev.  Should  regional  socio-economic  disparities 
have  affected  decision-making  at  the  centre,  why  should  it  matter  more  in  the  post- 
Soviet  system?  How  strong  is  the  influence  of  the  regions,  and  what  are  the 
implications  for  the  future  of  Russia? 
In  order  to  examine  the  influence  of  the  regions  upon  decision-making  at  the 
federal  level,  this  study  will  focus  on  the  voting  behaviour  of  deputies  in  the 
Congresses  of  People's  Deputies  (CPDs)  of  the  USSR  and  Russia  that  were  operating 
between  1989  and  1993,  as  decisions  made  in  these  Congresses  formed  the  basis  of 
centre-periphery  relations.  For  the  analysis,  the  influence  of  personal,  social,  and 
regional  factors  upon  the  voting  patterns  of  deputies  in  roll-call  votes  at  the  Congress 
will  be  discussed.  The  analysis  will  consider  various  regional  groups,  mainly  at  the 
republic  level  in  the  CPD  of  the  USSR  and  in  lower-level  administrative  units-89 
regions-for  the  Russian  CPD.  In  particular,  emphasis  will  be  placed  on  the  Siberian 
and  Russian  Far  Eastern  (SIBFE)  regions  and  their  deputies,  considering  the  strong 
regionalist  tendencies  and  distinctive  socio-economic  conditions  in  the  area. 
In  this  introductory  chapter,  a  brief  discussion  of  regional  factors  in  the  Russian 
history  will  be  undertaken.  The  discussion  will  be  followed  by  a  brief  review  of 
centre-periphery  relations  in  Western  countries,  from  which  the  assumptions  of  this 
study  can  be  derived.  We  shall  also  discuss  in  this  chapter  why  the  regions  matter 
more  in  the  post-Soviet  period  than  before.  Finally,  the  structure  and  methods  of  this 
thesis  will  be  outlined. (Chapter  Q3 
I.  1.  Reforms  and  the  Regions  in  Russian  History 
The  size  and  location  of  the  territory  of  a  state  has  been  a  traditional  topic  of 
politics  and  international  relations,  particularly  when  the  question  of  the  `power'  of  a 
state  is discussed.  Apart  from  the  geopolitical  point  of  view,  a  vast  territory  has  often 
been  regarded  as  a  necessary  factor  for  a  state  to  be  a  superpower,  with  their  potential 
human  and  natural  resources.  At  the  same  time,  however,  a  huge  territory  has  been 
considered  a  burden  to  a  state  when  it  raises  questions  of  long  borders  to  defend,  and 
of  political  and  socio-economic  integration,  particularly  when  it  contains  diverse 
nationalities  with  different  cultural  and  historical  experiences,  and  an  uneven 
distribution  of  wealth. 
Russia  seems  to  be  a  good  example  of  the  dual  implications  of  a  large  territory. 
A  simple  geographic  and  demographic  overview  shows  a  dramatic  diversity  in  a 
territorial  expanse  that  accounts  for  the  seventh  of  the  world's  land  surface.  ' 
Differences  between  regions  in  much  a  huge  territory  are  found  not  only  in  natural  and 
demographic,  but  also  in  their  various  socio-economic  features.  Although  the  need  to 
reduce  regional  disparities  has  been  recognised  as  a  major  goal  of  regional  policy,  '  the 
regional  policy  of  the  centre  failed  to  limit  regional  disparities,  but  rather  deepened  a 
regional  division  of  labour  throughout  the  Soviet  period.  For  instance, 
industrialisation  and  the  development  of  natural  resources  to  meet  the  needs  of 
extensive  economic  growth  have  changed  the  economic  structure  of  Western  Siberia 
from  an  agricultural  and  fur-trading  region  to  a  resource-extractive  economic  structure 
in  which,  for  instance,  fossil  fuel  production  has  been  highly  intensified.  Despite  such 
changes,  however,  the  basic  relations  between  the  western  and  eastern  parts  of  the 
Russian  Federation  have  not  altered  in  their  essence  and  have  continued  to  be  depicted 
as  `colonial  relations.  " 
Socio-economic  disparities  between  various  regions  often  resulted  in  different 
attitudes  towards  political  and  economic  changes  that  had  been  introduced  in  the  tsarist 
period.  The  different  attitudes  of  the  regions  towards  change  led  in  turn  to  a 
confrontation  of  interests  in  the  decision-making  process  and  regionalisation  in  the 
policy-implementation  process.  For  instance,  regions  with  different  economic 
structures  showed  different  attitudes  towards  `the  great  liberalisation  of  serfdom'  in 
1861,  which  finally  recognised  the  regional  variations  of  reform  and  failed  to  achieve 
its  original  goal  to  free  the  peasants.  ' (Chapters  4 
Differences  between  various  regions  in  their  attitudes  towards  political  and 
socio-economic  changes  continued  throughout  the  revolutionary10  and  the  Soviet 
period,  although  any  possible  regional  initiatives  were  easily  overridden  by  centripetal 
forces.  For  instance,  regions  such  as  Siberia  opposed  or  at  least  less  actively  supported 
central  initiatives  on  many  occasions  during  the  1920s.  When  the  centre  initiated  a 
scheme  to  change  the  old  tsarist  administrative  structure  into  economic  units  in  1920- 
1923,  the  Siberian  Guberniia  Communist  Party  opposed  the  plan  and  demanded 
regional  autonomy  (oblastnichestvo).  "  Another  example  of  regional  influence  on 
central  decisions  can  be  found  in  the  process  of  grain  procurement  and  dekulaidsation 
at  the  end  of  the  New  Economic  Policy  (NEP)  period,  "  However,  industrialisation  and 
forced  collectivisation  soon  superseded  these  regional  tendencies.  " 
Regional  initiatives  for  economic  and  political  change  increased  when 
Khrushchev  launched  his  sovnarkhoz  reform  and  activated  local  initiatives  that  were 
expected  to  make  a  difference  to  economic  performance.  "  Khrushchev's  short-lived 
reform  clearly  activated  regional  initiatives  in  mobilising  resources  within  their 
boundaries  to  attain  the  targets  set  by  the  centre,  "  although  a  further  discussion  of 
which  is beyond  the  boundaries  of  this  study. 
Under  Brezhnev's  rule,  the  scope  for  regional  initiatives  was  growing  not  only 
in  policy  implementation  but  also  in  the  policy-initiation  process,  although  a  branch 
planning  system  was  rehabilitated.  Many  Western  scholars  observed  that 
industrialisation  and  the  changing  cadre  policy  under  Brezhnev  encouraged 
`pluralistic'  tendencies  which  gradually  modified  the  environments  of  the  decision- 
making  process  and  centre-periphery  relations,  16  although  those  environments  were  far 
from  pluralistic.  "  Expanded  size  and  increasingly  more  complicated  economic 
activities  made  it  simply  impossible  for  Gosplan  to  control  or  to  decide  every  detail  in 
practice.  18  Furthermore,  the  elite  recruitment  system  based  on  'trust  in  cadres'  under 
Brezhnev  invited  local  leaders  to  represent  regional  interests  not  only  in  the  union 
republics19  but  also  in  lower  administrative  units.  20  Much  empirical  research  showed 
an  increasing  influence  of  regional  leaders  in  the  decision-making21  and  policy- 
implementation  processes,  22  although  some  other  scholars  emphasised  the  dominant 
role  of  the  central  elite  and  the  dependence  of  regional  leaders  on  central  elites  in  line 
with  the  patron-client  model.  '  Furthermore,  changes  in  elite  politics  were 
accompanied  by  changes  in  the  participation  of  the  grassroots,  which  became  more 
institutionalised  during  the  Brezhnev  period.  " (Chapter  I)  S 
I.  2.  Centre-Periphery  Relations  in  Post-Soviet  Politics 
After  perestroika,  the  environment  of  centre-periphery  relations  had  clearly 
changed  in  many  aspects.  Despite  the  peculiarities  of  Russian  politics,  the  changing 
environment  made  it  more  appropriate  to  discuss  regionalism  within  the  context  of 
centre-periphery  relations  that  can  also  be  found  in  many  countries  all  over  the  world 
such  as  Britain,  Canada,  France,  the  United  States,  Germany,  Italy,  Spain,  Belgium, 
India,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Brazil,  Nigeria,  South  Africa,  and  Tanzania.  Although 
centre-periphery  relations  in  these  countries  vary  from  a  unitary  to  a  federal  system, 
there  is  a  general  literature  on  the  development  of  centre-periphery  relations.  It  can 
often  be  appropriate  to  discuss  such  questions  in  the  Russian  context,  nonetheless  the 
mechanism  in  the  Russian  case  is  less  institutionalised,  and  therefore  more  difficult  to 
examine. 
According  to  Western  experience,  a  centralised  system  is  supported  not  only 
because  of  the  belief  that  the  general  will  should  surpass  regional  or  functional 
interests,  but  also  because  of  its  ability  to  provide  a  more  egalitarian  distribution  of 
goods  and  services,  stability  and  public  order,  and  protection  of  ethnic  minorities.  By 
contrast,  a  decentralised  system  is  advocated  because  of  its  supposed  contribution  to 
increasing  citizen  participation  in  public  affairs,  restraining  the  central  government's 
abuse  of  powers,  protecting  ethnic  minorities  by  providing  them  with  more  autonomy, 
and  providing  efficiency  at  the  local  level  by  recognising  diversities.  2s 
Based  on  this  rationale,  centre-periphery  relationships  take  a  form  that  reflects 
the  development  of  centralising  and  decentralising  factors.  Again  the  Western 
literature  has  shown  that  the  discussion  can  be  pursued  in  three  different  dimensions: 
environments,  actors,  and  the  capability  of  actors  26  According  to  many  Western 
theorists,  centre-periphery  relations  are  put  to  a  new  challenge  when  crises  arise. 
Rousseau  and  Zariski  divide  such  crises  into  five  categories-crises  of  identity, 
legitimacy,  penetration,  participation,  and  distribution-and  argue  that  these  crises  are 
interrelated: 
The  crisis  of  penetration  has  to  do  with  the  changes  wrought  or 
attempted  by  centralising  states.  The  crises  of  identity  and  participation 
are  frequently  precipitated  by  reactions  to  the  central  government's 
penetration  of  the  periphery.  On  the  other  band,  penetration  requires 
legitimacy  in  order  to  be  successful,  and  the  centralisers  may  themselves 
encourage  broader  participation  in  order  to  enhance  their  own  legitimacy. 
These  crises  are  interrelated,  then,  and  these  interrelationships  need  to  be 
examined  in  each  political  system.  27 (Chapters  6 
When  the  crises  are  intensified  and  centre-periphery  relations  are  put  to  the  test, 
interactions  between  centre  and  periphery  develop  a  new  pattern  based  on  their 
resources  and  strategies.  In  this  regard,  Rhodes  divides  resources  into  five  categories: 
legal  authority,  monetary  resources,  political  legitimacy,  informational  resources,  and 
organisational  resources  28  He  also  mentions  eleven  strategies  employed  by  the  central 
and  local  governments:  bureaucratic  command  (direction  and  control),  incorporation, 
consultation,  bargaining,  confrontation  (local  governments'  legal  or  illegal  rejection  of 
central  policies),  penetration  (upward,  reverse  of  incorporation),  avoidance  (ignoring 
and  vetoing  other  party's  initiatives),  incentives,  persuasion,  professionalisation 
(creation  of  single-issue  policy  area),  and  factorising  (subdivision  of  problems  to  sub- 
national  units  of  the  government)  29  As  a  result  of  the  interaction,  centre-periphery 
relations  crystallise  that  are  somewhere  between  a  unitary  and  federal  or  between  a 
centralised  and  decentralised  system  (see  Figure  1.1). 
<Figure  1.1>  Interaction  Mechanism  between  Centre  and  Peripheries 
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These  factors,  resources,  and  strategies  have  some  relevance  to  the  Russian 
context,  although  decision-making  during  the  Soviet  and  post-Soviet  period  appeared 
to  be  heavily  dependent  on  either  bureaucratic  or  'regime'  style  methods,  ending  up 
with  a  pseudo-federal  system.  30  During  the  Soviet  period,  regional  disparities  had 
intensified  as  a  result  of  branch  planning,  despite  a  regional  policy  that  was  supposed 
to  limit  the  gaps  between  regions.  "  Bureaucratic  decisions  overruled  regionalist (Chapter  l)  7 
tendencies,  though  the  tendencies  of  incorporation  and  upward  penetration  were  also 
apparent. 
However,  perestroika  brought  qualitative  changes  in  regionalism  and  the 
mechanism  of  interaction  between  the  centre  and  peripheries.  For  the  regions, 
perestroika  was  regarded  as  a  crisis-particularly  for  poorer  regions  in  an  economic 
sense-as  well  as  an  opportunity  for  the  regions  in  the  political  sense.  Given  the 
economic  structure  that  developed  under  the  slogan  of  the  socialist  division  of  labour, 
price  liberalisation,  for  instance,  threatened  the  state  delivery  system  when  suppliers 
did  not  implement  delivery  contracts  looking  for  a  more  lucrative  market  that  was 
developing.  "  The  self-accountancy  drive  also  severely  damaged  living  conditions  at 
the  regional  level  when  enterprises  that  used  to  supply  local  services  (sotskul'tbyt) 
withdrew  their  commitment  in  order  to  concentrate  on  their  own  need.  33  Accordingly, 
the  regionalism  that  emerged  during  the  perestroika  period  appeared  to  be  more  than  a 
simple  regional  lobby  for  more  funds  or  a  subsidy  from  the  centre,  but  a  struggle  for 
survival. 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  perestroika  changed  the  environment  which,  in 
turn,  altered  the  mechanism  of  interaction  between  centre  and  peripheries,  not  only 
limiting  centripetal  forces  but  also  activating  centrifugal  factors  in  the  face  of  a 
legitimacy  crisis.  "'  First  of  all,  an  oligarchic  decision-making  process  changed  into  a 
`pluralistic'  one,  making  it  difficult  for  the  centre  to  employ  a  bureaucratic  strategy. 
Under  the  slogan  of  'all  power  to  the  soviets,  '  the  legislative  branches  gained  more 
substantial  powers.  "  The  'leading  role'  of  the  CPSU  began  to  be  challenged,  which 
soon  accommodated  legalised  opposition  and  'pressure  groups.  '"  Popular  control  over 
elites  and  bureaucrats  went  further  when  electoral  reforms  made  them  vulnerable  not 
only  to  criticism  but  also  to  the  threat  of  being  removed  by  the  grassroots.  " 
Furthermore,  glasnost'  supported  these  changes  with  freedom  of  speech,  which 
resulted  in  open  competition  between  regional,  economic,  and  social  groups  for  limited 
resources. 
In  these  new  circumstances,  regional  demands  and  their  impact  also  showed 
differences  from  past  experience,  particularly  when  the  centre  was  losing  its  power  of 
control  over  the  regions.  First  of  all,  regionalist  demands  no  longer  confined 
themselves  to  'low  politics,  '  but  included  questions  of  'high  politics.  '  These  changes 
were  clearly  revealed  when  the  question  of  a  new  federal  system  and  a  new 
constitution  was  discussed  in  the  early  1990s.  38  In  the  process,  the  federal  republics 
declared  sovereignty  and  the  supremacy  of  republican  laws  over  the  decisions  of  the (Chapter  n8 
central  government,  developing  into  a  `war  of  laws.  '  Many  lower  administrative  units 
also  followed  a  similar  path  to  expand  their  economic  rights. 
Secondly,  regional  demands  had  a  much  stronger  influence  on  political  and 
economic  changes.  As  many  Western  scholars  observed,  the  regionalisation  of  reform 
at  the  implementation  stage  affected  the  course  and  speed  of  reform  in  the  regions.  " 
In  particular,  the  regionalisation  of  reform  hampered  central  stabilisation  measures  and 
macro-economic  activities,  as  regional  authorities  showed  different  attitudes  towards 
price  liberalisation  and  privatisation,  40  and  imposed  tariff  barriers  across  regional 
borders,  "'  increasing  the  importance  of  systems.  42  Furthermore,  the  indigenisation  of 
political  elites  was  more  clearly  revealed,  43  particularly  in  the  Baltic  republics  where 
popular  fronts  were  actively  participating  in  political  activities.  " 
In  particular,  the  increasing  influence  of  regions  on  the  legislative  process  is 
important  since  legislation  at  the  central  level  has  a  nationwide  effect  and  provides  the 
institutional  setting  for  regionalisation.  On  the  one  hand,  increased  inputs  `from 
below'  to  decision-making  bodies  enhance  regional  autonomy.  Equipped  with  more 
channels  to  exert  their  influence  over  the  decision-making  process,  regions'  denial 
power  over  central  decisions  has  increased,  either  by  blocking  the  adaptation  of  certain 
decisions  (avoidance  strategy),  or  by  simply  ignoring  central  decisions  and 
regionalising  implementation  (confrontation  strategy).  The  regions'  increasing  denial 
power,  therefore,  has  led  the  centre  to  employ  `bargaining'  and  `consultation' 
strategies,  which  have  also  contributed  to  increasing  regional  autonomy. 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  regionalisation  of  reform  without  an  institutional 
and  legal  basis  can  cause  damage  to  regional  autonomy  itself  at  least  in  the  medium 
term.  "  If  the  regionalisation  of  reform  has  been  an  obstacle  not  only  to  stabilisation 
measures,  but  also  possibly  to  economic  growth  by  discouraging  macro-economic 
activities,  such  a  development  might  invite  pressure  to  reduce  the  regions'  expanding 
autonomy.  Such  a  pressure  might  not  only  come  from  the  centre,  "  but  also  possibly 
from  'loser'  regions  and  their  grassroots,  who  might  prefer  'stability'  and  'economic 
growth'  to  regional  autonomy  and  freedom.  47  Furthermore,  should  the  Russian 
economy  decline  and  the  gap  between  'winner'  and  'loser'  regions  broaden,  it  will 
threaten  the  legacy  of  reform  and  strengthen  public  support  for  stabilisation  measures 
which  could  include  'anti-reform'  measures,  including  a  'strong  centre.  '48  Although  a 
'strong  centre'  does  not  necessarily  mean  a  return  to  the  past,  "'  such  a  development 
may  bring  shifts  in  the  emphasis  of  reform  from  economic  growth  to  economic  equity 
and  stability.  It  may  also  cause  changes  in  centre-periphery  relations  in  which  the (Chapter  l)  9 
centre  can  reign  in  the  tendencies  of  regional  autonomy.  As  in  Figure  1.2,  despite  the 
changes  introduced  by  perestroika,  the  crises  that  arose  at  the  national  and  regional 
levels  and  the  consequent  interaction  between  centre  and  regions  did  not  seem  to 
produce  a  `stable'  federal  structure. 
Should  the  political  circumstances  during  the  period  between  1989  and  1992 
invite  open  discussion  of  a  new  federal  system,  what  has  led  the  centre  and  regions  to 
uninstitutionalised  bargains  rather  than  to  institutionalised  and  systematic  changes  in 
federal  relations?  My  provisional  answer  to  this  question  is  that  the  conflicting 
interests  of  various  actors  in  the  legislative  process-individual  regions,  regional 
groups,  and  the  centre-made  it  difficult  to  adopt  legislation  which  could  provide  a 
framework  for  institutional  changes. 
<Figure  1.2>  Reform  and  Evolution  of  Centre-Periphery  Relations  in  the  Russian 
Context 
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In  this  regard,  Slocum  has  also  suggested  the  difficulties  in  reaching  agreement 
on  a  new  federal  structure  not  only  between  centre  and  regions,  but  also  between  the 
regions: 
...  not  all  status  games  will  be  engaged  in  collectively,  but  the 
republics  as  a  group  and  regions  as  a  group  will  have  incentives  to  co- 
operate  for  the  preservation  or  extension  of  the  constitutional  status  of (Chapter!  )  10 
these  representative  sets  of  subjects,  and  political  competition  at  the  centre 
will  provide  incentives  for  politicians  to  seek  provincial  allies.  ... 
On  some 
issues-most  fundamentally,  the  issue  of  ethnic  federalism  versus  non- 
ethnic  federalism-the  collective  interests  of  the  republics  will  clash  with 
those  of  the  regions,  while  on  other  issues  (general  policies  of  economic 
decentralisation)  the  republics  and  regions  will  have  an  incentive  to  act  in 
concert  against  the  centre.  5° 
In  examining  my  provisional  answer  to  the  reasons  for  the  emergence  of 
`unstable'  federal  relations,  I  shall  mainly  discuss  the  following  questions:  the  interests 
of  regions  or  regional  groups  in  the  process  of  reform;  the  demands  of  the  regions  and 
their  cohesiveness  in  the  CPD;  the  limits  of  the  development  of  regionalism  in  the 
CPD;  and  the  future  implications  of  the  regions  in  the  Russian  politics. 
I.  3.  Assumptions,  Boundaries  and  Methods  of  Research 
The  new  political  context  that  was  a  result  of  the  process  of  reform  activated  not 
only  the  regional  factor  but  also  other  social  factors  in  the  CPD.  5'  For  instance,  the 
development  of  social  groups32  or  'associational'  interest  groups,  and  their  functional 
interest  articulation  and  lobbies"  were  also  observed.  They  surely  affected  any 
decisions  in  their  regard  in  the  CPD.  Furthermore,  the  political  affiliations  of  deputies 
certainly  exerted  some  influence  over  their  decisions.  S4  Both  factors  are  normally 
regarded  as  cross-regional  factors,  and  thus  may  diminish  the  influence  of  the  regional 
factor.  In  this  regard,  the  changing  political  and  socio-economic  settings  since 
perestroika  have  had  not  only  a  positive  but  also  a  negative  effect  on  the  development 
of  regionalism  or  regional  interest  articulation. 
In  order  to  simplify  the  mechanism  of  the  interactions  between  centre  and 
regions  in  the  Russian  context,  the  discussion  will  focus  on  the  political  and  socio- 
economic  environment,  changing  behaviour  and  the  political  and  economic  capacity  of 
actors,  which  has  clearly  changed  after  Gorbachev.  The  analysis  will  be  based  on  the 
following  assumptions. 
Firstly,  a  brief  review  showed  that  the  existence  of  socio-economic 
disadvantages  and  'dispersed  groups''  supported  regionalist  tendencies.  However, 
heterogeneity  within  a  region  or  regional  group  was  likely  to  hamper  the  development 
of  regionalist  tendencies. (Chapterl)  11 
Secondly,  the  better  represented  a  region  within  central  decision-making  bodies 
and  the  more  strongly  regional  deputies  articulate  regional  interests,  the  better 
opportunities  a  region  is  provided  with  for  regionalism.  In  particular,  the  functions  of 
the  CPD  and  the  Supreme  Soviet  made  this  factor  more  important.  However, 
functional  or  associational  interest  articulation  of  deputies  was  likely  to  reduce 
regionalist  tendencies,  "  nonetheless  functional  or  sectoral  interests  might  be  closely 
related  to  a  particular  region  where  a  particular  economic  sector  was  dominant. 
Thirdly,  the  more  the  regional  leaders  articulate  regional  interests,  the  more 
opportunities  are  provided  for  regions  to  attain  regionalist  goals.  In  this  regard, 
regional  leaders  who  are  elected  rather  than  appointed  are  more  likely  to  express 
regionalist  interests. 
Fourthly,  the  resources  and  strategies  of  the  centre  and  regions  have  also 
affected  the  development  of  centre-periphery  relations.  The  development  of 
regionalism  is  dependent  on  support  from  the  grassroots  and  the  successful 
performance  of  economic  activities  in  the  region,  which  will  legitimise  its  rationale. 
The  main  emphasis  in  this  study  will  be  upon  regional  groups  in  the  CPD,  since 
it  will  be  more  effective  for  regions  to  form  a  cohesive  voting  bloc  in  order  to  resist 
any  moves  initiated  by  the  centre  or  other  regions  and  to  initiate  policy  that  will  serve 
the  interests  of  the  bloc.  In  this  analysis,  the  SIBFE  regions  and  their  relations  with  the 
centre  will  mainly  be  discussed.  Despite  differences  between  Western  and  Eastern 
Siberia  and  the  Russian  Far  East  in  their  economic  potential,  there  is  some  merit  in 
considering  the  three  planning  regions  altogether.  First  of  all,  among  the  inter-regional 
associations  that  appeared  in  the  late  1980s,  those  of  the  SIBFE  covered  more 
substantial  activities  than  other  inter-regional  associations.  Secondly,  the  SIBFE 
regions  have  a  good  supporting  context  for  their  regionalist  tendencies  as  the  SIBFE  as 
a  whole  has  peculiar  socio-economic  features  and  a  distinctive  historical  experience 
compared  with  the  European  part  of  Russia.  "  Thirdly,  the  SIBFE  regions  include  units 
that  are  diverse  not  only  in  their  administrative  status,  but  also  in  their  socio-economic 
features.  The  existence  of  diverse  regions  in  turn  helps  in  understanding  regions 
located  in  the  European  part  of  Russia  that  share  similar  socio-economic  features. 
Finally,  the  number  of  deputies  from  the  SIBFE  regions  in  legislative  bodies  provides 
a  good  basis  for  the  statistical  analysis  that  will  constitute  a  main  part  of  the 
discussion.  In  addition  to  regional  boundaries,  the  main  part  of  the  analysis  will  cover 
the  period  between  1989  and  1993,  when  the  first  elected  CPDs  of  the  USSR  and 
Russia  were  operating. (Chapter!  )  12 
Regionalism  in  Russia  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  1990s  reemerged  in  the 
process  of  democratisation,  which  enabled  us  to  locate  regionalism  in  Russian  in  a 
broader  comparative  context.  The  discussion  will  begin  with  basic  concepts  related  to 
centre-periphery  relations,  e.  g.  regionalism,  federalism  and  federal  principles,  and 
consociationalism  in  Chapter  2.  The  chapter  will  also  cover  some  examples  of  the 
varying  equilibria  between  centralising  and  decentralising  forces,  and  three  cases  of 
the  `federalisation'  process  that  will  show  the  importance  of  regions  in  central 
decision-making  and  coordination  among  political  actors  in  order  to  achieve  a  stable 
transition. 
Within  the  already  mentioned  boundaries,  the  background  of  SIBFE  regionalism 
will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  3.  In  the  chapter,  socio-economic  disparities-between 
the  SIBFE  regions  and  the  European  part  of  Russia,  and  within  the  SIBFE  regions- 
and  regional  responses  to  reform  will  be  explored.  In  order  to  identify  regional 
disparities,  regional  clusters  will  be  made  on  the  basis  of  three  indicators  such  as 
economic  performance,  living  standards,  and  socio-economic  stress.  In  this  chapter, 
economic  data  published  by  Goskomstat  and  local  newspapers  published  in  the  SIBFE 
regions  will  be  mainly  used.  The  newspapers  were  consulted  in  St.  Petersburg  in  the 
course  of  my  research  trip  to  Russia. 
In  Chapter  4,  the  representation  of  SIBFE  regions  in  the  CPDs  of  the  USSR  and 
Russia  and  changing  interest  articulation  patterns  of  SIBFE  deputies  will  be  compared 
with  past  Soviet  experience.  For  the  analysis,  the  composition  of  deputies  of  the  CPDs 
(2,250  deputies  of  the  USSR  CPD  and  1,068  deputies  of  the  Russian  CPD),  the 
frequencies  of  speeches,  and  of  issues  mentioned  in  their  speeches,  particularly  in  the 
First  CPD  of  the  USSR,  will  be  discussed.  The  necessary  data  for  the  analysis  was 
collected  from  the  directory  of  deputies  and  stenographic  records  of  the  CPDs. 
Chapters  5  and  6  examine  the  influence  of  regional  factors  in  the  decisions  made 
in  the  CPDs  of  the  USSR  and  Russia  respectively.  In  this  analysis,  the  influence  of 
personal  (gender,  generation,  and  ethnicity),  functional  ('class'  and  political 
affiliation),  and  regional  factors  in  roll-call  votes  will  be  discussed,  employing 
statistical  methods  such  as  one-way  anova  and  logistic  regression.  For  the  analysis,  39 
roll-call  votes  (17  for  the  USSR  CPD  and  22  for  the  Russian  CPD)  are  selected. 
Deputies'  personal  details  are  based  on  directories  and  voting  details  are  based  on  the 
results  appearing  in  the  stenographic  records  of  the  CPDs.  Details  of  the  methodology 
for  statistical  analyses  appear  in  an  appendix. (Chapter  n  13 
In  Chapter  7,  the  economic  and  political  resources  of  the  centre  and  the  regions 
and  their  strategies  will  be  discussed  in  order  to  explore  the  overall  influence  of 
regional  demands  and  the  limits  of  the  development  of  regionalism  during  the  period. 
In  this  chapter,  the  discussion  will  be  mainly  concentrated  on  the  diversification  of 
regional  goals,  discord  among  regional  political  actors,  performance  of  regional 
political  `parties'  and  movements,  and  regional  policy  of  the  centre. 
Finally,  the  influence  of  regionalism  on  reform  and  its  future  impact  on  political 
and  economic  changes  including  federal  relations  will  be  considered  in  the  conclusion. 
Despite  the  changes  in  the  electoral  system  in  1993  and  the  development  of  `party 
politics,  '  the  regional  influence  on  central  decision-making  remains  an  important 
variable  in  the  future  of  postcommunist  Russia.  "  The  discussion  will  include  a  brief 
review  of  the  development  of  the  political  situation  since  1993,  and  four  scenarios- 
status  quo,  the  advent  of  a  strong  centre  or  strong  regions,  and  a  `fourth  way'-for  the 
future  development  of  federal  relations  in  Russia. 
I)  For  instance,  Bradshaw  observes  that  the  Baltic  republics  are  clearly  'winners,  '  while  traditional 
industrial  regions  such  as  the  Donbass  and  Kuzbass  are  relative  'losers'  in  terms  of  the  creation  of  joint 
ventures.  Michael  J.  Bradshaw  (ed.  ),  The  Soviet  Union:  A  New  Regional  Geography?  (London:  Belhaven 
Press,  1991),  pp.  11.12. 
_)  Christine  I.  Wallich,  "Russia's  Dilemma,  "  in  Wallich  (ed.  ),  Russia  and  the  Challenge  of  Fiscal 
Federalism  (Washington,  D.  C.:  World  Bank,  1994),  pp.  10,13;  Vladimir  Gelman  and  Olga  Senatova, 
"Sub-National  Politics  in  Russia  in  the  Post-Communist  Transition  Period:  A  View  from  Moscow,  " 
Regional  &  Federal  Studies,  vol.  5,  no.  2  (Summer  1995),  pp.  220-221;  and  Sergei  Shakhrai, 
"Obshchenatsional'ye  interesy  Rossii  i  problemy  regional'nogo  razvitiia,  "  Sibir't  politika,  ekonomika, 
upravlenle,  no,  1(1995),  pp.  52-63, 
3)  Ralph  S.  Clem  and  Peter  R.  Craumer,  "The  Geography  of  the  April  25  (1993)  Russian 
Referendum,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol.  34,  no.  8  (October  1993),  p.  495. 
')  During  1989.1993,  regional  associations  were  established  not  only  in  the  Congress,  but  also  in 
the  regions.  For  instance,  an  initiative  group  of  deputies  of  the  USSR  CPD  from  Siberia  and  the  Far  East 
held  a  meeting  in  Novosibirsk  in  January  1990  to  work  out  a  draft  regionalist  platform.  Izvestlla,  31 
January  1990,  p.  2.  In  March  1992,  Siberian  deputies  of  the  CPD  of  Russia  held  a  Congress  in 
Krasnoiarsk  to  adopt  a  regionalist  resolution.  Izvestiia,  30  March  1992,  p.  2.  For  a  brief  discussion  of  the 
development  of  regional  associations,  see  N.  V.  Petrov,  S.  S.  Mikeyev,  and  L.  V.  Smimiagin,  "Russia's 
Regional  Associations  in  Decline,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol.  34,  no.  1(January  1993),  pp.  59-66. (Chapter  I)  14 
I)  Bradshaw  has  maintained  that  being  economic  winners  and  losers  can  be  a  basis  for  political 
cohesion.  Bradshaw  (ed.  ),  The  Soviet  Union,  p.  12.  Sutherland  and  Hanson  have  also  argued  that  "tension 
amongst  regions  and  between  regions  and  the  centre"  has  become  an  important  factor  in  the  decision- 
making  process  in  Russia.  Douglas  Sutherland  and  Philip  Hanson,  "Structural  Change  in  the  Economies 
of  Russia's  Regions,  "  Europe-Asia  Studies,  vol.  48,  no.  3  (1996),  p.  367. 
6)  Even  after  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  size  of  the  territory  of  the  Russian  Federation 
accounts  for  1.7  million  km2  in  which  exist  more  than  140  ethnic  groups,  including  23  ethnic  groups 
whose  population  size  is  larger  than  10  million.  Within  the  territory,  population  density  varies  from  3 
people  per  square  kilometre  in  the  northern  regions  to  325  people  per  square  kilometre  in  Moscow  oblast 
in  1995.  The  temperature  varies  from  0  to  -5°C  in  the  western  part  of  the  territory  to  -65  to  -70°C  in 
northern  Siberia  in  January.  Goskomstat  Rossii,  Rossiiskii  statisticheskii  ezhegodnik  1996:  statisticheskii 
sbornik  (Moscow:  Goskomstat,  1996),  pp.  11,16-21,45. 
I)  Schiffer  suggests  that  only  three  of  eight  goals  of  Soviet  regional  policy  are  related  with  equity 
category:  evenly  distributed  economic  activity  throughout  the  country,  equalised  economic  development 
between  republics  and  regions  which  provides  all  citizen  of  the  USSR  with  comparable  living  standards, 
and  evenly  distribution  of  production  which  eliminates  socio-economic  differences  between  urban  and 
rural  areas.  Jonathan  R  Schiffer,  Soviet  Regional  Economic  Policy:  The  East-West  Debate  over  Pacific 
Siberian  Development  (London:  Macmillan,  1989),  pp.  5-7. 
I)  Siberian  regionalists  depicted  Siberia  as  a  colony  in  the  late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth 
centuries.  N.  M.  Iadrintsev',  Sibir'  kak'  koloniia:  v'  geographicheskom,  etnografcheskom'  1 
Istoricheskom'  otnoshenil  (S.  Peterburg':  Izdanie  I.  M.  Sibiriakova,  1892);  and  A.  Kaufman', 
"Kolonizatsiia  sibiri  v'  eia  nastoiashchem'  i  budushchem',  "  Sibirskkie  voprosy,  no.  1  (1905),  pp.  171-201. 
Similar  views  again  appeared  after  perestroika.  For  instance,  in  an  interview  with  Sibirskaia  gazeta, 
Perov,  leader  of  Siberian  Independent  Party,  complained  about  the  delayed  central  assistance  to  normalise 
socio-economic  situation  in  Siberia,  denouncing  the  central  policy  as  neo-colonialisation  of  Siberia.  Boris 
Perov,  "Sibirskaia  ekonomika  golosuet  za  sibirskuiu  nezavisimost',  "  Sibirskaia  gazeta,  no.  1  (January 
1993),  p.  4.  Dmitrieva  has  also  noted  that  the  regional  policy  of  the  Soviet  Union  can  be  called  "internal 
colonialism"  when  it  was  blamed  for  "neglecting  the  social  and  cultural  needs  of  regions  in  favour  of 
central  sectoral  ministry  priorities.  "  Oksana  Dmitrieva,  Regional  Development:  The  USSR  and  After 
(London:  UCL  Press,  1996),  p.  23. 
°)  Discussing  the  memoranda  on  peasant  liberation  questions  worked  out  by  the  various  authors, 
Mayor  maintained  that  the  differences  in  the  opinions  appeared  in  the  memoranda  were  "due  partly,  no 
doubt,  to  the  degree  of  intelligence  or  of  generosity  of  the  writers,  but  chiefly  to  variations  in  the  density 
of  population,  in  the  fertility  of  soil,  in  the  indebtedness  of  the  landowners,  and  in  the  amount  of  available 
capital.  "  After  briefly  reviewing  the  different  attitudes  of  the  regions-the  Central  Black  Soil  regions, 
non-Black  Soil  regions,  prairie  lands,  and  southern-western  gubernia-towards  the  liberation  question,  he 
concluded  that  "a  uniform  method  of  dealing  with  the  bondage  question  would  not  be  a  just  method,  " 
since  the  attitude  of  the  landowners  varied  with  economic  conditions  of  the  regions.  James  Mayor,  An 
Economic  History  of  Russia  (New  York:  Dutton,  1914),  pp.  375-379.  For  a  further  discussion  of  the (Chapter  l)  15 
different  drafts  of  the  Provincial  Gentry  Committees  on  the  liberation  programmes,  sea  Terence  Emmons, 
The  Russian  Landed  Gentry  and  the  Peasant  Emancipation  of  1861  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press,  1968),  Chapters  4  and  S. 
10  )  Discussing  the  economic  situation  in  Siberia,  Poppe  maintained  that  "clearly  less  marked  class 
distinctions"  in  Siberia  than  other  parts  of  Russian  Empire  could  be  a  reason  for  staggering  the 
development  of  a  Social-Democratic  Movement  in  Siberia.  He  also  argued  that  the  abolition  of  free  trade 
by  Bolsheviks  and  fixed  prices  for  grain  were  against  the  interests  of  the  wealthy  peasants,  by  citing 
Riabikov's  views.  Nikolaus  Poppe,  "The  Economic  and  Cultural  Development  of  Siberia,  "  in  George 
Katkov,  Erwin  Oberlander,  Nikolaus  Poppe  and  George  Von  Rauch  (eds.  ),  Russia  Enters  the  Twentieth 
Century  (London:  Methuen,  1973),  p.  151. 
11)  For  a  further  discussion,  see  Edward  Hallett  Carr,  Socialism  in  One  Country  1924-26,  vol.  2 
(London:  Macmillan,  1959),  pp.  273-303;  and  James  Hughes,  Stalin,  Siberia  and  the  Crisis  of  the  New 
Economic  Policy  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1991),  pp.  26-34. 
12)  During  his  visit  to  Siberia  in  January  1928,  Stalin  put  the  blame  on  the  Party  organisations  in 
the  region  which  were  sympathetic  to  kulaks  (in  the  category,  perhaps  moderately  wealthy  peasants  in 
Siberia  could  be  included)  for  the  unsatisfactory  grain  procurement.  I.  V.  Stalin,  "0  khlevozagotovkakh  i 
perspektivakh  razvitiia  sel'skogo  khoziaistva:  iz  vystuplenii  v  razlichnykh  raionakh  Sibiri  v  ianvare 
1928g.,  "  in  Sochinentia,  vol.  1l  (Moscow:  Gosudarstvennoe  izdatel'stvo  politicheskoi  literatury,  1949), 
pp.  3.4.  In  his  address  to  all  Party  organisations  after  his  visit  to  Siberia,  he  emphasised  the  need  to  put  to 
an  end  to  "distortions  of  the  Party  line  in  the  practical  work  in  the  countryside,  "  which  obviously  was  a 
warning  to  regionalisation  of  grain  procurement  and  de-kulakisation.  Stalin,  "Pervye  itogi  zagotovitel'noi 
kampanii  i  dal'neishie  zadachi  partii:  ko  vsem  organizatsiiam  VKP(b),  "  in  ibid.,  p.  15.  For  more  details, 
see  J.  R  Hughes,  "The  Irkutsk  Affairs:  Stalin,  Siberian  Politics  and  the  End,  "  Soviet  Studies,  vol.  XLI,  no. 
2  (April  1989),  pp.  228-253. 
13  )  Although  it  is difficult  to  figure  out  the  influence  of  the  deviant  development  pattern  in  Siberia 
during  the  NEP  period  on  Stalinist  industrialisation  and  collectivisation,  it  is  nonetheless  true  that  Stalin's 
Siberian  visit  became  a  turning  point.  Hughes,  Stalin,  Siberia  and  the  Crisis  of  the  New  Economic  Policy, 
p.  210.  However,  some  Western  scholars  emphasised  the  power  struggle  at  the  centre  as  a  main  reason  for 
the  change.  For  instance,  Nove  argued  that  Stalin's  collectivisation  was  connected  with  his  "plotting  to 
isolate  and  defeat  the  Bukharin-Rykov  group.  "  Alec  Nove,  "The  Soviet  Industrial  Reorganisation,  "  in 
Abraham  Brumberg  (ed.  ),  Russia  Under  Khrushchev,  An  Anthology  from  Problems  of  Communism  (New 
York:  Frederick  A.  Praeger,  1962),  p.  189.  For  more  details  on  the  arguments,  see  Alec  Nove,  Was  Stalin 
Really  Necessary?:  Some  Problems  of  Soviet  Political  Economy  (London:  George  Allen  &  Unwin,  1964). 
")  Discussing  Khrushchev's  virgin  land  campaign,  McCauley  maintained  that  Khrushchev  knew 
that  managers  of  production  units  "very  often  made  the  difference.  "  Martin  McCauley,  Khrushchev  and 
the  Development  of  Soviet  Agriculture:  The  Virgin  Land  Programme  1953-1964  (London:  Macmillan, 
1976),  pp.  59,107. (Chapter  1) 16 
")  In  particular,  republic  authorities  were  allowed  to  control  their  sovnarkhoz,  nonetheless  they 
were  under  the  control  of  the  centre.  For  instance,  the  question  of  number  of  sovnarkhozy  that  were  to  be 
created  in  a  republic  was  left  to  the  republic.  Nove,  "The  Soviet  Industrial  Reorganisation,  "  p.  193. 
Nove's  further  comments  on  the  disadvantages  of  the  sovnarkhoz  system  clearly  shows  that  a  degree  of 
regionalist  tendencies  appeared.  He  asserted  that  any  choice  between  alternatives  would  be  "guided  by  the 
economic  interests  of  its  own  regions,  "  since  "any  territorial  authorities  must  feel  primary  responsibility 
for  enterprises,  "  and  therefore  sovnarkhoz  authorities  were  "driven  towards  mestnichestvo  by  the  planning 
system  itself.  "  Ibid.,  pp.  196-197.  Willerton  has  also  asserted  that  sovnarkhoz  reform  resulted  in 
devolution  of  some  decision-making  to  actors  in  the  periphery,  and  who  often  ignored  the  goals  of  the 
centre.  John  P.  Willerton,  Jr.,  "Evolving  Centre-Periphery  Relations  in  the  Soviet  Polity,  "  Problems  of 
Communism,  vol.  XXXVIII,  no.  6  (November-December  1989),  p.  72,  A  similar  argument  can  be  found 
in  George  W.  Breslauer,  "Khrushchev  Reconsidered,  "  in  Stephen  F.  Cohen,  Alexander  Rabinowitch  and 
Robert  Sharlet,  The  Soviet  Union  Since  Stalin  (London:  Macmillan,  1980),  pp.  50-70, 
16  )  For  a  more  detailed  discussion,  see  Gordon  Skilling,  "Interest  Group  and  Communist  Politics 
Revisited,  "  World  Politics,  vol.  XXXVI,  no.  1  (October  1983),  pp.  1-27;  Susan  Gross  Solomon,  Pluralism 
in  the  Soviet  Union  (London:  Macmillan,  1983);  H.  Gordon  Skilling  and  Franklyn  Griffiths  (eds.  ), Interest 
Groups  in  Soviet  Politics  (Princeton,  N.  J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  1971);  and  Gordon  Skilling, 
"Interest  Groups  and  Communist  Politics,  "  World  Politics,  vol.  18,  no.  1  (April  1966),  pp.  435-451. 
Hough  has  maintained  that  bureaucratic  organisations  might  represent  the  diverse  interests  of  their 
constituency  and  could  serve  as  "a  communication  channel"  for  interest  articulation.  Jerry  F.  Hough,  The 
Soviet  Union  and  Social  Science  Theory  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press,  1977),  pp.  105- 
106.  Löwenhardt  has  also  asserted  that  individuals,  institutions,  and  groups  influenced  the  decision- 
making  process  and  that  there  were  some  policy  coalitions  among  them.  John  Löwenhardt,  Decision- 
Making  in  Soviet  Politics  (London:  Macmillan,  1981),  pp.  184-185. 
17  )  McAuley,  for  instance,  noted  five  features  of  the  Soviet  system  which  showed  clear  differences 
from  a  liberal-democratic  political  process:  the  absence  of  regular  elections  to  control  policy  makers;  no 
legalised  active  opposition  which  was  able  to  criticise  and  defeat  government  proposals;  absence  of 
freedom  of  speech;  the  absence  of  autonomous  sectors  to  exert  pressure  and  to  be  bargained  with;  and  the 
absence  of  organised  opposition  or  pressure  for  change  after  the  adoption  of  a  decision.  Mary  McAuley, 
Politics  and  the  Soviet  Union:  An  Introductory  Analysis  (London:  Penguin  Books,  1977),  pp.  151.152. 
11  )  Novo  noted  that  central  planners  "do  not  in  fact  take  the  bulk  of  detailed  decisions,  "  and  thus 
there  occurred  "inescapable  delegation  (devolution,  decentralisation),  "  a  process  he  described  as  "central 
pluralism.  "  See  Alec  Novo,  The  Soviet  Economic  System  (London:  George  Allen  &  Unwin,  1977),  p.  60. 
19  )  Discussing  the  relations  between  Moscow  and  union  republics,  Hodnctt  insisted  that  local 
nationals  had  greater  access  to  the  levers  of  state  power  under  the  Soviet  federal  system.  Grey  Hodnett, 
"The  Debate  over  Soviet  Federalism,  "  Soviet  Studies,  vol.  18,  no.  4  (April  1967),  p.  458;  and  Grey 
Hodnett,  Leadership  in  the  Soviet  National  Republics  (Oakville,  Ontario:  Mosaic  Press,  1978),  pp.  101- 
103,377-378.  Rakowska-Harmstone  also  maintained  that  centre-periphery  relations  had  reflected  three 
crucial  factors:  the  indigenisation  of  republic  leaders,  a  federal  system  which  enabled  indigenous  republic (Chapter  l)  17 
leaders  to  pursue  the  interests  of  those  minority  groups,  and  the  hegemony  of  the  Russian  majority 
together  with  a  growing  national  chauvinism  manifested  by  them  vis-'a-vis  the  national  minorities.  Teresa 
Rakowska-Harmstone,  "The  Dialectics  of  Nationalism  in  the  USSR,  "  Problems  of  Communism,  vol. 
XXIII,  no.  3  (May-June  1974),  p.  10.  Gleason  has  also  summarised  the  demands  of  republican  leaders  for 
decentralisation  as  'bureaucratic  nationalism.  '  Gregory  Gleason,  Federalism  and  Nationalism:  The 
Struggle  for  Republican  Rights  in  the  USSR  (Boulder:  Westview  Press,  1990),  pp.  81-104. 
40)  Moses  noted  that  Brezhnev's  cadre  policy  contributed  the  development  of  regionalism.  He 
asserted  that  a  regional  leader  whose  career  was  built  up  in  the  same  region  would  be  "more  inclined  to 
relate  their  promotion  to  their  active  defence  of  narrow  regional  concerns.  "  He  also  observed  that  "the 
Brezhnev  leadership  did  little  to  discourage  regionalism  in  ethnic  or  even  non-ethnic  provinces  when 
increasing  numbers  of  regional  first  secretaries  were  'deliberately'  selected  from  'the  locals'  inside  the 
same  regions.  "  Joel  C. Moses,  "Regionalism  in  Soviet  Politics:  Continuity  as  a  Source  of  Change,  1953- 
1982,  "  Soviet  Studies,  vol.  XXXVII,  no.  2  (April  1985),  p.  187.  For  more  details  on  Brezhnev's  cadre 
policy,  see  Robert  E.  Blackwell,  Jr.,  "Cadres  Policy  in  the  Brezhnev  Era,  "  Problems  of  Communism,  vol. 
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Dynamics  of  Centre-Periphery  Relations 
The  prime  concern  of  this  chapter  is  to  formulate  a  framework-setting  out 
factors  that  affected  the  structure  of  centre-periphery  relations  and  interactions  of 
factors  in  the  evolution  of  such  relations-for  the  discussion  of  centre-periphery 
relations  in  Russia  in  a  broader  context.  Until  recently,  the  Soviet  case  has  seldom 
been  discussed  in  the  context  of  comparative  centre-periphery  relations,  partly  because 
of  its  peculiarity-i.  e.  extreme  centrist  features  and  the  gap  between 
constitutional/legal  arrangements  and  practices-and  partly  because  of  limited  data 
availability.  However,  the  current  trends  of  federalism  which  Elazar  and  Agranoff 
describes  "post-modern"  federalism'  and  the  democratisation  process  in  Russia,  with 
all  its  shortcomings,  enable  us  to  discuss  federal  relations  in  Russia  in  a  broader 
comparative  viewpoint.  ' 
In  this  chapter,  basic  concepts  such  as  regionalism,  federalism,  centralisation 
and  decentralisation/non-centralisation  will  be  discussed.  The  discussion  will  be 
followed  by  a  general  overview  of  various  forms  of  centre-periphery  relations-for 
instance,  from  unitary  to  federal  system,  though  it  is  much-more  complicated  than  this 
simple  comparison-and  factors  that  affected  the  development  of  centre-periphery 
relations.  In  line  with  the  discussion,  the  development  of  centre-periphery  relations  in 
the  context  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  Russia  will  also  be  explored. 
The  discussion  in  this  chapter  shows  three  main  features  in  the  evolution  of 
centre-periphery  relations  within  a  comparative  context.  Firstly,  the  distinctiveness  of 
regions  in  different  socio-economic  settings  has  led  to  a  variety  of  centre-periphery 
relations'  A  general  review  of  comparative  centre-periphery  relations  suggests  that 
state  structures  have  been  challenged  by  the  interaction  between  regional 
distinctiveness  and  changes  in  socio-economic  and  political  circumstances. 
Accordingly,  centre-periphery  relations  have  evolved  not  only  in  the  structures  but  also 
in  practices,  producing  various  forms  in  various  countries.  In  particular,  uneven (Chapter  IIn  26 
processes  of  nation-state  building  and  democratisation  have  contributed  to  this 
increasing  variety. 
Secondly,  a  structure  or  a  set  of  institutions  is  a  necessary,  but  not  a  sufficient 
factor  in  the  establishment  of  'genuine'  federal  relations  as  past  Soviet  federal 
experience  suggests.  Despite  diversities  in  their  structural  features,  differences 
between  unitary  and  federal  systems  in  this  respect  have  become  less  clear,  because  of 
growing  interdependency  between  central  and  regional  authorities  in  both  systems. 
Furthermore,  centre-periphery  relations  appear  to  be  more  dependent  on  the 
corresponding  federal  arrangements  or  practices  employing  federal  principles-e.  g.  the 
establishment  of  Scottish  and  Walsh  parliaments  in  the  United  Kingdom-than  on  the 
formal  framework  itself.  In  particular,  as  in  the  Spanish  model  of  federal  construction, 
a  federation  "in  process"  or  "incomplete"  federation  can  also  be  effective  means  of 
solving  centre-periphery  conflicts,  as  well  as  maintaining  national  unity.  ` 
Finally,  a  mechanism  for  building  consensus  on  the  question  of  centre-periphery 
relations  appears  to  be  essential  in  the  establishment  of  or  transition  to  a  federal  system 
whether  it  is  "genuine"  or  "incomplete.  "  As  in  the  Belgian  case,  which  will  be 
discussed  in  the  following,  in  what  way  federal  relations  have  been  established  appears 
to  be  more  important  in  the  stable  evolution  of  centre-periphery  relations  than  the 
formal  content  of  federal  relations-e.  g.  demarcation  of  powers  between  central  and 
provincial  authorities-at  a  particular  time. 
H.  1.  Basic  Concepts  Revisited 
In  the  contemporary  literature,  three  factors  are  regarded  as  key  components  of  a 
state:  territory,  population,  and  sovereignty.  As  these  key  components  suggest, 
territorial  integrity  is  a  basic  requirement  not  only  in  the  state-building  process,  but 
also  in  the  evolution  of  state  structures.  Threats  to  the  territorial  integrity  of  a  country 
come  from  inside  (e.  g.  separatism  as  in  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union),  as  well  as 
from  outside  (e.  g.  invasions  and  conquest).  The  former  is  more  likely  when  a  country 
is  divided  by  smaller  territories  which  differ  from  each  other  in  their  historical 
backgrounds  and  traditions,  ethno-national  composition,  and  socio-economic 
conditions.  However,  little  attention  was  paid  to  the  regional  level  until  nationalism 
emerged  and  the  nation-state  building  process  started. (Chapter  In  27 
In  the  development  of  the  modern  state,  the  term  region  and  its  implications  for 
the  evolution  of  a  state  system  have  been  contested.  For  instance,  theorists  of 
modernisation  argued  that  functional  features  would  replace  territorial  ones  in  the 
modernisation  and  industrialisation  process.  '  However,  even  after  nation-state 
building,  regional  distinctiveness  played  a  major  role  in  the  establishment  and 
evolution  of  state  structures.  '  In  fact,  compromises  between  centralising  and 
decentralising/non-centralising  forces  in  which  regional  factors  were  involved  have 
increased  diversities  in  state  structures. 
In  line  with  changes  in  the  state  structures,  the  term  region  or  other  terms 
directly  or  indirectly  related  to  centre-periphery  relations  have  also  evolved.  For 
instance,  the  term  region  is  now  understood  to  cover  not  only  a  geographic  area  in  a 
state,  but  also  a  group  of  states  in  the  global  context.  The  content  of  the  term  may  also 
vary  depending  on  the  context  in  which  it  is  discussed,  and  thus  needs  to  be  explored. 
II  1  (1)  A  Region  and  Regionalism 
According  to  Vance,  a  region  is  "a  homogenous  area  with  physical  and  cultural 
characteristics  distinct  from  those  of  neighbouring  areas.  "  As  a  part  of  national 
domain,  a  region  is  "sufficiently  unified  to  have  a  consciousness  of  its  customs  and 
ideals,  and  thus  possesses  a  sense  of  identity  distinct  from  the  rest  of  the  country.  "' 
His  definition  indicates  three  key  factors  in  defining  the  term  region:  a  territorial 
boundary,  contents  or  distinctiveness,  and  identity. 
The  central  defining  characteristics  of  a  region  is  of  course  a  physical  space. 
However,  Vance's  definition  of  the  term  `area'  is  rather  ambiguous,  as  the  term 
`region'  is  often  used  in  various  contexts.  In  his  discussion  of  regionalism,  Keating 
categorises  the  term  territory  into  six  spatial  levels:  the  global,  the  continental,  the 
state,  the  regional,  the  local,  urban  and  municipal,  and  the  neighbourhood!  In  this 
discussion,  the  term  region  indicates  the  level  of  territory  between  state  and  local. 
However,  territory  is  more  than  physical  space  itself.  It  is  rather  a  broad 
concept  of  social  entity,  a  place  constituted  by  "social,  economic  and  political 
construction"  and  "a  sense  of  identity.  "9  The  content  or  distinctiveness  of  a  region  is 
also  dependent  on  the  context  in  which  the  term  is  used.  Although  Vance  mentions 
physical  and  cultural  characteristics,  identifying  a  region  is  often  ambiguous  because 
of  the  criteria  involved  in  the  process.  For  instance,  we  may  employ  geographical, (Chapter  11)  28 
cultural  (e.  g.  language),  ethnic,  administrative,  and  economic  (e.  g.  common  production 
patterns  and  market  linkages)  criteria.  Often  a  region  identified  in  accordance  with 
various  of  these  criteria  may  not  be  identical. 
As  a  social  entity,  regional  distinctiveness  in  terms  of  any  of  these  criteria  may 
not  have  political  meaning  without  the  identity  through  which  people  in  the  region  are 
mobilised.  In  analysing  regional  identity  and  regional  mobilisation,  three  elements  are 
noteworthy:  cognitive,  affective  and  instrumental  ones.  "  The  cognitive  element  is 
related  to  knowledge  of  characteristics  of  regions  such  as  geographic  features,  history 
and  political  disposition  that  may  be  different  from  other  regions.  The  affective  one  is 
how  people  feel  about  the  region  that  becomes  the  basis  of  "common  identity  and 
solidarity.  "  This  element  links  the  cognitive  element  to  the  instrumental  element  that 
forms  a  basis  of  "mobilisation  and  collective  action  in  pursuit  of  social,  economic  and 
political  goals.  "" 
The  term  regionalism  represents  "the  regional  idea  in  action  as  an  ideology,  as  a 
social  movement,  or  as  the  theoretical  basis  for  regional  planning;  it  is  also  applied  to 
the  scientific  task  of  delimiting  and  analysing  regions  as  entities  lacking  formal 
boundaries.  ""  The  term  regionalism  differs  from  nationalism  in  that  the  latter 
recognise  a  high  national  unity  and  upper  or  national  interests  transcending  the 
attachment  to  the  local  region.  It  also  differs  from  localism  as  the  latter  is  involved 
with  a  lower  level  of  territorial  unit  when  we  accept  Keating's  levels  of  territories.  In 
particular,  localism  was  often  discussed  in  the  context  of  decentralisation  rather  than 
non-centralisation,  terms  that  will  be  discussed  later.  Regionalism  should  also  be 
distinguished  from  separatism  in  that  the  latter  denies  the  existing  single  political 
unity,  aiming  at  independence-i.  e.  complete  sovereignty  in  all  matters-although  the 
frustrated  demands  of  regionalism  may  be  driven  into  separatism  in  an  extreme  case. 
II.  1  (2Unita  to  Federal  System 
Even  before  the  emergence  of  republicanism  or  the  nation-state  building 
process,  regional  distinctiveness  existed  in  various  forms.  However,  regional 
distinctiveness  could  be  compatible  with  monarchism,  as  Keating  observes,  until 
popular  sovereignty  and  republicanism  emerged: 
Monarchical  states  never  succeeded  in  eradicating  territorial 
distinctiveness,  even  in  the  age  of  absolutism.  Rulers  strove  to  exercise  direct (Chapter  II)  29 
control  by  sending  out  commissary  agents,  like  the  French  intendants,  or  the 
Spanish  corregidores,  but  still  had  to  compound  with  local  interests.  Such 
territorial  diversity  is  quite  compatible  with  monarchical  authority,  even 
absolutism,  since  what  matters  is  the  final  authority  of  the  monarch,  not  the 
relationship  of  the  territories  to  each  other.  It  is  much  more  difficult  to  reconcile 
with  the  principle  of  popular  sovereignty  and  republicanism.  " 
Under  the  emerging  republicanism  and  popular  sovereignty,  regional 
distinctiveness  placed  a  major  obstacle  upon  the  empires  (such  as  the  Habsburg  and 
the  Tsarist  empires)  in  which  historical  units  were  multinational  regions  causing 
threats  to  territorial  integrity.  "  The  state-building  process  was  also  challenged  by 
regional  peculiarities  in  countries  where  political  units  were  rather  segmented  and 
loosely  combined  such  as  the  United  States  of  America.  In  the  process,  federalism  has 
been  conceptualised  in  two  main  forms:  European  and  American  federalism.  As 
Hague  and  his  colleagues  observes,  emphasis  was  placed  upon  the  cooperation 
between  levels  of  government  in  European  federalism,  while  upon  the  creation  of  "a 
central  government  with  limited  functions"  in  American  one  which  became  the 
prototype  of  modem  federal  systems: 
European  federalism,  as  found  in  Austria,  Germany,  and  Switzerland,  has 
different  origins  from  the  American  form.  Federalism  in  the  USA  is  based  on  a 
contract  in  which  the  states  came  together  to  crate  a  central  government  with 
limited  functions.  By  contrast,  European  federalism  (particularly  in  Germany) 
rests  on  the  idea  of  cooperation  between  levels  of  government.  Such  solidarity 
expresses  a  shared  commitment  to  a  united  society;  federalism  display  organic 
links  which  bind  the  participants  together.  The  moral  norm  is  'solidarity.  '  The 
idea  here  is  that  decisions  should  be  taken  at  the  lowest  level  possible  but  with  the 
central  government  offering  overall  leadership.  " 
In  the  development  of  modern  state,  however,  federalism  has  been  implemented 
in  two  processes:  upwards  and  downwards.  16  Upward  process  indicates  the  process  in 
which  a  federation  is  formed  by  the  separate  units  based  upon  common  interests. 
Although  it  is  rare,  a  downward  process  in  which  a  unitary  system  is  restructured  as  a 
federation  is  also  possible  as  in  Belgium  and  possibly  in  Spain  after  Franco  regime. 
However,  both  approaches  were  to  find  equilibrium  between  unity  and  diversity,  and  a 
balance  of  power  between  central  and  regional  (provincial  or  state)  authorities.  " 
The  term  federalism,  as  its  conceptualising  process  indicates,  is  "the  principle  of 
sharing  sovereignty  between  central  and  provincial  (or  constituent  state) 
governments,  "  and  a  federal  system  is  "any  political  system  which  puts  this  idea  into 
practice.  ""  However,  it  is  rather  more  complicated  than  this  simple  definition, 
primarily  because  of  "difficulties  in  relating  theoretical  formulations  to  the  evidence (Chapter  II)  30 
gathered  from  observing  the  actual  operation  of  federal  systems.  "9  Furthermore,  the 
employment  of  federal  principles  in  unitary  systems  and  the  increasing 
interdependence  between  central  and  regional  authorities  in  federal  systems  has 
reduced  the  differences  between  federal  and  unitary  systems.  It  has  even  been  argued 
that  the  increasing  similarities  between  the  two  systems  make  the  formal  definition  of 
federalism  "meaningless.  "20 
Despite  these  difficulties,  we  can  distinguish  federal  systems  from  other  types  of 
political  systems.  Federal  systems  differ  from  unitary  systems  that  partially  utilise 
federal  principles  or  practice.  In  federal  systems,  three  components--a  written 
constitution,  non-centralisation,  and  areal  division  of  powers-are  regarded  as  key 
principles  zi  In  federal  systems,  provincial  or  regional  governments  are  not 
subordinated  to,  but  coordinated  with  the  central/federal  government  under  the 
principle  of  non-centralisation.  Under  these  principles,  functions  are  either  solely 
allocated  to  either  level  of  government  (exclusive  jurisdiction)  or  shared  by  both  of 
them  (concurrent  jurisdiction).  '  Non-centralisation  differs  from  devolution  in  that  "no 
matter  how  certain  powers  may  be  shared  by  the  general  and  constitutional 
government  at  any  point  in  time,  the  authority  to  participate  in  exercising  them  cannot 
be  taken  away  from  either  without  mutual  consent.  ""  In  this  context,  a  constitution 
that  is  designed  to  guard  non-centralisation  emerges  as  a  prime  basis  of  federal 
systems24 
The  term  `dual  federalism'  has  been  used  to  depict  a  federation  in  which  central 
and  regional/provincial  governments  retain  "separate  and  independent  spheres  of 
action,  "  as  in  its  original  concept  2i  However,  because  of  growing  interdependence 
between  the  two  tiers,  the  prototype  of  dual  federation  no  longer  appears  to  exist  26 
Furthermore,  as  Agranoff  observes,  the  term  "federal"  is  used  "to  indicate  its  larger 
historical  usage  to  include  a  variety  of  federal  arrangements.  "' 
By  contrast,  in  a  unitary  system,  sovereignty  renders  within  the  central  authority 
to  which  regional/provincial  authorities  are  subordinated.  In  a  unitary  system, 
subnational  governments  may  execute  central  government  functions  (decentralisation), 
or  may  be  granted  some  decision-making  autonomy  (devolution).  As  in  federal 
systems,  a  variety  of  unitary  systems  are  witnessed.  Hague  and  his  colleagues  divide 
unitary  systems  into  two  groups:  a  dual  system  and  a  fused  one.  28  A  dual  system 
features  a  formal  separation  of  central  and  subnational  government  as  in  Britain,  while 
a  fused  system  with  a  strong  centre  and  "a  uniform  system  of  administration  applying 
across  the  country"  exists  in  France.  29 (Chapter  11)  31 
Elazar  also  divides  unitary  systems  into  two-diluted  and  undiluted-which 
basically  are  the  same  as  Hague  and  his  colleagues'  terms  'dual'  and  'fused.  ' 
However,  he  provides  more  detailed  categorisation  of  unitary  systems  that  employ 
federal  arrangements:  legislative  unions,  constitutionally  decentralised  unitary  states, 
and  consociational  unions  on  a  nonterritorial  basis.  "  Legislative  unions  are  defined  as 
"a  compound  polity  in  which  the  constituent  units  find  their  primary  constitutional 
expression  through  common  institutions  rather  than  through  their  own  separateness,  " 
as  in  the  United  Kingdom.  "  Constitutionally  decentralised  unitary  states  are  mainly 
based  on  the  constitutional  guarantee  for  local  governments  of  "considerable 
autonomy"  in  some  areas.  However,  local  powers  are  determined  by  the  central 
authorities,  and  thus  are  subject  to  "national  supervision,  restriction,  and  even 
withdrawal.  ""  Finally,  consociations  indicate  "quasi-federal  unions  of  ethnic 
(including  tribal),  religious,  or  ideological  groups  that,  though  not  organised 
territorially,  have  acquired  corporate  characteristics  of  their  own  and  have  been  able  to 
secure  constitutional  arrangements  designed  to  preserve  their  respective  integrity 
within  a  common  polity.  ""  Such  arrangements  have  been  introduced  in  the 
Netherlands,  Belgium,  Lebanon,  and  Israel,  in  some  cases  together  with  territorial 
divisions  of  power.  Although  Friedrich's  definition  of  federalism  included  such 
relations,  "'  they  would  be  a  variant  of  unitary  system  employing  federal  arrangements, 
unless  they  were  closely  linked  with  territorial  divisions  of  power. 
As  briefly  mentioned,  federalism  has  been  represented  not  only  in  federal 
systems  but  also  partially  in  decentralised  unitary  system.  However,  despite  growing 
similarities  between  federal  and  dual  unitary  systems  in  practice,  decentralised  unitary 
systems  differ  from  federation  in  that  sovereignty  lies  exclusively  with  the  central 
government,  and  thus  decentralisation  or  devolution  is  not  regarded  in  terms  of  the 
rights  of  subnational  authorities  but  as  favours  of  the  central  government. 
Federations  should  also  be  distinguished  from  confederations  in  that,  in  the 
latter,  sovereignty  is  vested  in  member  states.  In  a  confederation,  a  greater  emphasis  is 
placed  on  diversity  than  on  unity.  Accordingly,  the  central  authority  in  confederations 
forms  only  "a  junior  partner  and  is  dominated  by  component  states.  ""  The  weakness 
of  central  authority  in  a  confederation  is  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  Commonwealth  of 
Independent  States  (CIS),  the  relatively  recent  incidence  of  the  establishment  of 
confederal  relations.  As  in  the  confederation  in  America  that  was  established  in 
1781-a  classic  example  of  confederation,  but  one  that  was  called  federation  at  that (Chapter  If)  32 
time-a  confederal  system  is  often  pursued  when  members  seek  the  benefits  of  scale 
without  closer  union. 
Federal  systems  also  differ  from  'hybrid'  types  of  systems  that  have  both  federal 
and  confederal  features,  but  often  been  neglected.  Among  Elazar's  categories,  three  of 
them  are  noteworthy:  associated  unions  (e.  g.  the  Netherlands  Antilles  and  the 
Netherlands),  federacy  (e.  g.  Puerto  Rico  and  the  United  States),  and  condominiums 
(e.  g.  the  relationship  of  Andora  with  Spain  and  France).  "  These  types  of  relations  are 
mainly  involved  with  more  than  two  sovereign  states-though  smaller  states  and  a 
larger  state  that  is  often  a  colonial  power  in  these  cases-which  could  be  a  feature  of 
confederal  relations.  At  the  same  time  these  relations,  particularly  associated  unions 
and  federacy,  have  federal  features,  albeit  asymmetrical.  Instead  of  full  independence, 
smaller  states  become  a  constituent  polity  of  a  larger  state,  but  with  autonomy  and  self- 
government,  seeking  "the  benefits  of  associations  with  a  greater  power  without  being 
incorporated  within  it.  ""  The  difference  between  associated  unions  and  federacy  lies 
in  whether  any  changes  in  the  relations  including  dissolution  can  be  introduced  on  the 
basis  of  a  unilateral  decision  (associated  unions)  or  a  mutual  agreement  (federacy).  38 
Although  it  is  unusual  and  rare,  a  condominium  in  this  context  identifies  a  polity  (e.  g. 
Andorra)  in  which  "responsibility  for  governance"  or  "ultimate  authority"  is  shared  by 
two  or  more  external  political  entities  (i.  e.  Spain  and  France  in  this  case),  while  the 
polity  in  question  maintains  the  fullest  form  of  self-rule.  " (Chapter  In  33 
11.2.  Forces  for  Centralisation  and  Decentralisation/Non-centralisation 
Those  conceptions  discussed  suggest  differences  in  polities  in  terms  of  their 
structures.  However,  structural  differences-for  instance,  between  unitary  and  federal 
systems-reveal  only  half  the  picture;  clear  differences  also  emerge  among  unitary  and 
among  federal  systems  in  terms  of  practice.  In  particular,  a  unitary  system  may  be 
more  `federal'  in  practice  than  a  federal  one.  What  causes  differences  in  structures  and 
practices  among  countries? 
A  brief  review  shows  a  set  of  answers  to  this  question:  uneven  processes  of 
nation-state  building,  industrialisation,  democratisation,  and  welfare-state  building; 
political  factors  (e.  g.  political  ideology,  leadership  style,  and  internallexternal 
circumstances);  socio-economic  factors  (e.  g.  the  existence  of  ethnic,  racial,  tribal,  and 
linguistic  groups,  and  regional  economic  disparities);  historical  experiences  (e.  g. 
experience  of  autonomy  or  colonial  status);  and  other  factors  (e.  g.  legal  and 
administrative  traditions,  and  geographical  demarcation).  It  is  noteworthy  that  the 
same  factor  may  have  opposite  effects,  becoming  either  centralising  or  decentralising, 
depending  on  context  or  circumstances.  Such  is  the  case  not  only  in  unitary  but  also  in 
federal  systems,  as  Schlesinger  observes,  although  he  uses  the  term  decentralisation  in 
a  broader  sense  which  includes  non-centralisation: 
Federalism  is  everywhere  a  compromises  between  centralising  and 
decentralising  forces. 
, 
As  we  have  seen,  nationalism  in  Germany  operated  as  a 
centralising  force,  but  in  the  two  multinational  monarchies  as  a  decentralising  or 
even  disruptive  one.  Traditionalism  in  each  case  played  an  exactly  opposite  part.  40 
Segre  has  also  made  a  similar  observation  in  his  article  on  regionalism  in  Italy, 
pointing  out  that  "an  Italian  way"  has  been  established  as  a  result  of  struggles  between 
Communists  and  Christian  Democrats  during  the  cold  war  period.  "  These 
observations  suggest  that  it  is  important  to  form  circumstances  that  support  non- 
centralisation  and  reduce  the  effects  of  centralising  forces  in  building  stable  and 
"genuine"  federal  relations. 
In  the  following,  a  brief  review  of  the  legacies  and  forces  of  centralisation  and 
decentralisation/non-centralisation  and  various  forms  of  equilibrium  will  be  provided 
in  the  various  circumstances.  Despite  the  conceptual  differences  between  the  terms 
decentralisation  and  non-centralisation,  the  terms  will  not  be  dealt  with  separately  in (Chapter  In  34 
this  part  of  the  discussion  as  both  terms  share  basic  features,  i.  e.  the  diffusion  of  power 
in  unitary  or  federal  systems. 
II  2  (1)  Legacies  of  Centralisation  and  Decentralisation 
The  question  of  power  distribution  within  a  national  context,  particularly  the 
geographical  distribution  in  this  context,  has  long  been  a  controversy  in  the 
development  of  the  nation-state.  In  the  process,  a  vehement  argument  about 
centralisation  and  decentralisation/non-centralisation  has  broken  out,  and  various 
forms  of  political  structures  have  been  developed  in  various  countries.  In  the  debates, 
the  arguments  of  both  centralists  and  decentralists  are  correct  in  their  respective  points 
and  thus  the  dichotomy  between  centralism  and  decentralism  may  be  a  false  one. 
Firstly,  in  relation  to  popular  sovereignty  and  democracy,  centralists  argue  that 
the  general  will  should  prevail  over  regional,  local,  or  functional  interests,  which,  in 
the  worst  case,  could  encourage  an  anti-system  party.  42  In  particular,  as  Friedrich 
observes,  decentralisation  could  encourage  the  development  of  anti-system  party 
consolidating  a  secure  local  and  regional  basis  for  such  a  party.  47  Such  demands  were 
apparent,  for  instance,  in  France44  and  Italy.  "  By  contrast,  decentralists  argue  that  that 
decentralised  structures  contribute  to  the  participation  of  citizen  and  the  diversity  of 
grassroots  politics.  For  instance,  Elazar  points  out  that  decentralisation  can  lessen  "a 
formidable  barrier  to  participation  and  communication"  caused  by  the  growing  size  of 
population.  "  In  particular,  decentralisation  has  been  advocated  as  a  means  of 
restraining  abuses  of  power  by  the  central.  government.  47  This  belief  also  played  a  role 
in  the  Allies'  imposition  of  federalism  in  Germany  in  1949  on  the  basis  of  regional 
traditions  as  a  safeguard  against  dictatorship  48 
The  efficiency  of  the  society  also  became  a  main  focus  of  arguments.  Both 
centralised  and  decentralised  structures  are  regarded  as  essential  to  improving  the 
performance  and  efficiency  of  governments  by  the  own  supporters.  A  centralised 
government  has  been  claimed  to  be  efficient  in  the  rapid  industrialisation  and 
modernisation  process,  "'  and  in  the  egalitarian  distribution  of  goods  and  services.  "  For 
instance,  Cameron  and  Hofferbert  claim  on  the  basis  of  their  case  study  of  the 
education  sector  that  a  centralised  government  can  better  deal  with  regional  disparities 
by  allocating  resources  to  regions  in  a  more  egalitarian  way  than  a  decentralised 
government.  "  By  contrast,  the  efficiency  of  the  society  also  became  a  compelling 
reason  for  decentralisation.  In  particular,  in  dealing  with  local  problems,  local (Chapter  11)  35 
government  is  claimed  to  be  better  in  dealing  with  its  own  problems  than  the  central 
government.  52  Supporters  of  decentralisation  also  underline  the  danger  of  the 
"distortion"  or  "delay"  of  decisions  in  a  highly  centralised  system  in  which 
administrative  and  communication  systems  can  easily  be  jammed  or  overloaded.  " 
Both  supporters  of  centralisation  and  decentralisation  claim  that  their  own 
version  of  the  state  structure  guarantee  the  rights  of  ethnic  minority  groups.  Those 
who  support  a  decentralised  government  argue  that  minority  groups  may  find  it 
difficult  to  safeguard  their  interests  in  a  highly  centralised  political  system,  even  when 
the  central  government  respects  the  rights  of  individuals.  "  Such  dangers  are  evident 
particularly  when  the  distinctive  identity  and  lifestyle  of  ethnic  or  linguistic  minority 
groups  are  concerned.  We  may  easily  find  examples  that  support  this  claim:  the 
French  in  Canada,  the  Catalans  and  Basques  in  Spain,  the  Germans  in  Southern  Italy, 
numerous  ethnic  minorities  in  the  Soviet  Union,  and  so  on.  Centralists  maintain  that 
even  under  a  decentralised  system  the  sub-national  authority  may  also  dominate  ethnic, 
linguistic,  or  religious  minority  groups  within  their  own  territorial  boundaries.  " 
Although  both  sides  advocate  the  protection  of  minority  groups  and  both  are  correct  in 
their  respective  claims,  it  depends  on  what  level  the  threats  to  minority  groups  are 
being  discussed. 
II.  2  (2)  Forces  of  Centralisation 
Although  the  same  factor  may  have  different  effects  on  the  development  of 
centre-periphery  relations,  we  may  identify  centralising  and  decentralising  forces  in  a 
particular  context.  As  a  discussion  of  detailed  factors  is  beyond  the  main  scope  of  this 
thesis,  the  emphasis  is  placed  on  centralising  and  decentralising  factors  that  are 
commonly  identified  in  the  literature:  historical  experiences  and  traditions,  socio- 
economic  structures,  and  political  factors  (see  Table  2.2.1). (Chapter  If)  36 
<Table  2.2.1>  Centralising  and  Decentralising  Forces 
Centralisation  Decentralisation  & 
Forces  Non-centralisation  Forces 
Historic  !  exverienc  and  Traditions 
Nation-state  building  "  Dominant  political,  economic,  "  Multiple  centres 
process  and  cultural  role  of  the  capital  "  Experiences  of  regional  autonomy 
city 
"  Secession  of  a  part  of  territory  as 
a  result  of  separatist  nationalism 
Legal  &  "  Jacobin  tradition  of  centralised  "  Traditions  of  local  self-government 
Administration  administration  (France) 
processes 
Socio-economic  and  Geo  r  hic  Features 
Geographic  "  Relatively  Small  territory  "  Relatively  huge  territory  with 
geographical  barriers 
Economic  Structure  "  Highly  correlated  economic  "  changing  trading  patterns  and 
structure  growing  competition  between 
regions 
"  A  high  level  of  regional  disparities 
Ethno-cultural  "  Homogeneous  "  Heterogeneous 
composition 
Political  Factors 
Democratisation  "  Status  quo  in  the  political  "  Decentralisation  as  a  course  of 
processes  including  elite  Democratisation  (e.  g.  Russia, 
working  patterns  Spain,  and  South  Africa 
Elite  recruitment  &  "  Appointment  of  subnational  "  Locally  elected  subnational  elites 
working  patterns  elites  by  the  centre  "  Indigenisation  of  subnational  elites 
"  Clientele  relations  between 
central  and  subnational  elites 
Interest  articulation  "  Functional  (or  associational)  "  Regional 
patterns 
Party  formation  "  Nation-wide  parties  0  Regional  parties 
Reformist  policies  "  Demands  for  nation-wide  "  Differentiation  of  regional  interests 
enforcement  of  new  orders 
In  the  history  of  modern  state  building,  some  strong  traditions  such  as 
centralised  administration  and  experiences  of  secession  of  territories  as  a  result  of 
separatist  movements  have  been  obstacles  to  decentralisation  or  federalisation.  Strong 
traditions  of  centralised  administration  could  be  traced  back  to  the  period  of  absolute 
monarchy  and  nation-state  building.  Centralist  drives  were  particularly  apparent  in 
those  countries  where  nation-state  building  was  carried  out  by  central  elites  in  capital 
cities  that  were  dominant  in  terms  of  politics,  economy  and  culture  such  as  Moscow  in 
Russia,  and  Paris  in  France.  "  Such  dominance  constituted  a  solid  basis  for  a 
centralised  state  structure,  particularly  when  the  centre  successfully  crushed  challenges 
from  the  regions.  For  instance,  in  France,  the  republican  government  after  the  French (Chapter  10  37 
revolution  faced  opposition  that  mainly  concentrated  in  the  Western  regions. 
Throughout  the  nineteenth  century,  conflict  mainly  developed  between  monarchism 
and  republicanism,  identifying  regionalism  with  traditionalism,  conservatism  and 
reaction,  and  centralisation  with  republicanism,  democracy,  and  secularisation.  " 
Based  upon  this  Jacobin  tradition,  `departments'  as  a  regional  administrative  system 
have  long  been  supported  as  a  mechanism  for  uniformity  and  modernisation.  " 
An  opposite  experience,  the  secession  of  territories,  also  encourages 
centralisation  tendencies.  The  fear  of  separation  and  secession  may  lead  the  centre  to 
make  concessions  in  the  direction  of  a  greater  degree  of  decentralisation  or  to  initiate 
structural  changes  establishing  a  federal  system.  However,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
widely  spread  fear  of  separation  may  also  delay  decentralisation,  it  is  a  seen  as  the  first 
step  to  separation.  In  Spain,  an  attempt  to  introduce  federal  or  decentralised  political 
system  was  regarded  as  a  threat  to  national  unity  after  the  failed  federal  experience  of 
Spanish  First  republic  of  1873  in  which  autonomous  status  for  the  Catalans  had  been 
granted.  39  Such  a  perception  also  delayed  decentralisation  in  the  Soviet  Union  and 
other  former  Soviet  federal  states  before  they  collapsed.  A  high  priority  has  also  been 
given  to  maintaining  territorial  integrity  in  India  particularly  after  the  separation  of 
Pakistan  in  March  1956,  which  provide  a  strong  legacy  to  its  centralisation  as  will  be 
discussed  later. 
Secondly,  some  socio-economic  features  encourage  centralisation,  or  more 
correctly  encourage  passive  attitudes  towards  decentralisation.  For  instance,  a  small 
territory  with  a  highly  homogeneous  socio-economic  structure  will  seldom  encourage 
decentralisation.  Even  in  large  countries  that  consist  of  territories  of  different 
economic  structures,  a  high  level  of  interdependency  between  regional  economies  will 
also  to  a  degree  discourage  decentralisation  and  separatist  movements. 
Some  political  factors-actors  and  their  behaviour,  representation  and  interest 
articulation  mechanisms,  and  internal  and  external  political  environments-also 
encourage  centralism.  Without  mentioning  the  universal  truth  that  no  officials  like  to 
relinquish  their  powers,  central  officials  may  fear  decentralisation  in  which 
"incompetent"  subnational  officials  may  cause  administrative  errors.  Central  officials, 
particularly  in  a  centralised  system,  may  prefer  the  status  quo  to  a  decentralisation  that 
would  require  the  adjustment  of  working  patterns  between  central  and  subnational 
authorities.  '  Such  reluctance  may  also  come  from  subnational  officials.  As  for 
regional  leaders  who  benefited  from  their  well-established  clientela  ties  with  national 
elites,  decentralisation  may  threaten  their  privileges  in  allocating  national  resources,  as (Chapter  In  38 
well  as  their  power  bases,  particularly  if  they  are  appointed  by  the  centre.  This  makes 
it  easier  to  understand  why  some  Russian  regional  leaders  supported  certain 
centralisation  measures  and  the  abolition  of  local  elections  in  the  1990s,  which  will 
also  be  discussed  later. 
Another  support  for  centralisation  comes  from  functional  interest  groups  and 
class-based  nation-wide  political  parties.  Functional  interest  groups  and  class-based 
parties  tend  to  support  centralisation,  which  facilitate  maintaining  their  integrity  and 
discipline.  "  In  a  passive  sense,  the  development  of  functional  or  class  groups  often 
deters  the  development  of  regionalism  because  of  their  cross-regional  features.  In  the 
same  context,  urban-rural  cleavages  reflecting  a  sectoral  conflict  between  agricultural 
and  industrial  sectors,  and  a  cultural  conflict  between  rather  more  traditional  culture 
and  modernised  culture. 
Our  literature  review  also  suggests  that  reformist  policies  may  demand  a 
centralised  government  to  impose  radical  reform,  particularly  when  success  is  at  stake 
as  a  result  of  regional  resistance.  "  Although  it  is  not  always  the  case,  a  centralised 
system  has  been  preferred  in  pursuit  of  rapid  socio-economic  changes.  For  instance, 
modern  state-building  processes  featured  centralised  and  uniform  bureaucracy.  67  The 
Russian  Revolution  and  implementation  of  socialist  rule  over  its  territory  also 
demanded  a  highly  centralised  political  system.  Rapid  industrialisation  policy, 
similarly,  played  a  major  role  in  establishing  a  centralised  administrative  system  in  the 
Soviet  Union,  although  there  have  been  contested  arguments  over  the  reasons  for 
centralisation  under  Stalin.  One  may  argue  that  the  demand  for  centralisation  was 
raised  by  communism  or  Leninism  itself.  However,  an  increasing  role  for  central 
government  has  been  witnessed  even  in  decentralised  or  federal  states  when  reformist 
policies  (e.  g.  welfare-state  building)  were  launched,  because  of  an  increasing  need  of 
coordination  between  various  levels  of  government.  "  For  instance,  the  Reagan 
administration's  "supply-side  approach  to  public  management"  in  order  to  reduce  the 
federal  budget  by  reducing  the  number  of  federal  government  managers  and  federally 
run  or  associated  domestic  programmes  in  the  1980s  yet  to  require  "extraordinary 
centralisation  of  policy  formation  and  administrative  power.  "" (Chapter!!  )  39 
112  (2  Forces  of  Decentralisation 
Despite  uneven  levels  of  decentralisation  in  both  historic  and  newly  established 
states,  the  literature  has  been  identified  a  couple  of  common  factors  that  emerge 
decentralisation:  multiple  centres,  experience  of  regional  autonomy,  socio-economic 
and  cultural  heterogeneity,  and  certain  political  factors  such  as  elite  recruitment 
patterns  on  the  basis  of  regional  representation. 
The  existence  of  regional  centres  that  could  challenge  the  dominant  political, 
economic,  and  cultural  influence  of  the  capital  can  be  a  good  steppingstone  to 
decentralisation,  although  it  could  simply  be  a  parameter  that  represents  regional 
cleavages  in  a  country.  Polycephalous  states  that  have  political,  economic  and  cultural 
cities  at  the  regional  level  in  parallel  with  the  capital  city  contain  possibilities  of 
conflict  between  the  capital  city  and  regional  centres.  In  general,  a  huge  territory  with 
geographic  barriers  and  poor  communication  and  transportation  networks  facilitates 
the  development  of  regional  centres  that  are  out  of  the  full  control  of  the  capital  city 
(e.  g.  Spain  and  Australia).  Imperial  expansion  or  unification  of  territories  that  enjoyed 
independence  or  a  high  level  of  autonomy  during  the  nation-state  building  process  also 
contained  regional  centres  as  a  default  (e.  g.  Germany,  Switzerland,  Canada  and  the 
United  States).  Similarly,  newly  established  states  emerged  as  polycephalous  states  as 
a  result  of  the  artificial  merger  of  territories  after  wars  or  under  colonial  rule  (e.  g. 
India,  Kenya,  and  Nigeria).  In  both  historic  and  newly  established  states,  new  regional 
centres  have  also  developed  in  the  process  of  industrialisation  or  modernisation, 
making  the  picture  of  regional  cleavages  more  complicated.  66 
Heterogeneity  in  a  country  in  terms  of  ethno-national  and  cultural  (e.  g.  linguistic 
and  religious)  composition  and  levels  of  economic  development  that  emerge  along  the 
lines  of  regional  boarders  is  also  a  maker  of  regional  identity  as  a  solid  basis  of 
decentralisation.  As  suggested  in  the  emergence  of  regional  centres,  imperial 
expansions  or  mergers  into  a  single  polity  either  voluntarily  or  under  colonial  rule 
increase  heterogeneity  in  a  society.  For  instance,  diversities  grew  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  Tsarist  Russia  and  the  Soviet  Union  in  the  process  of  imperial  expansion. 
Such  heterogeneity  also  features  in  the  socio-economic  composition  of  post-colonial  or 
newly  established  states  such  as  Canada,  India,  Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka,  Czechoslovakia, 
and  Yugoslavia.  In  particular,  most  of  the  post-colonial  states  in  Africa  (South  Africa, 
Nigeria,  Tanzania  and  so  on)  were  established  on  the  basis  of  boundaries  that  had (Chapter  11)  40 
never  existed  previously.  '?  Often  these  ethno-national  and  cultural  diversities  emerged 
along  the  regional  boundaries  as  suggested  in  Table  2.2.2. 
<Table  2.2.2>  Ethno-Cultural  Conflicts  in  Various  Countries 
Countries  Minority  or  Main  Conflicting  Groups 
Switzerland  Flemish,  French,  and  German 
Canada  French-speaking  Quebec 
The  United 
Kingdom 
Scottish,  Welsh,  and  Conflicts  in  Northern  Ireland 
Holland  Conflict  between  Catholics  (South  and  South-eastern  regions)  and 
Protestant  (North  and  North-eastern  regions) 
Belgium  Flemish  and  Wallon  nationalism  +  Dutch-  (Flander)  and  French-speaking 
allonia  and  Brussels  linguistic  group" 
Spain  Basques  and  Catalans 
South  Africa  An  to-Boer  division  +  Zulu  nationalism 
Nigeria  The  Hausa  Fulani  (the  Northern  regions),  the  Yoruba  (the  Western 
regions),  and  the  Ibo  Eastern  regions) 
Kenya  Kikuyu  tribalism  in  Central  provinces  and  other  minority  groups 
SriLanka  The  Shinhalese  (Buddihists  and  Sinhalese  speaking),  the  Tamils  (Hindus 
and  Tamil  speaking,  the  North-eastern  regions),  and  Muslims  (the 
Colombo  district 
Indonesia  Conflict  between  Muslims  and  Catholics 
Malaysia  Malays,  Chinese,  Muslims,  and  Indians 
India  Hindu  nationalism,  Punjab  and  Kashmir  separatism 
Pakistan  Punjabi  and  Muhajir  (West)  and  Benglai  (East  Pakistan)  before  1971 
Sindhi  nationalism  (by  Sindi-speaking  Muhajir),  Pathan  separatism  (Pushto 
or  Hindko-speaking  in  Northwest  Frontier  province), 
The  Soviet  Union  Multiethnic 
Czechoslovakia  Czechs  and  Slovaks 
Yugoslavia  Croat  Serb,  Muslim,  Slovene  Albanian,  Macedonian  etc. 
In  these  countries,  inter-ethnoregional  tensions  mainly  arise  from  three 
directions:  the  fear  of  cultural  erosion  by  a  single  hegemonic  culture,  "a  lawful 
struggle"  against  occupation  and  to  restore  statehood,  and  uneven  economic 
development  68  In  the  process  of  nation-state  building,  the  introduction  of  centrist 
policies  (for  instance,  public  education  and  official  languages)  to  build  a  "nation"  in 
these  multinational  states  has  often  been  identified  as  a  threat  to  the  culture  of  ethno- 
linguistic  minority  groups.  In  response,  the  need  for  cultural  autonomy  has  been 
recognised  as  an  appeasement  policy.  However,  social  tensions  are  growing  under  the 
cultural  autonomy  or  even  federal  arrangements,  particularly  when  a  minority  group 
has  not  voluntarily  merged  into  a  state.  In  many  such  cases,  minority  groups  raise 
claims  for  historic  territories  in  conjunction  with  the  demand  that  their  territoriality 
should  be  congruent  with  the  political  community.  Basque  separatism  in  Spain, (Chapter  In  41 
Kashmir  separatism  in  India,  Tibetan  separatism  in  China,  Kurd  separatism  in  the 
border  of  Iran  and  Turkey,  and  East  Timor  in  Indonesia  are  good  examples. 
Uneven  economic  development  also  constitutes  a  strong  basis  of  growing 
demands  for  more  autonomy  and  regional  participation  in  central  decision-making. 
Whether  uneven  economic  development  between  regions  was  caused  by  a  traditional 
structuring  or  imposed  by  external  factors  (e.  g.  colonial  setting  or  adjustment  to 
changes  in  external  markets  and  trade  patterns),  the  modernisation  and  industrialisation 
process  has  brought  new  tensions  between  "growing  and  declining"  regions  69  For 
instance,  tensions  arose  between  agricultural  and  industrial  regions  (e.  g.  southern  and 
northern  regions  in  Italy,  and  east  of  the  Elbe  and  the  Ruhr  in  Germany),  and  between 
industrial  centres  in  the  periphery  and  financial  and  banking  centres  as  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and  France?  °  Growing  regional  disparities  in  the  process  of  industrialisation 
or  modernisation  and  changes  in  world  trade  patterns  could  intensify  the  competition 
between  regions,  which  in  turn  mobilises  the  regions  to  defend  their  own  interests, 
seeking  stronger  influence  or  power  over  decision-making  either  at  the  central  or 
regional  level.  For  instance,  even  in  France,  an  example  of  a  centralised  and  unitary 
polity,  a  close  relationship  developed  between  the  regional  authorities  and  private 
sectors  in  the  process  of  privatisation.  In  such  circumstances,  regional  authorities 
found  themselves  in  increasing  competition,  which  became  main  basis  of 
decentralisation  demands  in  France  in  the  1980s.  7' 
Economic  disparities  are  in  many  cases  politicised  when  a  mechanism  for  the 
redistribution  of  wealth  is  absent  or  not  properly  functioning.  The  politicisation  of 
regional  identities  depends  on  various  political  factors  such  as  elite  recruitment  and 
working  patterns,  and  the  development  of  regional  political  parties.  Although  elite-led 
regionalism  was  apparent  in  some  historic  monarchies  (e.  g.  the  Habsburg  empire  and 
Tsarist  Russia),  the  introduction  of  universal  suffrage  in  the  early  twentieth  century 
created  the  political  circumstances  in  which  regions  could  increase  their  pressure  upon 
the  centre  to  recognise  regional  peculiarities.  For  instance,  in  Belgium,  Dutch  was 
introduced  into  public  administration,  legal  system,  and  public  education  as  an  official 
language  after  the  universal  suffrage  in  1919.1 
In  combination  with  universal  suffrage,  political  parties  that  are  based  on 
"subcultures"-particularly  those  linked  with  territories-also  provide  regions  with 
opportunities  to  articulate  their  demands,  although  they  are  vulnerable  to  manipulation 
by  the  centre.  In  this  context,  Keating  observes  that  the  importance  of  places  has 
increased  by  the  development  of  mass  politics  in  the  twentieth  century.  '  Despite  the (Chapter  IV  42 
development  of  class-based  parties  in  industrialised  countries,  regional  parties  or 
nation-wide  parties  that  are  based  on  regional  support  are  still  found  in  the  United 
Kingdom,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  Belgium,  Spain,  and  so  on.  "4  Such  tendencies  are 
also  apparent  in  post-colonial  countries  such  as  Indonesia,  "  Republic  of  Korea,  "  and 
South  Africa.  " 
Demands  for  decentralisation  may  be  strengthened  by  elite  recruitment  and 
working  patterns.  Regional  or  local  elites  are  more  likely  to  answer  to  the  demands  of 
the  electorate  at  their  respective  levels  than  simply  be  agents  of  the  central 
government.  Furthermore,  even  in  state  where  local  elites  are  accountable  to  the 
centre  on  the  basis  of  a  patron-client  model,  indigenisation  of  local  elites  is  likely  to 
support  decentralisation.  Central  elites  may  also  mobilise  some  regions  in  order  to 
serve  their  political  goals,  which  may  trigger  regionalism  in  other  parts  of  the  states.  " 
II.  2  (3)  Equilibrium  between  Centralising  and  Decentralising  Forces 
Centralising  and  decentralising  forces,  either  inherited  or  newly  developed,  exist 
in  every  country.  In  the  modem  state  building  and  its  evolution  process,  a  series  of 
compromises  between  these  two  forces  results  in  various  forms  of  equilibrium  not  only 
in  terms  of  political  structures  but  also  in  terms  of  practice. 
In  this  context,  Duchacek  concluded  in  his  comparative  analysis  of  federalism, 
applying  his  "ten  yard  sticks  of  federalism,  "  that  hybrid  types  rather  than  pure-bred 
federalism  were  widely  found,  warning  against  the  tendency  "to  equate  American 
experience  with  true  federalism.  ""  In  the  same  context,  Davis  emphasises 
peculiarities  in  each  federal  system,  noting  that  it  is  not  simply  a  distinction  between 
`genuine'  and  'pseudo-federalism'  or  `quasi-federalism': 
We  have  generalised  on  the  theme  of  the  Philadelphia  since  the  early 
nineteenth  century,  and  the  increasingly  low  yield  of  this  orientation  has  made  it 
apparent  that  we  must  shift  our  focus  from  the  pursuit  of  the  general  to  the  pursuit 
of  particular.  What  we  must  grasp,  in  sum,  is  that  American  federalism  is,  above 
all  else,  not  federalism  so  much  as  it  is  American  federalism;  and  for  the  same 
reason,  it  is  so  whether  it  is  Australian,  Canadian,  Indian,  Swiss,  German  or  any 
other  federalism.  It  is  national  culture,  however  we  define  it,  that  impregnates  our 
entire  subject  matter.  10 
Such  particularism  goes  even  further  when  Elazar  emphasised  that  one  of  the 
factors  that  upholds  federalism  in  Switzerland  is  the  people's  federal  way  of  thinking.  " (Chapter  11)  43 
Regardless  of  structural  features,  either  federal  or  unitary,  a  simple  review 
shows  that  different  decentralising  and  centralising-or  unifying  and  separating- 
forces  in  states  resulted  in  different  political  structures.  In  particular,  various  unifying 
and  separating  forces  affect  new  federations.  Davis,  for  instance,  noted  eleven  social 
factors  on  the  basis  of  his  analysis  of  states  that  were  under  British  colonial  rule  and 
emerged  as  federations.  The  factors  that  he  claimed  to  be  relevant  are  as  follows:  the 
desire  of  political  independence;  the  hope  of  economic  advantage;  the  need  for 
administrative  efficiency;  enhancing  the  conduct  of  external  relations  both  diplomatic 
and  military;  a  community  of  outlook  based  on  race,  religion,  language,  or  culture; 
geographical  factors;  the  influence  of  history,  similarity  and  differences  in  colonial  and 
indigenous  political  and  social  institution;  the  character  of  political  leadership;  the 
existence  of  successful  older  models  of  federal  union;  and  the  influence  of  the  United 
Kingdom  government  in  constitution-making.  "  In  accordance  with  these  factors,  he 
identified  unifying  and  separating  motives  in  Asian  federal  countries  that  used  to  be 
British  colonies.  "  Similar  unifying  and  separating  forces  had  also  affected  other 
federalisation  processes,  including  the  American  experience,  " 
The  various  forms  of  equilibrium  between  unifying  and  separating  forces  in 
various  countries  clearly  emerge  when  the  respective  competence  of  centre  and  regions 
are  compared  (see  Table  2.2.3).  Understandably,  a  clear  difference  emerges  along  the 
border  of  unitary  and  federal  system,  e.  g.  France  and  Switzerland.  The  level  of 
democratisation  may  also  be  one  of  criteria  that  could  capture  the  differences,  for 
instance,  between  Germany  and  India  or  Indonesia.  However,  differences  do  not 
always  emerge  along  the  border  of  democratic-authoritarian  or  federal-unitary 
systems.  For  instance,  consociational  principles  recognising  the  competence  of  ethno- 
linguistic  groups  are  employed  in  both  unitary  (e.  g.  Holland)  and  federal  (e.  g.  Belgium 
and  Switzerland)  states  while  not  in  many  other  countries  despite  the  ethno-linguistic 
conflicts.  The  regional  responsibilities  are  far  much  extended  in  the  United  Kingdom 
than  in  France,  although  both  states  are  categorised  as  unitary  systems  and  their 
political  systems  have  long  been  institutionalised. u  ý 
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Various  combinations  of  centralisation  and  decentralisation  forces  also  have 
made  differences  in  federal  practices  which  could  be  more  important  than  federal 
structures.  According  to  Elazar,  the  elements  of  federal  process  include  "a  sense  of 
partnership,  "  "negotiated  coordination"  and  "open  bargaining  between  all  parties,  " 
which  makes  structural  federalism  meaningful: 
...  and  many  come  to  an  conclusion  that  federalism  is  as  much  as  matter  of 
process  as  of  structure,  particularly  if  process  is  broadly  defined  to  include  a 
political-cultural  dimension  as  well.  The  element  of  federal  process  include  a 
sense  of  partnership  among  the  parties  to  the  federal  compact,  manifested  through 
negotiated  cooperation  on  issues  and  programs  and  based  on  a  commitment  to 
open  bargaining  between  all  parties  to  an  issues  in  such  a  way  as  to  strive  for 
consensus  or,  failing  that,  an  accommodation  that  protects  the  fundamental 
integrity  of  all  the  partners.  Only  in  polities  whose  processes  of  government 
reflect  federal  principles  is  the  structure  of  federalism  meaningful's 
Using  two  criteria,  structure  and  process,  Elazar's  matrix  demonstrates  a  variety 
of  forms  of  federalism  that  are  employed  in  federal  and  selected  non-federal  polities. 
At  the  end  of  each  extreme  in  his  matrix,  Switzerland,  the  United  States,  and  Canada 
are  classified  as  counties  with  federal  structures  and  processes,  the  USSR  and 
Czechoslovakia  as  those  with  federal  structures  but  without  a  federal  process,  Israel  as 
a  country  with  a  unitary  structure  but  a  federal  process,  and  Egypt  as  a  unitary 
structure  without  a  federal  process  (for  some  more  examples,  see  Table  2.2.4).  86 
<Table  2.2.4>  Structure  and  Process  in  Selected  Federal  and  Non-federal  States 
Process 
Federal  between  Unitary 
Federal  Switzerland,  USA 
Canada,  Australia 
Malaysia,  UAE 
Yugoslavia,  Nigeria 
USSR 
Czechoslovakia 
Structure  between  Netherlands,  UK 
Belgium,  Tanzania 
Italy,  South  Africa 
Japan 
China,  Mya=ar 
Zaire 
Unitary  Israel,  Lebanon  Finland,  Singapore 
New  Zealand 
Egypt,  Chile, 
Poland,  France 
Source:  Examples  selected  from  the  Figure  in  Elazar,  Exploring  Federalism,  p.  69  (Figure  2.7). 
With  his  "tentative"  classification,  Elazar  argues  that  the  structure  itself  is  "not 
sufficient  to  determine  the  federal  character  of  any  particular  polity,  "  although  "we 
know  little  about  to  what  extend  "the  introduction  of  federal  process  is  a  prerequisite 
for  the  establishment  of  a  federal  structure  or  structures  that  can  accommodate  them,  "87 
In  the  following,  the  impact  of  the  elements  of  federal  process  in  the  development  of 
federalism  in  Belgium,  India,  and  Spain  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail. (Chapter  In  48 
11.3.  Federalisation  in  India,  Spain  and  Belgium 
In  every  country  centre-periphery  relations  have  been  evolving  in  accordance 
with  changes  and  demands  from  within  or  from  outside.  In  democratic  societies  such 
an  evolution  process  often  appears  to  be  quite  stable  although  new  challenges  are 
continuously  emerging.  For  instance,  consociationalism  in  Switzerland  is  now  facing 
challenges  as  economic  resources  have  been  concentrating  in  Zurich.  SB  By  contrast, 
the  evolution  of  centre-periphery  relations  in  those  countries  where  the  mechanism  for 
building  consensus  is  malfunctioning  appears  to  be  less  stable  than  in  those  democratic 
countries.  In  the  process  of  changes,  various  structures  and  practices  have  been 
adopted  either  as  short-term  interim  measures  or  as  long-term  solutions,  depending  on 
centralising  (or  unifying)  and  decentralising  (or  separating)  forces.  A  brief 
observation  suggests  that  changes  in  practices  appear  to  be  a  prerequisite  to  structural 
changes. 
In  this  part  of  the  discussion,  a  focus  will  be  placed  on  three  cases-India,  Spain 
and  Belgium-that  have  relatively  recently  been  established  as  federations  or 
expanded  their  federal  practices.  The  Indian  case  is  selected  because  of  its  cultural 
diversities  and  mixture  of  centralising  features  with  a  federal  structure.  Although  a 
federal  structure  was  established  during  1950-1956,  all  democratic  institution  was 
suspended  during  1975-1977,  and  thus  the  discussion  of  federal  questions  has 
relatively  recently  resumed.  The  case  shows  a  process  of  expanding  federal  principles 
in  a  centralised  federal  structure.  The  Spanish  case  is  included  since  the 
decentralisation  process  started  as  a  part  of  the  democratisation  process,  employing 
interim  measures  in  older  to  apply,  federal  principles  to  a  unitary  system.  Among  the 
states  that  recently  converted  into  federation,  in  a  rather  stable  transition  from  a  unitary 
to  federal  system,  was  experienced  in  Belgium,  employing  both  territorial  and 
consociational  principles  in  its  federal  structure,  and  it  is  accordingly  included  in  this 
discussion. 
The  observation  of  changes  in  these  three  countries  leads  us  to  a  couple  of 
suggestions  to  a  federalisation  process  that  may  be  useful  to  the  Russian  case.  First, 
various  paths  including  `interim'  measures  could  be'employed  as  an  alternative  to 
constitutionally  established  federations,  depending  on  the  equilibrium  of  centralising 
and  decentralising  forces.  Second,  the  development  of  regional  parties  has  played  a 
major  role,  particularly  in  building  consensus  on  the  structure  of  a  polity  and 
accommodating  federal  practices.  Finally,  it  appears  to  be  more  important  to  develop (Chapter  R)  49 
federal  processes  or  practices  rather  than  a  structure  or  contents  of  a  federal  system  in 
a  particular  time  of  transition  period. 
113  (1)  India:  Federalism  in  'Stagnation' 
The  federal  structure  of  India  appears  to  be  a  good  example  of  a  `minimum' 
application  of  federal  principles  under  the  name  of  "unity  in  diversity"-i.  e.  a  federal 
structure  combined  with  a  strong  national  government  in  a  society  that  contains 
decentralising  forces  such  as  socio-economic  and  ethno-cultural  diversifies.  9 
Because  of  its  vast  territory  and  population,  regional  peculiarities  are  quite 
strong  in  India  despite  the  development  of  nationalism  under  British  colonial  rule.  The 
Federation  of  India  consists  of  25  states  and  seven  union  territories  with  more  than  84 
million  population.  Among  the  states,  some  regions  have  more  than  80  million 
population  (139  million  in  Uttar  Pradesh  and  86  million  in  Bihar),  while  Sikkim  (0.4 
million),  Mizoram  (0.7  million)  and  Arunachal  Pradesh  (0.86  million)  have  less  than  a 
million  population.  "  The  languages  used  by  more  than  a  million  people  are  more  than 
30  including  14  official  languages,  and  six  main  religions  are  prevailing.  "  Cultural 
differences  have  clearly  emerged  between  Northern  and  Southern  regions.  In 
particular,  Southern  regions  such  as  Andhra,  Karnataka,  Kerala,  and  Tamil  Nadu, 
which  comprise  about  165  million  populations,  have  opposed  the  use  Hindi  as  their 
official  language.  92  In  terms  of  religion,  Hinduism  is  dominant  (82  per  cent  of  the  total 
population)  in  256  out  of  356  districts.  "  However,  as  suggested  in  Table  2.3.1,  the 
Muslim  population  constitutes,  majority  in  Jäirnmu  &  Kashmir  and  Lakshadweep, 
Christians  in  Meghalaya,  Mizoram,  and  Nagaland,  and  Sikhs  in  Punjab. 
<Table  2.3.1>  Dominant  Religious  Groups  in  Some  Federal  Units  in  India  (1991) 
Popul  Hindu  Muslim  Christian  Sikhs  Buddhism  Jains 
-ation 
Total  846  82.0  12.1  2.3  1.94  0.76  0.40 
<> 
Arunachal  P  0.8  37.0  1.4  10.3  0.14  12.88  0.01 
Assam  22  67.1  28.4  3.3  0.07  0.29  0.09 
Bihar  86  82.4  14.8  1.0  0.09  "-  0.03 
Goa  1.7  64.7  5.3  29.9  0.09  0.02  0.04 
Jammu  & 
Kashmir»»  7.7  32.2  64.2  0.1  2.23  1.17  0.03 
Karantaka  44  85.5  11.6  1.9  0.02  0.16  0.73 
Kerala  29  57.3  22.3  19.3  0.01  --  0.01 
Manipur  1.8  57.7  7.3  34.1  0.07  0.04  0.07 
Meghalaya  1.7  14.7  3.5  64.6  0.15  0.16  0.02 (Chapter  11)  50 
Mizoram  0.7  5.1  0.6  85.7  0.04  7.83 
Nagaland  1.2  10.1  1.7  87.5  0.06  0.05  0.10 
Punjab  20  34.5  1.2  1.1  62.95  0.12  0.10 
Sikkim  0.4  68.4  1.0  3.3  0.09  27.15  0.01 
Uttar  P  139  81.7  17.3  0.1  0.48  0.16  0.13 
West  Bengal  68  74.7  23.6  0.6  0.08  0.30  0.05 
<Union  Territories> 
Andaman  & 
Nicobar  0.38  67.5  7.6  24.0  0.48  0.11  0.01 
Islands 
Chandigarh  0.64  75.8  2.7  0.8  20.29  0.11  0.24 
Dadra  & 
Nagar  Haveli  0.14  95.5  2.4  1.5  0.01  0.15  0.06 
Lakshadweep  0.05  4.5  94.3  1.2 
Figures  from  the  census  of  1981. 
Source:  M.  Mijayanunii,  Census  of  India  1991:  Religion  (New  Delhi:  Office  of  the  Registrar  General  and 
Census  Commissioner,  1995),  pp.  xi-xxiii. 
Together  with  cultural  differences,  socio-economic  differences  also  emerged 
between  the  Eastern  and  Western  parts  of  India.  Among  the  regions  of  Eastern  India 
including  Uttar  Pradesh,  Bihar,  West  Bengal,  Orissa,  Andhra  Pradesh  and  parts  of 
Madhya  Pradesh,  perhaps  only  Calcutta  has  own  industrial  base  while  other  regions  are 
underdeveloped.  By  contrast,  in  Western  India,  the  economic  capacity  of  Bombay, 
Asmedabad  in  Gujarat,  and  Pure  in  Maharashtra  has  been  growing,  and  a  stable  level 
of  agricultural  production  has  been  maintained  in  Punjab  where  the  land  is  relatively 
fertile.  "  According  to  Rothermund's  observation,  such  regional  disparities  have 
already  emerged  under  British  colonial  rule; 
The  striking  differences  between  Western  and  Eastern  India  have  not  been 
suddenly  emerged  in  recent  years.  We  have  seen  that  under  British  colonial  rule. 
Eastern  India  had  becn  the  major  source  of  agricultural  exports  and  that  the  export. 
oriented  industry  of  Calcutta  had  been  firmly  in  British  hands,  whereas  in  Bombay 
and  Ashemedabad  another  type  of  industry  had  grown  up  which  was  basically 
geared  to  the  home  market  and  was  led  by  Indians.  During  the  Great  Repression 
and  the  Second  World  War  Calcutta  declined,  whereas  Bombay  made  rapid  strides 
ahead  " 
During  the  early  period  of  nation-building  process  in  India  after  the  British 
colonial  rule,  these  religious  and  economic  disparities  encouraged  the  establishment  of 
a  strong  central  government.  Since  1950  three  principles-socialism,  secularism,  and 
federalism--have  been  continuously  pursued  until  recently.  "'  First,  under  the  name  of 
`socialism,  '  the  national  government  takes  responsibility  for  the  development  of 
infrastructure  and  heavy  industries  for  modernisation  and  economic  development. 
Second,  'secularism'-an  equal  regard  for  all  religions-has  been  advocated  in  order 
to  minimise  the  involvement  of  religion  with  state  affairs.  Secularism  appeared  to  be  a (Chapter  In  51 
natural  development  considering  the  religious  conflicts  just  after  the  independence  in 
August  1947,  which  claimed  millions  of  lives-"  Finally,  federalism  on  the  basis  of 
linguistic  groups  has  been  pursued  in  order  to  maintain  "unity  in  diversity.  " 
On  the  basis  of  these  principles,  a  federal  structure  was  established  in  1950- 
1956  under  the  strong  leadership  of  the  first  Prime  Minister  Pandit  Jawaharlal  Nehru. 
Although  the  Constitution  of  India  formally  vest  all  executive  powers  in  the 
President-e.  g.  the  appointment  of  the  Prime  Minister  (Article  74),  the  governors  of 
states  (Article  155.1),  members  of  the  Supreme  Court  (Article  124.2)  and  the  High 
Court  (Article  127),  and  administration  of  union  territories  (Articles  234  and  240)- 
these  powers  are  to  be  exercised  upon  the  advice  of  the  Prime  Minister.  9ß  In  particular, 
the  Prime  Minister  has  been  a  dominant  political  actor  in  India  not  only  at  the  national 
but  also  at  the  state  level  though  the  domination  of  the  Indian  National  Congress  in 
Parliament,  which  has  the  right  to  elect  the  President  (Article  54),  to  form  a  new  state 
or  to  alter  the  territorial  boundary  of  any  state  (Article  3),  and  to  abolish  the  state 
legislative  council  (Article  169).  As  a  result,  the  centre  has  dominated  the  states  in  the 
process  of  restructuring  the  territorial  boundaries  99  Furthermore,  regional  authorities 
have  been  heavily  dependent  on  the  patronage  of  the  Prime  Minister  as  the  dismissals 
of  chief  ministers  of  the  Congress  Party  in  the  states  assemblies  showed.  10° 
Despite  the  emergence  of  a  strong  centre,  however,  challenges  to  the  centralised 
federal  system  emerged  in  the  late  1960s,  particularly  with  the  rise  of  Hindu 
nationalism  and  discontents  of  minority  groups,  and  the  emerging  pluralist  politics 
together  with  the  split  of  the  Congress  Party  in  1969. 
Regional  challenges  to  centralised  federation  have  risen  from  the  reorganisation 
of  states'  territorial  boundaries  and  the  principles  applied  in  granting  the  statehood. 
During  the  process,  the  national  government  rejected  to  recognise  any  demands  that 
were  secessionist,  religious,  or  raised  by  only  one  of  major  linguistic  groups. 
Accordingly,  the  central  government  would  not  create  linguistic  states  on  "objective" 
grounds.  101  As  a  result,  territorial  disputes  have  been  developed  in  Maharashtra, 
Gujarat,  Rajasthan,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Andhra,  Punjab,  Haryana,  Himachal  Pradesh, 
and  Karantaka.  102  Such  territorial  disputes  encouraged  the  development  of  regionalism 
and  hindered  economic  coordination  between  states.  103  Furthermore,  Hindu 
nationalism  evoked  the  secessionist  movement,  particularly  in  Kashmir  and  Punjab, 
resulting  in  "more-or-less  continual  war"  involving  the  Indian  Army  and  police 
force.  104 (Chapter  In  52 
Despite  violent  measures  by  the  centre,  growing  regional  identities  continue  to 
affect  centre-periphery  relations  in  India,  particularly  when  regional  parties  emerged. 
Since  1967  the  dominant  Congress  Party  became  rather  defensive,  particularly  because 
of  the  poor  economic  situation,  forcing  it  to  form  coalition  government.  "'  Together 
with  nation-wide  opposition  parties,  regional  parties  enjoyed  success  in  the  state 
assembly  elections  since  1970s,  controlling  the  state  assemblies.  106  For  instance,  All 
India  Anna  Dravida  Munnetra  Kazhagam  (AIADMK)  in  Tamil  Naud,  the  Telugu 
Desam  in  Andhra,  the  Akali  Dal  in  Punjab,  the  National  Conference  in  Jammu  & 
Kashmir,  the  Asom  Gana  Parishad  in  Assam,  and  the  Shiv  Sena  in  Maharashtra  either 
won  majorities  or  became  the  first  opposition  party  in  the  state  assembly  elections  held 
between  1985  and  1992.107  These  regional  parties  are  advocating  greater  autonomy 
and  focus  upon  specific  state  issues.  However,  regionalism  has  been  suppressed  and 
still  appears  to  be  too  weak  to  overturn  the  centralised  federal  structure  in  India.  For 
instance,  Punjab  and  Jammu  &  Kashmir  regional  parties  were  dismissed  and 
presidential  rule  was  imposed,  and  the  Congress  Party  won  a  dubious  victory  in  the 
state  assembly  election  in  Punjab  in  1992.108 
I.  3  (2)  Spain:  `Federation  in  Process' 
As  regional  problems  reemerged  in  India  after  the  Emergency  rule  (1975-1977), 
similar  discussions  or  changes  were  taking  place  in  Spain  after  the  Franco  dictatorship. 
In  both  cases  regional  parties  won  strong  support  at  least  in  regional  parliamentary 
elections,  and  leading  parties  were  facing  challenges  in  the  national  parliament  and 
forced  to  look  for  coalitions.  However,  changes  in  centre-periphery  relations  appear  to 
be  more  stable  and  extensive  in  Spain-although  it  remains  as  a  unitary  system- 
where  consensus  for  decentralisation  has  been  more  strongly  maintained  and  a  series 
of  more  institutionalised  negotiations  between  the  centre  and  regions  have  been  taken 
place. 
Current  changes  in  centre-periphery  relations  in  Spain  started  after  the  death  of 
General  Franco  in  1975.  When  the  dictatorship  finally  ended,  King  Juan  Carlos  I  won 
wide  support  for  "weakening  centralisation,  "  and  a  new  Constitution  was  adopted  in 
1978  after  sixteen  months  of  debate.  The  new  Constitution  recognised  the  rights  to 
autonomy  of  the  nationalities  and  regions  (Article  2),  to  self-government  of 
municipalities,  provinces  and  Autonomous  Communities  (ACs,  Article  137),  and  to 
their  own  official  languages  in  the  respective  ACs  (Article  3).  On  the  basis  of  the  new (Chapter  11)  53 
Constitution,  50  provinces  were  reorganised  into  17  ACs,  to  which  an  unprecedented 
transfer  of  powers  has  been  implemented. 
Regionalism  has  featured  in  Spanish  politics  since  its  early  period  of  state 
building.  Regional  problems  emerged  in  the  early  fifteenth  century  and  administration 
was  organised  on  the  basis  of  former  kingdoms  or  principalities  until  the  end  of 
eighteenth  century.  109  However,  after  the  war  of  independence  (1808-1813)  regions 
were  artificially  reorganised  into  50  provinces,  which  faced  strong  resistance  from 
historic  regions  such  as  the  Basque  and  Catalonia.  Although  the  first  major  regional 
reform  was  introduced  during  the  Second  Republic  (1931-1939),  it  only  lasted  five 
years  as  the  Spanish  Civil  War  (1936-1939)  broke  out,  which  was  soon  followed  by 
the  Franco  dictatorship. 
Regional  administrative  reform  after  the  Franco  dictatorship  differs  from 
previous  attempts  in  many  respects,  First,  regionalism  has  grown  in  most  regions, 
though  in  some  cases  it  is  simply  defensive,  as  well  as  in  historic  regions,  and  is  better 
equipped  with  institutionalised  support.  Prior  to  1975,  regionalism  was  prevalent  only 
in  the  Basque  country  and  Catalonia,  while  in  other  regions  there  was  little  evidence  of 
regionalist  sentiment  until  the  1980s,  1°  However,  growing  economic  disparities"'  and 
democratisation  in  such  forms  as  the  development  of  regional  political  parties  and 
election  campaigns  encouraged  the  development  of  regional  identities.  "' 
In  particular,  the  development  of  regional  parties  or  non-state  wide  parties  is  a 
feature  of  the  democratisation  process.  Although  there  were  some  regional 
differences,  regional  parties  won  on  average  between  16  and  20  per  cent  of  the  vote  in 
the  regional  parliamentary  elections  during  1983-1995.113  Regional  parties  were 
particularly  strong  in  the  Basque  country  (63.8  per  cent),  Catalonia  (51.6  per  cent),  and 
Navarre  (46.3  per  cent).  About  the  average  level  of  support  was  also  obtained  in 
Canary  Islands  (28.1  per  cent),  Aragon  (24.0  per  cent),  Cantabria  (22.6  per  cent) 
Galicia  (17.9  per  cent),  and  Balearic  Islands  (17.5  per  cent).  '  14  Furthermore,  Some 
regional  parties  such  as  Convergence  and  Union  (CiU)  in  Catalonia,  and  the  Basque 
Nationalist  Party  (PNV)  and  People's  Unity  (HB)  in  the  Basque  country  were 
represented  in  the  national  parliament  where  the  majority  disappeared  since  the  early 
1990s.  "s  As  a  result  they  took  part  in  the  coalition  government  with  their  regionalist 
programmes  after  the  1993  (with  the  Spanish  Socialist  Party,  PSOE)  and  1996  (with 
the  People's  Party,  PP)  general  elections.  "' 
Second,  regional  reform  after  the  Franco  dictatorship  differs  from  previous (Chapter  In  54 
reforms  in  its  level  of  transfer  of  power-to  the  regions.  The  Constitution  of  1978 
acknowledges  the  right  of  provinces  to  form  ACs  (Article  143.2),  their  own 
autonomous  institutions  (Article  147);  they  have  given  spheres  of  exclusive 
competence  including  the  right  to  self-government,  and  the  alteration  of  municipal 
boundaries  (Article  148,  more  in  Table  2.2.3).  Furthermore,  the  Senate  was  to  be 
elected  on  the  basis  of  territorial  representation  including  four  members  from  each 
province,  three  from  each  two  major  islands  and  so  on.  The  ACs  are  also  entitled  to  be 
represented  at  least  by  one  member  and  additional  one  member  for  every  million 
habitants  (Article  69.1.  ).  1  " 
Although  it  may  be  incomplete,  Spanish  regional  reform  was  more  extensive 
than  in  India.  In  Spain,  two  factors  are  noteworthy:  consensus  on  regional  reform  in 
which  regionalist  parties'  roles  have  been  increasing  particularly  in  the  1990s,  and 
two-tier  approaches  including  interim  measures  to  respond  the  demands  of  particular 
regions  for  separate  treatment  and  to  achieve  greater  parity. 
After  the  Franco  dictatorship,  there  developed  an  increasing  consensus  in  favour 
of  weakening  centralisation  in  Spain  as  a  basis  of  the  democratisation  process.  The 
major  parties  facing  the  election  in  1977  basically  agreed  on  the  need  of  some  degree 
of  devolution,  although  there  was  variety  in  the  interpretation  of  decentralisation  or  the 
status  of  regions;  the  right-wing  preferred  simple  administrative  decentralisation, 
whereas  the  left-wing  recommended  the  extended  Second  Republic  model  of  regional 
reform.  "'  In  particular,  the  victory  of  the  left-wing  Democratic  Centre  Union  (UCD), 
led  by  Adolfo  Suarez,  created  clearly  favourable  situation  for  a  federalist  approach  to 
regional  questions  when  the  UCD  members  had  the  largest  share  in  the  committee  for 
drafting  a  new  Constitution  (three  out  of  seven).  "'  Furthermore,  concerns  of  military 
intervention  in  circumstance  of  'disintegration'  were  growing,  particularly  after  the 
failed  anti-regionalist  coup  d'etat  by  police  and  the  military  in  Valencia  and  Madrid, 
which  also  facilitated  the  consensus-building  process,  as  in  the  Pact  on  the  Regions 
(pacto  autondmica)  of  1981.120 
Another  important  actor  in  maintaining  or  even  expanding  such  federalist 
consensus  particularly  in  the  1990s  is  the  growing  influence  of  regionalist  parties.  In 
the  course  of  shifting  power  from  the  UCD  (6.5  per  cent  of  support)  to  the  PSOE  (48.4 
per  cent)  in  1983  and  from  the  PSOE  (37.5  per  cent)  to  the  PP  (38.9  per  cent)  in  1996, 
the  role  of  regionalist  parties  has  been  growing,  and  thus  the  pressure  on  the  major 
nation-wide  parties  for  a  further  transfer  of  power  has  been  maintained.  ''  Agranoff 
and  Gallarin  also  observes  that  such  bargains  between  leading  nation-wide  parties  and (Chapter  11)  3f 
regionalist  parties  have  helped  to  accelerate  "Spain's  federal  development": 
In  the  eighteen  years  that  this  form  of  territorial  organisation  has  been  in 
place,  Spain  has  differentiated  its  previous  unitary  structure  through  a  series  of 
negotiations  and  agreements  while  reinforcing  self-government  and  sharing  power 
with  regions.  After  the  1996  parliamentary  elections,  power  shifted  to  a  minority 
government  led  by  the  right  of  centre  Popular  Party  (PP),  with  the  support  of  three 
regional  nationalist  parties.  The  bargains  struck  with  these  three  parties  in  return 
for  support  will  accelerate  Spain's  federal  development.  Thus,  Spain  is  adopting 
federal  arrangement  through  its  Estado  de  las  Autonomias  or  state  made  up  of 
autonomies.  122 
Another  strong  basis  of  transition  has  been  a  two-tier  approach  of  the  centre 
towards  regional  demands.  As  in  any  other  country,  regional  demands  are  different 
among  the  regions  in  Spain.  For  instance,  `historic  regions'  such  as  the  Basque 
countries  and  Catalonia  have  been  advocating  broader  and  more  extensive  transfer  of 
power  than  other  regions.  When  the  ACs  were  created,  the  Constitution  allowed  a 
`rapid'  path  for  those  regions,  considering  their  status  during  the  Second  Republic  and 
previous  referendum  results  for  autonomy,  by  allowing  them  an  immediate  acquisition 
of  the  competences  listed  in  Article  148.  This  procedure  was  applied  to  the  Basque 
country,  and  Catalonia  in  1979  and  Galicia  in  1981.  Other  way  to  attain  AC  status-so 
called  `slow  path'-is  to  hold  a  referendum  and  win  the  support  of  participating 
municipalities  (Article  143)  but  to  wait  five  years  for  further  rights  (Article  149).  This 
two-tier  path  was  in  effect  a  special  treatment  for  the  historic  regions,  which  of  course 
is  asymmetric.  However,  the  Constitution  also  provides  any  region  that  does  not 
belong  to  the  above  category  of  historic  regions  but  wishes  the  rapid  path  with  a  third 
way,  bridging  the  gap  between  the  historic  and  other  regions.  The  third  way  demands 
two  referendums,  one  for  AC  as  a  whole  and  another  in  each  province  that  has  joined 
the  AC.  Among  the  regions  only  Andalusia  followed  this  path  and  claimed  its 
autonomy  in  1981. 
Another  example  of  the  two-tier  approach  to  meet  the  demands  for  separate 
treatment  and  the  need  to  achieve  greater  parity  can  be  found  a  series  of  pacts.  As  a 
result  of  a  separate  deal  between  the  central  parliament  and  ACs,  an  asymmetric  power 
transfer  could  occur,  since  the  bargaining  powers  of  ACs  are  different.  For  instance, 
the  PP  party  concluded  a  separate  agreement  with  three  nationalist  parties-the  PNV, 
CiU,  and  Carnaries  Coalition  (CC)-in  return  for  entering  the  coalition  in  1996.11' 
However,  alongside  the  separate  deals,  the  centre  made  efforts  to  level  the  competence 
of  the  ACs  through  multiparty  agreements.  For  instance,  the  Acuerdo  Autondmico  of 
1981  brought  uniform  regional  elections,  term  limitations  for  regional  deputies, (Chapter  10  56 
subjection  of  regional  governments  to  a  no-confidence  vote  upon  the  petition  of  15  per 
cent  of  each  assembly,  regional  supervision  of  provincial  government  and  so  on.  124 
The  Pact  of  Autonomy  of  1992  also  introduced  a  fifteen  per  cent  income  sharing 
between  the  centre  and  ACs,  levelling  competence  in  this  regard  among  seventeen 
ACs.  '25 
Despite  the  relatively  extensive  regional  reform,  however,  the  Spanish  model  of 
centre-periphery  relations  appears  to  be  far  from  non-centralisation.  The  Constitution 
of  1978  still  emphasises  the  "indissoluble  unity  of  the  Spanish  nation"  (Article  2).  The 
political  structure  still  preserves  centralist  administrative  bodies.  Despite  the 
consensus  on  "weakening  centralisation,  "  there  is  still  a  tension  between  centralism 
and  federalism  even  among  the  socialists,  who  appear  to  be  more  supportive  of  federal 
ideas  than  other  main  political  groups  in  Spain  apart  from  the  regionalists.  126  Although 
the  Spanish  model  of  transition  does  not  clearly  intend  to  build  a  federation,  it  shows 
that  some  interim  measures  for  "unity  and  diversity"  or  "self-rule  and  shared-rule"  are 
useful  to  enhance  the  stability  and  to  expand  federal  ideas  in  the  transition  of  a 
centralised  system  to  a  more  democratic  and  decentralised  one. 
II.  3  (3)  Belgium:  A  `Stable  Transition  to  Federation  with  Consociationalism' 
Belgium's  federal  structure  appears  to  be  quite  unique  with  its  territorial  and 
consociational  principles,  and  to  be  more  complicated  than  other  federal  structures.  In 
Belgium  linguistic  demands  are  accommodated  through  a  two-tier  system:  regions  on 
the  basis  of  the  territorial  principle,  and  communities  on  basis  of  the  linguistic  groups. 
The  federalisation  process  in  Belgium  also  appears  to  be  stable  and  peaceful  as  a  result 
of  employing  both  asymmetric  and  equalising  measures  to  meet  the  demands  for 
diversity  and  unity,  and  both  formal  and  informal  negotiations  in  building  consensus. 
Belgium  was  created  as  a  strong  unitary  state  in  the  1830s.  However,  the 
conflicts  between  linguistic  groups  throughout  its  history,  particularly  in  the  1960s, 
paved  the  way  to  a  federal  state,  which  for  the  first  time  in  Belgian  history  was 
officially  recognised  by  the  throne  in  July  1988.  Belgium  currently  consists  of  three 
regions  (Wallonia,  Flanders,  and  Brussels),  three  linguistic  communities  (French., 
Flemish-  and  German-speaking),  nine  provinces,  and  589  municipalities.  Three 
regions  are  formed  on  the  basis  of  territorial  boundaries.  The  Flander  region  includes 
four  provinces  (Antwerp,  Limburg,  East  Flanders,  and  West  Flanders,  about  40  per 
cent  of  the  national  territory  and  57,8  per  cent  of  the  population).  The  Walloon  region (Chapter  11)  57 
consists  of  four  regions  (Hainaut,  Liege,  Namur  and  Luxembourg)  and  part  of  Brabant 
(about  60  per  cent  of  the  national  territory  with  32.4  per  cent  of  the  population).  The 
Brussels  region  covers  19  municipalities.  The  communities,  however,  are  not  based  on 
territorial  units,  but  on  linguistic  groups.  The  French-speaking  community  includes 
the  Walloon  region  and  parts  of  Brabant  and  Brussels.  The  Flemish-speaking 
community  covers  Flemish  provinces  and  also  parts  of  Brabant  and  Brussels.  The 
German-speaking  community  consists  of  about  70,000  Germans  in  Liege  province  and 
part  of  Brussels. 
<Figure  2.1>  The  Federal  Structure  of  Belgium 
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Source:  Alexander  Murphy,  "Belgium's  Regional  Divergence:  Along  the  Road  to  Federation,  "  in  Graham 
Smith  (ed.  ),  Federalism:  The  Multiethnic  Challenge  (London:  Longman,  1995),  p.  87  (Figure  3.2). 
Although  both  regions  and  communities--both  were  merged  in  the  Flemish 
region-have  their  own  legislative  and  executive  structures,  direct  elections  did  not 
held  until  the  1990s.  The  community  councils  were  composed  of  all  deputies  of  the 
national  parliament  and  directly  elected  members  of  the  Senate  in  each  linguistic  group 
(dual  mandate).  The  executive  bodies  of  the  communities  are  part  of  central (Chapter  11)  58 
government,  and  the  numbers  and  mode  of  appointment  of  executive  officers  are 
different  between  Brussels  and  other  regions.  '" 
Such  a  complexity  originated  from  the  conflicts  and  negotiations  between 
linguistic  groups  which,  as  Hooghe  observes,  have  been  a  mixture  of  "three  major 
games":  "Flemish  nationalism  versus  the  Francophones  on  cultural  identity,  Walloon 
nationalism  versus  Flanders  and  Brussels  on  socio-economic  grievances,  and 
(Francophone)  Brussels  versus  the  rest  of  the  country  on  centre-periphery  matters.  ""' 
Although  the  history  of  conflicts  dates  back  to  the  late  eighteenth  century,  the 
conflicts  and  negotiations  in  the  1960s  deserve  particular  attention as  they  paved  the 
path  to  a  federation.  In  the  1960s  three  major  factors  brought  qualitative  changes  to 
the  regionalist  movements:  territorial  'unilingualism,  '  the  shifting  economic  disparity 
between  the  Walloons  and  Flanders,  and  the  emergence  of  strong  nationalist  parties  in 
each  linguistic  region.  '29 
In  the  nineteenth  century,  French  was  the  official  language  in  Belgium,  whereas 
a  majority  of  Belgians  speak  Dutch.  In  1898,  the  Equalisation  Act  recognised 
bilingualism  in  the  Flander  regions  (Flemish  and  French),  whereas  the  rest  of  the 
country  remained  unilingual.  Unilingualism  in  the  Flanders  (Flemish)  and  Walloon 
(French)  regions  was  introduced  by  the  language  law  of  1932  to  meet  the  territorial 
bilingualism  of  Flanders.  Territorial  unilingualism  was  finally  adopted  in  1963, 
creating  four  language  regions,  which  developed  into  linguistic  communities  in  the 
constitution  of  1970.1D0 
While  language  issues-though  linked  to  socio-economic  and  political  issues- 
triggered  Flemish  nationalist  movements,  the  shifting  economic  structure  and  growing 
Flemish  nationalism  constituted  the  basis  of  Walloon  nationalism.  Walloon 
nationalism  emerged  after  the  Second  World  War  as  a  reaction  to  the  decline  of  the 
economy  in  the  region  (see  Table  2.3.2).  Walloons  feared  not  only  the  declining 
regional  economy,  but  also  the  growing  political  influence  of  Flanders  in  the  Flemish- 
dominated  national  parliament,  particularly  on  issues  of  the  restructuring  of  its 
economic  structure,  131 (Chapter  II)  J9 
<Table  2.3.2>Regional  Economic  Disparities  in  Belgium  (1955-1988) 
Share  of  GDP  Gross  Regional  Product  Per  Capita, 
(national  avers  a=100 
Flanders  Wallonia  Brussels  Flanders  Wallonia  Brussels 
1955  44.2  34.2  21.6  87.3  100.6  140.8 
1963  49.8  31.3  18.9  90.0  93.2  169.7 
1970  53.9  29.1  17.0  96.0  88.9  152.6 
1980  56.9  27.6  15.5  99.6  84.4  152.4 
1988  58.7  26.3  15.0  101.9  80.8  152.6 
Source:  NIS,  Statistische  studlJn,  no.  91  (Brussels:  NIS,  1991),  pp.  76-83,  in  Liesbet  Hooghe,  "Belgium: 
From  Regionalism  to  Federalism,  "  Regional  Politics  &  Policy,  vol.  3,  no.  1(Spring  1993),  p.  51  (Table  2). 
Another  significant  political  development  occurred  when  community  parties 
were  established  representing  each  linguistic  region  including  Brussels  by  the  middle 
of  1960s.  There  emerged  the  Volkrunie  (VU)  in  the  Flanders,  formed  by  a  group  of 
dissidents  from  the  Christelyke  Volksparti  (CVP)  in  1954.  In  Brussels,  the  French- 
speaking  population  formed  the  Front  Democratique  des  Francophones  de  Bruxelles 
(FDF)  in  1964,  facing  a  growing  militant  Flemish  movement  in  the  region.  After  the 
bitter  strike  in  1960-61,  the  Walloon  defensive  movements  fused  into  the  Parti  Wallon 
in  1965  and  the  Rassemblement  Wallon  (RW)  in  1968.12  These  three  community 
parties  waged  successful  campaigns  in  the  1965  general  elections  and  onward  (see 
Table  2.3.3),  then  joined  the  coalition  governments  in  the  1970s. 
As  developments  in  the  1960s  suggests,  challenges  to  the  country's  political 
structure  demanded  more  radical  measures  than  simple  territorial  unilingualism.  The 
coalition  government  (CVP/PSC-PSB/BSP)  formed  after  the  election  of  1968  set  the 
revision  of  the  Constitution  as  its  main  task.  Although  the  coalition  government 
lacked  a  two-thirds  majority  (142  votes  of  the  212  seats  required,  but  only  128  seats), 
four  main  amendments-the  establishment  of  four  linguistic  communities  (Article  59 
bis)  and  three  regional  councils  (Article  107  quater),  an  alarm-bell  system  (Article  38 
and  38  bis),  and  the  'special  majority'  for  adopting  laws  for  the  implementation  of 
Articles  59  bis  and  107  quater-were  adopted  in  December  1970  with  the  support  of 
the  Volksunie  (20  seats).  `  However,  the  implementation  of  those  Articles  that 
required  a  'special  majority'  and  inter-party  conflicts  in  the  coalition  governments 
delayed  the  restructuring.  Although  the  government  of  1970  declared  that  "the  unitary 
structure  had  become  obsolete,  ""'  it  took  nearly  twenty  years  to  introduce  significant 
changes. (Chapter  JI)  60 
<Table  2.3.3>  Composition  of  the  House  of  Representatives  (%  of  vote) 
1961'  1965'  1968'  1971'  1977'  1981  1985  1987  1991  1995 
PSC 



































FDF/RW  2.3  5.9  11.2  7.1  4.2  1.2  1.2  1.5 
W  3.5  6.7  9.8  11.1  10.0  9.7  7.9  8.1  5.9  4.7 
PSB/KPB  3.1  4.6  3.3  3.1  2.1  2.3  1.2  0.8  0.1 
Ecolo  4.8  2.5  2.6  5.1  4.0 
AGALEV  2.7  3.7  4.5  4.9  4.4 
UDRT  1.1  1.2  0.2 
Vaams 
Blok 
-  -  -  -  -  -  1.4  1.9  6.6  7.8 
Front 
National 
-  -  -  -  -  -  -  0.1  1.1  2.5 
Van 
Rossem  3.2 
Others  2.9  2.1  2.3  2.0  1.5  2.9 
Among  the  general  elections  held  between  1961-1995,  those  of  1965,1974,  and  1978  are  excluded. 
Figures  are  aggregated. 
PSC  (Parti  Social  Chr6tien),  CVP  (Christelijke  Volksparti),  PS  (Parti  Socialiste),  SP  (Socialistische  Partij), 
PRL  (Parti  Reformateur  Liberal),  PVV  (Partij  voor  Vrijheid  en  Vortuitgan),  FDF  (Front  D6mocratique  des 
Francophones),  RW  (Rassemblement  Wallon),  VU  (Volksunie),  PSBBSP  (Parti  Socialiste 
BelgeBelgische  Socialistische  Partij),  Ecolo  (Walloon  Ecologists),  AGALEV  (Anders  Gaan  Leven 
(Flemish  Ecologists)),  and  UDRT  (Union  D6mocrate  pour  le  Respect  du  Travail) 
Sources:  John  Fitzmaurice,  The  Politics  of  Belgium:  A  Unique  Federation  (London:  Hurst,  1996),  pp.  272. 
273  (Appendix  Q. 
The  process  of  federalisation  since  1970  can  be  divided  into  three  stages:  the 
initial  stage  (December  1970-May  1980),  the  moulding  stage  (June  1980-August 
1988),  and  the  round-off  stage  (September  1988").  During  the  first  stage,  the 
establishment  of  regional  and  community  executives  and  implementing  laws  for  the 
newly  revised  Constitutional  Articles  had  been  sought.  During  the  second  stage,  the 
changes  in  the  state  structure-e.  g.  the  merger  of  the  Flemish  community  and  region, 
and  the  establishment  of  the  arbitration  court-were  introduced,  aiming'at  preserving 
the  unitary  features  and  introducing  federal  arrangements.  The  constitutional 
amendments  of  May  1980  also  expanded  the  competence  of  regions  and  communities 
on  cultural  and  'personal  matters'  such  as  local  welfare  services,  hospital  services  and 
vocational  training,  which  were  expanded  together  with  some  financial  sources.  "'  The 
federal  structure  was  finally  established  at  the  third  stage  based  on  the  Accord  de  la  St 
Michel  of  1992.  The  Accord  included  the  direct  election  of  councils  for  five-year 
terms  after  1994,  although  the  power  of  the  Senate,  the  unequal  competence  of (Chapter  In  61 
constituent  regions  and  communities,  particularly  relating  to  the  unique  status  of 
Brussels,  and  fiscal  measures  have  still  to  be  considered.  "' 
The  Belgian  federalisation  process  during  the  period  between  the  1960s  and 
1990s  suggests  a  couple  of  features  that  led  to  a  stable  and  successful  transition  from  a 
unitary  to  federal  state.  First,  the  process  appears  to  be  more  important  than  the 
content  of  particular  stage  or  time.  As  Hooghe  observes,  in  the  federal  model  the 
actors  tended  to  pay  "more  attention  to  the  process  of  conflict  management  than  to  the 
outcome  in  terms  of  content.  "  i3'  In  Belgium,  an  alarm-bell  system,  a  `special 
majority,  '  and  a  transition  based  on  stages-i.  e.  negotiations  for  necessary 
implementation  laws  and  then  incarnation  of  agreement  in  the  constitution,  for 
instance  the  revision  of  the  Constitution  in  1980  was  to  reflect  the  Egmont  Pact  of 
1978-became  a  guarantee  of  no  turning-back,  and  thus  made  the  transition  process 
moves  forward. 
Second,  the  Belgian  experience  also  emphasised  the  importance  of  regional 
parties  in  the  transition.  During  the  transition  period,  regional  parties  enjoyed  their 
power  of  'casting-vote'  in  forming  coalition  governments  with  their  relatively  small 
numbers  of  parliamentary  seats.  Negotiations,  particularly  during  the  first  and  second 
stages,  were  normally  conducted  before  a  coalition  was  formed,  in  which  regional 
parties  could  strongly  put  forward  their  demands,  facilitating  the  federalisation 
process,  as  in  Spain. 
Finally,  the  Belgian  case  suggests  some  useful  measures-a  combination  of 
`separate  treatment'  and  multilateral  agreement  pacts  through  official  and  unofficial 
channels,  and  of  recognition  of  principles  and  'provisional  measures-=in  -building 
consensus  among  the  regional  or  nationwide  political  actors.  The  federal  constituents 
of  Belgium  enjoy  a  rather  different  competence,  as  already  mentioned,  as  a  result  of 
separate  negotiation.  However,  in  addition  to  separate  negotiation,  multiparty  pacts 
such  as  the  Egmont  Pact  and  the  Accord  de  la  St  Michel  had  also  been  achieved,  and 
emphasis  the  appeared  to  be  placed  on  nultiparty  pacts  than  on  separate  negotiations. 
Although  asymmetric  state  structure  and  competences  remain  problematical,  it  would 
not  be  desirable  to  simply  ignore  regional  peculiarities.  In  this  context,  the  Belgian 
government  employed  another  tactic:  recognition  of  changes  in  principle  with 
transitional  arrangements.  For  instance,  Bill  no.  461  of  1978  stipulated  the 
establishment  of  separate  elections  on  the  basis  of  direct  elections  for  the  regional  and 
community  legislatures  in  principle,  it  still  proposed  that  the  elections  would  be  held 
later.  138  However  it  still  proposed  that  the  elections  would  be  held  later.  The  elections (Chapter  10  62 
for  regional  councils-as  already  in  the  German  community  council  and  Brussels 
regional  councils-would  be  held  together  with  European  election  of  1999  in 
accordance  with  the  Accord  de  la  St  Michel  of  1992. 
I)  In  his  discussion  of  the  "federalisation"  process  in  Spain,  Agranoff  maintains  that  the 
developments  in  Spain  represent  "post-modem"  federalism  which  means  "reconstruction  of  states 
reflecting  the  paradigm  shift  to  federal  non-centralisation  based  on  forms  of  power  sharing.  "  Robert 
Agranoff,  "Federal  Evolution  in  Spain,  "  International  Political  Science  Review,  vol.  17,  no.  4  (October 
1996),  p.  386.  For  a  further  discussion  of  the  paradigm  shift  in  this  context,  see  Daniel  J.  Elazar,  "From 
Statism  to  Federalism:  A  Paradigm  Shift,  "  ibid.,  pp.  417-429. 
_)  Agranoff  and  Gallatin  suggest  that  it  would  be  possible  to  discuss  the  centre-periphery  relations 
in  Russia  in  line  with  the  discussion  of  a  number  of  countries  that  are  in  transformation  "from  unitary  to 
federal"  such  as  Spain,  Belgium,  Ethiopia,  and  South  Africa.  Robert  Agranoff  and  Juan  Antonoi  Ramos 
Gallatin,  "Toward  Federal  Democracy  in  Spain:  An  Examination  of  Intergovernmental  Relations,  " 
Publius:  The  Journal  of  Federalism,  vol.  27,  no.  4  (Fall  1997),  p.  2. 
3)  For  instance,  Elazar  clearly  showed  varieties  of  centre-periphery  relations  using  various  sets  of 
factors  such  as  structure  and  process.  See  Daniel  J.  Elazar,  "The  Role  of  Federalism  in  Political 
Integration,  "  in  Elazar  (ed.  ),  Federalism  and  Political  Integration  (Tel  Aviv:  Turtledove  Publishing, 
1979),  pp.  13-57,27;  Daniel  J.  Elazar,  "Contrasting  Unitary  and  Federal  System,  "  International  Political 
Science  Review,  vol.  18,  no.  3  (July  1997),  pp.  237.251;  and  Edward  C.  Page,  "Patterns  and  Diversity  in 
European  State  Development,  "  in  Jack  Hayward  and  Edward  C.  Page  (eds.  ),  Governing  the  New  Europe 
(Cambridge:  Polity  Press,  1995),  pp.  9-43. 
")  In  his  discussion  of  principles  of  federal  evolution,  Agranoff  maintained  that  "the  act  of 
creating  a  federation  is  not  the  only  way  of  federal  design,  "  and  that  "unitary  states  can  differentiate 
themselves  and  build  in  such  arrangement,  as  Spain  is  doing,  representing  a  federation  in  process.  " 
According  to  him,  a  formal  or  constitutionally  created  federation  was  not  the  route  to  federalism  in  the 
"post-modem"  trends.  He  suggests  that  "federal  compacting"  or  "covenanting"  could  be  an  alternative 
way  of  creating  federation  through  "self-rule  plus  shared  rule.  "  Robert  Agranoff,  "Federal  Evolution  in 
Spain,  "  International  Political  Science  Review,  vol.  17,  no.  4  (October  1996),  p.  386.  According  to 
Elazar,  "self-rule  and  shared  rule"  is  the  simplest  definition  of  federalism.  Daniel  J.  Elazar,  Exploring 
Federalism  (Tusaloosa  and  London:  The  University  of  Alabama  Press,  1987),  p.  12. 
s)  Theorists  of  modernisation  have  argued  that  the  territory  is  a  feature  of  a  'traditional'  society, 
and  thus  would  diminish  in  accordance  with  the  socio-economic  changes.  For  instance,  Durkheim  argued 
that  territorial  criterion  would  be  replaced  by  functional  one  in  the  development  of  division  of  labour  and 
organisation  of  society.  Emile  Durkheim,  George  Simpson  (trans.  ),  The  Division  of  Labour  in  Society 
(London:  Collier  Macmillan,  1964),  pp.  27.28,187.  Deutsch  also  argued  that  territorial  cleavages  would 
give  away  to  economic  one  as  peripheral  territories  were  incorporated  into  national  political  and  social 
system.  Karl  Deutsch,  Nationalism  and  Social  Communication:  An  Inquiry  Into  the  Foundations  of 
Nationality  (Cambridge,  M.  A.:  MIT  Press,  1966),  pp.  97,102-103.  Such  arguments  are  continued  in  the (Chapter  11)  63 
1990s  with  the  emphasis  of  spreading  global  influence  of  economics,  culture,  and  politics.  See  Bertrand 
Badie,  La  fin  des  territoires:  Essai  sur  le  desordre  international  et  sur  l'etilitd  sociale  du  respect  (Paris: 
Fayard,  1995). 
6)  The  influence  of  regions  keep  appearing  as  a  key  factor  in  the  changes  of  state  structure,  not 
only  in  the  former  Soviet  countries  but  also  in  the  rest  of  the  world.  For  an  exploration  of  recent 
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Revitalisation  of  Regionalism  in  the  SIBFE 
Regionalism  in  Siberia  and  the  Russian  Far  East  (SIBFE)  has  a  long  history 
which  dates  back  to  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Being  aware  of  the 
backwardness  of  their  'homeland,  '  a  group  of  students  from  Siberia  in  St.  Petersburg 
led  by  N.  M.  Iadrintsev  and  G.  N.  Potanin-both  are  also  students  then-raised  the 
question  of  'colonial'  appendage  in  connection  with  the  relationship  between  the 
Siberian  regions  and  the  European  part  of  Russia,  '  Discussing  the  negative  impact  of 
central  policies  in  the  region,  they  advocated  decentralisation  and  political,  economic 
and  cultural  autonomy  as  solutions  to  the  backwardness  of  Siberian  socio-economic 
conditions.  According  to  Allison's  observation,  the  main  concerns  of  the  'forefathers' 
of  Siberian  regionalism  could  be  divided  into  four  areas:  the  economic  exploitation  of 
Siberia  by  the  European  part  of  Russia,  the  deteriorating  living  conditions  of  the  native 
people  in  Siberia,  the  pernicious  effects  of  the  prisoner  exile  system,  and  the  need  for 
local  autonomy  in  order  to  realise  Siberia's  own  destiny  and  potentials? 
Early  Siberian  regionalism  reached  its  culmination  when  the  Siberian  Regional 
Union  Congress  was  convened  in  1905,.  At  the  Congress,  the  delegates  demanded 
regional  autonomy  with  an  independent  Siberian  Duma,  local  finance,  and  local 
legislation.  '  Siberian  regionalist  demands  developed  into  more  separatist  tendencies  in 
the  1910s.  In  March  1917,  the  committee  of  the  Siberian  Democratic  Federalist  Party 
in  Verkhneudinsk  (Ulan-Ude)  issued  a  draft  `minimum  programme'  that  included  the 
creation  of  a  'United  State  of  Siberia.  "  Separatist  goals  were  again  clearly  articulated 
when  the  First  Siberian  Regional  Conference  was  held  on  8  August  1917  in  Tomsk.  At 
the  conference,  more  ardent  desires  for  a  Siberian  statehood  were  witnessed  when  a 
Siberian  Duma  and  a  Siberian  Soviet  were  proposed,  and  a  Siberian  flag  was  adopted.  ' 
In  January  1918,  the  Siberian  Regional  Duma  established  the  Provisional  Government 
of  Autonomous  Siberia,  and  the  new  Provisional  Government  of  Siberia  in  Omsk 
declared  Siberian  independence  in  July  1918.6  Although  such  a  development  was (Chapter  Iln  73 
arrested  when  Stalin  began  to  rein  in  regionalist  tendencies,  it  sporadically  came  to  the 
surface  during  the  Soviet  period! 
After  perestroika,  regionalism  has  reappeared  in  the  SIBFE,  because  of  the 
disparities  between  the  region's  increasing  economic  contribution  and  the  declining 
living  standards  in  the  area.  Since  the  `colonial'  relations  of  the  SIBFE  with  the  centre 
remained  unchanged,  most  current  demands  were  echoed  the  early  regionalist 
demands!  The  association  of  deputies  from  the  SIBFE  regions  was  formed  at  the  end 
of  1989,  which  was  soon  followed  by  the  regional  associations  in  the  SIBFE.  In 
March  1992,  the  first  Congress  of  the  People's  Deputies  (CPD)  of  Siberia  was  held  in 
Krasnoiarsk  which  sought  to  link  the  regional  associations  and  their  deputies  in  the 
CPD  of  Russia.  Deputies  also  demanded  regional  autonomy  in  their  economic  and 
political  relations  with  the  centre.  The  questions  of  the  restoration  of  the  Far  Eastern 
Republic  and  an  establishment  of  a  Siberian  republic  again  appeared  in  their 
discussion.  Although  the  majority  of  the  general  public  did  not  support  the  idea,  ' 
Although  the  majority  of  the  general  public  did  not  support  the  idea,  "  the  experience 
of  autonomy-i.  e.  the  Far  Eastern  Republic"-supported  the  development  of 
regionalism,  as  already  discussed  in  Chapter  2. 
What  has  made  the  regions  reappear  on  the  surface  in  Russian  politics?  What 
are  the  demands  of  the  SIBFE  regions  in  particular?  In  the  process  of  economic 
reform,  some  changes  were  regarded  as  threats  or  possible  threats  to  the  SIBFE 
regions.  Firstly,  the  changing  economic  development  strategy  posed  a  considerable 
threat  to  the  SIBFE  regions.  When  the  past  strategy  of  extensive  growth  was  replaced 
by  an  intensive  growth  strategy,  investment  priorities  could  be  shifted  to  the  European 
part  of  Russia  where  infrastructures  were  relatively  well  developed.  Secondly,  the 
central  drive  for  economic  self-accountancy  and  price  liberalisation  also  caused 
serious  problems  in  the  delivery  of  necessary  goods.  As  for  the  SIBFE  regions, 
'marketisation'  could  lead  to  a  substantial  increase  in  the  cost  of  transportation  and  the 
prices  of  goods  and  services,  By  contrast,  the  price  of  resources,  the  main  products  of 
the  SIBFE,  remained  under  state  control.  The  changes  aggravated  the  living  standards 
in  the  SIBFE.  In  the  process,  the  regions  were  inclined  to  create  a  regional  barter 
system  and  to  claim  the  right  with  their  own  resources  and  wealth  to  cope  with  socio- 
economic  crises  in  the  regions. 
However,  the  economic  disadvantages  of  a  region  do  not  necessarily  develop 
into  regionalism  or  regionalisation  of  reform  on  a  massive  scale.  The  political  reforms 
followed  by  perestroika  also  supported  the  regional  manoeuvre.  First  of  all,  glasnost' (Chapter  Ill)  74 
encouraged  the  development  of  regionalism  by  revealing  socio-economic  disparities 
between  the  SIBFE  and  the  European  part  of  Russia.  Secondly,  'democratisation' 
enabled  regions  to  discuss  their  situations  from  a  regional  point  of  view,  and  to 
articulate  their  interests  more  openly.  Changes  in  political  structures  such  as  the 
abolition  of  the  CPSU,  the  introduction  of  a  new  parliamentary  system  and  the  collapse 
of  the  Soviet  Union  also  provided  regions  with  opportunities  to  initiate  more  'genuine' 
federal  relations.  Elections  to  the  local  leaderships  also  have  turned  local  leaders  more 
into  agents  of  regional  interests  than  those  of  the  centre.  Furthermore,  power  struggles 
at  the  centre  weakened  centripetal  power,  which  in  return  strengthened  the  power  of 
regions  in  the  relationship  between  centre  and  peripheries.  As  a  result  of  the  shifting 
balance  of  power  between  centre  and  regions,  the  centre  employed  bilateral 
negotiations  which  had  double-sided  effects  on  the  development  of  regionalism. 
Bilateral  negotiations  encouraged  copy-cat  demands,  but  at  the  same  time,  weakened 
regionalism  by  providing  the  regions  with  various  paths  to  attain  their  goals  and  thus 
hampered  coordination  efforts.  The  latter  aspect  of  bilateral  negotiations  will  be 
discussed  in  Chapter  7. 
In  this  chapter,  the  peculiar  economic  structure  of  the  SIBFE  regions,  political 
and  economic  changes  and  their  impact  on  the  SIBFE  regions,  and  the  SIBFE's 
demands  will  be  discussed.  The  chapter  also  includes  an  analysis  of  within-group 
disparities  by  scrutinising  the  socio-economic  conditions  of  individual  administrative 
units  in  order  to  examine  the  possible  level  of  coordination  among  the  SIBFE  regions. 
111.1.  The  SIBFE  as  a  Resource  Appendage 
III  1.  (1)  The  Resource-Oriented  Industrial  Structure  of  the  SIB  FE 
The  SIBFE  regions  have  long  been  regarded  as  resource  frontiers  that  have 
served  the  needs  of  the  Russian  heartland.  During  the  Tsarist  period,  the  SIBFE 
provided  the  European  part  of  Russia  not  only  with  their  agricultural  products,  but  also 
with  their  natural  resources  such  as  fur,  fish,  and  non-ferrous  metals.  In  the  nineteenth 
century,  non-ferrous  metal  production  became  a  main  stimulus  of  colonisation  of  the 
SIBFE,  replacing  the  fur  trade.  During  1882-1893,  the  SIBFE  produced  about  75  per 
cent  of  Russia's  entire  gold  output.  12  By  1910,  gold  regions  such  as  Vitim,  Zeia, 
Bureia,  Olekminsk,  Amursk,  Maritime  and  Ussuriisk  were  producing  about  one-third 
of  Russia's  gold  production-53,800  pounds,  worth  290  million  rubles.  13 (Chapter  111)  75 
Perhaps  more  importantly,  the  SIBFE  was  providing  the  European  part  of 
Russia  with  its  agricultural  products  until  the  early  nineteenth  century.  For  instance, 
the  SIBFE  accounted  for  nearly  90  per  cent  of  Russian  butter  exports  during  1906- 
1913.14  SIBFE  butter  was  the  fourth  main  `agricultural'-including  forest  and 
maritime  products-export  item  of  Russia,  only  surpassed  by  bread,  wheat  and  timber, 
In  1913,  the  SIBFE  exported  agricultural,  forest  and  maritime  products,  worth  148 
million  rubles,  including  butter  (66  million  rubles),  fur  (28  million  rubles),  meat  (10.5 
million  rubles),  and  fish  (1.4  million  rubles).  " 
During  the  Soviet  period,  the  SIBFE  continued  to  be  viewed  as  a  resource 
frontier.  Under  Stalin,  the  regions  were  producing  more  resources  in  order  to  meet  the 
need  for  extensive  growth.  In  particular,  Soviet  regional  or  regional  location  policies 
had  emphasised  the  need  to  reduce  transportation  costs  by  locating  industries  close  to 
the  resources  used,  and  to  the  markets.  Furthermore,  in  order  to  maximise  economies 
of  scale,  economic  regions  had  been  specialised.  When  the  Soviet  economy  started  to 
stagnate  in  the  1960s,  consistently  increasing  consumption  of  resources  per  unit  of 
production  resulted  in  a  series  of  massive  search  projects  that  intensified  the 
development  of  resource  industries  in  the  SIBFE. 
In  addition,  a  strategic  consideration  also  affected  the  industrial  structure  of  the 
SIBFE,  particularly  in  the  Russian  Far  East,  mainly  because  of  its  remoteness  from  the 
European  part  of  Russia.  This  strategic  consideration  emerged  after  World  war  11.11 
Because  of  this  consideration,  machine-building  industries  in  the  Far  East  were 
developed  for  primarily  military  purposes.  Such  a  structure  became  a  heavy  burden 
for  some  Far  Eastern  regions-e.  g.  Primorskii  and  Khabarovsk  krais  and  Amur 
oblast-in  the  process  of  conversion  of  the  military  industrial  complex.  "  The  burden 
in  turn  contributed  to  the  development  of  regionalism  in  the  Russian  Far  East. 
As  a  result  of  regional  specialisation  policies,  the  SIBFE  became  ever  more 
specialised  in  raw  resources  production  (fossil  fuel  and  non-ferrous  metals),  energy, 
and  energy  intensive  industries  in  general  (see  Table  3.1.1).  In  particular,  the 
industrial  structure  of  the  SIBFE  shows  that  the  region  was  rather  dominated  by  one  or 
two  industrial  sectors.  For  instance,  fossil  fuel  industries  accounted  for  almost  half  the 
industrial  production  in  Western  Siberia  in  1993.  In  Eastern  Siberia,  fossil  fuel  and 
non-ferrous  metal  industries  consisted  more  than  half  the  industrial  production.  In  the 
Far  East,  non-ferrous  metal  and  food  processing  sectors  produced  more  than  53  per 
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The  patterns  of  regional  division  of  labour  are  clearly  evident  when  the 
production  share  of  economic  regions  in  each  industrial  sector  is  considered.  For 
instance,  Western  Siberia-more  exactly  Khanty-Mansi  and  Iamalo-Nenets 
autonomous  okrugs-produced  67.9  per  cent  of  the  whole  gas  condensed  oil 
production  of  Russia  in  1985,  which  increased  to  70.9  per  cent  during  1990-1993.  The 
region  also  produced  82.4  per  cent  of  Russia's  natural  gas  in  1985,  which  also  rose  to 
more  than  90  per  cent  during  1990-1993  because  of  declining  gas  production  in  the 
Urals.  As  for  coal  production,  the  SIBFE  accounted  for  72.4  per  cent  of  the  whole  coal 
production  in  Russia  in  1985  and  76.4  per  cent  during  1990-1993.  The  region  also 
produced  more  than  60  per  cent  of  fish  and  maritime  products  (mainly  in  the  Far 
Eastern  regions),  and  more  than  30  per  cent  of  sawn  timber  and  cellulose,  chemical 
fabric,  and  plastics.  By  contrast,  the  region  made  a  modest  contribution  in 
manufacturing  sectors  such  as  paper,  ferrous  metallurgy,  construction  materials  and 
machine  building-excluding  military  purpose  machine  building-sectors  in  which 
the  European  part  of  Russia  has  made  the  largest  contributions.  " M 
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III.  1.  (2)  Perestroika  as  a  Crisis  for  the  SIBFR 
Under  such  a  specialised  economic  structure,  perestroika  had  become  a  crisis  as 
well  as  an  opportunity  for  the  regions.  In  terms  of  a  crisis,  the  SIBFE  economy  was 
facing  a  three-dimensional  threat:  continuing  economic  decline,  changing  investment 
priorities,  and  self-accountancy  under  the  `absurd'  price  system.  First,  although  it  was 
not  confined  to  the  SIBFE,  a  drastic  economic  decline  had  been  witnessed  in  the 
SIBFE  since  the  1980s  which  triggered  regionalist  resentment  against  the  central 
authorities  and  central  economic  policies.  A  physical  industrial  production  indicator 
showed  that  Russian  industrial  production  had  fallen  by  nearly  35  per  cent  in  1993  and 
just  to  half  in  1995  compared  to  the  production  level  of  1989.  Industrial  production 
had  fallen  more  severely  in  relatively  more  industrialised  regions  such  as  Central 
region  and  the  Urals  than  other  economic  regions.  In  general,  the  physical  industrial 
production  of  the  SIBFE  regions  had  fallen  by  about  30  per  cent  in  1993,  compared  to 
the  1989  level. 
These  general  indicators  and  the  expanding  share  of  industrial  production  of  the 
SIBFE  in  terms  of  monetary  value  during  1990-1993  seem  to  suggest  that  the 
industrial  decline  in  the  SIBFE  was  relatively  less  disastrous  than  other  economic 
regions.  However,  the  SIBFE's  increasing  share  of  the  whole  industrial  production  in 
monetary  terms  was  partly  because  of  the  decreasing  contribution  of  other  economic 
regions,  and  the  increasing  prices  of  energy  resources  since  1992.  Furthermore,  the 
SIBFE's  major  industrial  sectors  suffered  a  relatively  high  degree  of  decline  in  terms 
of  physical  volume  in  the  early  1990s.  For  instance,  comparing  to  the  physical  volume 
production  of  1985,  gas  condensed  oil  and  maritime  production  had  fallen  by  nearly  35 
per  cent,  chemical  fabric  and  thread  by  more  than  50  per  cent,  and  steel  tube  by  nearly 
65  percent.  In  particular,  sawn  timber  production  had  decreased  by  75  per  cent  in  the 
SIBFE  as  a  whole,  and  nearly  90  per  cent  in  Eastern  Siberia  (see  Table  3.1.3). (Chapter  Iln  80 
<Table  3.1.3>  Industrial  Performance  of  the  SIBFE  Regions  (1990-1993) 
RF  SIBFE  West  East  Far  Other 
Total  Total  Siberia  Siberia  East  Regions 
1990  1993  1990  1993  1990  1993  1990  1993  1990  1993  1990  1993 
Territory  100.0 






m  nerarv  va 
14.0 
24.1  -  36.4  -  25.4 
6.2  5.4  -  38.2 
n  the  RF  total)  at  oraaucuQn  ºn  terms  o 
Share  100.0  100.0  20.3  27.8  10.6 
Physical  Industrial  Production  (1989100) 
Shift  (total)  99.9  64.8 
hin  ofPh 
5.7  7.7  5.0  6.1  79.7  71.2 
99.1  71.2  98.0  71.2  98.0  71.1 
DR  DY_17ER74,  '  9'!  00 
(Fossil  Fuel  &  Energy) 
oil  95.3  65.3  101.9  66.3  102.0  66.3  --  77.2  64.7  80.7  63.0 
gas  138.6  133.9  150.9  147.9  150.8  147.8  177.1  175.5  79.5  66.0 
coal  100.0  77.4  104.6  81.0  103.0  73.6  111.9  96.1  96.5  76.1  88.1  68.0 
electricity  112.5  99.4  116.9  106.0  139.2  114.7  100.1  98.3  124.7  113.6  110.6  95.1 
(Timber  &  Fish) 
Timber  94.3  51.4  95.8  25.9  91.9  48.1  100.9  11.8  87.6  31.6  93.3  56.1 
fish  101.4  56.2  110.2  66.7  100.2  56.6  88.0  91.3  110.4  66.7  90.8  43.6 
(Metallurgy) 
Iron  ore  102.9  73.2  103.6  75.7  112.8  92.3  100,8  70.8  -  102.5  72.7 
smelt  cast 
iron  104.0  71.6  99.0  67.0  99.0  67.0  ---  105.1  72.9 
smelt  iron  101.0  65.8  98.7  63.2  96.8  63.9  84.7  45.2  131.2  67.2  101.5  66.3 
steel  tube  103.6  50.4  101.7  35.1  101.7  35.1  85.7  -  103.7  51.2 
(Chemicals) 
sulphur  106.2  68.6  140.0  69.0  100.3  69.3  250.0  133.0  127.8  35.9  103.1  68.6 
fertilizer  92.3  57.3  86.4  60.1  93.3  68.3  75.5  47.0  -  95.0  58.6 
chemical 
fabric  92.8  48.0  107.1  51.8  107.6  49.7  106.3  54.6  --  87.5  46.6 
plastic  108.1  74.5  152.7  85.4  145.6  74.3  164.4  104.6  183.3  100.0  95.4  71.5 
(Construction  Materials) 
reinforced 
concrete  110.7  70.3  122.8  65.4  124.0  71.8  128.1  69.8  115.2  49.1  107.6  71.8 
cement  105.0  63.1  108.9  52.1  111.5  59.3  114.8  56.2  98.1  37.1  103.8  66.3 
(Machine  Building  and  Domestic  Electronics) 
automobile 
crane  93.3  76.6  115.4  110.3  --  133.5  137.6  98.2  84.3  92.5  75.1 
automobile  94.7  82.1  ---"--  94.7  82.1 
freezer/ 
fridge  109.3  100.8  105.4  100.7  -  103.5  104.0  116.2  81.9  110.6  100.9 
washing 
machine  165.6  119.2  163.9  100.6  214.7  169.7  154.5  51.8  99.5  55.5  166.1  124.4 
TV  set  98.8  83.5  84.5  57.7  80.3  64.5  89.6  45.7  --  101.7  89.1 
Newly  developed  energy  resources  in  Eastern  Siberia  are  ignored. 
Shift  of  Physical  Industrial  Production  by  Industrial  Sectors  calculated  by  author. 
Sources:  Goskomstat,  Rossiiskaia  Federatsila  v  1992  godu:  statisticheskii  ezhegodnik  (Moscow: 
Respublikanskii  informatsiono-izdatel'skii  tsentr,  1993),  pp.  5-10;  Goskomstat,  Promyshlennost'  1996. (Chapter  Ill)  81 
Secondly,  the  shift  of  development  strategy  introduced  by  Gorbachev  was 
perceived  as  a  threat  to  the  SIBFE.  Gorbachev  emphasised  an  'intensive  growth' 
policy  that  was  based  on  scientific  and  technological  progress,  modernisation  of 
existing  facilities,  and  resource-saving  policies.  It  was  regarded  as  an  emphasis  on  the 
development  of  the  European  part  of  Russia  where  the  economic  potential  and 
infrastructure  was  relatively  well  developed.  '9  The  competition  for  investment 
between  the  European  part  of  Russia  and  the  SIBFE  has  a  long  history.  Even  after 
Central  Asia  was  ruled  out  of  the  competition  as  a  result  of  the  breakdown  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  still  the  same  unfavourable  factors  that  affected  the  ability  of  the  SIBFE 
regions  to  attract  investment-labour  shortage,  undeveloped  infrastructure,  harsh 
natural  conditions,  and  long  distances  from  the  Russian  heartland-remained 
unchanged.  20  Furthermore,  the  total  volume  of  investment  had  continued  to  decrease 
because  of  budget  deficits,  inflation,  wage  rises,  and  a  greater  priority  for  'non- 
production'  sectors.  According  to  the  Russian  Academy  of  Sciences  and  Reform 
International  Foundation,  capital  investment  had  decreased  by  48  per  cent  in  the  first 
nine  months  of  1992  alone  2' 
During  1985-1993,  most  of  the  economic  regions  received  capital  investment 
that  was  about  the  same  proportion  to  their  contribution  to  the  whole  industrial 
production  in  Russia.  However,  the  SIBFE  as  a  whole  received  about  one-third  of 
total  capital  investment  during  1985-1993,  which  was  larger  than  its  contribution  to 
industrial  production  and  population  size.  Despite  the  decreasing  capital  investment  in 
absolute  terms  in  Russia  as  a  whole,  the  SIBFE  steadily  received  about  the  same 
proportion-not  in  absolute  volume-of  investment. 
However,  the  problem  is  that  capital  investment  in  the  SIBFE  had  been 
concentrated  on  a  few  administrative  units  and  carried  out  in  a  highly  selective 
manner.  '  For  instance,  Tiumen  oblast  alone  took  nearly  ten  to  sixteen  per  cent  of  total 
investment  during  1985-1993,  although  the  absolute  volume  of  capital  investment  in 
the  oil/gas  industries  also  suffered  a  huge  cut  after  1989.  '  The  amount  allocated  to 
Tiumen  was  a  bit  smaller  than  the  amount  to  the  Central  regions,  about  the  same  as  to 
the  Urals,  and  larger  than  the  amount  taken  by  any  other  economic  region.  Therefore, 
as  the  falling  share  of  Eastern  Siberia  suggested,  the  increasing  share  of  Tiumen  and 
other  resource-rich  regions  were  fulfilled  at  the  cost  of  other  regions  in  the  SIBFE. .ý 8 
äm 












.r  v1  MN  00  N  d;  Yý  d'  Nj 
ýt-:  noOeP-d'G\c>  r-  ýo  b  viÖ 




rý  Oý(li  Nti  Oý1100ý  Vi  "i  C100  N1  V1tV 
14  N  00  viO00OÖ%00ýeh  1_  00  V1 
00  ý 
;ZN 





00  V'1000  d;.  +MNOONCý.  i  Cýl,  ý 
d  bCK  NO  vi 
00  .  "r  ýý  00 
r! 





09  etle;  ehettli  Cý00V1Mi  CýN  Vj.  "  O 
Vi  r1  N  V1  et  P  fV  be  eF  .r  oÖ  oo  er  -id 
00  N  00  00  00  00  0N  ýO  00  00  V1  [ý  Oh  r+  4r 
ýd  ..  +  rr  et  .4  .w 
M 
Oý 





ý  CýO  v1  N 
e+1  Y1  V1Öt  ÖPl00r+00ýt,  OMl+100 
V1  C1  OýD  v1  e+1  l-  O  00  in  00  l,  as  NM 




,0  r-  MQ  NNOM"  h-  ýýýN 
Y1  00  V1  1!  1  M  i-  Q1  00  00  r- 
V1  M  %wö  hÖ  Oý  ý  00  fV  V1  0e 





V1MCýNOýO00.  --iýOýOýDtýI-  pNNenGýMr+ýViO  V1O 
NN  fý  -N 
0 
CN ý 
V1  01  CA  a}  M  tý  lý  MýO  N  l-  -+  NM  lý 
Oeýe}'d:  VfvlýetrtvlOrl;  Oýd 
"-ý 
Ný 






VNO  00  00  ýD  On  v1  C  [-I  O;  Oý 
ýoC 
e+loy  -Ri  vi  ÖNý  ÖeMNý  V1ý 
N  lý  VjýCOtn  IýO  -NV;  Gs  Gs  OýO 
M  GI  tn  en  ý  -,:  r  q' 
.rt, 







09  c9  Cý  vryýývý  ri  Vi  19  aa 
wi  ýýOnýÖM  oo  d  %o  r- 
M  r+.. 
.r  rr  `p  IýD  00  IýO  en  IR  01  Yt  .r..  r  d'  -r  CT 
ý  v1  ýý  d'  it  c  t-  -O  en  oö  o  t-  Ný 
M  -0  ý 
ý 
00 
nnvOR  *q  oq  0)  v!  ryul  oq  aý 
Mýý 








ýa  3ý 




























;ý  h 

















































ý (Chapter  Il!  )  83 
Declining  investment  was  also  apparent  in  per  capita  capital  investment.  Most 
Siberian  regions-excluding  Kemerovo,  Tomsk,  Tiumen,  and  Krasnoiarsk-fell  short 
of  the  Russian  average.  Again,  per  capita  investment  in  Tiumen  oblast  was  nearly  five 
times  the  Russian  average  in  1990-1991,  and  increased  to  nearly  7.5  times  in  1992. 
Although  the  per  capita  investment  level  was  still  higher  in  the  Far  Eastern  regions 
than  the  Russian  average,  it  showed  decreasing  trends  during  1990-1993  with  a  few 
exceptional  cases  such  as  Tiumen,  Kemerovo,  Sakha,  and  Kamchatka. 
Thirdly,  economic  self-accounting  under  the  existing  price  system  became  a 
tangible  threat  to  the  SIBFE  regions.  It  is  understandable,  as  the  regions  were  to 
deliver  their  products  to  other  regions  in  return  for  the  products  they  lacked  under  the 
existing  regional  division  of  labour.  24  However,  self-accountancy  and  price 
liberalisation  delayed  delivery  of  goods  when  regions  and  enterprises  were  seeking 
more  favourable  terms  in  their  barter  relations  or  a  more  profitable  free  market.  In 
particular,  economic  self-accountancy  was  regarded  as  a  form  of  economic  sovereignty 
in  the  former  Union  republics  such  as  the  Baltic  republics,  and  often  resulted  in  control 
over  the  transfer  of  goods  for  `domestic'  consumption.  Such  a  trend  was  regarded  as  a 
serious  threat  to  the  economy  and  became  a  major  focus  of  debate  in  the  USSR  CPD, 
as  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  3. 
The  main  problems  of  self-accountancy  did  not  come  from  the  idea  itself,  but 
from  the  price  system,  which  would  leave  many  regions  and  enterprises  unable  to 
sustain  their  own  economy.  The  Soviet  price  system  was  a  `two-tier'  one.  Under  the 
system,  the  prices  of  raw  materials  and  agricultural  products  were  lower  than  the 
international  price.  By  contrast,  those  of  manufactured  goods  were  formed  to  have 
more  profits,  although  of  which  about  60  per  cent  would  go  into  the  national  budget  u 
As  Aganbegian  noted,  the  price  system  ignored  the  cost  concept  and  assumed 
resources  were  available  to  an  enterprise  `for  free.  '  According  to  him,  two  immediate 
problems-the  difference  in  prices  between  raw  resources  and  manufactured  goods, 
and  between  industrial  and  agricultural  products-had  to  be  sorted  out  before  any 
significant  self-accountancy  measures  could  be  taken.  In  order  to  tackle  the  problems, 
he  suggested  to  double  the  prices  of  raw  materials  at  least,  while  the  prices  of  other 
manufactured  goods  had  to  be  held  to  a  lower  level  of  increase  or  even  a  decrease  26 
Under  the  given  price  system,  economic  self-accountancy  seemed  to  be  a  threat 
rather  than  an  opportunity  for  the  SIBFE  regions.  Despite  the  need  to  adjust  the  price 
system,  however,  the  prices  of  agricultural  products  showed  relatively  lower  levels  of (Chapter  un  84 
increase  than  industrial  products?  '  Although  energy  prices  were  raised  higher  than  the 
average  price  rise  in  the  industrial  sector  in  January  1992,  still  the  price  of  crude  oil, 
gas,  and  coal  was  relatively  lower  than  that  of  processed  goods  such  as  gasoline  and 
diesel  fuel,  little  of  which  was  produced  in  the  SIBFE. 
<Table  3.1.5>  Price  of  Energy  Resources  (1991-1993) 
1991  1992  1993 
Crude  Oil  0.07  3.6  22.3 
Gasoline  0.1  6.1  54.2 
Fuel  Diesel  0.1  5.6  54.1 
Heavy  Fuel  Oil  (Mazut)  0.006  2.9  21.7 
Gas  (1,000  m)  0.001  0.2  1.2 
Coal  0.002  0.7  5.1- 
1,000  rubles/ton 
Source:  Goskomstat,  Rossliskil  statisticheskii  ezhegodnik  1996,  p.  399. 
In  this  regard,  the  SIBFE  regions  were  far  from  benefiting  from  the  process  of 
price  liberalisation,  which  developed  into  a  main  resentment  of  the  SIBFE.  18 
111.2.  Deteriorating  Living  Standards  and  Social  Conditions 
The  question  of  underdeveloped  social  conditions  in  the  SIBFE  and  the  need  to 
bridge  the  gap  between  the  European  part  of  Russia  and  the  SIBFE  had  been 
recognised  not  only  by  the  SIBFE  regional  authorities,  but  also  by  the  central 
authorities.  29  Despite  the  concerns,  however,  living  conditions  in  the  SIBFE  had  been 
deteriorating  after  perestroika. 
First  of  all,  despite  the  higher  monetary  income  levels  in  the  SIBFE  than  in  the 
European  part  of  Russia,  'real'  income  had  decreased  after  price  liberalisation, 
launched  in  January  1992.  Secondly,  the  consumption  of  goods  and  services  had  fallen 
because  of  the  lack  of  purchasing  power  and  supplies.  In  particular,  the  state  delivery 
system  and  enterprises  that  provided  a  major  portion  of  consumer  goods  and  local 
public  services,  had  withdrawn  from  these  sectors  to  survive  the  self-accounting  drive. 
Thirdly,  environmental  disasters  aggravated  living  conditions,  together  with  harsh 
natural  surroundings.  In  particular,  enterprises  under  the  Union  ministries  had  seldom 
taken  the  social  costs  of  their  economic  activities  into  account,  which  often  caused 
threats  to  natural  environments  and  the  traditional  ways  of  life  of  ethnic  minority 
groups. (Chapter  Iln  85 
Such  circumstances  led  regional  authorities  and  the  grassroots  to  complain 
about  living  conditions  in  the  SIBFE.  For  instance,  an  initiative  group  of  SIBFE 
deputies  in  the  USSR  CPD  adopted  a  draft  platform  at  a  meeting  in  Novosibirsk  in 
January  1990,  showing  their  concerns  about  the  development  of  living  conditions  in 
the  area: 
In  Siberia  and  the  Soviet  Far  East,  infant  mortality  reaches  20-40  per  cent 
and  mortality  between  the  age  of  16-45  is  1.2-2.3  times  higher  than  the  European 
parts  of  Russia.  Life  expectancy  is  five  to  seven  years  shorter  than  the  average  of 
the  RSFSR. 
... 
One-third  of  population  does  not  have  proper  education  and  health 
care.  Siberians  and  Far  Easterners  are  2.2-2.5  times-6.7  times  in  Tiumen-more 
exposed  to  air  pollution  than  those  in  the  European  parts  of  Russia.  1° 
Similar  complains  were  repeatedly  expressed  at  the  First  Siberian  Congress  of 
the  People's  Deputies,  held  in  Krasnoiarsk  in  March  1992.  In  the  meeting,  A. 
Novikov,  the  Chairman  of  Krasnoiarsk  kraisovet,  urged  the  central  authorities  to  take 
necessary  measures  to  deal  with  deteriorating  living  conditions  in  Siberia  which  were 
worse  than  in  the  central  regions  of  Russia.  "  The  feeling  of  crisis  was  shared  by  the 
grassroots  when  more  than  65  per  cent  of  Siberians  thought  their  material  well-being 
had  fallen  to  a  low  or  very  low  level,  and  more  than  80  per  cent  thought  they  simply 
could  not  cope  with  market  relations'  Such  deteriorating  social  conditions  and 
general  perceptions  on  the  matter  became  a  solid  basis  of  regionalist  movements  in  the 
area. 
1112  (1)  Deteriorating  'Real'  Income  and  Expenditure  Level 
During  the  Soviet  period,  harsh  natural  and  climatic  conditions  were  perceived 
as  an  obstacle  to  the  economic  activities  in  the  area  not  only  because  they  decreased 
the  productivity  of  labour  and  capital  investment,  but  also  because  they  worsened 
chronic  labour  shortage  problems  in  the  Far  Northern  and  the  SIBFE  regions.  As  part 
of  the  solution,  wages  had  been  set  considerably  higher  in  the  area  and  central 
subsidies  had  been  given  to  deliveries  of  necessary  goods,  although  these  measures 
failed  to  cope  with  the  problems.  "  Furthermore,  after  perestroika,  these  measures  to 
deal  with  the  peculiar  local  situation  had  almost  collapsed,  particularly  when  price 
liberalisation  and  decreasing  central  subsidies  caused  a  price  rise  in  the  area,  lowering 
'real'  income  levels.  34 (Chapter  Iln  86 
As  shown  in  Table  3.2.1,  industrial  workers  in  four  planning  regions  such  as  the 
North,  Western  and  Eastern  Siberia  and  the  Far  East  received  much  higher  wages  than 
those  in  other  regions  of  Russia.  Even  under  the  economic  reform,  the  wage  gap 
between  these  four  economic  regions  and  others  grew  wider.  In  particular,  workers  in 
the  Far  East  received  almost  double  the  national  average  wage  in  1993. 
<Table  3.2.1>  Average  Monthly  Wage  of  Industrial  Production  Personnel  (1985-1993) 
Average  Monthly  Wage  %  to  RF  Average 
1985  1990  1991  1992  1993  1985  1990  1991  1992  1993 
North  289.6  405.7  764.1  10336.3  92.7  131.7  130.5  126.2  146.3  146.2 
Northwest  202.4  293.3  559.8  5225.9  47.8  92.0  94.3  92.4  74.0  75.4 
Central  195.9  282.7  552.4  5524.3  48.5  89.1  90.9  91.2  78.2  76.5 
Volgo-Viatka  195.7  273.1  510.1  5344.3  49.8  89.0  87.8  84.2  75.7  78.5 
Cen  Chernozem  189.0  268.0  512.4  5800.5  50.8  85.9  86.2  84.6  82.1  80.1 
Volga  197.6  275.4  512.9  5862.2  54.5  89.9  88.6  84.7  83.0  86.0 
North  Caucasus  192.5  272.3  523.9  5234.3  45.4  87.5  87.6  86.5  74.1  71.6 
Urals  217.2  306.1  603.1  7403.1  63.1  98.8  98.5  99.6  104.8  99.5 
West  Siberia  250.5  364.8  742.4  10146.5  90.4  113.9  117.3  122.6  143.6  142.6 
East  Siberia  260.7  368.7  782.8  10864.2  94.0  118.6  118.6  129.2  153.8  148.3 
Far  East  341.2  484.9  929.2  11822.7  126.7  155.2  156.0  153.4  167.4  199.8 
Kaliningrad  ob  214.1  297.9  556.9  5037.5  49.2  97.4  95.8  91.9  71.3  77.6 
RF  Average  219.9  310.9  605.7  7064.0  63.4  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Wages  in  rubles  until  1992,  and  1,000  rubles  in  1993 
Source:  Goskomstat,  Promyshlennost'  1996,  pp.  271-273. 
Due  to  high  wages,  monetary  income  levels  were  also  higher  in  the  SIBFE  and 
the  North  than  in  any  other  region.  "  However,  a  higher  monetary  income  level  does 
not  necessarily  mean  a  higher  level  of  real  income  in  Russia,  since  it  fails  to  reflect  the 
real  purchasing  power  of  income  because  of  the  wide  variety  of  prices  of  goods  and 
services.  For  instance,  as  far  as  monetary  income  and  expenditure  were  concerned, 
most  SIBFE  regions  including  Altai  krai  and  the  Republic  of  Tyva  showed  higher 
income  levels  than  other  administrative  units  in  the  Russian  Federation.  However,  at 
the  same  time,  the  prices  of  basic  goods  in  the  SIBFE  cities  were  much  higher  than  in 
the  most  cities  of  the  European  part  of  Russia. 
Considered  in  terms  of  a  basket  in  which  included  the  most  important 
foodstuffs-a  kilogram  of  beef,  sausage,  bread,  animal  butter,  vegetable  butter,  potato, 
a  litre  of  milk,  and  ten  eggs-the  price  of  a  basket  was  highest  in  the  Far  East.  For 
instance,  a  basket  of  basic  foodstuffs  cost  about  4,500  rubles  in  Ulianovsk,  but  about 
26,000  rubles  in  Magadan  in  1993.  All  other  SIBFE  cities  ranked  high  in  terms  of 
living  costs,  although  Omsk,  Ulan-Ude  in  Buriatiia,  and  Kyzyl  in  Tyva  could  be 
exceptional  cases. (Chapter!!  n  87 
<Table  3.2.2>  Per  Household  Income  and  Expenditure  (the  First  Quarter  of  1993) 
Planning 
Monetary 






(%  of 
Regions  income  expenditure  (basket)  income  expenditure  income 
North  17695.6  9549.5  11008.2  1.6  0.9  45.3 
Northwest  9379.4  7298.1  9269.3  1.0  0.8  22.6 
Central  9736.4  7755.6  8895.3  1.1  0.9  21.3 
Volgo-Viatka  8547.5  6075.1  9228.0  0.9  0.7  29.0 
Central  Chernozem  8853.1  5980.9  8306.2  1.1  0.7  32.4 
Volga  9675.7  6020.6  8710.5  1.2  0.7  35.8 
North  Caucasus  6455.4  3163.2  9419.9  0.7  0.3  51.7 
Urals  11302.0  6900.6  10987.0  1.0  0.6  38.5 
West  Siberia  14756.1  6667.7  11739.6  1.3  0.6  54.6 
East  Siberia  12122.6  6831.5  10921.4  1.1  0.6  43.6 
Far  East  20542.9  10525.6  18143.3  1.1  0.6  46.5 
Kaliningrad  ob  7477.3  7858.7  9460.0  0.8  0.8  -5.1 
Moscow  oblast,  Leningrad  oblast,  Jewish  autonomous  oblast,  and  autonomous  okrugs  are  excluded  in  the 
table  because  average  prices  are  not  available. 
Sources:  Goskomstat,  Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe  polozhenle  RF  v  ianvare-marte  1993  goda,  pp.  145-146 
(monetary  income  and  expenditure);  and  Rossiiskii  statisticheskii  ezhegodnik,  1994.  pp.  599-607  (prices  of 
basic  foodstuffs). 
Based  on  the  shopping  basket  price,  we  can  produce  an  indicator  which  gives  a 
rough  idea  of  real  purchasing  power.  In  addition,  we  can  develop  another  indicator  of 
consumption  levels  in  terms  of  the  units  of  basket  consumed,  without  considering  the 
prices  of  other  commodities  or  services.  "  In  terms  of  purchasing  power,  income  levels 
in  the  SIBFE  regions  were  drastically  decreased,  particularly  in  Primorskii, 
Khabarovsk,  Amur,  and  Sakhalin,  as  high  living  costs  were  compensated  by  high 
monetary  income.  Among  the  SIBFE  regions,  Tiumen,  Magadan  and  Irkutsk  oblasts, 
Krasnoiarsk  krai  and  Republic  of  Sakha  maintained  a  relatively  high  level  of  real 
income. 
As  far  as  the  consumption  aspect  is  concerned,  expenditure  in  terms  of  a 
shopping  basket  unit  suggests  that  consumption  levels  in  the  SIBFE  were  generally 
very  low.  "  Among  the  SIBFE  regions,  only  four  regions-Tiumen  obaast,  Krasnoiarsk 
krai,  Irkutsk  oblast,  and  Republic  of  Sakha-maintained  average  or  higher 
consumption  levels  than  the  Russian  average.  It  also  suggests  that  monetary 
expenditure  levels  were  rather  exaggerated  and  failed  to  reflect  the  prices  of  goods. 
For  instance,  per  household  monetary  expenditure  during  the  first  quarter  of  1993  was 
about  14,300  rubles  in  Magadan  oblast,  but  about  10,000  rubles  in  Tiumen  oblast. 
However,  in  terms  of  a  shopping  basket  unit,  people  in  Tiumen  (0.86)  consumed  more 
than  in  Magadan  (0.55),  although  they  spent  less  money. (Chapter  III)  88 
Obviously,  lower  levels  of  consumption  were  also  caused  by  a  shortage  of 
supplies,  though  it  was  not  a  new  problem  at  all.  However,  it  was  getting  worse  when 
the  state  delivery  system  was  being  replaced  by  a  market  system  which  was  far  from 
being  fully  developed.  38  Another  reason  could  be  rocketing  inflation  caused  by  price 
liberalisation  and  decreasing  subsidies  for  transportation  costs.  In  particular,  high 
monetary  incomes  combined  with  a  shortage  of  goods  fuelled  inflation,  and  thus  offset 
its  intended  positive  effect  39  In  this  regard,  a  relatively  high  proportion  of  savings 
may  indicate  that  people  in  the  area  were  rather  `forced'  to  save  their  incomes  40 
III.  20  Underdeveloped  Infrastructure  and  Public  Services 
Lower  level  of  consumption  in  the  SIBFE  can  also  be  found  in  the  public 
service  sector  such  as  housing,  education  and  cultural  facilities,  health  care,  heat  and 
water  supply,  communication,  roads,  and  so  on.  Even  without  considering  their 
quality,  housing,  road,  and  telephone  services  were  notably  undeveloped  in  the  SIBFE. 
The  problem  has  often  been  blamed  for  the  higher  level  of  emigration  from  the  area.  " 
During  the  Soviet  period,  investment  in  the  `non-productive'  sectors  had  been 
given  a  relatively  low  priority,  particularly  in  the  SIBFE.  42  Assumoptions  of  this  kind 
came  with  increasing  challenge.  The  mine  workers'  strikes  that  started  in  Kemerovo 
oblast  in  July  1989  and  soon  spread  all  over  the  mining  areas  were  in  past  an  extreme 
form  of  demand  for  the  development  of  the  social  sphere.  43  A  sign  of  change  in 
priorities  was  revealed  in  the  guidelines  for  the  Five-Year  Plan,  which  were  adopted  at 
the  27th  Party  Congress  of  the  CPSU  in  February  1986.44  As  a  result,  capital 
investment  for  the  non-production  sector  continuously  increased  from  27.4  per  cent  in 
1985  to  29.1  per  cent  in  1990,31.4  per  cent  in  1991,36.2  per  cent  in  1992,  and  41.5 
per  cent  in  1993  4s 
Despite  increasing  investment  and  constructions,  however,  problems  in  the 
social  sphere  such  as  housing,  heat  and  water  supplies  remained  acute  in  the  SIBFE  46 
First  of  all,  the  increasing  cost  of  construction  of  social  infrastructure  should  be 
blamed  for  the  situation.  The  cost  was  much  higher  in  the  SIBFE,  "  and  thus  a 
noticeably  growing  proportion  of  investment  to  the  social  sphere  still  failed  to  meet  the 
need.  Furthermore,  ever-increasing  costs  forced  enterprises,  which  were  facing  a  cost- 
accounting  drive,  to  withdraw  their  services  (sotskul'tbyt,  public  services  of 
enterprises'  responsibility),  which  local  authorities  also  found  it  difficult  to  finance.  " .ý 
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Secondly,  a  continuing  emphasis  on  the  development  of  the  social  sphere  was 
not  accompanied  by  the  delivery  of  necessary  materials  for  construction.  49  Despite  the 
growing  numbers  of  enterprises  and  their  performance  in  terms  of  monetary  value, 
physical  production  and  employees  in  this  sector  were  decreasing  in  the  early  1990s. 
Therefore,  it  was  getting  more  difficult  for  the  SIBFE  regions  to  procure  construction 
materials,  since  the  regions  had  a  weak  industrial  basis  of  construction  materials  (see 
Table  3.1.1),  and  thus  were  dependent  on  deliveries  of  construction  materials  from 
other  regions.  5° 
<Table  3.2.4>  General  Index  of  Construction  Material  Industry 
1970  1980  1990,1991  1992  1993 
Number  of  Enterprises  -  1971  2074  2217  5053  6767 
Production  Total  (bil  rub)  8.8  13.1  20.2  44.2  562  5125 
Production  in  Physical  Volume 
(%  of  previous  year)  109  101  99.1  98  80  84 
Number  of  Employees  (1000)  1111  1252  1097  1067  1136  1095 
Workers  among  Employees  954  1046  918  893  962  929 
Source:  Goskomstat,  Rossiiskii  statisticheskii  ezhegodnik  1996,  p.  532. 
Finally,  despite  some  advances  in  the  social  sector,  success  had  been  spoiled  by 
the  unbalanced  and  uncoordinated  development  of  other  social  sectors  in  the  SIBFE. 
Housing,  one  of  the  most  serious  problems  in  the  regions,  demonstrated  the 
seriousness  of  unbalanced  development.  Together  with  an  absolute  shortage  of 
housing  space,  about  20  per  cent  of  the  housing  stocks  in  Russia  did  not  (or  only 
partially)  have  running  water,  sewerage,  central  heating,  and  gas.  The  figure  was  still 
higher  in  the  Russian  Far  East  s',  According  to  Pinski,  only  30  per  cent  of  housing  was 
specially  designed  for  climatic  conditions  in  Siberia  in  the  early  1980x'2  Complains 
about  the  quality  of  housing-and  the  lack  of  water,  heat,  gas  and  electricity-were 
heard  in  other  SIBFE  regions,  particular  in  the  remote  rural  areas  where  those  supplies 
are  more  desperately  needed  to  survive  harsh  natural  and  climatic  conditions'' 
The  problems  of  unbalanced  development  were  again  demonstrated  when  the 
electricity  supply  deteriorated  in  the  Russian  Far  East.  A  relative  `success'  in  housing 
construction  in  the  area,  where  electricity  generating  capacity  was  very  low  (see  Table 
3.1.2),  made  this  success  almost  obsolete,  when  energy  shortages  forced  heat  to  be 
supplied  in  shifts,  leaving  rooms  temperatures  at  no  more  than  10  degrees  centigrade 
in  winter.  " (Chapter  1I1)  91 
Problems  are  also  found  in  other  social  sectors  such  as  health  care  and 
education.  As  far  as  the  numbers  of  doctors  and  hospital  beds  were  concerned,  people 
in  the  SIBFE  appeared  to  enjoy  about  the  same-or  even  better-level  of  services  as 
compared  with  the  European  part  of  Russia  (see  Table  3.2.3.  ).  However,  the  matter  is 
not  that  simple.  Similar  numbers  of  doctors  and  hospital  beds  in  a  far  wider  territory 
meant  that  locals  had  sometimes  to  make  a  long  journey  to  see  a  doctor  in  the  area 
where  the  transportation  system  was  much  worse.  "  It  might  also  mean  that  people  in 
the  SIBFE  had  less  opportunity  to  see  a  doctor.  Furthermore,  the  quality  of  medical 
service  was  rather  low,  considering  outdated  medical  facilities  and  the  shortage  of 
medicines  and  other  necessary  supplies  such  as  hot  water  and  heat  in  the  area.  56 
Furthermore,  a  reduction  of  medical  services  was  also  reported  in  the  Russian  Far  East, 
because  of  the  closing  down  of  state  medical  facilities.  " 
1112  (3)  Deteriorating  Environmental  Surroundingy 
Environmental  problems  constitute  another  important  aspect  of  living 
conditions.  During  the  Soviet  period,  a  series  of  laws  on  the  issue  were  adopted, 
particularly  under  Brezhnev.  38  However,  environmental  concerns  had  been  given  a 
lower  priority  than  economic  efficiency,  and  had  been  discussed  in  a  `corporatist' 
manner.  S9  Under  Gorbachev,  Soviet  environmental  policies  underwent  significant 
changes,  because  of  growing  worries  after  the  Chernobyl'  accident  in  April  1986  and 
widespread  environmental  activism  stimulated  by  ecological  glasnost  :  60  Despite  the 
changes,  however,  the  problems  remained  unsolved  during  the  Soviet  period,  mainly 
because  of  the  bureaucratic  resistance  of  the  central  ministries,  inefficient  facilities  to 
cope  with  the  problems,  a  shortage  of  financial  support,  and  lack  of  determination  of 
the  Soviet  authorities.  "  Ecological  problems  severely  damaged  living  conditions  in 
the  SIBFE,  and  thus  became  a  good  stimulus  for  active  public  participation. 
In  fact,  ecological  movements  were  launched  in  the  1960s  in  Siberia  after  the 
establishment  of  two  cellulose  plants  in  the  Lake  Baikal  in  1958  led  by  Grigorii 
Galazii,  director  of  the  Limnological  Institute  of  the  Siberian  Academy  of  Sciences.  ' 
In  March  1965,  an  appeal  entitled  "In  Defence  of  Lake  Baikal"  was  adopted  at  a 
congress  of  Russian  writers  ,9  and  soon  the  "Village  Prose  School"  was  formed  by 
Valentin  G.  Rasputin,  V.  Astafe'v  and  A.  V.  Skalon,  drawing  attentions  to 
environmental  problems,  " (Chapter  Iln  92 
Among  many  indicators  of  environmental  problems,  air  pollution  was  one  of  the 
main  complaints  of  the  SIBFE  regions.  Air  pollution  was  more  serious  in  regions  such 
as  the  Urals,  Western  and  Eastern  Siberia  where  extractive,  metallurgical,  and 
chemical  industries  were  developed.  "  The  Russian  Far  East,  where  a  relatively  small 
population  lived  on  a  huge  territory,  seemed  to  be  less  severely  affected  by  air 
pollution.  However,  relatively  densely  populated  cities  in  the  area  also  were  reported 
to  suffer  high  levels  of  pollution. 
<Table  3.2.5>  Emission  of  Dust  in  the  Atmosphere  from  Stationary  Sources  (1985- 
1993) 
Planning  1985  1990-93  Shift  (1993)  %  of  RF  Total 
Regions  (1000  t)  (1000  t)  (1985=100)  1985  1990-93 
North  3230  3168.5  85.4  8.2  10.7 
Northwest  1032  760.3  57.7  2.6  2.6 
Central  4471  2687.3  47.9  11.4  9.0 
Volgo-Viatka  1156  860.3  60.3  2.9  2.9 
Central  Chernozem  1529  963.0  47.4  3.9  3.2 
Volga  3078  2120.0  58.6  7.8  7.1 
North  Caucasus  1988  1315.3  42.9  5.1  4.4 
Urals  9197  7102.0  63.5  23.4  23.9 
West  Siberia  6376  4908.5  67.7  16.2  16.5 
East  Siberia  5224  4300.8  72.5  13.3  14.5 
Far  East  1843  1452.3  65.5  4.7  4.9 
Kaliningrad  129  80.0  50.4  0.3  0.3 
All  Russia  Total  39253  29718.0  63.1  100.0  100.0 
Source:  Goskomstat,  Rossiiskii  statisticheskit  ezhegodnik,  1994,  pp.  572-574. 
According  to  Goskompriroda's  report  on  the  state  of  Soviet  environment  which 
was  released  in  1989,26  cities  in  the  SIBFE  were  included  in  the  list  of  99  highly 
polluted  cities  in  Russia  in  1989,  and  17  SIBFE  cities  were  listed  in  the  68  Soviet 
cities  with  the  highest  levels  of  air  pollution  in  1989.67  A  report  Goskomstat  published 
in  1989  covered  104  cities  of  the  USSR,  and  also  reported  the  level  of  air  pollution  in 
the  17  cities  of  the  SIBFE.  68  According  to  these  sources,  air  pollution  was  worst  in 
Noril'sk  in  Evenki  autonomous  okrug,  where  the  largest  nickel  combine  in  Russia  is 
located.  Noril'sk  metallurgical  plants  alone  emitted  about  2.34  million  tonnes  of 
pollutants  (or  6.2  per  cent  of  the  total  amount  of  pollutants  in  Russia)  in  1988,  and 
remained  far  worse  in  1990  than  any  other  cities  in  Russia.  "  Air  pollution  was  also 
very  severe  in  Novokuznetsk,  Omsk,  Angarsk,  and  Krasnoiarsk. (Chapter  III)  93 
<Table  3.2.6>  Noxious  Emissions  into  the  Atmosphere  from  Stationary  Sources  in 
Some  Cities  in  Russia  (1985-1990,1,000  tons) 
1985  1987  1988  1990 
1 Vol 
goda  oblast  Cherepovets  685.1  671.7  646.7  599.7 
Northwest 
0.  St.  Petersburg  St.  Petersburg  276.0  254.1  236.4  - 
Central 
0.  Moscow  Moscow  411.0  369.1  311.8  273.8 
Riazan  oblast  Riazan  185.4  213.9  163.8  - 
Iaroslavl  oblast  Iaroslavl  272.9  256.0  231.5  - 
Volgo-Vlatka 
Kirov  oblast  Kirov  100.9  102.7  104.2 
Central  Chernozem 
Belgorod  oblast  Belgorod  365.3  280.0  227.7  - 
Lipetsk  oblast  Lipetsk  752.8  722.1  684.1  643.1 
Vo1ea 
Volgograd  oblast  Volgograd  365.3  280.0  227.7  206.9 
Samara  oblast  Samara  173.2  160.5  147.1  122.0 
Tol'iatti  135.2  137.3  125.8  103.3 
Saratov  oblast  Saratov  195.3  195.1  186.6  - 
North  Caucasus 
Rep  Chechen-Ingush  Groznyi  341.2  308.5  297.7  238.3 
Urals 
Rep  Bashkir  Ufa  382.3  349.1  304.0  260.3 
Sterlitamak  213.9  181.7  157.9  132.0 
Orenburg  oblast  Orenburg  134.7  134.9  142.0  - 
Novotroitsk  294.5  290.9  233.9  220.4 
Penn  oblast  Perm  267.1  217.5  193.0  152.2 
Sverdlovsk  oblast  Nizhnii  Tagil  680.0  685.0  640.0  559.3 
Kamensk-Ural'skii  184.4  127.9  115.8  72.2 
Cheliabinsk  oblast  Cheliabinsk  435.8  446.7  426.9  391.5 
Maginitogorsk  904.1  871.4  849.0  791.1 
West  Siberia 
Altai  krai  Barnaul  208.5  183.7  183.6  165.1 
Kemerovo  oblast  Kemerovo  167.7  134.6  122.0  94.7 
Novokuznetsk  1001.9  892.9  833.0  572.7 
Prekop'evsk  45.7  43.3  40.9  41.3 
Novosibirsk  oblast  Novosibirsk  232.1  228.4  235.2  - 
Omsk  oblast  Omsk  529.2  479.4  440.4  438.8 
Tiumen  oblast  Tiumen  54.1  39.5  45.1 
East  Siberia 
Krasnoiarsk  krai  Krasnoiarsk  341.8  291.0  258.6  244.5 
Noril'sk  2518.0  2400.1  2342.7  2298.8 
Irkutsk  oblast  Irkutsk  78.7  89.4  94.4 
Angarsk  508.8  466.8  430.5  391.3 
Shelekhov  77.7  64.7  50.0  44.6 
Usol'e-Sibirskoe  102.6  94.9  95.7 
Bratsk  200.5  173.0  157.6 
For  East 
Khabarovsk  krai  Khabarovsk  231.3  172.8  171.3  141.1 
Amur  oblast  Komsomolsk-na-Amure  84.9  77.1  70.0  64.0 
Sakhalin  oblast  Iuzhno-Sakhalin  29.9  26.7  29.2  26.0 
Sources:  Goskomstat,  Okhrana  okruzhaiushchei  i  ratsional  'noe  ispol  zovante  prirodnykh  resursav  v  SSSR 
(Moscow:  Goskomstat,  1989),  pp.  22-24;  and  Goskomstat  RSFSR,  Narodnoe  khaziaistvo  RSFSR,  1990: 
statisticheskil  ezhegodnik  (Moscow:  Goskomstat,  1990),  p.  309. (Chapter  llV  94 
Cellulose-paper,  chemical  and  'metallurgical  industries  are  blamed  for  air 
pollution  in  Eastern  Siberia,  and  oil  and  gas  industries  caused  main  problems  in 
Western  Siberia,  particularly  in  the  northern  part  of  Tiumen  oblast.  According 
Mnatsakanian's  summary,  only  64-70  per  cent  of  gas  in  oil  fields  was  used  in  the  late 
1980s,  while  the  rest  was  simply  burned  off.  70  Gas  industries  in  the  area  also  generated 
similar  pollution  in  the  process  of  extracting,  processing  and  transporting. 
Furthermore,  according  to  Wolfson,  70-170  gas  pipeline  accidents  occurred  annually 
and  were  responsible  for  the  emission  of  2,850  million  cubic  metres  during  1970-1988, 
mainly  because  of  the  wear  and  tear  of  pipelines.  " 
Such  air  pollution  became  a  serious  threat  to  public  health.  For  instance,  in 
Kemerovo  city,  20.6  per  cent  of  newborn  babies  were  already  ill,  30-40  per  cent  were 
born  prematurely,  and  almost  half  the  children  under  the  age  of  fifteen  suffered 
respiratory  illness.  "  Similar  cases  were  observed  in  other  cities  and  industrial  centres 
such  as  the  Kuznetsk  basin,  Novosibirsk,  Noril'sk,  and  so  on.  " 
Secondly,  water  pollution  in  many  rivers,  lakes  and  water  reservoirs  became  a 
major  threat  to  public  health  and  nature.  In  particular,  Lake  Baikal  has  been  one  of  the 
most  popular  issues  not  only  in  the  SIBFE  but  also  in  Russia  as  a  whole,  because  of  its 
enormous  size  and  unique  natural  qualities.  "  Despite  the  'conservation  efforts'  during 
the  Soviet  period,  73  the  lake  suffered  significant  levels  of  pollution,  mainly  caused  by 
dumped  industrial  waste  from  cellulose-paper  plants,  urban  sewage,  precipitation  of  air 
pollutants,  and  land  erosion  and  contamination  caused  by  agricultural  activities.  The 
most  serious  pollution  occurred  in  the  southern  part  of  the  lake,  including  Primorskii 
Range  and  Khamar-Daban  Range  where  highly  polluted  cities  were  located  along  the 
river  Angara  (Usol'e-Sibirskoe,  Angarsk,  and  Shelekhov  in  Irkutsk  oblast),  the  river 
Selenga  (Ulan-Ude  and  Seleginsk  in  Buriatiia),  and  Baikalsk.  76 
Many  other  rivers  and  reservoirs  in  the  area  were  also  polluted  by  similar 
sources  as  the  Lake  Baikal  case  suggested.  For  instance,  the  river  Ob',  which  runs 
through  Tiumen  oilfields,  were  polluted  with  oil  sediment.  Oil  leakage  from  frequent 
ruptures  of  oil  pipelines  worsened  the  situation.  "  Water  reservoirs,  which  were 
constructed  since  1960  in  a  massive  number  all  over  the  former  Soviet  Union,  suffered 
from  another  source  of  pollution.  Because  of  their  size,  they  buried  a  wide  expanse  of 
land  and  taiga  forest,  and  thus  a  couple  of  millions  cubic  metres  of  timbers  rotted  in 
the  water,  causing  a  high  concentration  of  phenols.  7S  These  huge  reservoirs  not  only 
altered  the  climates  of  surrounding  areas,  but  also  increased  respiratory  diseases  in 
neighbouring  areas. (Chapterlll)  95 
Thirdly,  radioactive  contamination  also  resulted  in  serious  environmental 
problems  in  the  area.  Despite  the  Chernobyl'  accident,  information  on  nuclear 
materials  was  seldom  open  to  the  public.  However,  glasnost'  brought  the  issue  into 
the  public  eye,  and  concerns  about  the  radioactive  contamination  appeared 
sporadically  in  the  Russian  press.  In  the  SIBFE,  the  effect  of  nuclear  tests  in  Sakha 
which  had  taken  place  during  the  Soviet  period,  nuclear  facilities  in  the  `closed  cities,  ' 
and  disposal  of  nuclear  wastes  from  various  sources  became  an  acute  problems  not 
only  for  the  local  population,  but  also  for  neighbouring  countries. 
During  the  Soviet  period,  twelve  of  the  120  nuclear  tests  `for  peaceful  purposes' 
had  carried  out  in  Sakha.  Among  them,  eleven  tests  including  those  with  the  code 
names  'Kraton-3,  '  'Sheksana,  '  and  `Neva'  were  performed  along  the  Viliui  river  basin. 
Some  environmentalists  estimated  that  contamination  must  have  affected  a  wide  area, 
although  comprehensive  research  had  not  yet  been  undertaken.  For  instance, 
radioactive  clouds  resulted  from  'Kraton-3'--which  contained  a  high  level  of 
plutonium  239  and  240  that  is  close  to  the  extent  of  contamination  on  soils  of  Belarus 
and  Ukraine  caused  by  the  Chernobyl'  incident-could  have  had  reached  Krasnoiarsk 
krai  and  Irkutsk  oblast  79  In  1974,  another  nuclear  explosion,  code  name  'Kristall,  ' 
was  made  to  build  a  dam  near  Udachnii-2,  which  contaminated  near-by  lakes  ao 
Nuclear  facilities  such  as  nuclear  power  stations  and  nuclear  material  processing 
plants  also  caused  radioactive  contamination.  A  nuclear  power  station  in  Tomsk  that 
was  operating  in  1990  had  been  shut  down,  because  of  its  radioactive  emissions, 
particularly  into  the  Tom  river"  Apart  from  nuclear  power  stations,  radioactive 
material-related  activities  in  the  'closed  cities'  also  caused  contamination  with  their 
radioactive  materials  and  wastes.  According  to  Feshbach,  twelve  ;  closed  cities'  were 
located  in  the  SIBFE,  mainly  in  Krasnoiarsk  and  Tomsk.  82 
Nuclear  facilities  inevitably  produced  radioactive  wastes.  However,  these 
wastes  were  not  properly  treated  and  caused  serious  contamination.  For  instance,  the 
Enisei  river  near  'Krasnoiarsk-26'  is  now  highly  contaminated.  In  some  places  the 
contamination  reached  40  curies  per  square  kilometre,  which  is  the  highest  since  the 
Chernobyl'  accident  83  Although  there  existed  a  huge  radioactive  waste  storage  facility 
in  Krasnoiarsk  (closed  city  of  "Site-27"),  which  consisted  of  tunnels  ten  times  longer 
than  the  Moscow  underground  system,  radioactive  wastes  were  dumped  in  `normal' 
places  without  proper  treatment  on  many  occasions.  For  instance,  in  Irkutsk,  a 
radioactive  waste  container  was  discovered  only  20-30  metres  from  Irkutsk 
Polytechnic  Institute.  In  Tomsk,  a  huge  amount  of  radioactive  waste  was  also  found  8° (Chapter  111)  96 
in  the  artificial  reservoirs.  "  Another  critical  case  was  reported  in  Balei  in  Chita  oblast. 
'Government  Enterprise  1084,  '  a  mining  enterprise  for  `product  17'  (thorium)  and 
'product  18'  (uranium)  which  remained  in  secret  until  1992,  caused  serious 
contamination  in  Balei  which  was  claimed  to  be  worse  than  Chernobyl'.  In  the  town, 
buildings  had  been  constructed  using  the  white  sand  from  the  uranium  pits  which 
emitted  more  than  10  to  40  times  the  level  that  was  officially  regarded  as  'safe.  'B6 
Conversion  programmes  also  worsened  the  situation  when  radioactive  reactors 
from  decommissioned  nuclear-powered  vessels  and  military  radioactive  wastes  were 
not  treated  properly.  According  to  the  Russian  government's  official  report  which 
appeared  in  April  1993,  the  former  Soviet  Union's  Navy  fleets  dumped  radioactive 
waste  into  the  sea  during  1959-1991.87  In  fact,  a  couple  of  nuclear  waste  storage 
facilities  had  been  planned  during  the  Soviet  period.  However,  they  had  never  been 
commissioned,  because  they  failed  to  meet  the  safety  standard  and  had  not  been 
sufficiently  financed.  8ß  The  problem  remained  acute  when  the  Northern  and  Pacific 
Fleet  decommissioned  140  nuclear-powered  submarines  by  1996,  and  twenty  more  by 
2000.89 
111  2  (4)  Problems  of  Small  Nations 
The  problems  of  small  nations  might  not  be  a  major  source  of  the  development 
of  regionalism  in  the  SIBFE,  perhaps  except  in  Tyva.  90  However,  it  is  noteworthy 
since  the  problems  of  small  nations  were  a  cross-section  of  the  socio-economic 
problem  of  the  area  as  a  whole.  Furthermore,  the  problems  not  only  supported  the 
criticism  of  regional  authorities  on  the  'colonial  policies'  of  the  centre,  but  also 
provided  regions  with  the  'legacy'  of  their  demands  for  rights  to  natural  resources. 
According  to  official  census  data  in  1989,  more  than  thirty  indigenous  peoples 
live  in  the  SIBFE,  including  the  nations  of  the  North.  "  The  size  of  these  groups  varied 
from  about  40,000  to  less  than  200.  The  total  population  of  indigenous  people  has 
accounted  for  about  5  per  cent  of  the  total  population  in  the  SIBFE  since  the  1930x92 
Even  in  the  titular  republics,  the  population  size  of  titular  nations  often  ranged  between 
64.3  per  cent  of  the  total  in  the  Republic  of  Tyva  to  less  than  1.4  per  cent  in  the 
Khanty-Mansi  autonomous  okrug.  93 (Chapter  Ill)  97 
<Table  3.2.7>  Indigenous  Peoples  in  the  SIBFE  (1970-1989) 
Population  Indigenous  Language 
User  (%) 
1970  1979  1989  1970  1979  1989 
<Indigenous  Peoples  with  Titular  Republic  Status> 
Main  Inhabitant 
Areas 
(Administrative  Units) 
Buriaty  312847  349760  417425  92.8  90.4  86.6  Buriatiia,  Irkutsk,  Chita 




139013  165426 
65368  69247 
54614  58879 
<Other  Indigenous  Peoples> 
Nenets 
Evenki 
28487  29487 
25051  27041 
206160  98.8  98.8  98.6 
78500  84.2  810.7  76.6 
69409  88.1  87.1  85.1 
34190  83.7  80.9  77.7 
29901  51.3  42.5  30.4 
Khanty  21007  20743  22283  69.1  68.1  60.8 
Eveny  11819  12452  17055  55.5  57.0  43.8 
Shortsy  16000  15000  16000  -  62.8'  59.41) 
Chukchi  13500  13937  15107  82.8  78.3  70.4 
Nanaitsy  9911  10357  11883  69.3  55.9  44.1 
Koriak  7367  7637  8942  81.6  69.6  52.4 
Mansi  7609  7434  8279  52.2  49.7  36.7 
Dolgany  4718  4911  6584  90.2  90.6  84.0 
Nivkhi  4356  4366  4631  49.0  30.4  23.3 
Sel'kupy  4249  3518  3564  51.0  56.5  47.7 
U1'chi  2410  2494  3173  60.9  37.9  30.7 
Itel'meny  1255  1335  2429  34.6  23.2  18.8 
Udegeitsy  1396  1775  1835  54.4  22.2  25.2 
Saamy  1836  1775  1835  56.3  51.8  42.0 
Eskimosy  1265  1460  1704  61.1  60.2  51.6 
Teleuty  1700  --- 
Chuvantsy  -  1384  --  18.5 
Nganasany  823  842  1262  74.5  90.3  83.4 
lukagiry  593  801  1112  46.2  36.8  32.0 
Kety  1161  1072  1084  74.9  60.2  48.8 
Orochi  1037  1040  883  47.3  33.2  17.8 
Tofalary  570  576  722  55.1  54.0  42.8 
Aleuty  410  489  644  18.5  11.5  25.3 
Negidal'ty  495  477  586  52.1  43.4  26.6 
Entsy  198  --  46.5 
Oroki  --  179  -  44.7 
Magadan 
Tyva,  Ust-Ordynsk 
Kakhasia,  Tyva 
Altai 
Iamalo-Nenets 
Sakha,  Evenki,  Buriatiia, 
Khabarovsk 
Khanty-Mansi 
Iamalo-Nenets,  Skaha, 
Kamchatka 
Kemerovo,  Krasnoiarsk 
Chukchi,  Koirak,  Sakha, 
Magadan 
Khabarovsk,  Primorskii 
Koriak,  Magadan 
Khanty-Mansi  aok 
Taimyr 
Sakhalin,  Khabarovsk 
Khanty-Mansi,  Evreisk, 
Tomsk 
Khabarovsk 
Koriak,  Magadan 
Primorskii,  Khabarovsk 
(Murmansk) 
Chukchi  SSR 
Altai  mountains 
Magadan,  Sakha 
Krasnoiarsk,  Taimyr 
Sakha,  Magadan 
Krasnoiarsk,  Taimyr, 
Evenki 
Khabarovsk,  Sakhalin 
Irkutsk 
Kamchatka 
Khabarovsk,  Kamchatka 
Taimyr,  Iamalo-Nenets 
Amur  &  Sakhalin  basin 
among  those  in  Kemerovo  oblast  (12,767  in  1979,12,585  in  1989)  only. 
+  Komi,  mainly  distributed  in  Komi  republic,  are  excluded  in  the  table. 
Sources:  Goskomstat  RSFSR,  Natsional'nyt  sostav  naseleniia  RSFSR:  po  dannym  vsesoiuznoi  perepisi 
naselenlia  1989  g.,  pp.  S.  10,44-47;  Goskomstat,  Rossiiskii  statisticheskil  ezhegodnik  1994,  pp.  30-32;  and 
"Chuzhie  na  svoi  zemle,  "  Sibirskaia  gazeta,  no.  4  (29  January  1990),  p.  10. (Chapter  111)  98 
As  suggested  by  socio-economic  conditions  in  the  SIBFE  in  general,  these  small 
nations,  particularly  those  who  lived  in  an  area  that  was  remote  from  regional  centres 
and  without  titular  national  administrative  units,  had  fallen  victim  to  central  policies. 
These  small  nations  suffered  severe  threats  from  the  assimilation  policies  that  were 
conducted  during  the  Soviet  period.  Russification  policy,  for  instance  the  abolition  of 
the  Roman  alphabet  and  introduction  of  Cyrillic  for  all  indigenous  languages  in  1939, 
severely  damaged  indigenous  languages  which,  in  some  cases,  did  not  have  their  own 
alphabet  system.  "'  Despite  the  1959  law  that  allowed  parents  to  choose  between 
Russian  and  a  native  language  in  their  children's  education,  proper  opportunities  had 
not  been  given  to  those  small  number  of  people,  particularly  in  small  towns  95 
More  closely  related  to  regionalism,  the  harsh  living  conditions  of  small  nations 
became  a  good  example  of  the  'colonial'  approach  of  departmentalism  in  the  SIBFE. 
The  areas  of  settlement  of  these  small  nations  often  did  not  have  schools,  hospitals, 
running  waters,  sewerage  system,  or  electricity.  Furthermore  their  average  wages  were 
10-15  times  lower  than  those  of  oil  workers  in  neighbouring  settlements  %  In 
particular,  'departmental  invasion'  in  the  area  often  resulted  in  severe  environmental 
problems,  causing  damage  to  the  health  of  the  native  population.  "  It  also  made  it 
impossible  for  indigenous  people  to  continue  their  traditional  economic  activities  such 
as  hunting,  fishing,  and  reindeer  herding.  98 
These  problems  in  turn  raised  the  question  of  property  rights,  particularly  of 
reindeer  herding  people  in  oil  and  gas  extracting  areas  such  as  the  Khanty-Mansi  and 
Iamalo-Nenets  autonomous  okrugs.  In  the  region,  according  to  Stewart,  three-quarters 
of  the  land  in  these  okrugs  became  useless  for  `traditional  economic  activities'  because 
of  aggressive  industrial  activities  and  subsequent  pollution.  Furthermore,  in  this 
century,  reindeer  herding  land  had  decreased  by  about  22  million  hectares,  more  than 
the  size  of  England,  in  the  North.  99  The  issue  constituted  a  main  demand  of  the  small 
nations  which  developed  into  more  organised  forms.  10° (Chapter  III)  99 
IH.  3.  Evaporation  of  the  Centripetal  Structure 
During  the  Soviet  period  a  highly  centralised  economic  and  political  structure, 
based  on  one-party  rule,  had  deterred  long-lasting  and  widespread  discontent  in  the 
peripheries  from  developing  into  a  more  organised  and  institutionalised  regionalism. 
However,  the  political  context  had  changed  since  Gorbachev's  reform.  In  the  process 
of  reform,  four  main  changes  are  noteworthy  in  relation  with  the  development  of 
regionalism.  First,  'democratisation'  transferred  power  from  the  CPSU  and  Union 
ministries  to  the  Soviets  under  the  slogan  of  "all  power  to  the  Soviets.  "  Second, 
glasnost'  accommodated  open  discussions  of  the  defects  of  central  policies  and  of 
regional  socio-economic  circumstances.  Third,  the  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  raised 
the  question  of  the  federal  system  in  Russia.  Finally,  power  struggles  at  the  centre  in 
the  process  of  reform  weakened  centripetal  forces  and  thus  created  a  more  favourable 
environment  for  regional  initiatives. 
111  3  (1)  'Democratisation'  and  'All  Power  to  the  Soviets' 
At  the  beginning  of  perestroika,  Gorbachev  did  not  mention  political  reform. 
However,  the  need  for  political  reform  emerged,  as  economic  reform  was  faced  with 
the  resistance  of  an  `ossified'  system.  The  first  hint  of  political  reform  appeared  at  the 
27th  Party  Congress  in  February  1986  and  accelerated  until  the  Soviet  Union 
collapsed,  introducing  fundamental  changes  in  the  state  structure. 
The  main  logic  of  political  reform  was  based  on  three  points:  control  over  the 
Party  apparatus,  'socialist  pluralism,  '  and  the  'rule  of  law.  '  First  of  all,  Gorbachev 
regarded  it  as  the  most  urgent  matter  to  rebuild  a  'socialist  democracy,  '  which  had 
been  deformed  by  the  Party  apparatus.  In  his  political  report  to  the  Congress, 
Gorbachev  emphasised  that  the  development  of  society  was  "unthinkable  and 
impossible"  without  the  further  development  of  'socialist  democracy,  '  and  criticised 
the  Party  and  administrative  apparatus  for  their  'departmentalism,  '  'parochialism,  ' 
'irresponsibility,  '  'red  tape'  and  'bureaucratic  indifference.  ""  The  attack  on  the 
apparatus  had  been  intensified  during  the  period  between  the  27th  Party  Congress  in 
February  1986  and  the  28th  Party  Congress  in  July  1990.102 (Chapter!!!  )  100 
Based  on  these  perceptions  of  the  Party  apparatus,  Gorbachev  declared  it  urgent 
to  supervise  the  work  of  the  Party  at  all  levels  by  the  Soviets,  social  organisations,  and 
the  general  public,  suggesting  that  they  maximise  the  `direct  participation  of  the 
masses.  '  103  He  criticised  the  Party  for  its  encroachment  on  the  functions  of  the  Soviets, 
which  had  caused  "a  fault  in  the  functioning  of  the  democratic  machinery,  "  and  thus 
the  Soviets  must  be  "fully  in  charge  of  their  respective  territories  in  all  issues 
concerning  development  and  should  meet  the  everyday  needs  of  the  people.  s104 
Since  1987,  more  detailed  measures  had  been  taken  to  'normalise'  the  Soviets' 
function  and  supervision  of  the  Party  by  the  `mass  participation'  through  competitive 
elections.  Accordingly,  the  January  1987  Plenum  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the 
CPSU  decided  to  hold  experimental  local  elections  in  June  1987.105  A  more 
comprehensive  reform  had  been  discussed  at  the  19th  Party  Conference  in  June-July 
1988,  including  the  role  of  the  Party,  a  comprehensive  electoral  reform  and  new  Soviet 
legislative  bodies.  The  new  election  law  was  adopted  on  1  December  1988,  and 
accordingly,  elections  to  the  USSR  and  Russian  CPDs  were  held  in  March  1989  and 
March  1990  respectively.  "' 
Apart  from  electoral  reform,  the  role  of  the  party  itself  became  a  thorny  issue  of 
debate  during  this  period.  Despite  the  considerable  restructuring  during  the  early  stage 
of  political  reform,  reform  in  the  Party  turned  out  to  be  slow,  107  and  the  Party  remained 
a  bulwark  of  the  conservatives.  "'  Since  the  19th  Party  Conference,  the  question  of  a 
new  Party  programme  was  open  to  public  discussion.  In  February  1990  the  Central 
Committee  Plenum  decided  to  abolish  the  Party's  political  monopoly,  which  was 
followed  by  the  constitutional  amendment  of  Article  6  at  the  Third  CPD  of  the  USSR 
in  March  1990.109  In  fact,  the  Party's  `leading  role'  had  ceased  to  exist  in  practice  by 
1989,  and  the  Party  was  drifting  away  from  the  public  at  the  final  stage  of  Gorbachev's 
reform.  "0 
Political  reforms  affected  the  development  of  regionalist  tendencies  not  only  in 
the  Union  republics  such  as  the  Baltic  republics,  but  also  in  lower  administrative  units. 
First  of  all,  criticism  of  the  Party  apparatus  had  significantly  damaged  the  authority  of 
the  central  government.  In  particular,  the  blame  on  the  Party  apparatus  and 
bureaucratic  decision-making  style  fell  on  Moscow  authorities  in  general  not  only  in 
the  former  Soviet,  but  also  in  the  Russian  context.  "' 
Secondly,  the  decline  in  the  Party's  leading  role  had  resulted  in  the  expansion  of 
the  Soviets'  power.  This  occurred  not  only  because  of  the  devolution  of  power  to  the (Chapter  Ill)  101 
Soviets,  but  also  because  of  the  absence  of  a  'new'  mechanism  of  control  over  the 
Soviets.  When  the  slogan  of  "all  power  to  the  Soviets"  was  launched,  it  was  meant  to 
be  controlled  by  the  Party  members  who  successfully  competed  for  power,  and  thus 
participated  in  the  Soviets.  "'  However,  despite  the  'successful'  representation  of  the 
Party  in  the  Soviets,  party  discipline  hardly  bound  its  members  in  the  representative 
bodies,  and  thus  the  Party  was  unable  to  control  the  activities  of  the  Soviets,  I" 
Furthermore,  the  collapse  of  the  Party  also  caused  a  stalemate  in  upward 
communication  and  interest  representation  `from  below'  through  the  Party,  and  thus 
through  the  Soviets  as  well.  ""  When  an  `explosion'  of  participation  and  interest 
articulation  was  witnessed,  the  only  nationwide  political  party  failed  to  coordinate 
demands  'from  below.  '  The  results  were  obvious:  another  explosive  increase  in  the 
numbers  of  'parties'  including  those  based  on  regional  interests  in  the  peripheries,  only 
to  be  frustrated  at  higher  levels  of  the  Soviets.  "'  In  this  regard,  the  law  on  the  local 
Soviet  of  April  1990,  which  provided  substantially  expanded  competence  of  the 
Soviets-particularly,  of  the  Union  republics  and  autonomous  republics-had 
facilitated  declarations  of  sovereignty  and  the  development  of  regional  associations. 
Thirdly,  a  series  of  elections  brought  regionalists  into  the  power  circle. 
Although  old  elites  had  some  success  in  the  elections  with  "new  tricks,  ""'  regionalists 
also  secured  seats  in  the  Soviets  at  all  levels.  For  instance,  Baltic  deputies  who  were 
mostly  elected  with  the  support  of  the  people's  fronts  in  the  republics  clearly  supported 
the  sovereignty  of  their  republics.  The  establishment  of  the  Interregional  Deputies' 
group  in  the  USSR  CPD  also  clearly  showed  that  this  unexpected  effect  of  electoral 
reform.  In  the  SIBFE,  one  of  the  ardent  separatists,  Aman-Geldy  Tuleev,  won  the 
election  to  the  CPD  of  Russia  with  the  support  of  miners,  and  was  then  elected  as 
chairman  of  the  oblsovet.  1  '  The  emergence  of  Vitalii  Mukha  as  governor  of 
Novosibirsk  oblast,  who  became  the  chairman  of  Siberian  Agreement,  also  appeared  to 
be  a  result  of  an  emphasis  on  the  accountability  of  regional  leaders  to  the  local 
population.  "' 
Finally,  glasnost'  revealed  not  only  the  faults  of  the  Party  apparatus,  but  of 
almost  every  aspect  of  Soviet  society,  including  the  problems  of  regional  disparities. 
Although  Gorbachev  encouraged  glasnost'  to  go  further  than  criticising  the  Party 
apparatus,  it  developed  even  further  than  that:  glasnost'  covered  all  aspects  of  the 
society  such  as  environmental,  historical,  cultural,  ethno-national  situations  as  well as 
socio-economic  situations,  as  Nove  put  it  a  "cultural  renaissance  in  Russia.  ""'  In 
particular,  the  mass  media  had  gone  beyond  the  censorship  even  before  it  was (Chapter  rrn  102 
eventually  abolished  in  1990,  often  causing  conflict  between  mass  media  and  political 
authorities  including  Gorbachev.  12'  In  conjunction  with  existing  regional  disparities, 
glasnost'  spread  regionalist  sentiments  in  the  SIBFE.  121  Furthermore,  election 
campaigns  also  supported  these  revelations,  performing  a  political  education  function 
at  the  grassroots. 
III.  3  (2)  Collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union 
The  growing  power  of  the  Soviets  and  their  antagonism  towards  the  centre,  the 
decreasing  control  of  the  centre  over  the  peripheries,  and  the  deteriorating  socio- 
economic  situation  was  culminated  in  the  failed  military  coup  of  August  1991.  After 
the  failed  coup,  the  collapse  of  the  Union,  one  of  the  most  important  events  in  the 
Soviet  history,  took  place.  The  event  imposed  on  Russia  the  new  task  of  state 
building,  because  of  the  asymmetrical  federal  structure  of  the  USSR  It  led  to  a 
discussion  of  possible  changes  in  centre-periphery  relations,  spreading  expectations  for 
the  devolution  of  power  in  the  Russian  peripheries. 
Unlike  other  former  Union  republics,  Russia  lacked  its  own  state  structure  such 
as  its  own  party  organisation  (up  to  1990)  and  Academy  of  Sciences  during  the  Soviet 
period,  although  some  efforts  had  already  begun  after  the  declaration  of  sovereignty  of 
June  1990.  Furthermore,  another  inherited  asymmetrical  aspect  within  the  RSFSR- 
the  unequal  status  of  autonomous  republics  and  ordinary  administrative  units-caused 
a  serious  threat  to  state-building  efforts  in  Russia,  when  autonomous  republics  in 
Russia  upgraded  their  status  to  that  of  republics  and  joined  the  march  of  declarations 
of  sovereignty.  As  Kempton  put  it,  the  situation  developed  into  a  'status  game' 
between  the  centre  and  all  the  subjects,  and  a  'resource  game'  between  the  centre  and 
individual  regions  and  republics  based  on  bilateral  negotiations.  "' 
Despite  the  view  that  the  proliferation  of  bilateral  negotiations  encouraged  other 
regions  to  articulate  their  demands,  `'  the  more  profound  reason  for  such  a 
development  should  be  found  in  the  favoured  status  of  the  republics,  which  was 
inherited  from  the  old  Constitution.  When  republics  which  had  the  right  of  secession 
sought  a  more  favoured  status  than  ordinary  subjects  in  the  process  of  state-building, 
other  options  excluding  separate  negotiations  did  not  seem  to  be  practical.  In  fact,  the 
centre  was  too  weak  to  contain  republics  in  a  'federal'  system.  Therefore,  the  question 
of  amending  the  old  Constitution,  and  then  adopting  a  new  Constitution,  emerged  as  a 
thorny  but  urgent  task. (Chapter  III)  103 
As  a  basis  of  a  new  federal  structure,  Eltsin  himself  tended  to  support  the 
development  of  regional  associations,  presumably  hoping  to  counterbalance  the 
separatist  threat  of  republics,  at  least  before  regional  associations  became  politicised  in 
the  middle  of  1992.  In  his  election  campaign  for  a  seat  on  the  CPD  of  Russia  in 
February  1990,  he  suggested  rebuilding  the  federal  system  on  the  basis  of  8  to  10 
ethnically  neutral  zemli.  124  Despite  the  opposition  of  republics,  the  idea  of  zemli 
appeared  in  his  draft  Constitution  in  November  1990  and  October  1992.123  In  his 
discussion  of  the  draft  Constitution  of  the  CPD  of  Russia  in  November  1991,  Eltsin 
revealed  his  de  facto  recognition  of  existing  regional  associations: 
Many  questions  arise  from  the  term  zemli.  People  regard  it  as  a  foreign 
borrowing,  although  it  comes  from  the  ancient  Russia.  Zemli  are  intended  to  be 
formed  on  the  basis  of  existing  krais  and  oblasts  or  through  unifying  them.  It  is  to 
enshrine  the  regional  consolidation  in  the  Constitution  which  is  taking  place  in 
practice.  ... 
Currently,  such  a  consolidation  in  becoming  a  reality  in  the  boundaries 
of  the  Far  East,  Siberia,  the  Urals,  Central  Russia,  the  Northwest  and  so  on.  126 
In  fact,  his  attitude  towards  regional  associations  went  further  than  de  facto 
recognition.  Paying  attention  to  the  oppositions  of  republics,  he  suggested  that 
republics  were  to  be  recognised  as  subjects  of  the  Russian  Federation  `by  right,  '  and 
the  creation  of  zemli  would  not  be  enforced.  Instead,  he  claimed  that  the  process  of  the 
creation  of  zemli  was  to  provide  existing  regional  associations  with  legal  status: 
Furthermore,  the  establishment  of  zemli  creates  the  requisite  material  and 
organisational  basis  which  will  provide  them  [regional  associations]  with 
appropriate  organisational  and  legal  status. 
At  the  same  time,  the  present  draft  Constitution  does  not  propose  an 
artificial  enforcement  of  this  process.  Above.  all,  it  is  intended  to  put  it  in  order 
with  legal  regulation.  The  draft  Constitution  carries  it  clear  that  regions  can 
acquire  the  status  of  zemli only  if  they  can  fully  carried  out  their  duties  as  federal 
subjects.  127 
Although  his  concept  of  zemli  failed  to  survive  the  opposition,  the  concept 
showed  his  intention  to  provide  regional  associations  with  not  only  de  facto  but  also  de 
jure  recognition  and  support  their  organisational  expansion,  which  might  have 
eventually  absorbed  republics  within  their  boundaries.  "'  Although  he  withdrew  the 
concept  of  zemli,  the  Siberian  Agreement  attained  legal  status  in  January  1993. 
Whatever  the  fate  of  Eltsin's  draft  Constitution,  he  seemed  to  support  the  development 
of  regional  associations-at  least,  before  regional  associations  became  politicised-for 
his  own  purposes,  which  accommodated  the  development  of  inter-regional 
coordination  mechanisms  in  the  periphery. (Chapter  111)  104 
III.  3  (3)  Persisting  Power  Struggle  at  the  Centre 
In  the  process  of  political  and  economic  changes  on  an  enormous  scale,  clashes 
of  different  ideas  seemed  to  be  unavoidable.  However,  the  power  struggle  at  the  centre 
had  often  made  the  resources  of  power  that  could  be  employed  to  control  the  regions 
more  limited.  As  McAuley  observed,  the  centre  had  lost  almost  every  control  over  the 
political  and  economic  resources  of  power  by  August  1991,  except  the  means  of 
coercion  such  as  the  armed  forces,  police  and  the  security  forces.  129  The  situation,  thus 
became  more  favourable  to  the  peripheries  in  their  relations  with  the  centre. 
During  the  transition  period  of  1988-1993,  the  power  struggle  had  a  couple  of 
features  that  were  almost  unprecedented  during  the  Soviet  period.  First  of  all,  the 
scale  of  the  power  struggle  was  larger  than  in  earlier  reforms  of  the  Soviet  regime. 
Since  the  changes  were  introduced  in  almost  every  sector  of  the  Soviet  society,  clashes 
of  different  ideas  were  not  limited  to  a  sector  or  two.  Therefore,  power  struggles  often 
cannot  be  simplified  as  conflicts  between  anti-reform  and  pro-reform  groups.  The 
picture  was  more  complicated  and  multi-layered:  anti-reform  versus  pro-reform, 
centralism  versus  federalism,  and  presidentialism  and  parliamentalism.  In  this 
structure  of  conflicts,  for  instance,  either  parliamentalism  led  by  Khasbulatov10  or 
centralism,  did  not  necessarily  mean  anti-reform.  "' 
Secondly,  because  of  the  multi-layered  nature  of  the  conflicts,  it  appeared  that 
no  one  alone  could  control  the  situation.  As  for  Gorbachev,  facing  opposition  from 
both  conservatives  and  radicals,  he  tried  to  maintain  a  balance  of  power  between  these 
two  blocs,  As  Hough  observes,  Gorbachev  needed  radicals  such  as  Eltsin  not  only  for 
a  counterbalance  against  the  conservatives,  but  also  as  a  scapegoat  for  the  negative 
results  of  reform  policies.  "'  In  this  regard,  for  Gorbachev,  it  would  have  been  better  to 
maintain  a  balance  of  power  between  two  extremes-conservatives  and  radicals- 
because  it  would  be  not  only  difficult  but  also  undesirable  to  get  rid  of  either  side  of 
the  opposition.  As  for  Eltsin,  the  situation  was  almost  the  same  when  Russia  achieved 
its  sovereignty  in  June  1990.  He  was  also  facing  with  a  decentralisation  drive  by  the 
peripheries  and  parliamentalism  led  by  Khasbulatov  when  he  tried  to  build  a  strong 
presidency  for  his  reform.  Furthermore,  in  the  main  arena  of  power  struggle-the 
CPD  of  Russia-neither  side  controlled  the  parliament.  "' 
Thirdly,  the  tug-of-war  at  the  centre  often  led  Eltsin  and  his  opposition  blocs  to 
search  for  an  alignment  with  third  parties  such  as  peripheries  or  the  grassroots.  For (Chapter  lllJ  105 
instance,  the  referendum,  a  populist  method,  had  been  quite  frequently  employed  to 
achieve  a  breakthrough  in  situations  of  stalemate,  particularly  in  the  CPD.  134 
Gorbachev  put  the  question  of  the  preservation  of  the  USSR  to  a  referendum  on  17 
March  1991,  to  which  Eltsin  attached  his  own  question  of  the  introduction  of  a  Russian 
presidency  to  consolidate  his  power  base.  Eltsin  also  put  four  questions-confidence 
in  the  president  and  the  socio-economic  policy  of  the  government,  and  early  election 
of  the  president  and  the  CPD-to  a  referendum  on  25  April  1993,  in  order  to  bloc  the 
anti-government  drive  of  the  parliament.  Again  on  12  December  1993,  he  held 
another  referendum  to  adopt  the  new  Constitution. 
As  these  events  suggest,  a  bid  for  the  support  of  regions  also  featured  power 
struggles  at  the  centre,  particularly  when  they  were  divided  on  the  question  of 
government  structure,  presidentialism  and  parliamentalism,  rather  than  a  federal 
structure.  This  tendency  was  clearly  revealed  in  1990  when  the  sovereignty  of  the 
RSFSR  became  a  critical  matter  to  the  future  of  the  Union.  In  1990,  Gorbachev 
launched  an  appeasement  gesture  towards  the  autonomous  formations  of  the  former 
Soviet  Union,  recognising  them  as  `federal  subjects,  '  135  which  Eltsin  was  reluctant  to 
accept  as  he  regarded  it  a  threat  to  his  power  base  in  Russia.  "'  In  response  to  such 
initiatives,  Eltsin  shifted  his  position  and  went  further  than  Gorbachev  in  autumn  1990, 
urging  the  regions  to  "swallow  as  much  power  as  possible.  ""' 
In  particular,  when  the  CPD  was  acting  as  a  stalemate  in  1992,  Eltsin  and 
Khasbulatov  had  tried  to  gain  every  possible  segment  of  support  of  the  regional 
groups,  as  well  as  groups  of  economic  sectors  such  as  entrepreneurs  and  farmers, 
which  increased  sectoral  and  regional  lobbies.  "'  According  to  the  Ministry  of 
Economy,  31  presidential  decrees  and  39  government  decrees  had  provided  49  regions, 
including  19  republics,  with  special  terms  during  1992-1993.179  For  instance,  decrees 
to  establish  an  FEZ  were  mainly  issued  before  the  presidential  election  on  12  June 
1991.  Other  concessions  were  made  after  the  Sixth  Congress  when  the  question  of 
power  balance  between  legislative  and  executive  branches  became  a  hot  issue  in  the 
second  half  of  1992.!  40  In  particular,  after  the  Sixth  Congress,  Eltsin  tried  to  postpone 
the  Seventh  Congress,  in  which  the  one-year  emergency  power  of  the  president  was 
due  to  expire,  even  showing  an  intention  to  share  power  with  the  heads  of  republics.  141 (Chapterlln  106 
<Table  3.3.1>  Decisions  on  Central  Support  for  the  Regions  (1991-1993) 
Date  Decrees  /  Resolutions 
I= 
May-June  on  the  FEZ  in  Altai  krai  (25  May),  Chita  (25  May),  Sakhalin  (27  May), 
Kaliningrad  (3  June),  Evereiskii  (3  June),  Kemerovo  (7  June),  and  Novgorod 
(7  June) 
on  the  socio-economic  development  in  the  Northern  regions  (28  May), 
Murmansk  (28  May),  Kareliia  (29  May),  and  the  Komi  SSR  (11  June) 
on  the  inter-regional  association  of  the  Central  Chemozem  regions  (31  May), 
the  Urals  (9  June)  and  the  "Great  Volga"  (10  June) 
",  »",  ,  µ.  ,  ,  "_,  _.,  »" 
on  the  development  of  a.  gro-industrial  complex.  ý6  June) 
»  »».  »..  July-December  on  the  inter-regional  association  of  the  Siberian  Agreement  (11  July) 
"  on  the  development  of  the  Siberian  branch  of  the  Akademnauk  (2  August) 
...  »»..  »».  »»  »».  _.....  »»on 
the  development  of  Tiumen"  (19  Setember)  and  S.  k!  (1  December  )...... 
«..  .....  ......  ».........  ............  »....  »  ...............  »  ............................... 
January-March  "  on  the  socio-economic  development  in  Komi  (24  January),  Chita  (3 
February),  Kemerovo  (on  the  budget  resources,  7  March),  Taimyr  aok  (30 
March) 
"  on  the  social  support  for  small  nations  or  poor  population  in  Evenkii  aok  (12 
&  30  March),  Taimyr  aok  (12  March),  Murmansk  (21  March),  Buriatila  (25 
March),  Bashkortostan,  Pechorsk  ralon  in  Komi,  Marii-El,  Chuvash,  Sakha, 
Khabarovsk  Turukhansk  raion  in  Krasnoiarsk  Rostov,  Nizhneudinsk  raion 
..  »»  _ý.  »  .  ", 
In  Irkutsk  Cheliabinsk.  Chtta;  and  Nenets  aok  (30  March)» 
»»  April-June  on  the  social  support  for  small  nations  or  poor  population  in  Karellia, 
Kolpashevsk  ralon  in  Tomsk,  Chukot  aok  (4  April),  Again-Burial  aok  (10 
April),  raion  in  the  Far  North  regions  (21  April  &  22  June) 
on  the  economic  activities  of  the  small  nations  in  the  North  (22  April) 
on  the  development  of  the  FEZs  (4  June) 
"  on  the  socio-economic  development  in  Dagestan  (5  June),  Ingush  (resolution 
of  the  Soviet  of  Nationalities 
. 
10  June).  North,  Ossetiia..  Buriatiia.  (30  June) 
July-September  on  the  development  of  lamal,  Bering  Sea,  and  Sakhalin  shelf  (1  July). 
"  on  the  socio-economic  development  in  Chukot  aok  (15  July),  Marii-El  (24 
August),  Tyva  (2  September),  Chuvash  (11  September),  Khakassia,  Komi- 
Permiak  aok  (16  September),  the  Far  East  and  Zabaikalia  (22  September) 
"  on  the  housing  construction  in  the  Far  North  (23  September) 
"  on  the  delivery  of  products  to  the  Far  North  (resolution  of  the  Soviet  of 
".  »  "  ",.  ""..  »»ý..,  "»» 
Nationalities  on"7  July  &  13  July)., 
",  ,"  October"  on  the  socio-economic  development  in  Kabardino-Balkarsk  (14  October),  the 
December  Kuril  Islands  (26  October  &8  December),  Caspian  Sea  (31  October), 
Mordavia  (4  December),  Kaliningrad  (23  December),  Karachaev-Cherkersk 
(24  December) 
"  on  the  support  for  mercantile  navy  float  in  the  Caspian  Sea  (21  October) 
"  on  the  Free  Trade  Zone  in  Moscow  city 
"  on  measures  to  realistion  of  the  Federal  Agreement  with  Komi  (23  December) 
"  on  the  ecological-economic  zone  of  "Como-Altai"  (12  October) 
"  on  the  socio-economic  development  in  Primorskii  krai  (10  November), 
.  »»».....  »..  »».  »».  »....  »Mordavia, 
(23  November)»»»»... 
».  »».  ».  ».  »........  ».  »»»..  ».  »».  »..  ».  ».  ».  ».  ».  ».  ».  »»»....  ».  »....  »  1  U9 
January-March  "  on  the  socio-economic  development  in  Chellabinsk  (8  February) 
on  financingfuel-energy  complex  (12  February) 
"  on  the  preservation  of  natural  complex  in  Pozhrsk  raion  of  Primorskil  (24 
February)  and  Okhotsk  Sea  (1 March) 
Resolutions  of  the  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  in  italic.  Others  are  presidential  decrees. 
Sources:  Vedomosti  s  "ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR  I  Verkhovnogo  Sovet  RSFSR,  1990-1992;  and 
Vedomosti  s  "ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskol  Federatsii  I  Verkhovnogo  Sovet  Rossliskoi  Federatsil, 
1992-1993. (Chapterlll)  107 
Furthermore,  Eltsin  established  the  Council  of  Heads  of  Administrations  in  1992 
in  order  to  gain  the  support  of  regional  leaders,  accepting  it  as  an  advisory  body  of  the 
CPD.  14s  After  the  Sixth  CPD  of  Russia,  he  also  proposed  to  establish  a  Federal 
Council  consisting  of  two  representatives  from  each  federal  subject,  which  eventually 
developed  into  the  upper  house  in  the  Constitution  of  1993.143 
In  this  regard,  Teague  has  claimed  that  Eltsin's  policy  was  a  "Russian  version  of 
`don't  ask,  don't  tell,  "  which  was  based  on  the  premise  that  as  long  as  "the  centre  does 
not  try  to  curb  the  provinces'  accumulation  of  economic  and  political  power,  the 
republics  and  regions  will  have  little  incentive  to  try  to  leave  the  Russian 
Federation.  "'"  As  Teague  suggested,  the  power  struggle  led  Eltsin  to  a  `minimalist' 
approach,  which  encouraged  the  demands  of  the  regions. (Chapter  lll)  108 
M.  4.  Agenda  of  the  SIBFE  Regionalism:  'Decolonisation' 
Although  a  relatively  increasing  proportion  of  investment  had  been  allocated  to 
the  social  sphere,  the  decreasing  capital  investment,  failure  of  delivery,  and 
deteriorating  living  conditions  had  been  witnessed  in  the  late  1980s.  The  general 
economic  decline  experienced  during  the  reform  made  situation  worse.  As  a  way  to 
survive  the  chaotic  situation,  the  SIBFE  demanded  more  investment  for  the  production 
and  non-production  sectors  to  avoid  a  sharp  economic  decline  and  enhance  the 
material  well-being  of  the  population.  However,  the  possible  intensification  of 
`colonial  relations'  was  also  forecast  when  the  state  delivery  system  failed  to  meet 
demands,  and  the  hope  of  central  support  was  fading  away  as  the  central  budget  deficit 
increased. 
This  situation  led  the  SIBFE  to  formulate  various  ways  to  keep  its  own  wealth  in 
order  to  finance  self-assistance  measures  by  denying  existing  `colonial  relations.  ' 
First,  in  the  short  term,  the  failed  state  delivery  system  had  to  be  replaced  by  a  mutual 
delivery  agreement  between  the  SIBFE  regions,  and  then  a  barter  system.  Second,  the 
right  to  their  own  natural  resources,  development  projects  and  profits  had  to  be 
expanded.  Third,  the  need  to  adjust  the  economic  structure  of  the  area  was  raised  in 
order  to  keep  added  value  in  the  regions  and  to  guarantee  deliveries  of  manufactured 
goods.  Fourth,  the  SIBFE  regions  demanded  more  rights  to  conduct  foreign  economic 
activities  including  foreign  investment  and  foreign  trade.  In  particular,  foreign 
economic  activities  had  a  growing  importance  for  the  SIBFE  since  they  would  be 
another  source  of  necessary  goods,  capital  and  technologies,  as  well  as  more  a 
lucrative  market  for  natural  resources  through  which  an  'absurd'  price  system  could  be 
avoided.  Finally,  these  procedures  also  demanded  the  development  of  coordination  in 
the  SIBFE  and  the  decentralisation  of  economic  management.  Discussions  on  these 
matters  soon  escalated  to  a  thorny  debate  on  the  question  of  creating  a  single  market, 
and  the  economic  and  political  sovereignty  of  the  SIBFE  regions,  although  the  regions 
failed  to  reach  an  agreement. (Chapter  111)  109 
III.  4  (1  Rebuilding  a  Regional  Delivery  System:  An  Urgent  Task 
The  main  focus  of  the  demands  of  the  SIBFE  regions  seemed  to  be  simple:  to 
increase  investment  in  the  productive  and  non-productive  sectors,  and  thus  to  enhance 
the  material  well-being  of  the  population.  However,  when  the  discussion  of  economic 
reform  reached  two  pivots  of  marketisation,  self-accounting  and  price  liberalisation, 
the  expectation  of  price  rises  began  to  undermine  the  state  order  and  delivery  system. 
The  immediate  impact  of  those  reform  measures  was  devastating,  forcing  the  regions 
to  formulate  their  own  barter  system  to  replace  the  cracking  state  mechanism,  and  to 
develop  regional  autarchy  based  on  expanding  rights  to  the  resources  at  their  disposal. 
In  the  SIBFE,  the  situation  was  critical:  the  increasing  need  of  capital  goods 
only  met  with  sharply  decreasing  deliveries  and  a  worsening  of  the  absurd  prices  of 
natural  resources  compared  with  those  of  manufactured  goods  and  machinery.  For  the 
SIBFE  regions,  such  a  development  meant  growing  difficulties  in  procuring  the 
necessary  goods  through  state  deliveries  or  on  the  market.  The  problem  hit  resource- 
rich  regions  such  as  Tiumen  and  Krasnoiarsk,  as  well  as  agriculture-oriented  regions 
such  as  Altai  and  Tyva.  Such  problems  were  clearly  revealed  in  the  discussion 
organised  by  the  local  newspaper  Sibirskaia  gazeta.  At  the  meeting,  G.  A.  Pavlov, 
Mayor  of  Omsk  city  and  President  of  the  Association  of  Cities  of  Siberia  and  Far  East, 
complained  about  the  situation  in  Omsk: 
Omsk  city  needs  trolley  buses.  For  each  we  paid  85  thousand  rubles  this 
year  [1991],  but  will  pay  290  thousand  rubles  [next  year]....  What  we  can  do  about 
it?  ... 
We  have  no  petroleum,  no  metal.  ...  If  this  peculiarity  of  a  Siberian  oblast  is 
not  reflected  in  legislation,  we  simply  cannot  survive.  "' 
V.  Nesterov,  the  General  Director  of  the  Siberian  Agreement,  also  complained 
about  the  absurd  price  system  and  unilateral  state  orders  in  Krasnoiarsk  and  Irkutsk: 
Direct  goods  exchange  between  cities  or  regions  must  be  carried  out  in 
accordance  with  economic  rules.  For  some,  they  are  advantageous,  while  for 
others,  they  are  a  sharp  knife....  We  had  government  orders  for  forest  products 
which  increased  to  250  per  cent.  About  this  all  in  Krasnoiarsk  and  in  Moscow 
know  that  more  than  80  per  cent  of  timber  enterprises  cannot  carry  them  out.... 
How  is  it  possible  to  administer  the  economy  as  a  whole  under  the  current  absurd 
prices?  The  price  of  consumer  goods  are  rising  without  limits,  while  the  prices  of 
forest  products,  coal,  crude  oil,  and  gas  are  fixed  by  the  government....  In  Irkutsk 
or  in  Krasnoiarsk,  timber  costs  80-100  rubles  per  cubic  metre  and  is  exported  to 
Caucasus  and  the  Ukraine  where  timber  is  resold  at  600-700  rubles  per  cubic 
metre.  '" (Chapter!  I1)  110 
Increasing  needs  and  declining  material  support  were  also  reported  in  Tiumen 
oblast.  For  instance,  Andrei  Konoplianik,  Deputy  Minister  of  Fuel  and  Energy, 
expressed  his  worries  about  the  situation  in  Tiumen,  blaming  'systematic  under- 
supplies'  causing  a  'marked  decline'  in  oil  and  gas  production  in  the  region: 
There  is  an  acute  need  for  highly  productive  extracting  and  drilling 
machinery  and  equipment.  The  major  part  of  technical  facilities  has  wear  and  tear 
of  more  than  50  per  cent.  Only  14  per  cent  of  machinery  and  equipment  conform 
to  world  standard,  while  70  per  cent  of  all  drilling  machines  are  obsolete  and 
require  replacement.  The  break-up  of  the  Soviet  Union  has  exacerbated  the 
situation  with  the  supply  of  oil  extraction  equipment  from  CIS  countries:  prices  are 
being  raised  while  deliveries  of  equipment  to  Russia  are  on  the  decline. 
... 
Due  to  the  systematic  under-supply  of  material  and  technical  resources 
to  oil-producing  enterprises,  the  exploitation  of  oil  producing  wells  has  sharply 
deteriorated  in  recent  years.  "' 
In  fact,  state  deliveries  in  Tiumen  oblast  had  fallen  by  70  per  cent  in  1989, 
compared  with  those  of  the  previous  year,  and  the  rest  was  to  be  supplied  by 
monopolistic  enterprises  at  `negotiated'  prices.  However,  the  prices  of  nearly  all  oil 
and  gas  output  remained  fixed  from  1982  to  1991,  and  thus  the  region  simply  was  not 
able  to  afford  the  cost.  As  a  consequence,  deliveries  of  equipment  were  reduced  to 
almost  one-tenth.  14 
In  such  a  situation,  there  emerged  the  need  to  coordinate  rebuilding  regional 
delivery  and  barter  systems  to  cope  with  `alarming  tendencies  of  regional  isolation,  '  as 
Potapov,  First  Secretary  of  Irkutsk  obkompartii,  put  it.  149  Despite  the  marketisation 
measures,  the  importance  of  barter  was  growing  because  of  absurd  prices,  shortage  of 
liquidity  and  the  collapse  of  state  coordination.  "'  In  such  a  context,  enforcement 
became  critical,  particularly  in  multilateral  barter  and  delivery  contracts.  As  a  rather 
natural  consequence,  inter-regional  coordination  bodies  were  bound  to  develop.  By 
1990,  regional  associations  were  established  in  almost  every  planning  region,  which 
culminated  in  the  middle  of  1992.  "'  For  instance,  the  main  goals  of  the  Siberian 
Agreement  in  the  initial  stage  of  its  development  were  to  guarantee  mutual  deliveries 
and  coordinate  own  economic  potential.  "' 
111  4  (2)  Expanding  qntrof  over  Resources  and  Wealth 
If  an  effort  to  create  a  regional  delivery  and  barter  system  was  a  passive  and 
immediate  response.  by  regions  facing  price  liberalisation  and  self-accounting,  the 
demand  for  expanding  control  over  resources  constituted  a  more  active  and  essential (Chapter  lll)  111 
part  of  SIBFE  regionalism.  153  The  question  highlighted  a  key  point  of  `colonial' 
relations  and  a  `paradoxical  situation'  as  Shafranik,  governor  of  Tiumen  oblast,  put  it: 
A  region  (Tiumen]  where  enterprises  of  federal  property  accounted  for  92 
per  cent  of  industrial  output  is  tied  hand  and  foot.  We  see  a  paradoxical  situation: 
this  property  is  governed  by  federal  authorities,  while  responsibility  for  the  state  of 
affairs  and  living  standards  lies  at  the  door  of  the  regional  management  154 
In  the  same  context,  Tomsk  oblsovet  sent  an  ultimatum  to  Gorbachev  in  April 
1991,  urging  him  to  take  urgent  measures  to  alter  the  situation  caused  by  the 
`exploitation'  of  the  central  authorities: 
Tomsk  oblast  delivers  15  million  tons  of  oil  and  7  million  cubic  metres  of 
timber  as  its  state  orders,  and  is  exploited  to  the  extreme  by  the  central  authorities. 
The  oblast  has  nothing  left  with  which  to  support  its  own  social  programme  and  is 
on  the  verge  of  a  social  explosion.  If  the  government  fails  to  adopt  urgent 
measures  to  provide  vital  support  to  the  oblast,  the  oblast  Soviet  reserves  the  right 
to  adopt  counter-measures  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  population  resident  on  its 
territory,  up  to  and  including  the  most  extreme  measures.  155 
The  issue  was  clearly  stated  in  a  draft  platform  of  SIBFE  deputies  of  the  USSR 
CPD.  A  initiative  group  of  deputies  of  the  USSR  CPD  from  the  SIBFE  regions 
gathered  in  January  1990  in  Novosibirsk  and  worked  out  a  draft  platform,  which 
included  their  evaluation  of  the  general  socio-economic  situation  in  the  area  and 
necessary  measures  to  be  taken.  In  the  draft  platform,  deputies  urged  a  change  in  the 
relationship  between  centre  and  regions  regarding  the  exploitation  of  resources.  "' 
Furthermore,  the  demand  was  supported  by  the  development  of  the  situation 
itself.  First  of  all,  the  centre  was  creating  a  more  lucrative  `market,  '  which  increased  a 
gap  between  state  orders  and  deliveries,  fuelling  the  feeling  of  being  exploited  in  the 
regions.  Such  a  development  forced  regions  to  be  less  dependent  on  the  state 
mechanism  of  deliveries  and  investment,  and  to  claim  their  own  shares  of  products  at 
their  disposal  to  increase  access  to  a  newly  developing  demand-supply  mechanism, 
including  foreign  markets. 
Secondly,  the  demand  of  rights  to  resources  was  highly  supported  by  increasing 
concerns  about  the  environment  and  small  nations  in  the  area.  Despite  the  observation 
that  the  demands  were  mainly  raised  by  regional  leaders,  the  same  demands  were 
heard  from  deputies  of  indigenous  peoples  and  environmentalists,  as  already  noted. 
Although  these  parties  might  have  a  different  priorities  regarding  the  issues,  157  and  thus 
could  be  problematic  in  the  long  run,  the  question  provided  regional  actors  with  a (Chapter!!!  )  112 
cause  to  form  a  common  front  in  their  fight  against  the  central  authorities,  at  least  in 
the  early  stages  of  the  conflict  between  centre  and  regions. 
In  fact,  the  question  of  rights  to  natural  resources  was  raised  when  a 
constitutional  amendment  to  Article  11  was  discussed  in  the  Second  Congress  of 
Russia.  Despite  the  constitutional  amendment  which  acknowledged  the  rights  of 
republics,  the  rights  of  ordinary  administrative  units  remained  unresolved. 
Furthermore,  the  article  was  nothing  but  a  vague  declaration  of  basic  principle.  "  The 
exact  boundaries  of  rights  were  decided  by  a  series  of  bilateral  agreements,  and  thus 
continued  to  be  a  critical  issue  between  centre  and  regions.  t59 
III  4  (3)  Structural  Changes  and  Building  a  Common  Market 
Another  attempt  to  keep  wealth  in  the  regions  appeared  in  the  form  of  the 
adjustment  of  economic  structure.  Structural  adjustment  was  also  demanded  by  the 
collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  conversion,  privatisation  and  increasing  environmental 
concerns.  t60  However,  the  difference  in  price  between  raw  materials  and  manufactured 
goods  had  also  encouraged  regions  to  develop  processing  industries  in  order  to  keep 
added  value  within  their  territory  and  to  enhance  regional  self-sufficiency. 
For  instance,  Tiumen  oblast,  the  largest  crude  oil  producing  region,  lacked 
processing  facilities,  and  thus  had  to  import  refined  petroleum  from  outside  the  region. 
Western  Siberia  produced  72.7  per  cent  of  Russia's  crude  oil,  but  it  refined  only  8.6 
per  cent  (in  Omsk)  of  petroleum  produced  in  Russia  in  1990,  which  even  fell  short  of 
regional  needs.  By  contrast,  nearly  30  per  cent  of  petroleum  was  refined  in  non-oil 
producing  areas  in  the  European  part  of  Russia  such  as  Central,  Volgo-Viatka  and 
Northwest. 
<'Table  3.4.1>  Production  and  Consumption  of  Crude  Oil  and  Refined  Petroleum 
(1990-1993) 
Oil  Petroleum  Petroleum  Net 
Production  Production  Consumption  Balance') 
1990  1993  1990  1993  1990  1993  1990  1993 
North  3.1  3.5  1.9  1.7  6.5  0.9  -10.6  -7.9  Northwest  0.0  0.0  6.5  6.9  6.2  S.  8  3.8  S.  0 
Central  0.0  0.0  15.3  16,0  15.3  17.4  6.8  4.8 
Volgo-Viatka  0.0  0.0  7.0  8.9  5.4  5.6  7.1  9.7 
Central  Chernozem  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.3  3.8  -10.6  .  6.5 
Volga  10.6  11.8  18.9  17.1  12.4  10.7  24.7  18.8 
North  Caucasus  1.7  1.7  7.0  3.2  9.4  7.0  -2.8  -5.1  Urals  11.2  13.3  22.5  21.6  11.8  11.1  36.6  27.8 (Chapter!!  n  113 
West  Siberia  72.7  69.0  8.6  8.8  12.4  10.4  -5.5  1.3 
East  Siberia2)  0.001  0.0003  10.1  10.7  7.2  7.1  11.5  10.9 
Far  East  0.4  0.5  3.4  3.6  10.0  7.9  -15.0  -5.8 
RF  TOTAL')  516.8  353.9  292.1  217.5  247.3  172.3  44.8  45.2 
')  Net  Balance  and  RF  Total  in  million  tonnes,  other  figures  in  percentage  to  RF  total.  Percentages  are 
calculated  based  on  the  amounts  given. 
2)  Krasnoiarsk  began  to  produce  oil  in  1990  (7,000t)  which  expanded  to  25,000t  in  1995. 
Sources:  Goskomstat,  Promyshlennost'  1996,  p.  283;  and  OECD,  Energy  Policies  of  the  Russian 
Federation:  1995  Survey  (Paris:  OECD,  1995),  pp.  144-145. 
The  question  of  adjusting  industrial  structure  in  Tiumen  had  already  been 
included  in  the  13th  and  14th  FYP  (1991-2000).  According  to  Egor  Gaidar,  the 
Council  of  Ministers  of  the  USSR  adopted  a  resolution  in  1989  to  create  five 
hydrocarbon-fed  chemical  plants-Surgurt,  Tobolsk,  Nizhneartovsk,  Novy  Urengoi, 
and  Uvat-in  Tiumen  oblast.  161  Although  the  plan  had  perished  with  the  demise  of  the 
Union,  it  was  shifted  the  accent  from  the  extractive  to  the  processing  branches  in 
Tiumen  oblast. 
The  Republic  of  Sakha,  another  resource-rich  region,  also  initiated  a  change  in 
the  structure  of  its  diamond  industry,  which  was  quite  successful.  In  addition  to  the 
right  to  sell  10  per  cent  of  diamonds  independently  (December  199l),  t62  and  then  to  20 
per  cent  of  profits  gaining  from  gem  diamonds  and  all  from  industrial  diamonds 
(March  1992),  t63  Sakha  also  persuaded  Moscow  to  establish  a  joint  enterprise,  Almazy 
Rossii-Sakha.  With  the  share  of  Almazy  Rossii-Sakha,  which  was  established  in  July 
1992,  Sakha  was  also  allowed  to  claim  32  per  cent  of  its  profits,  which,  according  to 
Kempton,  constituted  about  half  Sakha's  budget  by  1994.164  Furthermore,  Sakha 
showed  its  interest  in  establishing  a  diamond  processing  complex  on  its  territory  when 
it  initiated  a  joint  venture,  Tiumaada  Diamond,  in  March  1991.  The  joint  venture 
would  allow  Sakha  more  independence  from  Moscow  and  De  Beers,  which  had  the 
right  to  95  per  cent  of  uncut  diamonds  produced  in  Sakha  in  accordance  with  the 
agreement  of  1990.  t65 
Such  attempts  were  witnessed  not  only  in  industrially  developed  regions,  but 
also  in  regions  where  the  industrial  base  was  relatively  weak,  although  their  immediate 
impact  seemed  to  be  less  evident  than  in  Sakha's  case.  For  instance,  the  Buriat 
authorities  also  showed  their  interest  in  the  processing  industries.  According  to  Oleg 
Khomutov,  department  head  of  the  Soviet  of  Ministers  of  Buriatiia,  the  possibility  of 
linking  Buriat  raw  materials  and  technology  to  'Krasnoiarsk-26'  to  produce  finished 
goods  was  being  reviewed.  t66  The  Buriat  case  could  be  an  example  of  conflicting 
interests  between  centre  and  regions.  As  Anatoli  Ivanov,  section  chief  of  the  Central (Chapterlll)  114 
Economic  Research  Institute  of  the  Ministry  of  Economy,  suggested,  the  centre 
insisted  the  economy  of  Buriatiia  should  be  based  on  resource  extracting  sectors.  16' 
The  adjustment  of  economic  structure  was  also  discussed  at  the  inter-regional 
level.  According  to  Valery  Kuleshov,  Director  of  the  Institute  of  Economy  and 
Organisation  of  Industrial  Production  of  the  Siberian  Branch  of  the  Russian  Academy 
of  Sciences,  the  Siberian  Agreement  expressed  the  need  to  manufacture  finished 
products  via  setting  up  financial  groups  on  the  basis  of  privatised  enterprises  of 
Siberian  regions.  "'  The  Far  Eastern  regions  were  also  interested  in  the  development  of 
processing  industries  in  the  area.  In  particular,  a  working  group  of  the  Association  of 
Far  Eastern  Congress  of  People's  Deputies  expressed  their  concerns  about  economic 
structure  of  the  regions,  blaming  it  for  the  low  profitability  of  economic  activities  in 
the  area.  "' 
Despite  the  interest  of  the  SIBFE  regions  in  the  processing  industries,  however, 
most  regions  did  not  seem  to  have  visible  success.  For  instance,  raw  material 
processing  industries  such  as  the  paper  industries  appeared  to  decline  in  the  Far 
Eastern  regions.  Furthermore,  the  economic  structure  tended  to  be  more  specialised 
when  construction  material  production,  machine  building,  and  domestic  electronic 
industries  had  almost  collapsed. 
<Table  3.4.2>  Some  Indicators  of  Changing  Industrial  Structure  in  the  SIBFE  (1990- 
1995) 
1985  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Domestic  Electronics 
Freezers  &  Fridge  (1000) 
Khabarovsk  krai  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.0  0.0  0.1 
Primorskii  krai  130.4  151.5  148.6  65.4  104.8  23.2  0.2 
Washing  Machines  (1000) 
Novosibirsk  ob  0.0  0.0  5.0  4.0  6.3  5.4  10.5 
Tomsk  ob  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.02  0.0  0.0 
Rep  Buriatiia  227.5  238  240.5  83.8  64  16.4  2.7 
Khabarovsk  krai  91.4  75.6  68.4  17.4  42.9  9.7  0.6 
Television  Sets  (1000) 
Altai  kr  0.0  0.0  0.0  18.2  43.7  37.2  16.3 
Kemerovo  ob  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.1  15.8  7,9 
Tomsk  ob  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  3.0  2.3 
Rep  Buriat  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  3.7  2.3  0.5 
Irkutsk  ob  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.2  1.0 
Khabarovsk  kr  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  13.5  8.1  0.0 
Novosibirsk  ob  253.2  101.0  139.2  149.4  124.1  43.6  14.1 
Omsk  ob  186,0  251.5  263.3  216.7  114.4  28.2  14.8 
Krasnoiarsk  kr  365.3  327.3  305.5  157.7  163.3  59.1  15.8 (Chapter  lll)  115 
Machine  Building 
Automobile  Cranes  (1000) 
Krasnoiarsk  kr  0.0  0.0  0.0  32.0  17.0  5.0  0.0 
Rep  Khakasiia  266.0  355.0  360.0  396.0  349.0  73.0  7.0 
Amur  ob  280.0  275.0  300.0  280.0  236.0  24.0  52.0 
Forestry  (light  Industry) 
Cellulose  (1000  t) 
Khabarovsk  kr  250.3  264.2  240.0  206.8  105.6  29.2  27.4 
Sakhalin  ob  323.2  275.7  244.8  193.5  57.7  18.3  32.6 
Paver  (10001) 
Evereisk  AO  0.0  8.5  4.9  1.9  1.4  0.3  0.0 
Khabarovsk  kr  9.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.03  0.1 
Amur  ob  3.5  3.1  2,9  2.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Sakhalin  ob  215.6  203.9  199.9  146.8  60.9  11.0  14.0 
Construction  Materials  (light  Industry) 
Cement  (1000  t) 
Altai  kr  0.0  0.0  0.0  . 
00  27.0  0.0  0.0 
Kamchatka  ob  0.0  0.0  0.0  53.4  72.0  24.2  18.0 
Magadan  ob  0.0  0.0  0.0  80.0  26.5  23.7  16.7 
Primorskii  kr  3537.0  3337.0  3404.0  1939.0  940.0  619.5  557.0 
Sakhalin  ob  68.8  94.2  89.7  33.9  37.2  10.1  0.0 
Source:  Goskomstat,  Promyshlennost'  1996,  various  pages. 
In  the  SIBFE,  only  small  numbers  of  regions-for  instance,  Altai  krai,  Tomsk, 
Kemerovo  and  Novosibirsk  oblasts,  and  Buriatiia--had  a  limited  success  in  the 
domestic  electronics  sector.  In  this  sector,  newly  emerging  regions  were  replacing 
traditionally  dominating  regions.  However,  changes  in  these  regions  did  not  seem  to 
alter  the  existing  resource-oriented  economic  structure  in  general. 
III.  4  (4)  More  rights  for  Foreign  Economic  Activities 
In  a  situation  of  declining  investment  and  delivery  of  goods  and  ever  increasing 
demands  in  the  regions,  foreign  economic  activities-foreign  investment  and  foreign 
trade-mattered  much  more  than  before.  "'  They  were  regarded  as  a  main  source  of 
capital,  investment,  capital  goods  and  technology,  all  of  which  were  crucial  to 
economic  development.  During  the  transition  period,  the  right  to  control  over  resource 
development  projects,  and  necessary  regulations  which  would  create  a  favourable 
environment  for  foreign  investment,  emerged  as  main  points  of  disputes  between  the 
centre  and  regions  in  relation  to  foreign  investment.  Regarding  foreign  trade,  export 
quotas  and  licensing  systems,  share  of  hard  currency  revenue,  and  necessary 
supporting  mechanisms  such  as  information  on  the  foreign  market,  grew  to  be  crucial 
factors. (Chapterlln  116 
As  for  foreign  investment,  who  should  take  the  initiative  in  these  activities 
became  a  thorny  matter,  since  it  invited  disputes  between  centre  and  peripheries  in  the 
right  to  resources  and  profit  distribution.  It  was  still  more  so  became  foreign 
investment  involved  tens  of  billion  dollars,  and  thus  a  large  sum  of  profits  from  taxes 
and  semi-taxes  such  as  contribution  to  the  funds  for  regional  social  development  and 
compensation  for  the  environmental  contamination  resulting  from  exploitation  of 
resources.  171  Although  Viktor  Chemomyrdin  recognised  the  need  of  regional 
initiatives  in  resource  development  projects  including  the  decision  on  foreign 
tenders,  "  it  remained  only  in  principle. 
In  this  regard,  Viacheslav  Novikov,  the  Chairman  of  Krasnoiarsk  kraisovet  and 
the  Coordinating  Council  of  the  Siberian  Agreement  for  Foreign  Economic  Activities, 
emphasised  regional  initiatives  for  resource  development  projects.  He  urged  Moscow 
to  set  up  a  Siberian  Tender  Committee  on  a  permanent  basis  "to  which  central  bodies 
on  their  behalf  would  grant  the  right  to  make  final  decisions  on  determining  the 
winners  of  tenders  held  in  Siberia.  ""'  Although  regional  centres  of  the  State 
Committee  on  Economic  Cooperation  in  the  Pacific  were  set  up  in  Novosibirsk  and 
Khabarovsk  in  1992,14  more  specific  issues  regarding  foreign  investment  such  as 
taxation  and  distribution  of  profits  remained  in  dispute  between  Moscow  and  regions, 
placing  a  major  obstacle  on  foreign  investment. 
Another  dispute  between  the  centre  and  the  SIBFE  regions  in  foreign  economic 
activities  stemmed  from  the  state  control  of  foreign  trade  with  the  license  and  quota 
system.  Despite  changing  circumstances,  resources  remained  the  main  item  of  exports 
both  at  Russian  and  the  SIBFE  levels.  "'  However,  the  export"of  resources  was 
restricted  under  the  law  "On'the  Procedure  for  Registering  Entities 
. 
and  Enterprises 
Entitled  to  Export  Strategic  Raw  Materials,  "  adopted  on  26  June  1992,  in  which  fossil 
fuels,  electricity,  some  non-ferrous  and  ferrous  metals,  chemicals,  wood  products,  furs 
and  grains  were  included.  "'  For  the  SIBFE  regions,  these  arrangements  were  placing 
obstacles  to  their  access  to  a  more  profitable  world  market,  despite  the  abolition  of  the 
state  monopoly  of  foreign  trade. 
In  this  regard,  Mikhail  Semiunov,  Deputy  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers 
of  Buriatiia,  complained  that  they  could  not  sell  timber  in  a  way  they  see  fit,  because 
of  negligible  sales  quota.  "'  At  the  Tomsk  meeting  of  February  1993  where  Viktor 
Chernomyrdin  took  part  with  his  ministers,  the  question  of  export  quotas  was  raised  by 
Viacheslav  Novikov  who  demanded  that  the  quota  system  controlled  by  Moscow 
should  be  abolished.  "' (Chapter  llA  117 
On  this  issue,  the  centre's  position  was  quite  clear,  as  Chemomyrdin  stated.  He 
rejected  the  idea  of  abolishing  the  export  quota  system,  claiming  that  the  system  was 
not  for  the  centre,  but  for  the  efficiency  of  foreign  trade,  though  he  reluctantly 
accepted  regional  participation  in  the  regulation  of  export  quotas.  "  Considering  that 
revenues  from  the  export  of  raw  materials-particularly  oil  and  gas-had  financed  the 
import  of  capital  goods  that  were  required  for  manufacturing  industries  in  the 
European  part  of  Russia,  the  question  of  distribution  of  revenue  earned  from  foreign 
economic  activities  and  export  quotas  has  remain  a  contended  issue  between  centre 
and  regions.  "' 
111  4  (5)  Political  Agenda:  Mere  'Antithesis  to  Centralism'? 
In  the  process  of  growing  decentralisation,  the  need  of  inter-regional 
coordination  emerged  in  the  SIBFE  on  the  basis  of  a  widespread  perception  of  being 
exploited,  geographical  vicinity,  complementary  economic  structure,  and  reasonably 
recognised  efficiency  to  form  a  common  front  in  their  negotiations  with  the  centre. 
From  an  economic  point  of  view,  restoring  the  barter  system"'  and  adjustment  of 
economic  structure,  "'  foreign  economic  activities"'  invited  certain  form  of  inter- 
regional  coordination  in  these  spheres.  However,  decentralisation  in  these  fields  can 
hardly  be  conceivable  out  of  the  context  of  the  federal  system,  which  linked  the  issue 
of  inter-regional  coordination  with  political  issues.  Furthermore,  expanding  spheres  of 
coordination,  a  growing  need  to  lobby,  a  deteriorating  economic  situation  because  of 
`shock  therapy,  '  and  slow  modification  of  the  federal  system  raised  the  question  of 
how  far  these  coordination  activities  should  go  and  what  shape  they  should  take, 
particularly  after  1992. 
However,  the  question  of  the  future  shape  of  inter-regional  coordination  was 
rather  a  delicate  and  challenging  matter,  and  thus  continued  to  be  a  core  of  thorny 
debate  in  the  SIBFE.  At  the  initial  stage,  the  demands  for  'decentralisation'  were 
limited  to  the  socio-economic  sphere,  as  the  Association  of  Cities  of  Siberia  and  the 
Far  East,  184  the  Far  Eastern  Association  of  Economic  Co-operation,  "'  and  the  Siberian 
Agreement186  suggested.  However,  as  Hughes  has  observed,  the  establishment  of 
inter-regional  associations  itself  had  political  meanings.  137 
A  more  detailed  discussion  of  the  mechanism  for  inter-regional  coordination 
began  in  1990.  In  January  1990,  an  initiative  group  of  deputies  of  the  CPD  of  the 
USSR  from  Siberia  and  the  Russian  Far  East  claimed  the  establishment  of  the (Chapter  lll)  118 
`Siberian  market'  and  a  territorial  governing  mechanism  as  their  prime  task.  The 
group  also  declared  that  it  would  work  out  a  structure  and  mechanism  of  regional 
autonomy  in  their  draft  platform,  although  they  failed  to  fmalise  it.  1B8 
In  1991,  the  debate  on  the  level  of  inter-regional  coordination  acquired  a  new 
momentum,  when  the  debates  on  the  new  constitutional  drafts  echoed  in  the  SIBFE.  In 
particular,  Eltsin's  concept  of  zemli  encouraged  debates  on  the  possible  political 
integration  of  the  SIBFE.  189  Discussions  of  the  issue  appeared  in  the  local  newspapers, 
which  showed  a  wide  range  of  opinions.  For  instance,  Sibirskaia  gazeta  organised  a 
discussion  in  which  participated  leading  regional  political  figures  such  as  A.  V. 
Nestrov,  General  Director  of  the  Siberian  Agreement,  G.  A.  Pavlov,  Mayor  of  Omsk 
city  and  President  of  the  Association  of  Cities  of  Siberia  and  the  Russian  Far  East,  and 
K.  E.  Lebedev,  member  of  the  Presidium  of  Tomsk  oblsovet.  In  the  discussion, 
Nesterov  maintained  that  the  desire  of  political  independence  follows  economic  self- 
accountancy.  He  also  observed  that,  under  the  current  situation,  many  things  depended 
on  the  personal  quality  of  political  leaders,  suggesting  that  opinions  of  the  inter- 
regional  coordinations  in  the  political  issues  were  divided.  "' 
Politicisation  of  the  Siberian  Agreement  was  clearly  revealed  in  the  First 
Congress  of  People's  Deputies  of  Siberia  held  in  Krasnoiarsk  in  March  1992.  It  was 
supposed  to  establish  a  close  linkage  between  the  deputies  of  the  CPD  from  the  area 
and  inter-regional  associations.  The  resolution  of  the  Congress  made  an  important  step 
in  the  development  of  the  inter-regional  coordination  with  its  demands  to  remove  the 
President's  additional  power  and  to  abolish  `unnecessary  and  even  harmful' 
presidential  representatives  at  the  local  level.  "' 
Despite  the  increasing  political  influence  of  the  association  and  the  expansion  of 
its  organisational  structure,  "'  the  perception  of  regional  leaders  of  the  political  status 
of  Siberia  as  a  single  entity  in  the  federation  and  thus  that  of  the  association,  remained 
in  dispute  and  rather  passive.  "'  The  disagreement  among  regional  leaders  was 
highlighted  in  their  response  to  Eltsin's  decision  to  dissolve  the  CPD  in  September 
1993  and  the  dismissal  of  Vitalii  Mukha  as  governor  of  Novosibirsk  oblast  in  October 
1993.194  A  further  discussion  of  the  discord  among  regional  leaders  will  be  presented 
in  Chapter  6. (Chapter!!!  )  119 
HI.  5.  Regional  Differentiation 
As  the  development  of  inter-regional  associations  that  were  mostly  based  on 
geographical  vicinity,  levels  of  economic  development  and  living  standards  were 
varied  within  these  associations.  In  this  part  of  analysis,  I  will  explore  the  levels  of 
economic  performance,  living  standards,  and  socio-economic  in  the  regions.  These 
different  features  could  result  in  different  attitudes  of  the  regions  towards  reforms  and 
the  centre. 
Many  Russian  and  Western  scholars,  as  well  as  Russian  central  authorities,  have 
been  engaged  in  the  task  of  identifying  regional  differentiation.  For  instance,  the 
Centre  for  Economic  Competition  and  Forecasting  of  the  Russian  Ministry  of 
Economy  identified  `rich'  and  'poor'  regions  in  1992.195  In  the  same  year,  Petrov, 
Mikheev  and  Smirniagin  of  the  Centre  for  Geographic  Research,  which  was 
established  by  Eltsin's  personal  staff  to  provide  him  with  information  for  policy 
making,  worked  out  an  index  of  social  tension  in  1992.196  Another  study  was 
published  in  1992  by  Dmitrieva.  With  an  intention  to  identify  regions  similar  to  each 
other  as  measured  by  selected  indicators,  rather  than  to  seek  the  exact  position  of 
regions,  she  set  out  two  criteria-living  standards  and  economic  development-for  the 
classification.  '"  A  more  recent  study  by  Aleksei  Savin  was  published  in  Izvestiia  in 
1997  based  on  indicators  of  nominal  income,  minimum  living  expenditure,  and 
budgetary  income  levels  198  Western  scholars  also  noted  regional  differentiation  in  the 
Russian  Federation  in  economic  structure  and  economic  performance,  '99  living 
conditions,  200  fiscal  relations,  201  and  the  speed  of  reform  202 
In  particular,  Hanson  noted  the  economic  structure  affected  the  adaptability  of 
regions  to  changing  economic  circumstances,  and  thus  developed  regional 
differentiation.  203  He  worked  out  categories  of  regions  based  on  two  criteria:  "the 
categories  of  economic  structure  that  are  likely  to  loom  large  in  their  adaptation  to  the 
market:  and  each  group  should  form,  with  respect  to  that  particular  feature,  a  cluster 
that  is  reasonably  distinct  from  other  regions.  "204  He  suggested  five  groups  of  regions: 
rural,  natural  resources,  and  commercial  hub/gateway,  high-technology,  and  ordinary 
regions.  "' 
Although  they  reached  an  agreement  that  there  were  significant  regional 
disparities  in  Russia,  these  works  demonstrate  the  complexity  of  drawing  a  regional (ChapterIll)  120 
differentiation  map.  Their  identifications  were  varied  to  some  extent,  because  of  data 
sets  and  methodologies  employed,  and  different  periods  covered  by  the  research.  Most 
importantly,  however,  different  purposes,  and  thus  different  emphases  seem  to  be  a 
main  reason  for  the  variance  in  their  clusters  of  regions. 
In  the  context  of  this  research,  the  following  two  purposes  will  be  the  main 
concerns  in  identifying  regional  groups.  First,  the  analysis  will  verify  the  claims  of 
exploitation  which  formed  the  economic  background  of  regionalism  such  as  regional 
disparities  between  the  SIBFE  and  the  European  part  of  Russia,  and  between  the 
contribution  of  the  SIBFE  to  the  Russian  economy  and  their  living  standards.  Another 
concern  is  to  identify  the  possible  contribution  of  socio-economic  features  to  the 
activisation  of  regionalism-in  both  economic  and  political  senses-which  would 
affect  the  regional  voting  patterns  of  deputies  in  the  CPDs  and  the  grassroots  in 
referenda  and  elections. 
In  this  regard,  three  main  criteria  are  formulated:  economic  performance  and 
living  standards,  and  the  socio-economic  stress  levels  of  76  regions.  06  In  order  to 
create  an  economic  performance  indicator,  variables  such  as  industrial  production, 
capital  investment,  and  basic  fund  share  are  employed.  Although  the  output  aspect  of 
industrial  activities  is  related  to  the  contribution  of  regions  to  the  national  economy, 
and  the  input  aspect  to  benefits  from  the  centre,  these  variables  are  put  together  as  they 
are  correlated. 
As  for  a  living  standards  indicator,  two  aspects-urbanicity  and  income- 
consumption  levels-are  considered.  The  level  of  urbanisation  is  employed  on  the 
assumption  that  urban  areas  are  `better  off'  than  rural  areas,  and  thus  the  degree  of 
urbanisation  could  be  an  indicator  of  the  living  standards. 
Finally,  a  socio-economic  stress  indicator  is  intended  in  order  to  take  into 
account  socio-economic  fluctuation  and  political  atmosphere,  particularly  caused  by 
the  growing  ethno-national  identities  which  are  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  republics. 
However,  because  of  technical  difficulties  in  formulating  an  indicator,  only  two 
variables-the  declining  rate  of  industrial  production  since  1989  and  the  proportion  of 
non-Russian  population-are  considered,  with  a  view  to  reflecting  the  different  impact 
of  economic  development  and  awakening  ethnic  identities  in  a  region  (for  scores  and 
methodology,  see  Appendices  1.1  and  1.2). (Chapter  111)  121 
<Table  3.5.1>  Composition  of  Regional  Differentiation  Indicators 
Indicator  Variables  Employed 
A.  Input  aspect 
Economic  "  Capital  investment  in  total  &  per  capita  (1990-1993) 
Performance  "  Basic  fund  share  in  total  &  per  capita  (1991.1993) 
B.  Output  aspect 
"  Industrial  production  in  total  &  per  capita  (1991-1993) 
A.  Urbanicity 
"  Proportion  of  urban  population  (1989) 
"  Proportion  of  people  who  completed  higher  level  of  education 
Living  (1989) 
Standards  "  Numbers  of  telephones  (1990-1993) 





Average  real  income  (in  terms  of  shopping  basket  units,  1993) 
Average  real  expenditure  (in  terms  of  shopping  basket  units,  1993) 
Average  housing  space  per  habitant  (1990-1993) 
0  Per  cavita  electricity  consumption  (1994 
0  Declining  rate  of  physical  industrial  production  (1989-1993) 
0  Proportion  of  non-Russian  population  (1989) 
Based  on  these  three  criteria,  five  clusters  of  regions  are  identified:  highly 
adapted  region  (Moscow  city),  adapted  regions,  stagnated  regions,  stagnated  republics, 
and  adapted  republics.  However,  considering  the  general  economic  crisis  in  Russia,  it 
should  be  noted  that  these  categories  are  relative  terms  and  are  employed  to  distinguish 
features  of  one  region  from  another.  Therefore,  adapted  regions  did  not  necessarily 
mean  that  those  regions  achieved  an  absolute  sense  of  successful  adaptation. 
First  of  all,  the  cluster  groups  showed  a  clear  difference  between  republics  and 
non-republics.  Although  the  socio-economic  stress  indicator  was  expected  to  reflect 
the  privileged  status  of  republics,  it  is  rather  surprising  that  the  variable  of  the 
proportion  of  non-Russian  population  seemed  to  dominate  the  other  variables. 
Although  these  clusters  still  identified  differences  between  relatively  successful 
regions  and  stagnated  regions  in  the  transition  period,  we  can  also  identify  regional 
groups  with  two  indicators  excluding  the  socio-economic  stress  indicator. "ä  .ý 
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Among  76  regions  considered  in  the  analysis,  Moscow  is  classified  as  the  most 
successful  region  scoring  100  out  100  in  terms  of  living  standards,  84  in  economic 
performance,  and  21  in  socio-economic  stress.  Eleven  regions  including  St  Petersburg, 
Tiumen,  Murmansk,  Magadan,  Krasnoiarsk,  and  Irkutsk  are  categorised  as  adapted 
regions  with  higher  levels  of  economic  performance  (Mean  score,  henceforth  reduced 
to  M,  =60),  living  standards  (M=45)  and  a  low  level  of  socio-economic  stress  (M=24). 
However,  as  already  mentioned,  a  `higher'  level  does  not  mean  an  absolute  sense  of 
`high,  '  but  relative  to  other  regions.  "'  The  cluster  also  identified  five  republics 
including  the  republics  of  Sakha  and  Tatarstan  which  distinguished  themselves  from 
other  successful  ordinary  administrative  units  with  their  high  levels  of  socio-economic 
stress  (M=71),  and  from  other  republics  with  their  relative  success  in  economic 
performance  (M=56),  and  moderate  living  standards  (M=30).  Eleven  other  republics 
including  Altai,  Tyva,  and  Dagestan  are  grouped  into  stagnated  republics  because  of 
their  low  levels  of  economic  performance  (M=8),  living  standards  (M=12),  and  high 
levels  of  socio-economic  stress  (M=68).  The  remaining  regions  are  classified  as 
stagnated  regions  which  had  an  average  level  of  development,  although  there  were 
some  differences  in  their  economic  capacity  and  living  standards  (for  one-way  anova 
descriptives,  see  Appendix  1.3). 
However,  these  clusters  of  regions  tend  to  draw  a  rather  static  map  of  regional 
differentiation.  In  the  context  of  the  research-to  find  some  linkage  between  regional 
socio-economic  features  and  active  regionalism-dynamic  aspects  of  development 
also  need  to  be  taken  into  consideration  since  the  expectation  for  future  development 
must  be  based  on  the  development  of  regionalism.  With  the  clusters  based  on  regions' 
economic  structure  that  Hanson  suggested,  "'  we  can  make  a  cross-tabulation  which 
shows  two  aspects-economic  structure  and  performance--of  a  region.  Roughly 
speaking,  resource  and  hub/gate  regions  tended  to  experience  a  more  successful 
transition  than  other  regions,  particularly  than  rural  regions  in  general,  although  not 
every  resource  and  hub/gate  region  was  highly  successful,  as  Table  3.5.3  suggests. A.  o  :  ""  ýy  °o  ,ý 
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In  relation  with  the  regionalism  in  the  SIBFE,  we  can  draw  the  following 
observations.  Firstly,  regionalism  in  the  SIBFE  was  based  not  only  on  the  prevailing 
sentiment  of  being  exploited  in  `donor'  regions,  but  also  on  poor  conditions  in 
`recipient'  regions  which  made  a  smaller  contribution  to  the  whole  Russian  economy. 
Such  sentiment  constituted  the  basis  of  SIBFE  regionalism. 
Secondly,  the  sentiment  of  being  exploited  could  be  a  matter  of  point  of  view. 
For  instance,  when  we  noted  economic  performance  in  terms  of  total  amount-in  other 
words,  an  absolute  contribution  to  the  state-most  the  SIBFE  regions  seemed  to  be 
quite  fairly  treated  (see  Figure  3.1). 
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In  this  case,  only  a  couple  of  resource  regions  such  as  Tiumen,  Kemerovo, 
Krasnoiarsk,  and  Irkutsk  are  regarded  as  `exploited'  regions.  Similar  conclusions  can 
be  drawn  when  the  industrial  production  in  total  amount  and  living  standards  which 
were  more  relevant  in  the  discussion  of  exploitation  are  considered. 
However,  such  a  conclusion  can  be  controversial.  For  instance,  Aganbegian  and 
his  `Novosibirsk  group'  insisted  that  the  perception  could  be  "illusory  and  stemmed 
mostly  from  improper  under-pricing  of  Siberian  natural  resources.  "209  Even  when  we 
accept  improper  prices,  per  capita  industrial  production  in  the  regions  clearly 
I (Chapter  Ill)  126 
demonstrates  that  almost  every  region  in  the  SIBFE  does  not  seem  to  be  properly 
treated  (see  Figure  3.2). 
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Finally,  there  existed  regional  disparities  not  only  in  Russia  as  a  whole  but  also 
in  the  SIBFE  regions  210  Regional  disparities  in  the  SIBFE  existed  not  only  in  their 
economic  structure,  but  also  in  their  economic  performance  and  living  standards  (see 
Table  3.5.2  and  Table  3.5.3).  The.  differentials  between  the  regions  in  the  SIBFE  may 
cause  diversities  in  their  perception  of  the  reasons  of  being  exploited,  and  thus  the  way 
to  solve  the  situation.  Simply  poor  living  standards  could  only  be  enhanced  by  a  more 
active  engagement  of  the  centre  (e.  g.  central  financial  support).  On  the  contrary,  `real' 
exploitation  could  be  removed  by  the  disengagement  of  the  centre  (e.  g.  freedom  of 
economic  activities  and  expanded  rights  of  regional  authorities  to  natural  resources). 
The  questions  remaining  unsolved  are  to  what  degree  the  SIBFE  regions  were 
united  with  the  consensus  of  being  exploited  and  being  a  resource  appendage  of  the 
European  part  of  Russia,  and  in  what  degree  regional  disparities  within  the  SIBFE 
regions  hampered  regional  coordination  in  the  transition  period.  These  questions  will 
be  discussed  in  the  following  chapters,  mainly  in  a  'new'  central  decision-making 
body,  the  Congress  of  People's  Deputies. (Chapter!!!  )  127 
I)  For  more  details  on  the  development  of  Siberian  regionalism  in  the  late  nineteenth  century,  see 
Stephen  Digby  Watrous,  Russia's  Land  of  the  Future:  Regionalism  and  Awakening  of  Siberia, 
unpublished  Ph.  D.  dissertation,  University  of  Washington,  1970. 
I)  Anthony  P.  Allison,  "Siberian  Regionalism  in  Revolution  and  Civil  War,  1917.1920,  " 
Siberica:  A  Journal  of  North  Pacific  Studies,  vol.  1,  no.  I  (Summer  1990),  p.  80. 
3)  Igor'  Aristov,  "Chto  takoe  Sibirskii  separatizm?  "  Sibirskaia  gazeta,  no.  17  (17  April  1992),  p. 
12. 
`)Ibid.,  p.  13. 
)  For  the  full  text  of  the  resolution,  see  "Postanovlenie  Sibirskoi  konferentsii  obshchestvennykh 
organizatsii  po  voprosu  ob  avtonomnom  ustroistve  Sibiri,  "  Sibirskaia  gazeta,  no.  32  (August  1992),  pp.  6- 
7.  In  particular,  Siberian  regionalists  demanded  that  the  Siberian  Duma  should  be  given  a  broad 
jurisdiction  over  the  following  questions:  legislation  for  Siberia,  the  choice  of  the  executive  power  that 
would  be  responsible  to  the  Siberian  Duma,  the  use  and  disposal  of  all  the  land  of  the  region,  questions  of 
industrial  and  agricultural  development,  defining  the  extent  and  methods  of  colonisation,  full 
administration  of  public  education,  participation  in  the  fixing  of  Russian  tariffs,  Zemstvo,  legislation 
concerning  national  minorities,  and  supervising  the  regional  budget.  Novoe  Uremia,  no.  14745  (7  April 
1917),  p.  7,  in  Robert  Paul  Browder  and  Alexander  F.  Kerenskii  (eds.  ),  The  Russian  Provisional 
Government  1917:  Documents,  vol.  1(Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press,  1961),  p.  431. 
6)N.  G.  0.  Pereira,  "The  Idea  of  Siberian  Regionalism  in  Late  Imperial  and  Revolutionary 
Russia,  "  Russian  History,  vol.  20,  nos.  1.4  (1993),  pp.  170-172. 
1)  Under  Brezhnev,  the  Association  of  Siberian  Cities  was  formed  to  oppose  the  Siberian  water 
diversion  scheme.  Andrew  R.  Bond,  et  at.,  "Panel  on  Siberia:  Economic  and  Territorial  Issues,  "  Soviet 
Geography,  vol.  XXXII,  no.  6  (June  1991),  p.  370. 
)  Their  demands  are  similar  to  those  of  early  regionalists.  Perhaps,  ecological  issues  were  added 
in  place  of  the  prisoner  exile  system.  Alan  Wood,  "Siberian  Regionalism  Resurgent?  "  Sibirica,  vol.  1,  no. 
1(1993/94),  p.  71. 
9)  Izvestiia,  30  March  1992,  p.  2, 
10)  Izvestiia,  30  March  1992,  p.  2. 
11)  Although  Far  Eastern  Republic  was  created  not  by  the  regionalists'  demand  but  by  the 
Bolsheviks'  need,  a  buffer  state  to  defend  the  Revolution  from  the  intervention  forces  in  the  Far  East,  its 
historical  existence  was  used  to  strengthen  the  legacy  Far  Eastern  regionalism.  For  the  Far  Eastern 
republic,  see  Henry  Kettredge  Norton,  The  Far  Eastern  Republic  of  Siberia  (London:  George  Allen  & 
Unwin,  1923);  Alexander  Azarenkov  and  Ernst  Shchagin,  "Some  Pages  from  the  History  of  the  Far 
Eastern  Republic,  "  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  vol.  81,  no.  1  (1992),  pp.  117-129;  and  John  J.  Stephan,  The 
Russian  Far  East:  A  History  (Stanford,  California:  Stanford  University  Press,  1994),  pp.  141.155. 
1_)  A.  P.  Okladnikov,  V.  I.  Shunkov  (eds.  ),  Istortia  Sibiri:  s  drevneishikh  vremen  do  nashikh  dnel, 
vol.  3  (Leningrad:  Izdatel'stvo  NAUKA,  1968),  p.  43. (Chapter  lln  128 
13  )  Aziatskaia  Rossita,  vol.  2  (originally  printed  in  St  Petersburg  in  1914;  reprint  published  in 
1974  by  Oriental  Research  Partners,  Cambridge,  Mass.  ),  pp.  186-187,  cited  in  Gary  Hausladen,  "Settling 
the  Far  East:  Russian  Conquest  and  Consolidation,  "  in  Allen  Rogers  (cd.  ),  The  Soviet  Far  East: 
Geographical  Perspectives  on  Development  (London:  Routledge,  1990),  p.  17. 
14)  Okladnikov  and  Shunkov  (eds.  ),  Istoriia  Sibiri,  vol.  3,  p.  318. 
13  )  Ibid.,  p.  321. 
16)  Pavel  Minakir,  The  Russian  Far  East:  An  Economic  Survey  (Khabarovsk:  RIOTIP,  1996),  pp. 
62-63,65.  For  more  details  on  strategic-military  concerns  in  the  development  of  the  SIBFE  economy 
during  the  Soviet  period,  see  Harry  Gelman,  "The  Siberian  Military  Build-up  and  the  Sino-Soviet-U.  S. 
Triangle,  "  in  Rodger  Swearingen  (ed.  ),  Siberia  and  the  Soviet  Far  East:  Strategic  Dimensions  in 
Multinational  Perspective  (Stanford:  Hoover  Institution  Press,  1987),  pp.  179-225;  and  Swearingen,  "The 
Soviet  Far  East,  East  Asia,  and  the  Pacific:  Strategic  Dimension,  "  in  ibid.,  pp.  226-272. 
17)  For  a  discussion  of  conversion  of  the  military  industrial  complex  in  the  Russian  Far  East,  see 
Y.  Gudkova,  "Conversion  in  the  Defence  Industry  of  Russia's  Far  East,  "  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  no.  S 
(1995),  pp.  29-38. 
U)  For  instance,  90  per  cent  of  ferrous  metallurgy,  about  85  per  cent  of  industrial  engineering,  and 
more  than  70  per  cent  of  construction  material  industries  are  located  in  the  European  part  of  Russia.  RAU 
Corporation,  RAU  Business  Book:  Russia  Today,  Part  I  (Moscow:  Obozrevatel',  1993),  p.  24. 
19)  Theodor  Shabad,  "The  Gorbachev  Economic  Policy:  Is  the  USSR  Turning  away  from  Siberian 
Development?  "  in  Alan  Wood  and  R.  A.  French  (eds.  ),  The  Development  of  Siberia:  People  and 
Resources  (London:  Macmillan,  1989),  p.  256. 
20)  Jan  Ake  Dellenbrant,  The  Soviet  Regional  Dilemma:  Planning,  People,  and  Natural  Resources 
(London:  M.  E.  Sharpe,  1986),  p.  14. 
21  )  Russian  Academy  of  Sciences  (Dept.  of  Economics)  and  Reform  International  Foundation,  On 
the  Strategy  of  Socio-Economic  Reforms  in  Russia  (Joint  Report)  (Moscow,  December  1992),  p.  2. 
n)  Dienes  observed  that  economic  decline  appeared  to  "further  narrow  Siberia's  economic  profile 
and  foreclose  any  hope  for  self-sustained  growth,  "  and  that  the  development  will  be  "even  more  selective 
and  restricted  to  a  few  regional  export  commodities,  such  as  Tiumen's  gas  and  oil,  more  than  ever.  "  Leslie 
Dienes,  "The  Development  of  Siberia:  Regional  Priorities  and  Economic  Strategy,  "  in  George  J.  Demko 
and  Roland  J.  Fuchs  (eds.  ),  Geographical  Studies  on  the  Soviet  Union  (Chicago:  The  University  of 
Chicago  Press,  1984),  p.  213. 
n)  According  to  Dienes,  investment  for  oil  and  gas  industries  peaked  in  1988.  In  1989,  capital 
investment  in  the  gas  industry  sector  had  decreased  by  7  per  cent.  He  observed  that  the  shifting 
investment  priority  to  the  social  sphere  resulted  in  the  decline  of  investment.  Leslie  Dienes,  "Siberia: 
Perestroika  and  Economic  Development,  "  Soviet  Geography,  vol,  32,  no.  7  (September  1991),  p.  452. 
1)  For  instance,  the  North  regions  produced  1I  per  cent  of  bread,  55  per  cent  of  meat,  60  per  cent 
of  milk,  33  per  cent  of  vegetables  that  were  consumed  in  the  region.  The  Russian  Far  East  could  only 
produce  about  29  per  cent  of  grain  and  52  per  cent  of  vegetables  for  its  own  consumption.  RAU (Chapter  lll)  129 
Corporation,  RAU  Business  Boob  Part  1,  pp.  28,62.  Bulldozers  used  in  gold  mines  in  Magadan  has  been 
mainly  produced  in  Cheliabinsk,  and  oil  drilling  equipment  wanted  by  Tiumen  oil  fields  has  been 
delivered  by  the  former  Union  republics. 
u)  Abel  Aganbegian,  Inside  Perestroika:  The  Future  of  the  Soviet  Economy  (New  York:  Harper  & 
Row,  1989),  p.  23. 
'6)  Ibid.,  pp.  24-25. 
27)  In  1992,  for  instance,  the  prices  of  agricultural  products  had  increased  9.4  times  comparing  to 
those  of  previous  year,  while  the  prices  of  commodity  goods  had  risen  by  26.1  times,  industrial  goods  by 
20.5  times,  civil  service  tariff  by  20.5  times.  Goskomstat,  Rossiiskii  statisttcheskii  ezhegodnik  1996 
(Moscow:  Goskomstat  Rossii,  1996),  p.  376. 
2t)  Bond  also  observes  that  the  question  of  pricing  had  "heightened  resentment  that  Siberia  is 
being  exploited  as  a  resource  colony  of  the  centre.  "  Despite  the  substantial  rise  of  resource  prices  in 
January  1992,  he  emphasised,  regional  leaders  felt  the  price  yet  to  be  increased  to  make  regions 
economically  self-sufficient.  Bond,  et  al.,  "Panel  on  Siberia,  "  p.  365. 
29)  In  order  to  meet  the  socio-economic  and  political  goals  of  the  Soviet  system  such  as  stabilising 
labour  forces  in  naturally  harsh  regions  and  equity  between  various  regions,  special  measures  have  been 
taken  for  the  Far  Northern  and  SIBFE  regions-though  some  administrative  units  are  overlapping  in  these 
grouping-since  the  end  of  1920s.  For  instance,  high  wages  in  the  regions  had  been  introduced  in  May 
1932  which  had  expanded  to  workers  in  almost  all  socio-economic  branches  including  education,  health 
services,  municipal  and  housing,  science,  and  cultural  sectors  at  the  24th  Party  Congress  in  1971.  The 
privileged  measures  included  additional  paid  holidays,  early  retirement,  improved  pension  rights,  housing 
privileges,  support  for  migration  and  travel  costs  and  so  on.  For  more  details,  see  Peter  de  Souza,  "The 
Nature  of  the  Manpower  Problems  in  the  Development  of  Siberia,  "  Soviet  Geography,  vol.  XXVII,  no.  10 
(December  1986),  pp.  701-702.  In  the  1980s,  the  concerns  continued  to  be  discussed.  At  the  26th 
Congress  of  the  CPSU  in  1981,  Brezhnev  urged  to  improve  living  standards  in  order  to  create  normal 
working  conditions.  Accordingly,  the  CPSU  issued  a  decree  to  improve  housing  and  living  conditions  in 
February  1983,  in  which  special  attention  was  paid  to  Siberia  and  the  Soviet  Far  East.  "V  Tsental'nom 
Komitete  KPSS:  Tsental'nyi  Komitet  KPSS  prinial  postanovleniu  o  merakh  po  obespecheniiu  vypolneniia 
planov  stroitel'stva  zhilykh  domov  i  sotsial'no-bytovykh  ob"ektov,  "  Pravda,  26  February  1983,  p.  1.  For 
decisions  made  at  the  centre  in  this  context  since  Khrushchev,  see  Swearingen,  "The  Russian  Far  East, 
East  Asia,  and  the  Pacific,  "  in  Swearingen  (ed.  ),  Siberia  and  the  Soviet  Far  East,  pp.  231.233. 
J°  )"Proekt  platforma  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR  ot  Sibiri  i  Dal'nego  Vostoka,  "  Sibirskaia 
gazeta,  no.  5  (5  February  1990),  p.  6. 
")  He  argues  that  the  living  standard  in  the  area  was  lower  than  in  the  European  part  of  Russia  by 
47  per  cent,  citing  the  collective  index  prepared  by  the  Siberian  Branches  of  Academy  Sciences.  "Eshche 
odno  predupreahdenie  tsentru,  "  Krasnotarskaia  gazeta,  no.  39  (2  April  1992),  p.  2. 
72  )  F. M.  Borodkin,  "Sotsial'nye  problemy  Sibiri  v  usloviiakh  ekonomicheskoi  reformy,  "  Region: 
ekonomika  i  sotsiologlia,  nos.  2-3  (May-December  1993),  p.  40. (Chapter!!!  )  130 
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Associations  in  Decline,  "  p.  61.  Hughes  also  maintained  that  the  association  was  based  on  quadripartite 
political  and  economic  structure  in  the  area,  identifying  four  main  structural  features  of  the  regions;  the 
military  industrial  complex  of  Novosibirsk  and  Tomsk;  the  agriculture  of  Altai  and  Novosibirsk;  the 
energy  industry  of  Krasnoiarsk  and  Irkutsk;  and  the  extractive  industries  of  Tiumen  and  Kemerovo. 
Hughes,  "Eltsin's  Siberian  Opposition,  "  p.  30. 
"'  )  Siberian  regionalism  was  based  on  their  confidence  that  they  would  be  better  off  once  they 
could  use  their  wealth  for  themselves.  This  confidence  was  clearly  demonstrated  by  separatists.  For 
instance,  V.  Sterligov,  Deputy  Chairman  of  Kemerovo  oblsovet,  stated  "Siberia  can  survive  without 
Russia,  while  Russia  cannot  survive  without  Siberia,  "  in  Krasnoiarsk  meeting  of  the  Siberian  Agreement 
in  March  1992.  Izvestiia,  30  March  1992,  p.  2.  Boris  Perov,  leader  of  the  Siberian  Independence  Party, 
also  advocated  that  Siberia  could  solve  its  problems  with  own  wealth.  In  his  interview  with  Sibirskaia 
gazeta,  he  insisted  that  the  GNP  of  Siberia  (about  $250  billion  in  1990,  according  to  his  calculation)  was 
much  larger  than  the  sum  needed  to  solve  social  problems  in  Siberia  (about  $40  billion  a  year,  again  in  his 
calculation).  Boris  Perov,  "Sibirskaia  ekonomika  golosuet  za  sibirskuiu  nezavisimost',  "  Sibirskaia  gazeta, 
no.  I  (January  1993),  p.  4. 
11  )  Iuri  Shafranik.  "Strong  Regions  Make  Strong  Russia,  "  International  Affairs,  no.  11 
(November  1992),  p.  32. (Chapter  III)  145 
"')  Moscow  All-Union  Radio  Maiak  Network  (8  April  1991),  in  FBIS  SOY  91-068  (8  April 
1991),  p.  44. 
is6  )  "Proekt  platfonna  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR  ot  Sibiri  i  Dal'nego  Vostoka,  "  Sibirskaia 
gazeta,  no.  5  (5  February  1990),  p.  6. 
1"I  )  The  regional  authorities  and  environmentalists,  for  instance,  allied  to  criticise  the  central 
department  for  their  ignorance  of  environmental  consequence  of  the  'colonial'  economic  activities. 
However,  regional  authorities  often  found  themselves  in  a  dilemma  between  economic  efficiency  and 
environmental  protection  as  the  forestry  industry  in  the  Russian  Far  East  suggested.  DeBardeleben,  "The 
New  Policies  in  the  USSR,  "  in  Stewart  (ed.  ),  The  Soviet  Environment,  p.  69. 
1S8)  When  Article  I1  of  the  Constitution  was  amended  in  the  Second  CPD in  December  1990  in 
order  to  support  the  privatisation  process  by  recognising  various  forms  of  land  ownership,  the  federal 
subjects'  jurisdiction  on  natural  wealth  became  a  focus  of  debates.  Although  deputies  basically  agreed 
that  natural  resources  were  to  be  regulated  by  the  law  of  the  federation,  they  failed  to  reach  an  agreement 
on  the  point  that  republics  or  other  federal  subjects  were  to  be  listed  in  the  article.  Verkhovnyi  Sovet 
Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  Vtoroi  (vneocherednoi)  s"ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR:  stenograficheskit 
otchet,  vol.  V  (Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo  'Respublika',  1992),  pp.  138.141.  After  the  debate,  Article  11 
recognised  that  "ownership,  use  and  disposal  of  natural  wealth  are  regulated  by  the  laws  of  the  RSFSR  and 
republics  which  form  part  of  the  structure  of  the  RSFSR,  and  acts  of  local  soviets  within  the  limits  of  their 
jurisdiction.  "  Ibid.,  pp.  140.141.  However,  the  'limits'  of  administrative  units  other  than  republics  had 
not  been  clearly stated. 
159  )  According  Vorontsov  and  Muradian,  the  idea  of  granting  15-20  per  cent  of  products  at  the 
regions'  disposal  has  long  been  supported  in  the  area.  V.  Vorontsov  and  A.  Muradian,  "Far  Eastern 
Regionalism,  "  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  vol.  81,  no.  1(1992),  p.  29. 
160  )  For  instance,  Valery  Kuleshov,  Director  of  the  Institute  of  Economy  and  Organisation  of 
Industrial  Production  of  the  Russian  Academy  of  Sciences  Siberian  Branch,  pointed  out  that  a  radical 
change  was  witnessed  in  "the  geopolitical,  economic  and  geographic  situation"  of  Siberia,  in  which  not 
only  suppliers  but  also  consumers  of  Siberian  industrial  products  became  foreign  counties.  According  to 
him,  there  emerged  problems  in  iron  and  steel  industry  in  Kemerovo  oblast,  aluminium  plants,  and 
Barnaul  and  Kansk  mills  where  raw  materials  were  provided  by  Kazakhstan  and  Central  Asia.  He  also 
maintained  that  such  Siberian  primary  goods  as  timber  and  lead-and-zinc  concentrate  had  no  consumers. 
Valery  Kuleshov,  "The  Region  of  Russia's  Constant  Interests,  "  International  Affairs,  no.  4  (April  1993), 
p.  45. 
161)  The  Resolution  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  USSR  "On  Measures  to  Create  a  Petroleum- 
Gas-Chemical  Complex  in  Tiumen  Oblast  on  the  Basis  of  Hydrocarbon-Fed  Stocks  from  Deposits  in 
Western  Siberia"  in  1989.  E.  Gaidar,  "Khoziaistvennaia  reforma,  pervyi  god:  ekonomicheskoe 
obozrenie,  "  Kommunist,  no.  2  (January  1989),  pp.  30-31. 
lu  )  Ukaz  prezidenta  Rossiiskoi  Sovetskoi  Federativnoi  Sotsialisticheskoi  Respubliki  "0 
polnomochiiakh  Iakutskoi-Sakha  SSR  v  rasporiazhenii  prirodnymi  rezursami  respubliki,  "  Yedmostt 
s  "ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFRS  !  YS  RSFSR,  no.  51  (19  December  1991),  pp.  2070.2071. (Chapter  Ill)  146 
163  )  "Soglashenie  o  vzaimootnosheniiakh  mezhdu  Pravitel'stvami  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  i 
Respubliki  Sakha  (Iakutiia)  po  ekonomicheskim  voprosam,  "  lakuriia,  4  April  1992,  p.  1. 
164)  Another  32  per  cent  were  assigned  to  Moscow.  The  remaining  share  was  allocated  to 
workers'  groups  (23  per  cent),  retirement  fund  (5  per  cent)  and  eight  local  governments  (1  per  cent  each). 
Daniel  R.  Kempton,  "The  Republic  of  Sakha  (lakutia):  The  Evolution  of  Centre-Periphery  Relations  in  the 
Russian  Federation,  "  Europe-Asia  Studies,  vol.  48,  no.  4  (1996),  pp.  592-593. 
16J)  Ekonomika  i  zhizn',  no.  12  (March  1994),  p.  17,  in  ibid.,  pp.  593-594. 
166)  "Forum  Ulan-Ude:  Reform  Priorities,  "  International  Affairs,  no.  5  (May  1993),  p.  12. 
167 
/) 
Although  he  noted  that  it  was  necessary  to  develop  engineering  and  metal  working  branches 
in  the  republic  and  limit  the  growth  rate  of  resource  extracting  sector,  he  claimed  that  the  economic 
potential  of  Buriatiia  should  be  boosted  "at  the  expanse  of  processing  facilities.  "  Anatoli  Ivanov, 
`Buriatiia:  Development  Prospects,  "  International  Affairs,  no.  5  (May  1993),  pp.  28-29. 
iea)  Kuleshov,  "The  Region  of  Russia's  Constant  Interests,  "  p.  45. 
ße9)  In  its  draft  "Concept  of  Resolving  the  Crisis  and  Stimulating  the  Social  and  Economic 
Development  of  the  Russian  Far  East  and  Trans-Baikal  Regions  until  2000,  "  the  working  group  noted  the 
problems  of  economic  structure  of  the  Russian  Far  East:  a  loss  of  potential  added  values  by  exporting  raw 
materials  to  other  regions  for  their  process,  and  then  bring  them  back  as  finished  or  semi-finished  products 
which  caused  high  costs  of  production  and  low  profitability.  Vorontsov  and  Muradian,  "Far  Eastern 
Regionalism,  "  p.  31.  The  Development  Task  Force  created  by  the  city  of  Vladivostok  and  Primorskii  krai 
in  1992  unveiled  the  "Vladivostok  concept"  which  also  recognised  the  need  of  structural  changes  of 
economy  in  the  region.  Robert  B.  Krueger  and  Leon  A.  Polott,  "Greater  Vladivostok:  A  Concept  for  the 
Economic  Development  of  South  Primorie  (Appendix  2),  "  in  Mark  J.  Valencia,  The  Russian  Far  East  In 
Transition:  Opportunities  for  Regional  Economic  Co-operation  (Boulder:  Westview  Press,  1995),  pp. 
200-202. 
I"  )  In  this  regard,  the  SIBFE  regions,  particularly  the  Russian  Far  East,  are  interested  in 
establishing  close  economic  tie  with  Asia-Pacific  countries.  Gorbachev  emphasised  the  importance  of 
'Pacific  partners'  in  his  Vladivostok  speech  in  July  1986.  See  M.  S.  Gorbachev,  "Rech'  na 
torzhestvennom  sobranii,  posviashchennom  brucheniiu  Vladivostoku  ordena  Lenina  (28  iiuliia  2986 
goda),  "  in  Institut  Markizma-Leninizma  pri  Tsk  KPSS,  M.  S.  Gobaehev;  izbrannye,  rechi  i  stat'i,  vol.  IV 
(Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo  politicheskoi  literatury  1987),  pp.  19-34,24-25.  Eltsin  also  noted  the  importance 
of  foreign  investment  in  solving  socio-economic  problems  in  the  area  during  his  Vladivostok  visit  in 
August  1990.  TASS,  21  August  1990,  in  FBIS  SOV  90-163  (22  August  1990),  p.  68.  Primporskii 
kralsovet  also  underlined  the  importance  of  foreign  economic  activities  as  a  measure  of  enhancing 
independence.  "Primor'e:  put'  k  samostoiatel'nosti,  "  Krasnoe  znamia,  20  April  1990,  p.  2.  In  this 
context,  Vladivostok  was  declared  an  open  city  in  September  1990.  Izvestiia,  25  September  1990,  p.  2. 
"'  )  For  instance,  in  relation  to  the  Sakhalin-2  project,  one  of  Sakhalin  off-shore  oil  and  gas 
development  projects  which  is  expected  to  produce  $23  billion  of  profits  during  25  year  duration,  the 
Western  consortium  was  to  contribute  $100  million  to  the  Sakhalin  Development  Fund.  Already  the  '3- 
M'  consortium  had  paid  $15  million  worthy  'bonus'  to  Russia,  of  which  $7  million  was  to  be  handed  over 
to  Sakhalin  oblast.  Matthew  J.  Sagers,  "Prospects  for  Oil  and  Gas  Development  in  Russia's  Sakhalin (Chapter  111)  147 
Obalst,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol.  36,  no.  5  (May  1995),  p.  282.  According  to  Dienes,  Sakhalin  oblast 
demanded  15  items  including  $1  billion  for  a  development  fund  for  the  oblast,  $5  million  'bonus'  for  the 
right  to  develop  oil/gas  deposits,  and  32  per  cent  of  tax  for  Sakhalin  alone.  Leslie  Dines,  "Economic 
Geographic  Relations  in  the  Post-Soviet  Republics,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol.  34,  no.  8  (October 
1993),  p.  505. 
172  )  Viktor  Chernomyrdin,  "Russian  Reforms  and  Siberia,  "  International  Affairs,  no.  4  (April 
1993),  p.  9. 
III)  Viacheslav  Novikov,  "On  the  World  Market,  "  International  Affairs.  no.  4  (April  1993),  p.  9. 
17')  Nikolai  Solovev,  "Siberia  and  the  APR,  "  International  Affairs,  no.  4  (April  1993),  p.  28.  In 
fact,  the  Siberian  Agreement  and  the  Far  Eastern  Association  for  Economic  Activity  were  founders  of  the 
Committee  which  was  mainly  aimed  at  creating  a  mechanism  for  external  integration.  For  detailed 
programme  of  the  Committee,  see  Marina  Fuchs,  "Regional  Separatism  in  Russia:  Siberia  1992-1994,  " 
Russia  and  the  Successor  State  Briefing  Service,  vol.  3,  no.  3  (June  1995),  pp.  7.8. 
17!  )  Rolf  J.  Langhammer,  Matthew  J.  Sagers,  and  Matthias  Lücke,  "Regional  Distribution  of  the 
Russian  Federation's  Export  Earnings  Outside  the  Former  Soviet  Union  and  Its  Implication  for  Regional 
Economic  Autonomy,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol.  33,  no.  10  (December  1992),  p.  619.  For  the  structure 
of  foreign  trade  in  the  SIBFE,  see  Tsuneo  Akaha  Tsuneo  Akaha,  Pavel  A.  Minakir  and  Kunio  Khada, 
"Economic  Challenge  in  the  Russian  Far  East,  "  Tsuneo  Akaha  (ed.  ),  Politics  and  Economics  in  the 
Russian  Far  East  (London:  Routledge,  1997),  pp.  49-69. 
176  )  The  appendix  of  the  law  listed  following  items  under  its  control:  oil  products  (crude  oil, 
petroleum  products),  gas  (natural  gas,  oil  and  other  hydrocarbon  gases),  electric  energy,  coal  (including 
sinter  burden,  coke,  and  semi-coke),  wood  products  (timber,  lumber,  cellulose,  and  cardboard),  non- 
ferrous  metals  and  rare  metals  (including  alloys  powders  and  semi-finished  products,  rolled  non-ferrous 
metals,  scraps,  and  by-products),  some  ferrous  metals  (cast  iron,  rolled  ferrous  metals,  steel  tubes, 
ferroalloys,  scraps  and  by-products  of  ferrous  metals),  some  chemical  products  (mineral  fertilisers, 
ammonia,  methanol,  and  non-organic  acids),  furs,  and  grains.  "Statute  On  the  Procedure  for  Registering 
Entities  and  Enterprises  Entitled  to  Export  Strategic  Raw  Materials,  "  in  RAU  Corporation,  RAU  Business 
Book,  Part  III,  pp.  237-239. 
"Forum  Ulan-Ude,  "  p.  11. 
"Reshenie  Sibirskogo  Soglasheniia,  "  no.  1  (8  February  1992),  typescript,  chancellery  of  the 
Directorate  of  the  Siberian  Agreement  (Novosibirsk),  in  Vladimir  A.  Zhdanov,  "Contemporary  Siberian 
Regionalism,  "  in  Stephen  Kotkin  and  David  Wolff  (eds.  ),  Rediscovering  Russia  in  Asia:  Siberia  and  the 
Russian  Far  East  (London:  M.  E.  Sharpe,  1995),  p.  125.  However,  for  some  reason,  he  changed  his 
position  in  his  article  appeared  in  International  Affairs  after  the  meeting,  demanding  "no  less  than  20  per 
cent  of  goods  produced  on  the  territory  of  the  Siberian  Agreement  at  its  disposal  without  discussing  the 
issue  with  the  central  ministries.  "  Novikov,  "On  the  World  Market,  "  pp.  19-20. 
"')  In  his  article  appeared  in  the  special  issue  of  International  Affairs,  he  justified  the  system  with 
a  couple  of  examples  of  negative  impact  of  uncontrolled  exports  such  as  higher  price  targeted  export  drive 
at  the  expanse  of  domestic  consumption.  He  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  domestic  consumption  of 
mineral  fertiliser  was  limited  to  a  minimum  level,  despite  the  6  million  tons  of  surplus  in  1992.  He  also (Chapter  llt)  148 
cited  the  case  of  Vostochny  harbour  where  300  thousand  tons  metal  was  lying  idle,  paralysing  the  harbour. 
However,  he  underlined  that  "this  kind  of  market  and  foreign  economic  initiatives"  must  be  avoided,  "with 
the  participation  of  local  bodies.  "  Chernomyrdin,  "Russian  Reforms  and  Siberia,  "  p.  8. 
1B0  )  Michael  Bradshaw,  Regional  Patterns  of  Foreign  Investment  In  Russia  (London:  Royal 
Institute  of  International  Affairs,  1995),  p.  30.  Against  alleged  efficiency  of  quota  and  license  system, 
Boris  Shaigulin,  the  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Economic  Relations  of  the  Tomsk  oblast 
administration,  criticised  that  central  policies  failed  to  create  a  single  mechanism  which  determined 
effectiveness  and  resulted  in  profitability  of  different  regions.  "Kommentarii:  ukaz,  kotoryi  likvidiruet 
]'gory,  no  ne  likvidiruet  problemu,  "  Sibirskaia  gazeta,  no.  14  (April  1993),  p.  5. 
"'  )  Carrying  out  a  delivery  contract  was  often  facing  complicated  administrative  obstacles.  For 
instance,  Tomsk  khlebprodukt  experienced  an  odd  situation  when  it  tried  to  transfer  its  oil  to  Khleb  Rossii 
in  1992.  Despite  of  Khleb  Rossii's  declaration,  Tomsk  Custom  House  levied  duty  regarding  oil  transfer  as 
supplementary  quota  in  order  to  keep  the  40  per  cent  regional  share  of  duty  from  305  million-ruble  worthy 
transaction.  Anatolii  Zakharov,  "Kto  zamaran  tomskoi  nef'iu,  "  Sibiriskaia  gazeta,  no.  2  (2  January 
1993),  p.  4. 
182  )  Valery  Kuleshov,  Director  of  the  Institute  of  Economy  and  Organisation  of  Industrial 
Production  of  the  Russian  Academy  of  Sciences  Siberian  Branch,  has  observed  that  the  mutually 
complementary  cooperation  between  groups  of  regions  can  help  individual  regions  to  cope  with  own 
problems.  He  has  identified  a  couple  of  possible  inter-regional  cooperations  such  as  Tiumen-Omsk- 
Tomsk,  Krasnoiarsk-Irkutsk,  and  Evnkia-Khakassia-Krasnoiarsk.  Kuleshov,  `The  Region  of  Russia's 
Constant  Interests,  "  p.  49.  The  needs  of  coordination  between  regions  rise  not  only  in  an  active 
cooperation  of  merging  industrial  capacities,  but  also  in  a  passive  cooperation  in  order  to  avoid 
unnecessary  competition  with  neighbouring  regions  in  the  same  sector.  In  their  work  on  industrial 
restructuring  in  the  Tomsk  oblast,  Hanson  and  Kirkow  suggests  that  the  oblast  should  find  its  own 
brandmark  "between  oil  and  gas  rich  Tiumen  and  the  financial,  transport  and  distributional  centre  of 
Novosibirsk.  "  They  also  maintain  that  the  oblast  may  remain  in  the  shadow  of  Novosibirsk,  but  not 
necessarily  compete  in  the  same  areas  such  as  international  airport.  Philip  Hanson  and  Peter  Kirkow,  "In 
the  Tomsk  Oblast:  Federal-Regional  Issue,  "  OECD  Centre  for  Co-operation  with  Non-members,  A 
Regional  Approach  to  Industrial  Restructuring  in  the  Tomsk  Region,  Russian  Federation  (Paris:  OECD, 
1998),  p.  142. 
183  )  The  need  was  widely  shared  by  regional  leaders.  For  instance,  G.  Shaman,  the  Chairman  of 
Tomsk  oblsovet,  admitted  that  regional  authorities  were  not  competent  enough  to  carry  out  regional 
foreign  economic  policy.  "Tomsk  Forum,  "  International  Affairs,  no.  4  (April  1993),  p.  13.  Viacheslav 
Novikov,  the  Chairman  of  Krasnoiarsk  kralsovet  and  Chairman  of  the  Coordinating  Council  of  the 
Siberian  Agreement  for  Foreign  Economic  Activities,  also  raised  the  questions  of  strengthening  influence 
over  decision-making  authorities  in  the  sphere  of  foreign  economic  activities,  representation  of  regions 
abroad,  ignorance  of  staffs  in  this  field,  and  the  need  of  an  "integrated  and  efficient"  network  of  foreign 
economic  information.  Novikov,  "On  the  World  Market,  "  pp.  17-19. 
'")  In  his  interview  with  Sibirskala  gazeta  in  December  1989,  Ivan  Indiniuk,  the  Chairman  of 
Novosibirsk  gorsovet  and  President  of  the  Association  of  Cities  of  Siberia  and  the  Far  East,  emphasised 
the  importance  of  informal  meeting  of  gorispolkoms,  insisting  that  they  could  help  solving  the  most (Chapter  111)  149 
common  and  acute  problems  such  as  housing,  maintenance,  development  of  energy  and  other  communal 
economy  more  swiftly.  Ivan  Indiniuk,  "My  postavili  vsekh  v  ochered'  i  skazali  zhdite,  "  Sibirskaia  gazeta, 
no.  0  (4  December  1989),  p.  3. 
"I)  Far  Eastern  regional  leaders  gathered  in  Khabarovsk  in  August  1990  to  sign  an  agreement 
"On  the  Basic  Principles  of  Economic  and  Social  Cooperation  between  the  lakut  Autonomous  Socialist 
Republic,  Primorskii  krai,  Khabarovsk  krai,  Amur  Oblast,  Jewish  Autonomous  oblast,  Kamchatka  oblast, 
Magadan  oblast  and  Sakhalin  oblast  of  the  Far  Eastern  Economic  Area  of  the  RSFSR.  "  Izvestiia,  30 
March  1992,  p.  2;  and  Rossiskaia  gazeta,  2  April  1992,  p.  2.  The  agreement  stipulated  that  enhancing  the 
economic  independence  of  the  Far  Eastern  Regions  would  be  their  main  goal.  "Far  Easterners  Pool 
Efforts,  "  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  no.  1  (1991),  pp.  13-15. 
186  )  The  charter  of  the  Siberian  Agreement  also  articulated  the  spheres  of  coordination  where 
coordination  were  needed.  The  spheres  of  coordination  listed  in  the  charter  reflected  their  economic 
concerns:  delivery  agreements,  single  system  of  management  in  energy  security,  ecology,  forest  and  water 
economy  and  others,  single  information  system.  However,  the  association  did  not  excluded  the  need  of 
cooperation  in  'political  issues.  '  Articles  6  and  7  of  the  charter  recognised  the  need  of  consultation 
between  members  in  political  issues,  as  well  as  economic  ones,  and  cooperation  between  soviets  of 
member  regions.  "Sibirskoe  soglashenie,  "  Zemlia  sibir,  no.  0  (1991),  p.  19. 
"')  Hughes,  "Eltsin's  Siberian  Opposition,  "  p.  30.  Zhdanov  also  notes  that  "simply  by  gathering 
together  into  an  inter-regional  association,  "  regional  leaders  strengthen  their  political  status.  Zhdanov, 
"Contemporary  Siberian  Regionalism,  "  p.  124. 
188  )  For  the  draft  platform,  see  "Proekt  platforma  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR  of  Sibiri  i  Dal'nego 
Vostoka,  "  Sibirskaia  gazeta,  no.  5  (5  February  1990),  p.  6.  After  the  meeting  in  January,  they  continued 
their  meeting  in  Moscow  and  Khabarovsk.  Despite  their  agreement  on  the  necessity  of  economic 
independence  in  the  SIBFE,  only  26  per  cent  of  deputies  supported  the  draft  platform  in  their  third 
meeting  in  Moscow  on  12.13  March  1990.  Viktor  Iukechev,  "Sibirskoe  deputaty:  nakanune  rossiiskogo 
s"ezda,  "  Sibirskaia  gazeta,  no.  20  (21.27  March  1990),  p.  13. 
189)  Of  course,  even  before  Eltsin's  draft  Constitution  was  unveiled,  proposals  on  the  political 
status  of  the  SIBFE  regions  had  appeared.  For  instance,  in  November  1990,  there  appeared  a  proposal  of 
Ivan  Popov,  Deputy  Director  of  Krasnoiarsk  kraigosarkhiv,  to  divide  the  RSFSR  into  four  republics:  the 
RSFSR,  Western  Siberian,  Eastern  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  Republics.  Ivan  Popov,  "Tri  respubliki,  " 
Sibirskala  gazeta,  no.  3  (22  January  1990),  p.  4.  Some  more  details  for  the  political  developments,  see 
Vera  Tolz,  "Regionalism  in  Russia:  The  Case  of  Siberia,  "  RFEIRL  Research  Report,  vol.  2,  no.  9  (26 
February  1993),  pp.  1-8. 
190  )  In  the  discussion,  A.  A.  Zabologtnyi,  an  economist,  opposed  the  politicisation  of  the  Siberian 
Agreement.  Another  participant  D.  V.  Chrnykh  also  opposed  the  concept  of  zemli,  claiming  that  there 
already  existed  far  much  autonomous  entities  in  the  area  such  as  Free  Economic  Zones  and  republics. 
Aleshin,  "Kak  I  komu  upravliat'  sibir'iu?  "  pp.  10-11.  Similar  discussions  also  appeared  in  "Kak 
upravliat'  Sibir'iu,  iii  o  novoi  kormushke  dlia  partapparata,  "  Sibirskala  gazeta,  no.  35  (September  1991), 
pp.  1,5;  Pavel  Barsagaev,  "Subetnnaia  Sibir':  bez  svobod?  "  and  Vladimir  Iurinskii,  "Sibir'  dolzhna  byt' 
ekonomicheskoi  respublikoi,  "  Sibirskala  gazeta,  no.  9  (March  1992),  p.  4;  and  "Nuzhna  li  Sibirskaia 
respublika?  "  Tiumenskaia  pravda,  6  December  1991,  p.  I. (Chapter  Ill)  1  50 
`)  In  the  Congress,  separatist's  views  also  heard,  though  they  failed  to  be  support  by  the  majority 
of  deputies.  For  instance,  V.  Sterligov,  Deputy  Chairman  of  Kemerovo  oblsovet,  warned  that  the 
Congress  could  be  converted  into  a  Siberian  Parliament,  insisting  that  "we  can  get  along  without  Russia, 
but  Russia  can  not  get  along  without  us.  "  Izvestiia,  30  March  1992,  p.  2. 
")  The  changing  feature  of  inter-regional  coordination  was  clearly  reflected  in  the  organisational 
changes  of  the  Siberian  Agreement.  In  addition  to  the  two  main  bodies-the  Council  of  the  Association  as 
the  supreme  executive  body  consisted  of  governors  and  chairmen  of  regional  soviets,  and  the  Executive 
Directorate  as  a  standing  executive  apparatus  with  representative  of  member  regions.  James  Hughes, 
"Regionalism  in  Russia:  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  Siberian  Agreement,  "  Europe-Asia  Studies,  vol,  46,  no.  7 
(1994),  pp.  1137.1138.  It  also  had  the  Coordinating  Councils  for  specific  needs  which  counted  more  than 
ten  by  February  1993.  According  to  Vladimir  Ivankov,  General  Director  of  the  Executive  Directorate  of 
the  Siberian  Agreement,  the  Coordinating  Councils  in  operating  in  the  early  1993  were  as  follows: 
Councils  for  Foreign  Economic  Activities  (Viacheslav  Novikov,  Chairman  of  Krasnoiarsk  kraisovet), 
Utilising  Mineral  Resources  (Iurii  Nozhikov,  governor  of  Irkutsk  oblast),  Transportation  (A.  Tuleev, 
Chairman  of  Kemerovo  oblsovet),  Crime  Control  (Mikhail  Kisliuk,  governor  of  Kemerovo  oblast), 
Agricultural  Policy  (Aleksandr  Nazarchuk,  President  of  Agrosib  and  deputy  of  CPD  of  the  RF),  Ecology, 
Western  Siberia,  Oil  and  Gas  Complex  and  Oil  Refining.  He  also  acknowledged  a  working  group  for 
information  technology  and  tele-communication.  In  relation  with  the  politicisation,  it  is  noteworthy  that 
the  Coordinating  Council  for  Law-Making  and  the  Implementation  of  the  Federal  Treaty,  led  by  Victor 
Ignatenko,  the  Chairman  of  Irkutsk  oblsovet,  were  established.  "Tomsk  Forum,  "  p.  11. 
193  )  For  instance,  the  Political  Council,  which  was  decided  at  the  association's  meeting  in 
February  1991,  was  abolished  in  the  next  meeting  in  Ulan-Ude  in  July  1992,  because  "the  time  was  not 
ripe  for  such  open  political  discussions,  and  the  creating  was  found  inconsistent  with  the  charter  of  the 
association.  "  Zhdanov,  "Contemporary  Siberian  Regionalism,  "  p.  124.  Viktor  Ignatenko,  the  Chairman 
of  Irkutsk  oblsovet  and  Coordinating  Council  for  Law-Making  and  the  Implementation  of  the  Federal 
Treaty,  also  maintained  that  he  regarded  the  Siberian  Agreement  as  a  "concrete  political  factor  for  the 
formation  of  Russian  Federalism.  "  However,  he  insisted  that  the  association  was  "functioning  on  a 
principle  that  was  the  antithesis  to  those  of  centralism.  "  "Tomsk  Forum,  "  pp.  13-14. 
'"  )  For  instance,  at  extraordinary  meetings,  leaders  of  the  Siberian  Agreement  failed  to  reach  an 
agreement  on  the  political  status  of  Siberia  including  declaration  of  independence  of  Siberia  and 
establishment  of  single  budget.  For  opinions  of  regional  authorities  on  those  issues,  see  Sibirskaia  gazeta, 
no.  39  (October  1993),  pp.  1-2,5;  no.  41  (October  1993),  pp.  1,5;  Hughes,  "Eltsin's  Siberian 
Opposition,  "  pp.  32-34;  and  Fuchs,  "Regional  Separatism  in  Russia,  "  pp.  12-21. 
193  )  Surinov  of  the  Centre  for  Economic  Competition  and  Forecasting  observes  regional 
differences  in  income  levels.  He  concluded  that  56  of  89  regions  recorded  lower  level  of  Income  than  the 
Russian  Federation  average,  particularly  in  Chechnia,  Ingushetiia,  Marii-El,  Dagestan,  North  Ossetiia, 
Kabardino-Balkariia,  Mordoviia,  Moscow  oblast,  and  Penza  oblast.  According  to  his  observation,  Income 
levels  were  higher  in  Sakha,  Komi,  Kamchatka,  Magadan,  Murmansk,  Sakhalin,  Tiumen,  and  Moscow 
city.  Aleksandr  Surinov,  "Rossiia  razdelilas'  na'bogatye'  I'bednye',  "  Izvestiia,  13  February  1993,  p.  4. 
'%  )  They  employed  two  ways  of  data  collecting:  'subjective'  data  based  on  surveys  of  presidential 
representatives  and  'objective'  data  based  on  experts'  observation  and  statistical  data  on  a  five-point  scale. (Chapter  Ill)  151 
They  worked  out  two  categories:  social  tension  and  level  of  misery.  '  The  'social  tension'  category  was 
mainly  to  identify  the  level  of  socio-political  turbulence,  using  data  on  the  numbers  of  participants  of 
'political  meetings,  '  strikes,  out-migration,  ethnic  conflicts  and  so  on.  For  the  'misery'  category,  they 
identified  levels  of  living  standards  in  the  regions,  using  statistical  data  on  income  and  expenditure, 
medical  care,  crime,  infant  mortality,  and  environmental  distress.  However,  Sagers  raised  questions  on  the 
methods  of  collecting  data  sets  and  presenting  the  results,  and  lack  of  explanation  on  the  variables.  N.  P. 
Petrov,  S.  S.  Mikheev,  and  L.  V.  Smirniagin  (summarised  and  annotated  by  Matthew  J.  Sagers),  "Regional 
Differences  in  the  Russian  Federation:  Social  Tensions  and  Quality  of  Life,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol. 
34,  no.  1(January  1993),  pp.  52-59,55. 
197)  For  indicators  used  for  these  criteria,  see  Oksana  Dmitrieva,  Regional  Development:  The 
USSR  and  After  (London:  UCL  Press,  1996),  pp.  81,88. 
ý'B)  Izvestita,  25  October  1997,  p.  5. 
Philip  Hanson,  "Russia's  Regions,  or  the  Mysteries  of  the  89  Organisms,  "  unpublished  paper 
presented  at  the  Annual  Conference  of  BASEES,  30  March-I  April  1996,  in  Cambridge.  Regarding  this 
article,  I  would  like  to  acknowledge  with  deep  gratitude  the  permission  of  Professor  Philip  Hanson, 
University  of  Birmingham,  to  use  his  regional  categories  for  the  analysis  of  the  voting  patterns  of  deputies 
in  the  Congresses. 
200  )  Matthew  Wyman,  Stephen  White,  and  Sarah  Oates  (eds.  ),  Elections  and  Voters  in  Post- 
Communist  Russia  (Northhampton,  MA:  Edward  Elgar,  1998);  and  Sarah  Oates,  "Electoral  Cleavages  and 
Constituencies:  Mapping  Party  Success  and  Failure  Across  Russia,  "  unpublished  paper  presented  at  the 
Annual  Conference  of  BASEES,  April  1998,  in  Cambridge. 
2°I  )  Alister  McAuley,  "The  Determination  of  Russian  Federal-Regional  Fiscal  Relations:  Equity  or 
Political  Influence?  "  Europe-Asia  Studies,  vol.  49,  no.  3  (1997),  pp.  431-444. 
202  )  Peter  R.  Craumer,  "Regional  Patterns  of  Agricultural  Reform  in  Russia,  "  Post-Soviet 
Geography,  vol.  35,  no.  6  (June  1994).  pp.  329-351;  and  Michael  Bradshaw,  Regional  Patterns  ofForeign 
Investment  in  Russia  (London:  The  Royal  Institute  of  International  Affairs,  1995). 
203  )  Douglas  Sutherland  and  Philip  Hanson,  "Structural  Change  in  the  Economics  of  Russia's 
Region,  "  Europe-Asia  Studies,  vol.  48,  no.  3  (1996),  p.  367. 
I)  Hanson,  "Russia's  Regions,  or  the  Mysteries  of  the  89  Organisms,  "  p.  S. 
205  )  Rural  regions  include  regions  with  more  than  45  per  cent  of  rural  population  in  at  1  January 
1995.  Natural  resource  regions  indicate  regions  in  which  industrial  products  of  'resource  sector'  such  as 
fuel-energy,  non-ferrous  metals,  and  timer  and  woodworking  sectors  accounted  more  than  half  the  total 
industrial  products.  Regions  which  were  possessing  foreign  economic  bourse  in  1994,  and  major  maritime 
port  facilities  are  categories  as  hub/gateway  regions.  High-technology  regions  include  top  ten  regions 
when  regions  are  ranked  by  number  of  identified  work  places  in  the  military  industrial  complexes  such  as 
aerospace,  radio,  communication  equipment,  and  electronics.  Ibid.,  pp.  5-6. 
106  )  Because  of  availability  of  data,  Chukot  SSR,  Jewish  autonomous  oblast,  Chechnia, 
Ingushetiia,  and  other  nine  autonomous  okrugs  are  excluded. (Chapter  111)  1  52 
207)  Despite  the  unstable  socio-economic  of  Kemerovo  oblast  as  miners'  strikes  in  the  region 
suggested,  its  relatively  high  level  of  economic  performance  (M=62)  seems  to  classify  the  region  into  an 
'adapted'  group.  It  would  be  a  good  example  of  relative  meaning  of  'being  adapted'  in  this  context. 
211  ) However,  a  minimum  level  of  revision  is  required,  because  of  overlapping  categories.  Here  in 
the  analysis,  high-technology  regions  are  merged  into  hub/gate  regions. 
209  )  M.  Bakhrakh  and  G.  Mil'ner,  "Proizvodstvo  chistogo  produkta  i  ispol'zavanie  natsional'nogo 
dokhoda  po  regionam  v  RSFSR,  "  Vestnik  statistiki,  no.  6  (1984),  pp.  20.22-23. 
210)  The  Russian  Economic  Ministry's  Centre  for  Economic  Competition  and  Forecasting  also 
acknowledged  that  large  differentials  between  the  highest  and  lowest  income  levels  were  found  in  North 
Caucasus,  and  to  a  lesser  extent,  in  North,  Siberia  and  the  Russian  Far  East.  Denis  J.  B.  Shaw,  "Russia's 
Division  into  "Rich"  and  "Poor"  Regions,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol.  35,  no.  5  (May  1993),  p.  324. CHAPTER  IV 
Growing  Representation  of  the  SIBFE  Regional  Interests 
In  the  CPDs 
In  the  course  of  the  democratisation  process,  the  working  patterns  of  the  Soviet 
parliament  had  changed.  Despite  the  spreading  discord  among  deputies  regarding  the 
function  of  the  Congress  of  People's  Deputies  (CPD)  itself,  '  the  CPD  of  the  USSR 
convened  more  frequently  and  longer  than  its  predecessors,  paving  the  way  for 
`democratic'  decision-making=  These  changes  had  provided  various  social  groups  and 
regions  with  more  opportunities  to  articulate  their  interests  in  the  central  decision- 
making  bodies. 
In  particular,  new  parliamentary  working  patterns  such  as  roll-call  votes 
encouraged  the  regions  to  form  coalitions  to  increase  their  influence  upon  the  decision- 
making  process.  The  establishment  of  inter-regional  deputy  groups  clearly  showed  the 
development  of  a  new  interest  articulation  style  in  the  Soviet  system.  Furthermore, 
such  a  move  turned  out  to  be  an  efficient  way  to  achieve  regional  goals  as  the  success 
of  the  Baltic  republics  suggested.  The  need  for  coordination  in  their  regional  interest 
articulation  in  the  CPDs  was  also  acknowledged  not  only  by  deputies,  but  also  by  the 
leaders  of  the  SIBFE  regions.  ' 
Changing  parliamentary  working  patterns  in  the  CPDs  appeared  to  support  the 
idea  of  applying  hypotheses  that  are  employed  to  analyse  the  development  of 
regionalism  in  Western  countries  to  the  Soviet  case.  In  this  regard,  the  following 
assumptions  need  to  be  recalled.  First,  the  more  deputies  from  a  region  are  represented 
in  the  central  decision-making  process,  the  more  opportunities  are  given  to  the  region 
to  articulate  its  regional  interests.  Second,  the  more  opportunities  are  given  to  deputies 
of  a  region,  the  more  possibilities  exist  for  regional  goals  to  be  fulfilled.  Third,  the 
more  deputies  from  a  region  represent  regional  interests,  the  more  likely  the  regional 
goals  are  to  be  accomplished.  However,  the  experiences  of  Western  countries  showed 
that  deputies'  interest  articulation  based  on  their  personal  (gender,  generation,  and (ChapterM  154 
cross-regional  ethno-national  origin°)  and  functional  (profession,  'class,  "  and  political 
affiliation)  backgrounds,  and  urban-rural  cleavages  overshadowed  regional  interest 
articulation.  ' 
Accordingly,  in  this  chapter,  the  number  of  SIBFE  deputies  and  their 
composition,  and  opportunities  of  interest  articulation  in  terms  of  frequency  and 
content  of  speeches  will  be  analysed.  In  relation  to  the  composition  of  SIBFE  deputies, 
regional  diversities  in  deputies'  composition  that  may  be  caused  by  different  economic 
structures,  and  levels  of  economic  performance  and  living  standards  in  the  SIBFE 
regions  will  also  be  discussed.  In  the  content  analysis,  the  changing  features  of  interest 
articulation  patterns  and  deputies'  perception  of  problems  and  solutions  will  constitute 
a  main  focus  to  examine  deputies'  attitude  towards  regional  interests  in  the  CPD.  The 
content  analysis  covers  the  speeches  made  in  the  First  Congress  of  the  USSR  where  an 
`explosion  of  participation'  had  been  witnessed.  Although  only  fifteen  speeches  of 
SIBFE  deputies  were  included  in  the  analysis,  they  showed  the  main  concerns  of  the 
regions,  as  they  were  made  by  deputies  from  various  regions  and  diverse  social 
backgrounds.  Further  analysis  of  the  coalition  of  SIBFE  deputies  will  be  continued  in 
Chapters  5  and  6  with  some  results  of  roll-call  votes  in  which  opportunities  were  open 
to  all  deputies  in  the  USSR  and  Russian  CPDs. 
The  analysis  suggests  that  there  were  significant  changes  in  the  policy-making 
process  during  the  transition  period,  although  some  continuities  were  also  apparent. 
Firstly,  the  working  patterns  of  the  CPDs  became  more  institutionalised  in  terms  of 
frequencies  and  duration  of  meetings,  and  ways  of  discussing  issues.  Secondly,  the 
socio-economic  features  of  a  region  resulted  in  regional  variations  in  the  composition 
of  deputies.  In  particular,  among  the  SIBFE  deputies,  heterogeneity  in  their 
composition  had  increased  in  the  Russian  CPD  than  in  the  USSR  CPD.  This  trend 
suggests  the  growing  difficulties  in  coordinating  their  activities  in  the  central 
legislature.  Thirdly,  opportunities  for  interest  articulation  had  been  open  to  deputies 
from  the  peripheries  in  both  geographical  and  functional  senses.  Fourthly,  interest 
articulation  patterns  of  deputies  became  more  straightforward,  clearly  mentioning 
regional  interests  rather  than  using  a  circumlocution.  Finally,  the  content  analysis 
suggests  the  possibility  of  differentiation  of  interests  among  SIBFE  deputies,  despite 
their  common  concerns  about  deteriorating  socio-economic  situations  in  the  SIBFE 
regions  and  criticism  on  departmentalism. (Chapter  1V)  1  55 
IV.  1.  From  'Ratification  of  the  Party  List'  to  'Selection' 
During  the  Soviet  period,  an  election  served  the  political  purposes  of  the  Soviet 
regime  rather  than  a  rather  genuine  purpose  of  electing  personnel  to  a  post,  as  Western 
scholars  have  noted.  '  However,  elections  were  endowed  with  a  changing  goal  in  the 
process  of  perestroika-control  over  the  party  apparatus  by  providing  the  grassroots 
with  an  opportunity  of  participation-as  Gorbachev  mentioned  in  his  speech  to  the  27th 
Party  Congress  in  February  1986.  $  Accordingly,  changes  were  introduced  in  the  new 
election  law  of  December  1988,  although  it  still  contained  some  flaws.  '  In  particular,  a 
new  principle  of  competition  had  changed  the  behaviour  of  voters  and  candidates, 
which  soon  developed  into  a  more  genuine  sense  of  competition  in  the  elections.  In  the 
process,  not  only  the  personal  backgrounds  of  individual  voters  and  candidates,  but 
also  the  general  socio-economic  features  of  a  region  began  to  play  a  major  role  in  the 
elections.  t0 
Firstly,  the  new  election  law  allowed  an  unlimited  numbers  of  candidates  for 
each  seat  (Arts.  38  and  39).  "  As  a  result,  multi-candidates  were  registered  in  1,100  of 
1,499  electoral  districts,  or  73.3  per  cent,  in  the  election  to  the  CPD  of  the  USSR  in 
March  1989,  although  single  candidacies  still  prevailed  in  Central  Asia  and  the 
Caucasus.  ' 
The  trend  of  multi-candidacies  also  found  in  the  elections  to  the  CPD  of  Russia, 
and  regional  and  local  Soviets.  "  For  instance,  in  Tiumen  oblast,  single-candidates 
were  registered  in  51  of  190  electoral  districts,  or  26.8  per  cent,  in  the  election  to  the 
gorsovet.  However,  the  proportion  of  single  candidacies  had  significantly  decreased  in 
the  elections  to  the  oblsovet  and  the  CPD  of  Russia.  In  the  elections,  average  numbers 
of  candidates  were  2.4  for  the  gorsovet  and  8.3  for  the  CPD  of  Russia  in  Tiumen 
oblast. 
<Table  4.1.1>  Numbers  of  Candidates  in  the  Elections  in  Tiumen  oblast  (1990) 
City  Soviet 
largest  average 
single  2-4  5-7  8  or  more  total  number  number 
candidate  candidates  candidates  candidates  of  of 
candidates  candidates 
electoral  51  131  80  190  6  in  2.4 
district  (26.8)  (68.9)  (4.2)  (0.0)  (100.0)  3districts 
candidates  51  354  33  0  448 (Chapter  1i9  156 
Oblast  Soviet 
electoral  3  30  14  5  52'»  11  in  4.4 
district  (5.8)  (57.7)  (26.9)  (9.6)  (100.0)  1  district 
candidates  3  99  83  44  229 
CPD  gf  Russia 
electoral  009  11  20  20  in  8.3 
district  (0.0)  (0.0)  (45.0)  (55.0)  (100.0)  1  district 
candidates  00  52  114  166 
Data  for  8  of  60  electoral  districts  are  unavailable. 
Figures  in  bracket  indicate  percentage  to  the  total  numbers  of  electoral  districts. 
Sources:  Tiumenskaia  pravda,  24  January  1990,  p.  1;  25  January  1990,  pp.  1.3;  26  January  1990,  pp.  2.3. 
Secondly,  the  election  law  stipulated  candidates'  right  to  conduct  election 
campaigns  (Article  38)  and  address  to  the  public  via  mass  media  and  public  meetings 
(Article  44).  The  law  also  provided  candidates  with  the  rights  to  have  up  to  ten 
election  campaign  assistants  (Article  46)  and  free  travel  for  electoral  meetings  (Article 
49).  14  With  the  development  of  'socialist  pluralism'  and  glasnost',  these  legal 
guarantees  brought  significant  changes  in  election  campaigns  in  two  aspects:  coverage 
of  the  platforms  of  candidates  and  emerging  coalitions  of  deputies  based  on  their 
platforms. 
During  election  campaigns,  candidates  gave  their  opinions  about  questions  at 
various  levels-from  Union  to  district  and  various  aspects-from  `high'  politics  to 
`low'  politics-although  not  all  these  platforms  were  practical  and  sensible.  "  For 
instance,  in  Primorskii  krai,  the  platforms  of  candidates  included  questions  of  'high' 
politics  at  the  federal  level  such  as  the  sovereignty  of  the  RSFSR,  "  a  multi-party 
system,  "  and  market  relations,  "  as  well  as  'low'  politics  at  the  regional  level  such  as 
housing  and  hospital  constructions  in  a  district.  "  However,  this  does  not  necessarily 
mean  that  the  platform  of  a  candidate  itself  played  a  decisive  role  in  his  or  her'  success 
in  the  election,  considering  that  a  significant  difference  in  the  platforms  was  hardly 
discernible  on  some  occasions.  20 
Another  significant  change  was  found  in  the  emerging  coalitions  of  candidates 
based  on  platforms  which  soon  developed  into  a  primitive  form  of  party  politics. 
Although  the  efficiency  of  these  coalitions  varied  region  by  region,  and  coalition  by 
coalition  (as  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  7,3),  it  certainly  changed  Soviet  election 
patterns,  as  the  success  of  the  People's  Front  in  the  Baltic  republics  suggested.  ' 
Thirdly,  the  electorate  was  no  longer  an  object  of  mobilisation,  but  emerged  as  a 
subject  of  participation  when  an  increasing  proportion  of  voters  ceased  to  be  a  rubber 
stamp  for  approving  a  party  list  of  candidates.  Hahn's  survey  in  1990  in  Iaroslavl (Chapter  M  1S7 
suggests  that  the  grassroots  regarded  elections  and  their  participation  in  these  elections 
as  important.  '  Other  surveys  conducted  during  the  period  of  election  campaigns  also 
showed  that  voters  began  to  select  candidates  based  on  their  own  preference,  whether 
rational  or  not.  For  instance,  Levanskii,  Obolenskii  and  Tokarevskii  suggest  that  about 
two-thirds  of  voters  had  own  criteria  in  their  selection  of  candidates.  '  A  survey 
conducted  by  the  Social  Group  of  'Elections-90'  (Vybory-90)  in  the  city  of  Tobol'sk  in 
Tiumen  oblast  also  showed  that  voters  regarded  the  personal  qualities-accord  of 
speech  and  deed,  ability  to  work  with  other  people,  and  anti-bureaucratic  attitude-of  a 
candidate  as  the  most  important  factor.  The  survey  also  suggested  that  respondents 
preferred  a  candidate  from  an  industrial  sector  (35.1  per  cent)  and  aged  less  than  50 
years  old  (95.5  per  cent).  24  The  changing  features  of  electorates  were  clearly 
demonstrated  in  the  electoral  meetings,  23  emerging  informal  organisations,  2'  decreasing 
turnout  compared  to  the  previous  Soviet  elections,  27  and  defeats  of  first  secretaries  in 
many  electoral  districts  23 
Finally,  the  socio-economic  features  of  a  region  affected  these  changing  features 
in  the  elections.  For  instance,  according  to  Berezkin  and  his  colleagues,  the  larger  the 
size  of  urban  populations,  employees  in  the  science  sector,  and  the  highly  educated,  the 
lower  the  voter  turnout  and  the  more  numbers  of  candidates  per  seat.  By  contrast, 
voter  turnout  was  higher  in  areas  where  the  proportion  of  the  agricultural  population 
was  high.  " 
IV.  2.  Composition  of  the  CPDs  of  the  USSR  and  Russia 
The  electoral  reform  had  changed  the  representation  patterns  in  the  CPDs,  as 
many  have  already  discussed.  In  relation  with  the  development  of  regionalism,  this 
analysis  also  shows  that  the  regional  socio-economic  features  influenced  the 
composition  of  the  deputies.  For  instance,  indigenisation  of  deputies  from  titular 
republics  was  evident  in  the  both  CPDs.  Furthermore,  socio-economic  features  of  a 
region  affected  the  composition  of  deputies.  As  far  as  SIBFE  deputies  were  concerned, 
heterogeneity  within  the  deputy  group  appeared  to  grow  in  the  Russian  CPD  than  in  the 
USSR  CPD,  which  accordingly  increased  difficulties  in  coordinating  SIBFE  deputies' 
parliamentary  activities. (Chapter  !  1)  158 
IV.  2  (1)  Composition  of  the  CPD  Of  the  USSR 
The  election  to  the  CPD  of  the  USSR  in  March  1989  was  distinguished  by 
changes  not  only  in  the  election  procedures  and  in  candidates'  and  voters'  behaviour, 
but  also  in  the  composition  of  deputies.  In  general,  women,  workers,  and  rural  regions 
were  significantly  underrepresented  in  the  1989  CPD  compared  to  the  previous 
Supreme  Soviet  of  the  USSR,  though  the  proportion  of  party  members  had  increased. 
More  importantly,  the  indigenisation  of  deputies  from  titular  autonomous 
administrative  units  was  evident. 
Changes  in  representation  in  the  USSR  CPD  were  apparent  in  many  aspects.  For 
instance,  candidates  of  `unusual'  occupational  background  such  as  priest  and 
pensioners  were  elected  to  the  CPD.  Furthermore,  there  was  a  decreasing 
representation  of  women  and  workers  in  the  CPD,  as  well  as  in  the  Supreme  Soviet, 
compared  to  Soviet  representation  patterns.  Under  the  Soviet  system,  representation 
was  intended  to  demonstrate  the  equity  of  the  socialist  country  as  a  state  of  workers, 
boosting  the  representation  of  workers,  women  and  youth  30  However,  the  proportion 
of  women  showed  a  sharp  decrease  from  32.8  per  cent  in  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  1984 
to  15.6  per  cent  (or  355  deputies)  in  the  new  CPD,  and  18.5  per  cent  (or  100  deputies) 
in  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  1989"  The  proportion  of  workers  also  decreased  from  49.5 
per  cent  in  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  1984  to  23.1  per  cent  in  the  CPD  and  18.3  per  cent  in 
the  Supreme  Soviet  of  1989. 
<Table  4.2.1>  Composition  of  the  Supreme  Soviets  (1984,1989)  and  the  USSR  CPD 
Supreme  Soviet  CPD  Supreme  Soviet 
(1984)  (1989)  (1989) 
deputy  %  deputy  %  deputy  % 
size  size  size 
Top  leadership  23  1.5  15  0.7  1  0.2 
Upper/middle  adm')  255  40.0  813  39.8  178  32.8 
Lower  admn  99  6.6  504  24.7  191  35.3 
Workers  688  49.5  473  23.1  99  18.3 
Highly  skilled  labourers  90  6.0  197  9.7  68  12,5 
Priests  0  0.0  5  0.2  0  0,0 
Pensioners  0  0.0  37  1.8  S  0.9 
Total  1499  100.0  2044  100.0  542  100.0 
Upper  and  middle  echelons  of  administration:  first  and  second  secretaries  of  union  republics;  first 
secretaries  of  the  kraikom,  obkom  and  gorkom  of  the  CPSU;  CPSU  CC  officials;  executives  of  the  USSR 
union  republic  Supreme  Soviets;  USSR  ministers  and  deputy  ministers;  union  republic  ministers  and 
deputy  ministers;  high  ranking  military  leaders;  KGB  and  procurators;  high  trade  union  executives;  and 
executives  of  the  Academy  of  Sciences,  research  institutes  and  officers  universities. 
2)  Lower  echelon  of  administration:  collective  farm  chairmen  and  chiefs  of  specialisation;  and  state  farm 
directors,  deputy  directors  and  chief  specialists. 
Sources:  Izvestiia,  28  April  1988,  pp.  1.2;  and  Moskovskie  novasti,  no,  24  (1989),  p.  8. (Chapter  M  159 
Furthermore,  rural  areas  and  small-numbered  nations  without  autonomous  status 
were  clearly  underrepresented  in  the  CPD  of  the  USSR.  According  the  1989  census, 
the  rural  population  accounted  for  34.1  per  cent  of  the  total  population  of  the  USSR, 
and  26.4  per  cent  of  the  RSFSR  population.  However,  they  accounted  for  20  per  cent 
of  deputies  in  the  USSR  CPD,  and  20.5  per  cent  in  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  1989. 
Apart  from  this  general  alteration,  two  important  features  are  noteworthy  in 
relation  to  the  development  of  regionalist  tendencies  in  the  autonomous  administrative 
units.  Firstly,  administrative  status  had  been  taken  into  account  in  representation,  with 
one-third  of  the  seats  in  the  CPD  allocated  to  autonomous  administrative  units.  "  As  a 
result,  autonomous  administrative  units  with  small  populations  such  as  the  Baltic 
republics  were  overrepresented  in  the  CPD  and  the  Supreme  Soviet.  By  contrast,  those 
of  large  population  such  as  RSFSR,  Ukraine,  Kazakhstan,  and  Uzbekistan,  were 
underrepresented.  The  gap  between  those  republics  was  still  larger  in  the  Supreme 
Soviet.  The  lower  levels  of  autonomous  administrative  units  were  also 
overrepresented,  "  which  increased  their  influence  on  the  central  decision-making. 
'Table  4.2.2>  Representation  of  the  Union  Republics  in  the  USSR  CPD 
Population  CPD  Supreme  Soviet  Cms  Cmt 
(%)  total  SN  SU 
Total  286731  2250  seats  542  seats  271  seats  271  seats  321  seats  605  seats 
RSFSR  51.4  -5.8  -6.9  -16.2  2.5  0.6  0.0 
Ukraine  18.0  -6.5  -6.5  -13.3  1.2  -8.3  -7.9 
Belarus  3.6  0.6  0.3  0.5  0.1  1.4  -0.1 
Estonia  0.5  1.3  1.9  3.6  0.2  1.7  2.6 
Latvia  0.9  1.1  1.7  3.2  0.2  1.3  1.2 
Lithuania  1.3  1.0  1.5  2.8  0.2  0.9  1.3 
Armenia  1.1  1.6  1.5  3.0  0.0  1.1  1.0 
Azerbaijan  2.5  0.2  1.6  3.8  -0.7  0.9  1.1 
Georgia  1.9  1.3  2.9  5.9  -0.1  1.5  1.1 
Kazakhstan  5.8  -3.4  -1.2  .  1.7  -0.6  -2.1  -1.7 
Kirgizstan  1.5  0.1  1.1  2.6  -0.4  1.0  0.8 
Tajikistan  1.8  0.2  1.2  3.0  -0.7  1.0  1.5 
Turkmenistan  1.2  0.6  1.4  2.9  -0.1  0.7  0.5 
Uzbekistan  6.9  -3.0  -1.5  -1.3  -1.7  -1.9  .  2.8 
Moldavia  1.5  0.4  1.3  2.6  0.0  0.4  1.3 
Population  total  (1,000);  SN  (Soviet  of  Nationalities);  SU  (Soviet  of  the  Union);  Cms  (Standing 
Commissions  of  the  Supreme  Soviet);  Cmt  (Committees  of  the  Supreme  Soviet);  +  and  -  values  indicate 
over-  and  under-representation  compared  to  the  per  cent  of  titular  population  in  each  republic 
Source:  Figures  derived  from  Verkhovnyi  Sovet  SSSR,  Narodnye  deputaty  SSSR. 
Secondly,  a  growing  degree  of  indigenisation  of  deputies  was  evident  in  most 
republic  deputy  groups,  4  Titular  nations  were  particularly  overrepresented  in  the 
Baltic  republics,  not  only  because  of  growing  national  assertiveness,  but  also  because (Chapter  Bq  160 
of  gerrymandering.  "  Despite  these  trends,  titular  nations  were  underrepresented  in  the 
RSFSR,  Ukraine,  Armenia,  and  Azerbaijan.  In  particular,  Russians  in  the  RSFSR  were 
considerably  underrepresented  when  they  consisted  74.3  per  cent  of  the  RSFSR 
deputies  in  the  CPD,  and  67.2  per  cent  in  the  Supreme  Soviet.  36  By  contrast,  Russians 
who  lived  in  other  union  republics,  except  in  the  Baltic  republics,  Kazakhstan,  and 
Georgia,  were  overrepresented.  The  trend  of  indigenisation  was  also  found  at  the 
lower  levels  of  autonomous  administrative  units,  which  will  be  discussed  later. 
<Table  4.2.3>  Representation  of  Titular  Nations  in  the  USSR  CPD 
Titular  Representation  of  Russian  Representation  of 
Nation  Titular  Nation  Population  Russian  Population 
(%)  CPD  Supreme  (%)  CPD  Supreme 
Soviet  Soviet 
RSFSR  81.5  -7.2  -14.3  -- 
Ukraine  72.7  .  3.8  -1.7  22.1  4.1  3.7 
Belarus  77.9  1.0  7.8  13.2  2.6  1.1 
Estonia  61.5  21.8  23.1  30.3  -22.0  -30.3 
Latvia  52.0  28.8  19.4  34.0  .  20.5  -12.6 
Lithuania  79.6  10.1  13.7  9.4  -6.0  -2.7 
Armenia  93.3  -2.7  6.7  1.6  7.8  -1.6 
Azerbaijan  82.7  -2.1  8.2  5.6  4.1  -1.1 
Georgia  70.1  6.8  6.8  6.3  -1.9  -6.3 
Kazakhstan  39.7  7.2  8.3  37.8  -4.5  -13.8 
Kirgizstan  52.4  12.4  19.0  21.5  2.6  7.1 
Tajikistan  62.3  11.4  19.0  7.6  11.7  4.9 
Turkmenistan  72.0  4.6  13.7  9.5  5.4  -2.4 
Uzbekistan  71.4  0.4  -16.2  8.3  3.5  5.5 
Moldavia  64.5  8.2  2.2  13.8  4.4  -0.5 
+  and  -  values  indicate  over-  and  under-representation  compared  to  the  per  cent  of  titular  population  in 
each  republic. 
Source:  Figures  derived  from  Verkhovnyi  Sovet  SSSR,  Narodnye  deputaty  SSSR. 
Thirdly,  the  composition  of  regional  deputy  groups  in  the  CPD  varied  in  their 
social  strata,  or  `class,  '  reflecting  socio-economic  and  political  features  of  an  electoral 
district  or  a  region"  For  instance,  nomenklaturists  and  the  intelligentsia  were  elected 
mainly  in  large  cities,  while  managers  and  workers,  particularly  of  agricultural  sectors, 
were  successful  in  rural  areas  ()0=903.8,  df=18,  p<0.001)'e  The  composition  of 
deputies  from  the  union  republic  groups  also  suggests  that  regional  socio-economic 
features  affected  representational  patterns.  For  instance,  a  large  proportion  of 
nomenklaturists  (21.1  per  cent)  was  represented  among  deputies  from  agricultural 
republics  such  as  Central  Asian  republics,  while  intellectuals  were  numerous  among 
39  Baltic  (41.1  per  cent)  and  Moscow  (47.9  per  cent)  deputies.  However,  a  large  number (Chapter  IVj  161 
of  nomenklaturists  (17.6  per  cent)  was  elected  in  Moscow,  perhaps  because  its  status  as 
the  capital  city  (X==364.0,  df=24,  p<0.001). 
<Table  4.2.4>  `Class'  Composition  in  the  USSR  CPD  (%) 
Nom  Cad  Mil  Man  Int  Tec  Wor  Total') 
Urbanisation  (X7-903.8.  df=18.  IL<-0.001) 
Large  cities  22.6  7.3  5.8  7.9  35.1  11.1  10.3  895 
Medium-sized  cities  19.3  6.2  2.2  15.1  11.6  23.3  22.2  450 
Small  cities  3.9  12.4  0.8  18.2  4.4  30.6  29.8  363 
Rural  areas  0.0  4.0  0.0  41.6  1.1  9.9  43.4  454 
Total  14.0  7.2  3.0  18.2  17.9  16.7  23.0  2162 
Republic  Groups(X2=364.  df-24.  p.  <0.001) 
Slavic  11.5  7.5  4.4  22.4  11.8  18.9  23.6  1239 
Moscow  17.6  7.4  7.4  7.4  47.9  9.6  2.7  188 
Baltic  12.7  9.5  1.3  13.9  41.1  17.7  3.8  158 
Caucasus  13.7  6.6  2.8  9.4  22.2  8.0  37.3  212 
Central  Asia  21.1  4.2  3.3  14.4  10.3  15.8  30.8  360 
Total=)  13.9  7.0  4.1  17.8  17.8  16.4  22.9  2157 
Nom  (nomenklaturists),  Cad  (Cadres),  Mil  (military  personnel  including  KGB),  Man  (managers),  Int 
(intelligentsia),  Tee  (technicians),  and  Wor  (workers);  large  cities  (cities  with  more  than  500,000 
population),  medium-sized  cities  (cities  between  100,000  and  500,000  population),  and  small  cities 
(cities  less  than  100,000  population  and  urban  settlements).  Military  districts  are  excluded. 
1)  Deputies  in  total  number  including  those  who  joined  the  CPD  after  1989. 
')Deputies  from  Moldavia  excluded. 
Source:  Figures  derived  from  Verkhovnyi  Sovet  SSSR,  Narodnye  deputaty  SSSR. 
IV.  2  (2)  Composition  of  the  CPD  of  Russia 
The  election  to  the  CPD  of  Russia  on  4  March  1990  for  1068  seats  also  showed 
clear  changes  in  the  character  of  Soviet  elections.  40  In  the  election,  district  pre-election 
meetings  and  the  representation  of  social  organisations  had  been  abolished.  Although 
the  principle  of  national  representation  was  still  maintained,  the  proportion  of  deputies 
from  national-territorial  districts  had  fallen  from  21.8  per  cent  among  deputies  of  the 
RSFSR  in  the  USSR  CPD  to  16.0  per  cent  in  the  CPD  of  Russia.  At  the  same  time  the 
changes  in  the  representation  patterns  that  were  apparent  in  the  election  of  1989 
seemed  to  be  intensified  in  the  1990  election.  Furthermore,  the  development  of 
informal  organisations  and  political  groups  was  also  reflected  in  the  CPD,  although 
many  of  these  political  groups  in  the  CPD  were  formed  after  the  election,  and  were  far 
from  stable  in  their  membership.  4' 
First  of  all,  the  Soviet  style  of  equal  representation  of  women  and  workers  had 
clearly  lost  its  significance,  with  female  deputies,  workers,  and  deputies  from  rural (Chapter  M  162 
areas  accounting  for  less  than  10  per  cent  respectively  in  the  CPD  and  the  Supreme 
Soviet  of  Russia.  "  In  particular,  the  representation  of  kolkhoz  and  sovkhoz  workers 
had  decreased  from  13.9  per  cent  in  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  1985  and  6.2  per  cent  in  the 
CPD  of  1989  (among  RSFSR  deputies)  to  a  negligible  proportion  of  0.7  per  cent  in 
1990.  By  contrast,  the  proportion  of  middle-level  governing  echelons  had  nearly 
tripled,  and  non-party  (CPSU)  members  had  doubled  in  the  CPD  and  the  Supreme 
Soviet  of  Russia.  ' 
Secondly,  the  indigenisation  of  deputies  from  the  titular  autonomous 
administrative  units  was  also  found  in  the  CPD  of  Russia,  although  the  degrees  of 
indigenisation  varied  region  by  region.  In  fourteen  autonomous  administrative  units 
that  were  represented  by  more  than  two  deputies,  titular  nations  were  represented  by 
more  than  half  the  numbers  of  deputies  from  each  republic  and  autonomous  region.  As 
a  result,  titular  nations  were  overrepresented  in  most  autonomous  administrative  units. 
<Table  4.2.5>  Indigenisation  of  Deputies  in  the  CPD  of  Russia  (1990) 
Population  Composition  Deputy  Composition  in  the  CPD 
Russian  Titular  Nation  Total  Russian  Titular  Nation 
(%)  Nation  (%)  Deputy  (%)  (%) 
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Udmurt  Rep 
Other  aoksý» 
Chechentsy, 
23.1  Ingushi  57.8  10  10.0  -13.1  90.0  32.2 
32.0  Kabardintsy  48.2  8  12.5  -19.5  87.5  39.3 
32.0  Tuvintsy  64.3  7  14.3  -17.7  85.7  21.4 
9.2  Dagintsy  15.6  12  16.7  7.5  75.0  59.4 
42.4  Karachevtsy  31.2  4  25.0  -17.4  75.0  43.8 
59.2  Nentsy  4.1  4  25.0  -34.2  75.0  70.9 
49.8  Chuvashi  67.8  11  18.2  -31.6  72.7  4.9 
83.2  Evrei  4.2  6  33.3  .  49.9  66.7  62.5 
39.3  Bashkiry  21.9  28  25.0  -14.3  60.7  38,8 
50.3  Iakuty  33.4  10  30.0  .  20.3  60.0  26.6 
29.9  Osetiny  53.0  9  22.2  .  7.7  55.6  2.6 
70.0  Buriaty  24.0  9  44.4  -25.6  55.6  31.6 
57.7  Komi  23.3  10  50.0  -7.7  50.0  26.7 
60.8  Mordva  32.5  10  50.0  -10.8  50.0  17.5 
37.7  Kalmyki  45.4  12  8.3  .  29.4  41.7  -3.7 
43.3  Tartary  48.5  24  54.2  10.9  41.7  -6.8 
47.5  Marritsy  43.4  8  62.5  15.0  37.5  -5.9 
60.4  Altaitsy  31.0  3  66.7  6.3  33.3  2.3 
73.6  Karely  10.0  9  66.7  -6.9  22.2  12.2 
68.0  Adygeitsy  22.1  6  66.7  -1.3  16.7  -5.4 
79.5  Khakasy  11.1  6  83.3  3.8  16.7  5.6 
66.3  Khanty  0.9  7  57.1  -9.2  14.3  13.4 
58.9  Udmurty  30.9  13  92.3  33.4  7.7  -23.2 
15  26.7  73.3 
Total  241  38.6  53.1 
'»  Eight  autonomous  okrugs  that  were  represented  by  two  deputies  or  less. (Chapter!  )')  163 
+  and  -  values  indicate  over-  and  under-representation. 
Komi  nationality  included  in  Nenets  aok,  Tatary  in  Bashkortostan,  Iamalo-Nenets,  and  Udmurtiia.  Small 
nations  such  as  Avartsy,  Dargintsy,  Kumyki,  Lesginy,  Nogaitsy  regarded  as  titular  nation  in  Dagestan. 
Sources:  Goskomstat  RSFSR,  Natsional'nyi  sostav  naseleniia  RSFSR:  po  dannym  vsesoiuznoi  perepisi 
naseleniia  1989  g.  (Moscow:  Respublikanskii  informatsionno-izdatel'skii  tsentr,  1990),  pp.  102-153;  and 
Verkhovnyi  Sovet  RSFSR,  Spisok  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR  na  12  febraliia  1991  g.  (Moscow:  Izdanie 
Verkhovnogo  Soveta  RSFSR,  1991). 
In  general,  the  higher  the  proportion  of  titular  population  in  a  region,  the  more 
indigenous  deputies  were  elected.  As  in  Chechnia/Ingushetiia  and  Tyva,  a  clearly 
activated  nationalist  sentiment  also  seemed  to  intensify  a  degree  of  indigenisation  of 
deputies,  though  it  was  not  always  the  case.  For  instance,  Tatars  in  Tatarstan  were 
underrepresented,  despite  the  noticeable  development  of  nationalist  sentiment  in  the 
republic. 
Thirdly,  socio-economic  features  of  regions  again  affected  the  composition  of 
deputies  of  the  Russian  CPD.  In  particular,  the  results  of  cross-tabulation  analyses 
suggest  that  the  composition  of  deputies  was  different  in  accordance  with  the  socio- 
economic  features  of  regions  where  they  were  elected.  For  instance,  the  higher  the 
living  standards,  the  less  opportunities  tended  to  be  given  to  the  nomenklaturists,  "  but 
the  more  opportunities  for  non-CPSU  members"  and  the  younger  generation46  to  be 
elected  to  the  CPD. 
'Table  4.2.6>  Regional  Differentiation  of  Composition  of  Deputies  in  the  CPD  of 
Russia  (%) 
N  Nom  Cad  Mil  Man  Int  Tec  Wor  Other 
Socio-economic  Conditions  and  Federal  Status  (X-160.3.  df28.  R<0.001) 
Highly  adapted  region  65  3.1  10.9  1.6  3.1  46.9  7.8  0.0  26.6 
Adapted  regions  238  5.9  23.1  4.2  18.5  10.5  10.5  7.6  19.7 
Stagnated  regions  553  12.8  18.9  5.4  22.5  8.5  14.6  5.4  12.1 
Stagnated  republics  76  23.7  23.7  2.6  22.4  13.2  5.3  5.3  3.9 
Adapted  republics  84  6.0  23.8  1.2  21.4  7.1  15.5  13.1  11.9 
Total  1016  10.8  20.1  4.3  20.2  11.6  12.6  6.2  14.1 
Economic  Structure  (X78.5.  df-20.001) 
Rural  regions  109  14.7  22.9  2.8  20.2  9.2  13.8  6.4  10.1 
Resource  regions  91  7.7  20.9  5.5  23.1  8.8  16.5  7.7  9.9 
Hub/gate  regions  360  5.6  18.1  5.3  14.5  17.3  13.9  3.9  21.4 
Residual  regions  501  15.3  21.4  4.0  23.0  8.1  10.7  7.5  9.9 
Total  1061  11.3  20.4  4.4  19.8  11.4  12.6  6.2  13.8 
Sources:  Figures  derived  from  Verkhovnyi  Sovet  SSSR,  Narodnye  deputaty  SSSR;  and  Verkhovnyi  Sovet 
RSFSR,  Spisok  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR  na  12  febraliia  1991  g. 
The  composition  of  deputies  also  varied  in  regional  deputy  groups  dependent  on 
the  regional  economic  structure.  For  instance,  nomenklaturists  accounted  for  a  smaller (Chapter  IV)  164 
proportion  among  deputies  from  hub/gate  (5.6  per  cent)  and  resource  (7.7  per  cent) 
regions  than  among  deputies  from  rural  regions  (14.7  per  cent).  Non-CPSU  members 
also  were  more  successfully  represented  in  hub/gate  (39.3  per  cent)  and  resource 
regions  (23.1  per  cent)  than  in  rural  (10.1  per  cent)  and  residual  regions  (15.9  per  cent, 
X2=76.2,  df--3,  p<0.001).  In  particular,  as  the  term  hub/gate  suggests,  nearly  three- 
quarters  (72.5  per  cent)  of  deputies  from  hub/gate  regions  were  elected  from  large 
cities,  while  the  proportion  accounted  for  about  half  the  deputies  from  other  types  of 
regions  ()2=62.1,  d  f--9,  p<0.001). 
Finally,  the  emergence  of  political  factions  in  the  Congress  is  noteworthy. 
Unlike  the  establishment  of  coalition  blocs  in  the  USSR  Congress  that  were  based  on 
regions,  political  orientations  formed  a  basis  of  coalitions  in  the  CPD  of  Russia, 
particularly  when  leading  figures  form  the  inter-regional  group  preferred  to  run  for  the 
local  Soviets.  "  In  the  CPD  of  Russia,  17  political  factions  were  operating  by  the 
Second  Congress  in  November  1990,  which  were  reduced  to  fifteen  by  the  Seventh 
Congress  in  December  1992.  More  than  three-quarters  of  deputies  participated  in  the 
political  factions.  Among  the  factions,  the  Agrarian  Union  was  the  largest  with  127 
members.  Other  factions  had  around  50  members,  though  numbers  fluctuated.  48  By 
the  end  of  1992,  these  factions  formed  political  blocs  to  increase  their  influence  in  the 
Congress.  Among  the  political  blocs,  the  Coalition  of  Reform,  a  main  political  bloc  of 
supporters  of  reform,  included  149  deputies  or  14.7  per  cent,  while  its  main 
counterpart,  Russian  Unity,  had  302  members  or  29.8  per  cent  of  deputies.  However, 
about  20  per  cent  of  deputies  remained  outside  these  political  factions. 
IV.  2  (3)  Composition  of  SIBFE  Deputies  in  the  CPDs 
In  the  context  of  regional  interest  articulation  in  the  central  legislature,  the  size 
of  a  regional  deputy  group  has  considerable  significance,  particularly  in  a  vote.  In  the 
CPD  of  USSR,  the  SIBFE  was  represented  by  217  deputies  or  9.6  per  cent,  including 
32  deputies  from  social  organisations.  The  number  was  larger  than  that  of  Baltic 
deputies  (158  deputies  or  7.0  per  cent),  and  about  the  same  number  of  Caucasian 
deputies  (216  deputies  or  9.6  per  cent).  The  SIBFE  delegation  also  had  10.4  per  cent 
of  the  Supreme  Soviet  seats  with  11.2  per  cent  of  the  USSR  population.  Among  the 
RSFSR  delegation  elected  in  the  territorial  and  national-territorial  districts  to  the  USSR 
CPD,  SIBFE  deputies  accounted  for  150  deputies  or  23.1  per  cent  with  21.8  per  cent  of 
the  RSFSR  population.  Although  the  SIBFE  regions  as  a  whole  were  somewhat (Chapter  M  165 
underrepresented  in  the  Congress,  this  was  mainly  caused  by  the  allocation  of  seats  to 
social  organisations  and  a  relatively  higher  level  of  under-representation  of  Western 
Siberia. 
The  new  CPD  of  Russia  turned  out  to  be  favourable  to  the  SIBFE  in  general, 
particularly  for  Western  Siberia,  in  terms  of  representation.  For  instance,  the  share  of 
the  SIBFE  regions  had  increased  from  19.7  per  cent  among  the  RSFSR  delegation  to 
the  USSR  CPD  to  22  per  cent,  or  235  deputies,  in  the  CPD  of  Russia.  An  increasing 
proportion  of  SIBFE  deputies  (by  2.1  per  cent)  was  also  returned  to  the  Supreme 
Soviet. 
<Table  4.2.7>  Representation  of  the  SIBFE  in  the  CPDs  of  the  USSR  and  Russia 
Population  RSFSR  Delegation  RSFSR  Degree  of  Over-  & 
(1989)  in  the  USSR  CPD  CPD  Under-Representation 
CPD 
West  Siberia 
Altai  Krai 
Kemerovo  oblast 
Novosibirsk  oblast 
Omsk  oblast 
Khanty-Mansi  aok 
East  Siberia 
Rep  Tyva 
Rep  Buriat 
Far  East 
Rep  Sakha 
Evereiskii  ao 
Primorskii  krai 
N&  N-T 
ABCD  B-A  C-A  D-A 
10.2  7.2  8.0  9.2  -3.0  -2.2  -1.0 
1.8  1.3  1.5  1.7  -0.5  -0.3  -0.1 
2.2  1.3  1.4  1.9  -0.9  -0.8  -0.3 
1.9  1.4  1.4  1.7  -0.5  -0.5  -0.2 
1.5  1.0  1.1  1.2  -0.5  -0.4  -0.2 
0.9  0.1  0.2  0.4  -0.8  -0.7  -0.5 
6.2  7.2  9.0  6.9  1.0  2.7  0.7 
0.2  1.2  1.9  0.6  1.0  1.7  0.4 
0.7  1.4  2.2  0.9  0.7  1.5  0.2 
5.4  5.3  6.2  5.9  -0.1  0.8  0.5 
0.7  1.4  2.2  0.9  0.7  1.5  0.2 
0.1  0.5  0.8  0.3  0.4  0.7  0.1 
1.5  1.0  1.1  1.5  -0.5  -0.4  0.0 
SIBFE  Total  21.8  19.7  23.1  22.0  .  2.1  1.4  0.2 
Regions  represented  by  more  than  five  deputies  are  listed. 
Sources:  Figures  derived  from  Verkhovnyi  Sovet  SSSR,  Narodnye  deputaty  SSSR;  and  Verkhovnyi  Sovet 
RSFSR,  Spisok  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR  na  12  febraliia  1991  g. 
Among  SIBFE  deputies  in  the  USSR  CPD,  14.7  per  cent  of  deputies  were 
females,  47.5  per  cent  young  deputies  of  less  than  45  years  old,  68.8  per  cent  Russians, 
and  30.9  per  cent  of  the  deputies  were  from  autonomous  administrative  units.  As  for 
their  'class'  backgrounds,  managers  accounted  for  the  highest  proportion  (24.9  per 
cent),  followed  by  workers  (19.8  per  cent),  technicians  (16.6  per  cent),  the 
intelligentsia  (13.8  per  cent),  and  cadres  (10.6  per  cent).  In  their  composition,  the 
SIBFE  delegation  to  the  USSR  CPD  distinguished  themselves  with  smaller  proportions 
of  deputies  from  the  older  generation  (more  than  45  years  old),  49  large  cities,  "  and 
nomenklaturist  background.  " (ChapterlTj  166 
However,  these  features  had  changed  in  the  CPD  of  Russia.  Firstly,  the  deputy 
group  was  dominated  by  male  deputies  (95.3  per  cent).  Secondly,  the  proportion  of 
young  deputies  had  decreased  among  SIBFE  deputies,  against  a  general  increase  of  the 
young  generation  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole.  Thirdly,  despite  growing  nationalist 
tendencies,  the  proportion  of  Russians  increased  to  73.1  per  cent  among  SIBFE 
deputies.  Fourthly,  an  increasing  share  of  deputies  was  elected  from  large  cities  (31.6 
per  cent  in  the  USSR  CPD  to  54.5  per  cent),  and  therefore  rural  areas  were 
significantly  underrepresented  (19.0  per  cent  in  the  USSR  CPD  to  8.2  per  cent). 
Finally,  the  composition  of  deputies  in  terms  of  `class'  background  had  significantly 
altered  when  nomenldaturists  and  cadres  had  made  a  success  in  the  elections,  while 
workers  experienced  a  severe  defeat.  However,  all  these  changes-except  the 
decreasing  percentage  of  young  deputies-were  generally  observed  in  the  Russian 
CPD  as  a  whole. 
As  a  result,  the  changes  overshadowed  features  of  the  SIBFE  delegation, 
compared  to  the  delegation  of  the  European  part  of  Russia  in  terms  of  its  composition, 
which  witnessed  in  the  USSR  CPD.  In  the  Russian  CPD,  no  significant  differences 
between  deputies  from  the  SIBFE  and  from  the  other  Russian  regions  were  found  in  the 
variables  tested  such  as  gender,  generation,  `class'  background,  CPSU  membership, 
urban-rural  origin,  and  ethnic  background. 
By  contrast,  the  regional  differentiation  in  the  composition  of  deputies  among 
SIBFE  deputies  seemed  to  grow.  As  already  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  the  SIBFE 
includes  various  types  of  regions  in  terms  of  their  economic  structure  and  levels  of 
economic  performance  and  living  standards.  In  the  election  of  1989,  the  differences 
between  these  regional  groups  were  mainly  revealed  in  the  proportion  of  deputies  from 
urban  or  rural  areas.  For  instance,  a  larger  proportion  of  rural  deputies  was  elected 
from  rural  regions,  52  and  stagnated  republics  and  regions.  " 
In  the  SIBFE  delegation  to  the  Russian  CPD,  the  intra-regional  difference  was 
mainly  apparent  in  deputies'  social  strata.  For  instance,  cadres  (27.7  per  cent)  and 
mangers  (26.5  per  cent)  constituted  a  larger  proportion  among  deputies  from  Western 
Siberia,  managers  (27.7  per  cent)  and  workers  (11.9  per  cent)  from  Eastern  Siberia,  and 
cadres  (25.9  per  cent)  and  technicians  (33.3  per  cent)  from  the  Russian  Far  East 
(X2=18.6,  df=10,  p<0.05).  Nomenklaturists  were  mainly  elected  in  the  republics, 
particularly  in  stagnated  republics  (44.4  per  cent),  while  they  accounted  only  for  6.8 
per  cent  of  deputies  from  adapted  regions  (X2=24.8,  df=15,  p<0.05).  54 (Chapter  M  167 
In  general,  the  SIBFE  had  been  rather  fairly  represented  in  the  CPDs, 
considering  its  population  size.  However,  differences  between  SIBFE  deputies  and  the 
delegations  from  the  European  part  of  Russia  in  the  composition  of  deputies  had 
decreased.  By  contrast,  heterogeneity  in  the  SIBFE  delegation  had  increased  in  the 
Russian  CPD  as  compared  with  the  USSR  CPD.  Therefore,  despite  the  increasing 
proportion  of  SIBFE  deputies  in  the  Russian  CPD  than  in  the  USSR  CPD,  difficulties 
in  coordinating  the  interest  of  deputies  also  seemed  to  be  growing,  particularly  when 
the  issues  in  question  at  the  CPD  became  more  specific  and  complicated  with  the 
acceleration  of  reform. 
IV.  3.  Changing  Interest  Articulation  Patterns  of  SIBFE  Deputies 
Another  changing  feature  of  the  newly  elected  CPD  was  evident  in  deputies' 
interest  articulation  patterns.  In  this  part  of  analysis,  frequencies  of  speeches,  fields  of 
interests,  types  of  interest  articulation,  and  levels  of  demands  in  the  speeches  made  at 
the  First  CPD  of  the  USSR  will  be  investigated.  The  interest  articulation  patterns  of 
speakers  at  the  CPD  of  the  USSR  suggest  that  deputies  were  attentive  to  functional  and 
regional  interests.  For  instance,  fields  of  interests  varied  depending  on  speakers'  social 
and  regional  origins.  An  increasing  numbers  of  speakers  including  those  from  the 
SIBFE  regions  also  took  part  in  the  discussion  of  various  questions  from  the  regional 
point  of  view. 
IV.  3  (1)  Frequeof  Speeches  in  the  CPD 
The  performance  of  the  USSR  CPD  was  outstanding  in  the  frequency  of 
speeches  made  in  its  sessions  (average  1,024.0  speeches  a  year)  which  was  nine  times 
more  than  in  the  eleventh  Supreme  Soviet  (1984-1989)  and  fourteen  times  more  than  in 
the  first  Supreme  Soviet  (1938-1946).  "  Despite  the  increasing  frequency  of  speeches, 
however,  only  a  small  number  of  deputies  among  those  who  wanted  were  able  to 
address  to  the  Congress.  "  Considering  the  competition  for  an  opportunity  for  the 
podium,  obtaining  an  opportunity  to  address  to  the  Congress  could  show  the  influence 
of  a  deputy,  as  well  as  that  of  the  regional  group  to  which  the  speaker  belonged. 
In  analysing  frequency,  speeches  will  be  categorised  into  three  groups,  based  on 
their  length  recorded  in  the  stenographic  records  published  by  the  Supreme  Soviet.  '? 
Category  A  speeches  which  appeared  on  three  or  more  pages  that  were  mainly  made  by (Chapter  IYJ  168 
approved  speakers.  A  speech  belong  to  this  category  is  normally  long  enough  to  carry 
the  opinions  of  a  speaker  on  the  issues  of  his  concern.  Speeches  of  more  than  a  page 
but  less  than  three  pages  are  grouped  into  category  B,  and  short  speeches  of  less  than  a 
page  into  category  C.  In  general,  category  B  speeches  included  discussions  on  a 
category  A  speech,  and  short  speeches  were  mainly  on  procedural  questions  such  as 
recommendation  of  the  deputies  to  the  elections  in  the  CPD  bodies  and  short  comments 
on  the  discussions.  s$  However,  speeches  made  by  the  presiding  deputy  of  a  session 
will  not  be  considered,  regardless  of  the  length  of  speeches. 
During  the  four  Congresses,  2,785  speeches  were  made  excluding  presiding 
speeches.  Among  them  583  speeches  belonged  to  category  A,  330  to  category  B,  and 
1,872  to  category  C.  In  terms  of  speakers,  a  total  of  867  speakers  were  took  part  in  the 
discussions  in  the  Congresses.  Among  them,  401  deputies  made  category  A  speeches. 
SIBFE  deputies  had  made  258  speeches  (by  93  of  217  deputies  or  42.9  per  cent), 
including  57  of  category  A  speeches  (by  44  deputies  or  20.3  per  cent). 
Despite  the  complaint  of  V.  P.  Khmel  from  Irkutsk  oblast  that  Siberian  deputies 
seemed  to  be  a  gallery  in  the  Congress,  S9  SIBFE  deputies  were  more  successful  in 
taking  opportunities  to  address  their  interests  than  Caucasian,  Central  Asian,  and 
Moldavian  deputies.  In  particular,  a  more  active  participating  of  SIBFE  deputies  was 
witnessed  in  the  Fourth  Congress,  when  draft  resolutions  "on  the  situation  in  the 
country  and  measures  to  overcome  the  crisis,  "  and  "on  the  general  concept  of  the  new 
Union  Treaty  and  the  procedures  for  concluding  the  Treaty"  were  discussed.  By 
contrast,  they  did  not  actively  take  part  in  the  discussion  in  the  Third  Congress,  where 
mainly  political  issues  such  as  the  new  post  of  president  and  subsequent  constitutional 
amendments  were  mainly  discussed. 
<Table  4.3.1>  Average  Frequency  of  the  Speeches  made  in  the  USSR  CPD 
N  1st  CPD  2nd  CPD  3rd  CPD  4th  CPD  CPD 
A  A-C  A  A-C  A  A-C  A  A-C  Total 
Slavic  1249  0.07  0.35  0.12  0.45  0.02  0.02  0.07  0.47  1.49 
Baltic  158  0.08  0.36  0.09  0.47  0,02  0.11  0.05  0.24  1.19 
Caucasus  216  0.06  0.23  0.06  0.23  0.01  0.10  0.02  0.09  0.65 
Central  Asia  364  0.05  0.15  0.10  0.21  0.02  0.12  0.05  0.33  0.81 
Moldavia  55  0.05  0.15  0.0  0.36  0.04  0.13  0.04  0.38  1.02 
S113FE  217  0.07  0.22  0.08  0.29  0.01  0.11  0.10  0.57  1.19 
Average  2259  0.07  0.29  0.11  0.37  0.02  0.17  0.06  0.40  1.24 
Sources:  Numbers  of  speeches  are  counted  based  on  Pervyi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  6  vols.; 
Ytorol  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  5  vols.;  Yneoeherednol  tretü  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR, 
3  vols.;  and  Chetvertyl  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR.,  4  vols. (Chapter  IV)  169 
Apart  from  an  increasing  numbers  of  speeches  and  participants  in  the  discussion, 
the  analysis  suggests  a  couple  of  changing  participation  patterns.  Firstly,  a  sharp 
increase  in  the  number  of  participants  from  cultural  and  scientific  sectors  including 
educational  and  medical  branches  in  the  discussions  was  apparent.  In  the  USSR  CPD, 
an  average  of  35.5  speakers  or  35.4  per  cent  of  the  total  from  the  cultural  and  scientific 
sectors  took  part  in  the  debates.  By  contrast,  nomenklaturist  participants  decreased 
from  an  average  of  77.6  per  cent  in  the  sessions  of  the  previous  Party  Congresses  to  an 
average  of  20.9  per  cent  of  total  participants  in  the  Congress.  Furthermore,  a  growing 
proportion  of  deputies  from  production  sectors  also  took  the  podium  at  sessions, 
although  they  had  still  less  opportunities  than  nomenklaturists  in  category  A  speeches. 
Secondly,  despite  the  general  trend  in  the  CPD  as  a  whole,  the  composition  of 
speakers  varied  region  by  region.  For  instance,  a  large  proportion  of  nomenklaturists 
was  included  among  speakers  from  Central  Asian  republics.  By  contrast,  deputies 
from  cultural  and  scientific,  and  production  sectors  outnumbered  among  the  Slavic 
deputies.  Differences  were  also  found  within  the  RSFSR  and  SIBFE  delegations  (see 
Table  4.3.2).  In  particular,  deputies  from  production  sectors  tended  to  come  forward 
more  frequently  than  nomenklaturists.  Supposing  the  competition  for  the  podium 
might  exist  possibly  even  in  a  delegation  of  a  region,  the  changes  suggest  that  the 
authority  that  nomenklaturists  had  traditionally  commanded  was  being  encroached 
upon  in  the  Congress. 
<Fable  4.3.2>  Composition  of  Speakers  in  the  USSR  CPD  (1989-1990) 
Party  Cultural  &  Mass  Local  Other  Total 
&  Scientific,  Orgs.  Productive  (pensioners,  Number 
State  represent.  represent.  represent.  law,  KGB,  of 
leaders  military)  Speaker 
CPSU  Congresses  (1966-1981) 
23nd  Congress  51  526  64 
24'  Congress  46  329-  60 
251  Congress  45  42  12  -  63 
26t°  Congress  38  322-  45 
Average  numbers  of  Speakers  45.0  3.8  2.0  7.3  58.0 
Average  (%)  77.6  6.5  3.4  12.5  100.0 
CPD  of  the  USSR 
A  Level  of  Speeches 
1st  CPD  34  59  3  27  10  133 
2nd  CPD  78  68  9  48  15  218 
3rd  CPD  19  14  162  42 
4th  CPD  42  43  4  25  9  123 
Average  numbers  of  Speakers  30.8  35.5  3.5  23.5  7.0  100.3 
Average  (%)  30.7  35.4  3.5  23.4  7.0  100.0 (Chapter  IV)  170 
All  (A.  B.  and  C)  Levels  of  Sen  eches 
Ist-4th  CPD  181  319  32  272  63  867 
Average  numbers  of  Speakers  45.3  79.8  8.0  68.0  15.8  216.8 
Average  (%)  20.9  36.8  3.7  31.4  7.3  100.0 
A  -Level  Speeches  by  Union  Republics  (the  CPD  of  the  USSR) 
Slavic  72  103  12  74  22  283 
RSFSR  56  90  8  54  20  228 
Moscow  16  38  667  73 
RSFSR  Other  29  37  2  32  11  111 
SIBFE  11  15  0  16  2  44 
(Western  Siberia)  49061  20 
(Eastern  Siberia)  43051  13 
(Russian  Far  East)  33050  11 
Other  Slavic  republics  16  13  4  20  2  55 
Baltic  9  12  042  27 
Caucasus  9  12  022  25 
Central  Asia  28  11  2  12  2  55 
Moldavia  54020  11 
CPD  Total  123  142  14  94  28  401 
Sources:  Party  Congress  data  calculated  based  on  Biddulph's  work  in  Howard  Biddulph,  "Local  Interest 
Articulation  at  CPSU  Congresses,  "  World  Politics,  vol.  XXXVI,  no.  1(October  1983),  p.  30.  Numbers  of 
speakers  at  the  USSR  CPD  are  counted  based  on  Pervyi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR;  Vtorot  s  "ad 
narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR;  Vneoeherednoi  tretii  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR;  and  Chetvertyi  s  "ezd 
narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR. 
Finally,  in  terms  of  frequencies  of  speeches,  male  and  senior  deputies, 
nomenklaturists  and  the  intelligentsia,  deputies  of  higher  education,  deputies  from  large 
cities,  and  ethnic  Russians  tended  to  appear  on  the  podium  more  frequently  than  other 
deputies  in  the  CPD  as  a  whole.  Among  the  SIBFE  deputies,  similar  trends  were 
apparent  although  there  were  no  significant  differences  between  male  and  female 
deputies,  junior  and  senior  deputies,  and  ethnic  Russians  and  others.  However,  those 
with  a  higher  education  and  from  large  cities  tended  to  speak  more  frequently  than 
others.  In  particular,  SIBFE  deputies  of  intelligentsia  origin  had  double  the 
opportunities  to  make  category  A  speeches  (N=30,  M=0.8)  than  nomenklaturists 
(N=15,  M=0.4,  F=4.0,  p<0.001)  (see  Appendix  2.2). 
IV.  3  (2)  Interest  Field  of  the  Spe  ce  hes 
As  suggested  in  the  assumptions,  an  increasing  participation  in  the  discussion 
should  in  principle  have  significant  implications  for  the  successful  articulation  of 
regional  interests  when  deputies  of  a  region  raise  regional  problems,  Therefore, 
deputies'  concerns  that  appeared  in  their  speeches  need  to  be  examined  as  a  first  step  to 
verify  whether  deputies  were  representing  regional  interests  in  the  Congress. (GrapterM  171 
In  the  analysis,  category  A  speeches  made  in  the  First  CPD  of  the  USSR  in  May- 
June  1989  constitute  a  main  concern,  since  important  issues  such  as  the  structure  of  the 
Congress  including  the  election  of  the  president,  the  "Basic  Guidelines  for  the 
Domestic  and  Foreign  Policy  of  the  USSR,  "  the  question  of  the  Constitutional  Control 
Committee  (Komitet  konstitutsionnogo  nadzora,  KKN),  and  the  government  economic 
policy  were  discussed.  The  speeches  of  the  142  deputies  are  considered  in  this 
analysis,  including  those  of  fifteen  SIBFE  deputies. 
For  the  analysis,  speeches  will  be  categorised  into  seven  groups  in  accordance 
with  the  concerns  that  were  articulated  in  each  speech:  political,  economic,  social, 
cultural,  ethnic-national,  environmental  and  other  questions.  Political  fields  of  interest 
include  discussions  of  the  federal  system,  constitutional  control,  the  status  of  the  CPD 
itself,  the  Tbilisi  incident  of  1989,  the  Soviet-German  Treaty  of  1939  and  so  on.  The 
economic  field  contains  mentions  of  investment  policy,  economic  system  including 
price  reform,  cost  accounting and  the  general  economic  situation.  Remarks  on  the 
housing  problem,  food  supply,  medical  service,  education  facilities,  pension  and  other 
issues  related  to  living  standards  are  regarded  as  within  the  social  interest  field. 
Cultural  interests  are  strongly  related  to  the  ethnic-national  field,  since  they  include 
arguments  on  the  development  of  indigenous  languages  as  well  as  general  comments 
on  the  situation  of  cultural  and  educational  sectors.  Statements  on  the  status  of  minor 
ethnic  groups,  and  inter-ethnic  relations  including  the  dispute  on  the  status  of  the 
Nagorno-Karabakh  autonomous  okrug  (NKAO)  between  Armenia  and  Azerbaijan  are 
also  categorised  as  ethnic-national  issues.  Another  issue  that  was  frequently  mentioned 
in  the  CPD  was  the  environmental  problem,  so  it  has  been  separately  categorised.  The 
seventh  group  includes  the  comments  on  the  procedural  matters  that  were  occasionally 
included  in  the  category  A  speeches. 
First  of  all,  the  analysis  suggests  that  different  priorities  on  political  and  socio- 
economic  problems  reflected  speakers'  regional  or  social  backgrounds.  Although 
attention  had  been  paid  quite  evenly  to  political,  economic,  social,  ethnic  and 
environmental  problems,  the  priority  of  concerns  tended  to  be  different  between 
regional  groups.  For  instance,  deputies  from  the  Baltic  republics  were  mainly 
concerned  about  political  issues  and  economic  relations  with  central  government.  They 
paid  little  attention  to  social  issues,  reflecting  relatively  high  living  standards  and 
nationalist  sentiment  in  the  republics.  Caucasian  deputies  also  spent  more  time  in 
mentioning  political  issues,  together  with  ethnic  problems,  perhaps  because  of  the 
NKAO  issue.  By  contrast,  SIBFE  deputies  were  more  attentive  to  social  and (Chapter  59  172 
environmental  problems  rather  than  political  issues.  For  instance,  twelve  out  of  the  15 
SIBFE  deputies  included  in  the  analysis  addressed  socio-economic  problems  of  the 
regions,  and  nine  deputies  mentioned  environmental  situations,  while  only  four 
deputies  touched  political  issues  in  their  speeches. 
<Table  4.3.3>  Interest  Field  of  Speeches  in  the  First  CPD  of  the  USSR  (1989) 
Political  Eco.  Social  Cultural  Ethnic  Environ.  Other  Total 
issues  issues  issues  issues  issues  issues  issues 
De  ut(es  in  the  CPD  total 
Slavic  37  45  68  10  18  29  8  203 
Baltic  11  502510  24 
Caucasus  10  212  10  20  27 
Central  Asia  12  11  92882  52 
Moldavia  21012107 
Total  72  64  68  17  43  41  10  315 
Deputies  from  the  European  part  o  ussia 
Nomenklaturists  869 
Cadres  145 
Managers  178 
Intelligentsia  757 
Technicians  445 
Workers  277 
Total 
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Sources:  Figures  calculated  based  on  the  text  of  speeches  in  Pervyi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR.  6 
vols.;  and  Patrick  J.  Rollins  (ed.  ),  First  Congress  of  People's  Deputies  of  the  USSR,  25  May-9 June  1989: 
The  Stenographic  Record,  2  vols.  (Gulf  Breeze,  FL.:  Academic  International  Press,  1993). 
The  content  of  speeches  of  SIBFE  deputies  also  suggests  that  SIBFE  speakers 
were  addressing  deteriorating  socio-economic  conditions  in  the  SIBFE  regions.  Many 
SIBFE  deputies  regarded  the  SIBFE  as  a  "colony"  and  a  "raw-material  appendage.  "60 
A.  P.  Ianenko,  a  rector  of  the  Novosibirsk  Engineering  and  Construction  Institute, 
complained  about  the  uneven  distribution  of  medical  services  and  foodstuffs  in  favour 
of  Moscow.  61  V.  V.  Kazarezov,  the  First  Secretary  of  Novosibirsk  Oblast,  requested 
investment  to  solve  social  problems  such  as  shortages  of  electricity  and  housing  in  the 
Oblast  62  V.  V.  Gustav,  an  oil  and  gas  production  foreman  from  Tiumen  oblast, 
appealed  to  solve  housing  problems  of  the  Tiumen  oil  workers  63  SIBFE  speakers  also 
agreed  that  disastrous  environmental  problems  were  caused  by  "departmental  ism"  and 
"industrial  invasion"  by  the  department  such  as  Minvostokstroy  (Ministry  of (Chapterli)  173 
Construction  in  the  Eastern  Regions  of  the  USSR),  and  other  bums  (paper-making 
industry)  and  proms  (industrial  administrations)  required  immediate  handing.  " 
However,  the  analysis  also  suggests  that  deputies'  concerns  might  vary 
dependent  on  their  social  origins.  For  instance,  political  issues  were  more  often 
discussed  by  nomenklaturists  and  the  intelligentsia-although  their  speeches  also 
covered  social  and  economic  issues-than  other  categories  of  deputies.  By  contrast, 
cadres,  managers,  and  workers  were  more  attentive  to  economic,  social  and 
environmental  conditions  than  other  issues.  The  trend  was  also  apparent  among  SIBFE 
deputies. 
IV.  3  (3)  Types  of  Interest  Articulation 
A  common  field  of  interest,  obviously,  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  regions 
were  uniform  in  their  priorities  and  recommendations.  In  particular,  a  policy  might 
have  different  implications  for  discussants,  dependent  on  the  point  of  view.  For 
instance,  many  construction  projects  that  were  demanded  at  the  national  level  were 
often  opposed  at  the  regional  level.  "  The  priority  of  investment  could  also  vary 
dependent  on  the  regional  economic  background.  66  Furthermore,  there  could  also  be  a 
conflict  between  different  sectors  such  as  agriculture  and  industry,  and  between  diverse 
social  strata  which  could  overshadow  regional  interest  articulation. 
Therefore,  as  a  second  step  in  the  analysis,  demands  included  in  the  speeches 
will  be  categorised  based  on  two  variables  such  as  territorial  and  functional  aspects. 
First,  territorial  aspects  of  interest  articulation  are  divided  into  four  levels:  union, 
republic,  region,  and  urban-rural  levels.  In  the  territorial  variable,  only  the  levels  at 
which  speakers  are  dealing  with  the  issues  of  their  concerns  are  considered,  ignoring 
deputies'  territorial  origins.  However,  the  urban-rural  type  of  interest  articulation  is 
particularly  concerned  with  the  rural  interests  made  by  deputies  from  rural  areas,  and 
thus  a  speech  contained  an  opinion  in  favour  of  rural  interests  articulated  by  deputies 
from  urban  areas  is  excluded. 
Second,  functional  aspects  of  interest  articulation  are  categorised  into  five  types: 
bureaucratic,  occupational,  ethnic,  gender,  and  general  interest  articulation.  In  this 
category,  a  demand  is  compared  with  the  speaker's  functional  origin.  For  instance,  a 
speech  is  regarded  as  containing  a  reference  to  occupational  interests  when  interests  are 
directly  related  to  the  speaker's  occupation.  Ethnic  interest  articulation  is  also  marked (Chapter  fl  174 
when  a  speech  contains  reference  to  the  interests  of  particular  ethnic  groups  made  by 
deputies  of  the  same  ethnic  origin,  at  least  in  a  wide  sense  such  as  small-numbered 
nations  in  the  Far  North.  Bureaucratic  interest  articulation  is  mainly  for  the  remarks 
made  by  the  party  apparatus,  which  supported  the  apparatus'  position  by  criticising 
attacks  on  the  party  apparatus  and  advocating  their  role  in  the  reforms.  "  However,  the 
gender  factor  is  considered  only  for  a  speech  in  favour  of  women's  interests  made  by  a 
female  deputy.  Other  speeches  that  contain  interests  that  do  not  match  with  speakers' 
functional  origins  are  regarded  as  articulating  a  general  type  of  interest.  In  this  regard, 
speeches  made  by  politicians-nomenklaturists  and  cadres--are  often  categorised  as 
general  types.  In  each  variable,  maximum  two  different  types  of  interest  articulation 
are  identified  when  a  speech  stipulates  more  than  two  different  types  of  interests. 
In  the  analysis,  three  findings  are  noteworthy:  regional  interest  articulation  of 
nomenklaturists  and  cadres  in  terms  of  their  territorial  dimension,  occupational  interest 
articulation  by  managers  and  workers,  and  regional  differences  in  interest  articulation 
types. 
First  of  all,  nomenklaturists  and  cadres  tended  to  be  more  attentive  to  the 
problems  of  their  own  republics  and  regions,  although  still  nearly  half  of  them  tended 
to  deal  with  the  questions  at  the  Union  level.  According  to  Biddulph's  work,  this  trend 
had  already  become  apparent  in  the  Party  Congresses  during  Brezhnev's  period,  "  In 
the  USSR  CPD,  nomenklaturists  seemed  to  be  more  attentive  to  the  union  level, 
together  with  the  intelligentsia.  Two  groups  contributed  nearly  half  the  total  of  union- 
level  speeches.  However,  at  the  same  time,  still  more  than  half  the  deputies  in  each 
group  had  been  preoccupied  with  republic  or  regional  interests,  The  tendencies  are 
clearer  when  Moscow  deputies,  who  contributed  30  union-level  speeches,  are 
excluded. 
Table  4.3.4>  Type  of  Speeches  by  'Class'  in  the  First  Congress  of  the  USSR 
Union  Republic  Regional  Urban-  Total 
Level  Level  Level  Rural 
Nomenklatura  18  15  50  38 
Cadre  31S09 
Military  40004 
Manager  6272  17 
Intelligentsia  30  22  12  0  64 
Technician  10  240  16 
Worker  8242  16 
Total  79  44  37  4  1641j 
')Two  speeches  made  by  other  category  of  deputies  are  excluded. (Chapter  117  17S 
Occupational  and  ethnic  interests  were  also  represented  in  the  Congress. 
Although  more  than  half  the  speeches  considered  pursued  general  of  interests  (99  of 
166  speeches),  36  speeches  or  more  than  20  per  cent  of  speeches  articulated 
occupational  interests.  In  particular,  deputies  from  production  sectors,  particularly 
workers,  were  more  attentive  to  the  interests  of  their  own  sectors,  For  instance,  17  of 
30  speeches  addressed  by  deputies  from  production  sectors-more  overwhelmingly,  8 
of  9  speeches  of  workers-contained  reference  to  their  sectoral  interests. 
Finally,  regional  differences  were  clearly  revealed  in  the  deputies'  speeches.  In 
general,  deputies  from  the  Slavic  republics  tended  to  discuss  matters  at  the  union  level, 
while  deputies  from  other  republic  groups  concentrated  on  the  republic  or  regional 
level.  A  combination  of  territorial  and  functional  dimensions  of  speeches  suggests  a 
clearer  picture  of  regional  differences  in  types  of  interest  articulation. 
<Table  4.3.5>  Territorial  and  Functional  Dimensions  of  Interest  Articulation  Patterns 
in  the  USSR  CPD 
Union  Republic  Regional  Urban 
Level  Level  Level  Rural  Total 
A  BD  E  A  B  C  D  E  B  CD  E  BE 
RSFSR'  4  71  8  0  0  0  0  1  3  51  4  11  36 
Moscow  0  71  22  0  0  0  0  1  0  00  1  00  32 
Slavic2  0  50  9  0  1  0  0  1  1  00  2  10  20 
Baltic  0  00  3  0  1  0  0  10  0  10  0  00  15 
Caucasus  1  10  0  1  1  3  0  6  0  40  0  00  17 
Cen.  Asia 
,2 
30  2  0  1  2  1  13  1  00  0  00  25 
Moldavia  0  00  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  00  0  00  2 
SIBFE  0  01  2  0  0  1  0  0  2  20  11  00  19 
Total  7  23  3  47  1  4  6  1  33  7  12  1  18  21  166 
')  excluding  deputies  from  Moscow  and  the  SIBFE  regions.  li  excluding  deputies  from  RSFSR 
Functional  dimension:  bureaucratic  (A),  occupational  (B),  ethnic  (C),  gender  (D),  and  general  (E). 
As  Table  4.3.5  suggests,  deputies  from  Moscow  and  the  Slavic  republics 
excluding  the  RSFSR  were  overwhelmingly  preoccupied  with  the  union-general  type 
of  interests.  By  contrast,  speakers  from  most  of  other  union  republics  tended  to 
articulate  republic  or  regional  interests  when  they  were  given  an  opportunity  to  address 
the  Congress.  For  instance,  10  of  14  Baltic  deputies  dedicated  themselves  to  making 
republic-general  type  of  speeches.  Most  of  the  Baltic  deputies  were  eager  to  express 
the  Baltic  republics'  sovereign  rights,  although  other  ethnic  minorities  among  Baltic 
deputies  such  as  Russians  and  Ukrainians  criticised such  initiatives,  as  will  be 
discussed  later.  A  large  proportion  of  republic  level  speeches  were  also  heard  from 
Caucasian  deputies,  mainly  because  they  more  actively  participated  in  the  discussion  of 
NKAO  question  to  support  their  own  republic's  interests  in  the  question. (Chapter  IV)  176 
By  contrast  to  deputies  from  the  European  part  of  Russia,  a  clear  tendency  of 
regional  interest  articulation  was  also  apparent  among  SIBFE  deputies,  when  15 
speeches  discussed  issues  at  the  regional  level.  Among  the  SIBFE  speakers,  only  two 
deputies  discussed  issues  at  the  union  level  69  Considering  the  functional  dimension,  a 
majority  of  speeches  delivered  by  SIBFE  deputies  were  categorised  as  of  general 
interest.  The  analysis  also  showed  that  SIBFE  deputies  articulated  ethnic  and 
occupational  interests.  "  However,  it  is  still  difficult  to  maintain  that  these  forms  of 
functional  interest  articulation  were  overshadowing  regional  interest  articulation,  since 
only  a  limited  numbers  of  speeches  were  at  the  union  or  republic  level.  Therefore, 
despite  the  possible  conflicts  of  functional  interests,  regionalist  tendencies  seemed  to 
be  maintained,  particularly  in  issues  in  which  functional  interests  may  not  be  engaged. 
IV.  3  (4)  Level  of  Demands 
As  many  Western  scholars  suggest,  regional  interest  articulation  had  been 
witnessed  during  the  Soviet  period.  For  instance,  Breslauer's  work  has  suggested  that 
regional  first  secretaries  of  the  post-Stalin  generation  tended  to  be  more  assertive  of 
regional  interests  with  more  political  `impatience,  '  although  other  factors  such  as  a 
patron-client  linkage  could  also  be  an  important  factor.  "  However,  the  demands  of 
peripheries  after  perestroika  became  more  threatening  to  the  central  authorities,  when 
they  began  to  raise  the  question  of  the  federal  system  itself. 
In  order  to  examine  changes  in  the  levels  of  demands,  speeches  were  categorised 
into  five  groups  based  on  Breslauer's  categories:  traditional,  regional  policy,  national 
policy  demands,  devolution  of  authority,  and  demands  for  independence.  '  Traditional 
demands  are  identified  when  a  speech  contains  a  demand  for  more  supplies  for  a  given 
project,  implementation  of  promised  deliveries  in  the  case  of  already  adopted 
programmes,  a  minor  adjustment  in  ministerial  behaviour  in  regard  to  the  regional 
needs,  and  similar  demands.  Regional-policy  demands  embrace  the  speeches  that 
request  changes  in  central  policies  towards  a  region  or  a  social  group  as  a  whole,  but 
not  so  far-reaching  as  to  request  a  revision  of  all-union  investment  priorities,  central 
administrative  relations,  or  centrally  defined  social  policies.  Speeches  that  contain 
requests  for  changes  in  all-union  investment  priorities  and  revision  of  central 
administrative  relations  or  centrally  defined  social  policies  are  recognised  as 
articulating  national-policy  demands.  Speeches  that  demand  devolution  of  authority  at 
the  republic  or  regional  level  constituted  the  fourth  group.  However,  a  new  category (Chapter  IV)  177 
has  to  be  added  in  order  to  identify  demands  for  political  and  economic  sovereignty 
and  significant  changes  in  the  existing  federal  system  as  the  strongest  form  of 
regionalist  demand.  "  In  the  categorisation,  only  the  highest  level  of  demand  in  a 
speech  is  considered,  if  it  contains  more  than  two  types  of  demands. 
Supposing  that  the  levels  of  demand  reflect  a  degree  of  regionalist  tendencies,  a 
score  ranged  from  -10  to  +10  on  a  five-point  scale  is  given  to  each  speech  depending 
on  the  level  of  demands  for  a  clearer  picture:  -10  for  a  traditional  demand,  -5  for  a 
regional-policy  demand,  0  for  a  national-policy  demand,  +5  for  a  demand  for 
devolution,  and  +10  for  a  demand  for  independence. 
As  expected,  demands  of  deputies  in  the  Congress  grew  stronger  than  they  had 
been  in  the  previous  Party  Congresses  in  the  discussion  of  central  economic  policies, 
although  there  appeared  regional  and  `class'  differences.  In  general,  an  absolute 
majority  of  deputies  demanded  an  alteration  of  central  policies  at  the  national  level, 
devolution  of  power  to  the  local  authorities,  and  economic  and  political  independence 
at  their  extreme.  Only  a  handful  of  deputies  articulated  their  interests  in  a  traditional 
way.  In  this  regard,  a  limit  on  the  interest  articulation  placed  by  'bureaucratic 
centralism'  during  the  Soviet  period  ceased  to  function  in  the  CPD.  " 
<Table  4.3.6>  Level  of  Demands  in  the  First  CPD  of  the  USSR 
Tradi-  regional  national  devolu-  indepen-  Average 
tional  policy  policy  tion  dence  Total  Score 
(.  10)  (-S)  (0)  (5)  (10) 
Slavic  republics 
Moscow  03  11  12  2  28  2.3 
European  Russia  12  11  11  1  26  1.7 
SIBFE  01390  13  3.1 
Slavic  other  12441  12  0.8 
Baltic  00239  14  7.5 
Caucasus  00362  11  4.5 
Central  Asia  06820  16  "1.3 
Moldavia  0001015.0 
Total  2  14  42  48  15  121  2.5 
In  particular,  most  Baltic  speakers  asserted  independence  of  the  republics,  while 
Central  Asian  deputies  focused  on  changes  of  regional  or  national  policies  (F=7.0, 
p<0.001).  As  K.  D.  P.  Prunskiene,  a  rector  of  the  Institute  for  Advanced  Training  of 
Specialists  in  the  National  Economy  under  the  Lithuanian  SSR  Council  of  Ministers 
who  became  Lithuanian  Prime  Minister,  stated,  the  speeches  of  Baltic  deputies 
supported  the  "principle  of  localising  the  solution  of  problems": (Chapter  119  178 
The  Baltic  conception  of  economic  reform  is  based  on  the  principle 
of  localising  the  solution  of  problems.  ... 
We  view  the  economic 
independence  of  the  republics  as  the  primary  and  necessary  condition  for 
reorganising  the  economic  management  of  individual  republics  as  well  as 
the  Soviet  Union  as  a  whole.  " 
Considering  speakers'  social  strata,  a  large  proportion  of  nomenklaturists 
(M=3.4),  cadres  (M=3.3),  and  intellectuals  (M=3.4)  more  strongly  asserted 
fundamental  changes  than  workers  (M=-0.8)  and  military  personnel  (M=-1.7,  F=2.4, 
p<0.05).  Speakers  from  large  cities  (M=3.3)  were  also  more  in  favour  of  changes  of 
policies  at  the  national  levels  than  speakers  from  rural  areas  (M=-0.5,  F=3.3,  p<0.05). 
In  the  First  CPD  of  the  USSR,  nearly  70  per  cent  SIBFE  speakers  supported 
devolution  of  power  and  the  principle  of  "localising  the  solution  of  problems,  "  rather 
than  appealing  for  adjustments  of  regional  policies  or  investment  priorities.  For 
instance,  most  of  the  SIBFE  deputies  who  made  a  speech  agreed  that  central 
importance  should  be  attached  to  the  Law  on  Local  Self-Government  and  Local 
Economy  as  a  real  path  to  the  solution  of  local  problems.  '  Devolution  of  authority  to 
the  national-territorial  formations  was  also  suggested  as  a  means  of  solving  socio- 
economic  and  environmental  problems,  and  enhancing  the  living  standards  of  small- 
numbered  nations  in  the  SIBFE.  "  The  demand  for  devolution  was  based  on  the  widely 
shared  perception  that  the  problems  were  mainly  caused  by  the  `departmentalism' 
already  mentioned.  Considering  the  demands,  at  least  SIBFE  deputies  who  took  the 
podium  seemed  to  be  united  in  conveying  regional  interests  to  the  Congress. (Chapter  1V  179 
IV.  4.  Attitudes  towards  Union-Level  Issues 
In  general,  a  relatively  high  level  of  unity  was  apparent  among  SIBFE  speakers 
in  their  articulation  of  regional  interests  at  the  First  Congress  of  USSR.  SIBFE 
speakers  were  ready  to  talk  about  their  deteriorating  socio-economic  situation  as  a  raw 
material  appendage  to  the  centre.  However,  as  far  as  union-level  issues  were 
concerned,  regional  solidarity  among  217  SIBFE  deputies,  nearly  ten  per  cent  of  the 
total  CPD  deputies,  remained  uncertain.  In  the  following  analysis,  SIBFE  deputies' 
views  are  considered  on  two  key  questions-cost  accounting  as  a  problem  and  new 
federal  relations  as  a  solution-both  which  had  been  main  concerns  of  the  SIBFE 
regions.  The  analysis  suggests  the  possible  differentiation  of  common  interests  among 
SIBFE  deputies  in  the  union  level  of  questions. 
IV.  4  (1)  Attitudes  towards  Cost  Accounting 
The  question  of  cost  accounting  and  price  liberalisation  which  would  have  a 
negative  impact  on  the  SIBFE  economy,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  caused  impassioned 
debates  at  the  regional  and  union  levels.  The  Congress  became  an  arena  for  the  debate, 
since  the  policy  had  a  significant  but  varying  impact  even  before  its  implementation, 
not  only  at  the  union  republic  level,  but  also  at  lower  levels. 
In  general,  Moscow  and  the  Baltic  republics  supported  the  idea  of  cost 
accounting.  However,  deputies  from  other  republics  where  agriculture  and  raw 
material  production  sectors  predominated,  opposed,  or  reluctantly  accepted  the  idea 
with  conditions.  For  instance,  K.  Makhkamov,  the  First  Secretary  of  Tajikistan, 
asserted  that  regional  cost  accounting  should  be  accompanied  by  three  conditions: 
These  and  many  other  official  discussions  quite  clearly  reveal  the 
thought  that  the  so-called  'raw-material'  republics  are  silently  boycotting 
the  application  of  the  principles  of  territorial  cost  accounting.  ...  This  is 
not  true.  We  as  a  whole  support  concepts  of  self-financing  and  self. 
management  of  the  republics,  nonetheless  their  implementation  must  meet 
three  mandatory  conditions.  First,  reform  of  wholesale  and  retail  prices. 
Second,  conversion  to  the  principle  of  cost  accounting  only  on  a  nation. 
wide  basis.  ...  Third,  the  creation  of  a  legal  foundation  on  economic 
relations  among  territories  within  the  system  of  the  state  federation.  " (Chapter  IV)  180 
Makhkamov's  conditions  for  cost  accounting  were  echoed  in  the  speeches  of 
many  other  deputies.  For  instance,  Kh.  Atdaev,  a  blacksmith  from  Turkmenia,  also 
argued  that  cost  accounting  should  be  accompanied  by  price  reform,  particularly  for 
raw  materials  such  as  oil,  gas,  and  cotton.  79  Many  others  supported  this  view  by 
insisting  that  unequal  prices  of  raw  materials  and  agricultural  products  should  be 
adjusted  in  advance  of  the  implementation  of  cost  accounting.  " 
Resistance  to  the  idea  came  not  only  from  economic  sectors,  but  also  from  social 
and  cultural  sectors.  For  instance,  D.  S.  Likhachev,  a  section  chief  of  the  Russian 
Literature  Institute  (Pushkin  House)  of  the  USSR  Academy  of  Sciences  and  chairman 
of  the  board  of  the  Soviet  Cultural  Foundation,  insisted  that  the  idea  should  not  be 
applied  to  the  cultural  sector.  "  B.  S.  Mitin,  a  rector  of  an  aviation  engineering 
institution  from  Moscow,  also  demanded  that  the  education  sector  should  be  provided 
with  legal  measures  for  normal  development  under  cost  accounting.  "  Although  Prime 
Minister  Ryzhkov  admitted  the  need  for  a  series  of  price  adjustments,  particularly  for 
agricultural  products  and  raw  materials,  his  conciliatory  gesture  seemed  to  be  far  from 
persuasive. 
By  contrast,  Baltic  deputies  were  strongly  in  favour  of  the  concept,  since  it 
would  provide  republics  with  more  power  on  the  economic  activities  performed  on 
their  territory.  In  fact,  regional  cost  accounting  was  scheduled  to  start  as  of  1  January 
1990  in  the  Baltic  republics,  and  thus  Baltic  deputies  sought  a  solid  legal  basis  for  their 
decision.  ß3  They  argued  that  cost  accounting  was  not  "economic  isolation,  "  but  a  way 
"to  form  a  right  price  formation  and  an  all-union  market,  and  to  the  search  for  the 
effective  forms  of  all  union  division  of  labour.  i84 
Among  the  SIBFE  speakers,  cost  accounting  was  regarded  as  a  problematic  and 
destabilising  factor  for  the  SIBFE  regions.  For  instance,  V.  I.  Sergienko,  the  Chairman 
of  Krasnoiarsk  kraiispolkom,  claimed  that  the  initiative  was  aggravating  regional  socio- 
economic  problems: 
It  was  thought  that  transition  to  full  cost  accounting  and  self. 
financing  would  automatically  solve  all  problems  stemming  from  the 
implementation  of  current  plans.  However,  in  practice,  the  experience  has 
shown  that  it  did  not  happened  yet.  On  the  contrary,  administration  of 
regional  economy  is  getting  more  difficult....  Because  there  is  no  unified 
integral  concept,  no  legal  normative  base  for  territorial  cost-accounting 
and  regional  administration  of  the  economy.  11 (chapter  m  181 
V.  V.  Kazarezov,  the  First  Secretary  of  the  Novosibirsk  oblast,  went  even  further 
when  he  called  for  the  establishment  of  a  region-based  administrative  system.  He 
suggested  five  regional  groups,  i.  e.  Central  Russia,  the  Urals,  Western  Siberia,  Eastern 
Siberia,  and  the  Russian  Far  East,  and  urged  to  endow  them  with  rights  equal  to  those 
of  republics  in  economic  respects,  as  a  pre-condition  for  the  introduction  of  cost 
accounting.  " 
The  economic  features  of  a  region  also  affected  the  attitude  of  SIBFE  deputies 
towards  cost  accounting.  For  instance,  a  deputy  from  Tiumen  oblast  insisted  that  cost 
accounting  should  be  reviewed  in  the  resource  regions  in  which  so-called  strategic 
sectors  such  as  oil  and  gas  predominated.  87  A  more  strong  opposition  was  asserted  by 
deputies  from  rural  area  such  as  I.  A.  Nazarov,  the  raikom  First  Secretary  from  Omsk 
oblast.  He  pointed  out  that  the  transition  of  sovkhozy  and  kolkhozy  to  self-financing 
would  only  lead  them  to  a  "false  self-financing,  "  without  an  improvement  in  price 
formation  and  adjustment  in  their  relations  with  cities.  " 
By  contrast,  a  deputy  from  Sakha  supported  the  realisation  of  regional  cost 
accounting  at  all  levels,  as  a  means  of  achieving  the  economic  independence  of 
republics  and  territories,  although  he  pointed  out  the  problematic  nature  of  the  price 
system.  89  Another  deputy,  V.  A.  Ostroukhov,  the  secretary  of  the  Party  committee  of  a 
production  association  in  Tomsk  oblast,  also  supported  the  switch  to  cost  accounting, 
but  mainly  because  his  collectives  was  planning  to  establish  a  lease-based  cooperative 
association  that  would  be  assisted  by  it  90 
According  to  these  speeches,  a  common  perception  of  cost  accounting  prevailed 
among  SIBFE  deputies  when  they  regarded  it  as  unacceptable  under  the  existing  price 
structure,  on  the  one  hand.  However,  on  the  other  hand,  as  the  diversity  of  claimed 
preconditions  for  cost  accounting  suggests,  a  common  front  of  SIBFE  deputies  could 
be  vulnerable  to  a  separate  deal  which  might  satisfy  the  preconditions  of  particular 
sectors  or  regions,  leaving  others  unattended. 
if  4  (2)  Attitudes  towards  the  Federal  System 
Another  major  issue  of  the  Congress  that  had  great  significance  for  the  SIBFE 
regions  was  federal  relations  between  centre  and  peripheries.  Separatist  tendencies  had 
already  appeared  in  the  union  republics  and  the  increasing  demands  of  lower-level 
regions  had  echoed  in  the  Congress,  causing  a  vigorous  debate  when  changes  and (Chapter  19  182 
amendments  to  the  Constitution  were  being  discussed.  In  particular,  the  question  of  a 
new  federal  treaty  and  the  KKN  evoked  bitter  controversy,  setting  nationalists  on  one 
extreme  and  federalists  on  the  other. 
Here  again,  a  striking  difference  between  Baltic  and  Central  Asian  deputies 
showed  two  main  extremes:  a  majority  of  Baltic  deputies  advocated  a  "strong  republic, 
and  strong  union"  approach,  but  the  latter  supported  a  "strong  union,  and  strong 
republic.  "  Among  Baltic  deputies,  even  nomenklaturists  such  as  Gorbunov,  the 
Chairman  of  the  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  Latvia,  and  A.  K.  Brazauskas,  the 
First  Secretary  of  Lithuania,  supported  the  economic  and  political  autonomy  of 
republics.  "  By  contrast,  deputies  from  Central  Asian  republics  such  as  A.  N. 
Mutalibov,  the  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  Azerbaijan,  P.  A.  Azizbekova, 
the  director  of  the  Museum  of  the  History  of  Azerbaijan,  and  N.  A.  Nazarbaev,  the 
Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  Kazakhstan,  asserted  that  there  could  be  "no 
strong  republic  without  a  strong  centre.  "" 
A  striking  difference  again  appeared  in  the  discussion  of  the  KKN  question. 
Baltic  deputies  insisted  that  the  KKN  would  infringe  the  sovereign  right  of  republics 
and  their  parliaments.  "  However,  those  who  supported  the  federal  system  regarded 
this  matter  as  "an  element  of  the  rule-of-law  state,  "  and  a  basic  component  of  the 
separation  of  powers  which  would  protect  republics'  sovereign  rights  from 
departmental  law-making.  "  In  particular,  Gorbachev  was  eager  to  adopt  a  resolution 
on  the  KKN  in  the  Congress  where  he  could  earn  support.  He  emphasised  positive 
effects  of  the  KKN  as  a  means  of  defending  the  law  from  departmental  encroachment, 
hoping  to  evade  nationalists'  resistance  on  the  issue: 
The  departments  have  created  many  instructions  for  interpreting  the 
application  of  a  law,  by  which  they  have  even  more  greatly  limited  the 
essence  of  the  law.  Thus,  the  defence  of  such  a  judicial  organ  is  a  very 
important  instrument  enabling  us  to  stand  strictly  in  defence  of  laws.  This 
is  very  necessary,  because  the  USSR  Supreme  Soviet  Presidium,  despite 
all  its  capacities  and  all  of  its  authority,  simply  does  not  always  encompass 
the  entire  set  of  problems  for  the  purpose  of  working  out  these  questions  in 
detail.  In  this  regard,  the  question  of  the  committee  has  emerged.  " 
The  question  of  the  KKN  was  adopted  at  the  First  Congress  on  8  June  1989, 
white  SO  Lithuanian  deputies  boycotted  the  vote  in  protest. 
Although  an  absolute  majority  of  the  Baltic  delegation  supported  the  right  of 
self-determination,  ethnic  minorities  among  Baltic  deputies  did  not  seem  to  agree.  For (Chapter  M  183 
instance,  V.  I.  Iaroboi,  an  Ukrainian  from  Estonia,  emphasised  the  need  to  protect  the 
Union  from  "possible  division  into  individual,  isolated  national  states.  "96  A  Russian 
deputy  from  Estonia  also  supported  the  establishment  of  the  KKN  "to  protect  the  rights 
of  everyone  living  in  the  country,  "  and  urged  the  KKN  "to  begin  its  work  with  the 
Baltic  republics.  "" 
The  attitude  of  SIBFE  deputies  on  this  issue  was  quite  similar  to  that  of  Slavic 
deputies.  In  general,  they  seemed  to  agree  with  the  need  to  revise  the  federal  system, 
providing  the  republics  with  more  economic  sovereignty.  However,  they  opposed  the 
possible  dissolution  of  the  Union  by  following  the  Baltic  way.  Regarding  the  KKN, 
Gorbachev's  appeal  turned  out  to  be  quite  effective  in  persuading  SIBFE  deputies  who 
complained  about  the  "departmental  invasion"  in  the  regions.  For  instance,  Iu.  V. 
Golik,  the  dean  of  the  juridical  faculty  at  Kemerovo  State  University,  insisted  that  the 
KKN  was  "just  as  necessary  as  air"  since  they  were  suffocating  from  "departmental 
standard-setting.  ""  However,  there  was  another  type  of  speech  which  claimed  political 
as  well  as  economic  autonomy  in  the  form  of  national-administrative  status  as  a  means 
of  solving  the  problems  of  the  small  people  in  the  northern  area.  99  The  demand 
insinuated  the  possibility  of  conflicts  on  the  issue  mainly  between  Russians  and  other 
national  or  ethnic  minority  groups  in  the  regions. 
According  to  these  observations,  some  provisional  conclusions  can  be  drawn. 
First,  the  SIBFE  regions  constituted  quite  a  large  proportion  of  the  CPDs  of  the  USSR 
and  Russia  which  in  turn  accommodated  more  genuine  parliamentary  working  patterns 
than  their  precedents.  Secondly,  in  terms  of  the  composition  of  deputies,  two 
features-an  increasing  level  of  indigenisation  of  deputies  and  a  diminishing  trend  of 
nominal  representation-that  were  often  regarded  as  supporting  regional  interest 
articulation  were  apparent.  Thirdly,  in  terms  of  interest  articulation,  a  majority  of 
SIBFE  speakers  were  more  attentive  to  the  socio-economic  situation  of  SIBFE  regions, 
demanding  the  devolution  of  power  that  was  often  discussed  in  the  regions.  In 
particular,  nomenklaturists  also  joined  other  deputies  in  articulating  regional  interests. 
However,  regional  differentiation  was  also  evident  in  the  composition  and 
interest  articulation  of  SIBFE  deputies.  In  this  regard,  the  analysis  suggests  that 
regional  differences  in  socio-economic  situation  and  economic  structure  resulted  not 
only  in  the  differentiated  composition  of  deputies,  but  also  the  possible  diversification 
of  common  regional  interests.  Furthermore,  functional  interest  articulation  was  also (Chapter  1V  184 
witnessed  in  the  First  Congress  of  the  USSR,  although  most  SIBFE  speakers  were  still 
discussing  issues  at  the  regional,  rather  than  at  the  Union  or  RSFSR  level. 
As  this  content  analysis  covered  only  a  limited  number  of  deputies  and  sessions 
of  the  Congress,  and  equally  a  limited  period,  further  discussion  of  regionalism  in  the 
central  legislature  will  be  presented  in  the  following  chapters. 
)  Sergeev  and  Biriukov  assert  that  still  many  deputies  regarded  the  CPD  as  a  Sobor,  a 
representative  institution  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth  century  Russia.  The  main  function  of  the  Sobor 
is  said  to  maintain  an  increasing  degree  of  unity  rather  than  a  genuine  parliamentary  function.  Victor 
Sergeev  and  Nikolai  Biriukov,  Russia's  Road  to  Democracy:  Parliament,  Communes  and  Traditional 
Culture  (Vermont:  Edward  Elgar,  1993),  pp.  32-33. 
2)  According  to  the  newly  revised  Constitution  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  CPD  was  to  meet  at  least 
once  a  year  (Article  110),  less  than  the  1977  Constitution  which  specified  that  the  Supreme  Soviet  should 
meet  twice  a  year  (Article  112).  In  reality,  the  CPD  convened  twice  a  year  in  1989  and  1990,  and  once  in 
1991  for  a  final  session.  Furthermore,  the  committees  and  commissions  attached  to  the  Supreme  Soviet 
held  1,250  formal  sessions  during  1989-1990,  while  the  former  Supreme  Soviet  had  held  only  about 
twenty  meetings  a  year.  Izvestiia,  3  June  1991,  p.  3.  As  far  as  duration  of  sessions  were  concerned,  the 
CPD  lasted  on  average  19.0  days  a  year,  twice  as  long  as  those  of  the  former  Supreme  Soviet  of  1954- 
1958  which  was  held  the  longest  sessions  of  the  previous  Supreme  Soviets  with  an  average  of  9.8  days  a 
year.  Stephen  White,  The  USSR  Supreme  Soviet:  A  Developmental  Perspective,  "  in  Daniel  Nelson  and 
Stephen  White  (eds.  ),  Communist  Legislatures  in  Comparative  Perspective  (London:  Macmillan,  1982),  p. 
135  (Table  6.4);  and  Stephen  White,  Graeme  Gill,  and  Darrell  Slider,  The  Politics  of  Transition:  Shaping 
a  Post-Soviet  Future  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1993),  p.  52  (Table  3.3). 
3)  For  instance,  the  Congress  of  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  Deputies  of  the  USSR  CPD  was 
convened  in  January  1990  in  Novosibirsk  as  already  mentioned.  Siberian  deputies  in  the  CPD  of  Russia 
also  organised  the  First  Congress  of  People's  Deputies  of  Siberia  in  March  1992  in  Krasnoiarsk.  The 
endeavour  of  regions  to  increase  their  influence  was  clearly  shown  in  the  comment  of  Lebedev,  Tomsk 
obisovet  Presidium  member  on  Political  Lobby  at  the  Parliament,  in  his  interview  with  Sibirskala  gazeta. 
Noting  the  proportion  of  Siberian  deputies  in  the  Congress,  he  emphasised  that  the  influence  of  Siberia  in 
the  work  of  the  government  must  be  increased.  "Kak  i  komu  upravliat'  sibir'iu?  "  Sibirskala  gazeta,  no. 
43-44  (November  1991),  p.  11. 
)  Ethno-national  interest  does  not  always  compete  with  regional  interest  articulation.  When 
ethno-national  interests  emerge  in  the  boundary  of  a  region,  they  will  constitute  a  strong  basis  for  regional 
interest  articulation  as  the  Baltic  case  suggested.  However,  cross-regional  ethno-nationalism-for 
instance,  Russian  nationalism  in  the  USSR  and  RSFSR  context-will  hinder  the  development  of 
regionalism. 
5)  As  it  is  difficult  to  identify  class  in  accordance  with  Western  concepts,  I  will  employ  the  term 
pseudo-class,  that  is,  only  considering  occupational  background  of  a  deputy  as  Chiesa  employed  in  his (Chapter  IY)  185 
analysis  on  the  CPD  of  the  USSR.  In  the  analysis,  nomenklaturists  include  high  party  and  governmental 
officials,  and  cadres  include  lower  levels  of  officials.  All  deputies  in  uniform  are  categorised  as  military 
personnel.  Directors  of  industrial  and  agricultural  production  sectors  such  as  production  complex,  co- 
operatives,  kolkhozy  and  sovkhozy  are  categorised  as  managers.  All  'creative'  workers  including  writers, 
actors,  artists,  professors,  academicians,  researchers,  and  journalists  are  grouped  as  intelligentsia. 
Technicians  include  those  employed  highly  qualified  professions  such  as  engineers,  teachers,  doctors, 
procurators,  and  lawyers.  Employees  of  material  producers  in  industrial  and  agricultural,  and  service 
sectors  constitute  the  working  class.  Giuletto  Chiesa,  Transition  to  Democracy:  Political  Change  in  the 
Soviet  Union  1987-1991  (Hanover:  University  of  New  England  Press,  1993),  pp.  38-39. 
6)  Mark  O.  Rousseau  and  Raphael  Zariski,  Regionalism  and  Regional  Development  in 
Comparative  Perspective  (New  York:  Praeger,  1987),  pp.  24-25;  Sidney  Tarrow,  Peter  J.  Katzenstein,  and 
Luigi  Graziano,  Territorial  Politics  in  Industrial  Nations  (New  York:  Praeger,  1978),  pp.  2-23;  and  Sidney 
Tar  ow,  Between  Centre  and  Periphery:  Grassroots  and  Politicians  in  Italy  and  France  (New  Haven: 
Yale  University  Press,  1977),  pp.  47-75.  In  particular,  Berezkin  and  his  colleagues  regarded  urban-rural 
cleavages  as  'azonal'  factor,  noting  its  cross-regional  impact.  A.  V,  Berezkin,  V.  A.  Kolosov,  M.  E. 
Pavlovskaia,  N.  V.  Petrov,  and  L.  V.  Smimiagin,  "The  Geography  of  the  1989  Elections  of  People's 
Deputies  of  the  USSR  (Preliminary  Results),  "  Soviet  Geography,  vol.  30,  no.  8  (October  1989),  pp.  628- 
629.  Solnick  also  categorises  ethnic/  religious  and  urban-rural  factors  as  "trans-regional"  factors.  Steven 
L.  Solnick,  "Russia's  Asymmetric  Federation:  Are  All  Differences  Alike?  "  unpublished  paper  presented  at 
the  ESRC  research  seminar  Russia's  Regional  Transformation  on  31  January  2000  in  London,  pp.  14-15. 
')  According  to  Shapiro,  a  Soviet  general  election  provided  the  regime  with  an  opportunity  to 
demonstrate  the  legitimacy  of  the  regime,  to  exercise  an  invaluable  political  education  and  propaganda, 
and  to  check  the  control  system  of  the  regime.  Leonard  Shapiro,  The  Government  and  Politics  of  the 
Soviet  Union,  6th  ed.  (London:  Hutchinson,  1977),  p.  108.  Zaslavsky  and  Brym  also  enumerate  six 
functions  of  an  election  in  the  Soviet  regime:  an  opportunity  for  electorates  to  extract  minor  concessions 
from  the  regime  by  the  threat  of  withholding  the  vote;  screening  candidates  for  the  party  and  rewarding 
them  for.  their  faithful  state  service;  serving  the  interests  of  the  canvassers;  social  control  functions  for 
authorities;  training  ground  for  the  implementation  of  Soviet  development  policy;  and  demonstration  of 
adjustment  of  the  citizen  to  the  fiction  of  democracy.  Victor  Zaslavsky  and  Robert  J.  Brym,  "The 
Functions  of  Elections  in  the  USSR,  "  Soviet  Studies,  vol.  XXX,  no.  3  (July  1978),  pp.  367-371. 
')  "Doklad  general'nogo  sekretaria  TsK  KPSS  tovarishcha  Gorbacheva  M.  S.,  "  Pravda,  26 
February  1986,  p.  7. 
9)  The  law  stipulated  a  district  electoral  meeting,  which  provided  the  authorities  with  an 
opportunity  to  manipulate  a  nomination  process.  Furthermore,  two-thirds  of  seats  were  allocated  to  the 
social  organisations  and  autonomous  administrative  units  in  the  CPD  of  the  USSR.  Although  allocation  of 
seats  to  the  social  organisations  was  abolished  in  the  election  to  the  CPD  of  Russia,  the  share  of 
autonomous  administrative  units-a  total  168  of  1068  seats,  or  15.7  per  cent-was  still  recognised.  For  a 
more  detailed  discussion  of  the  continuous  features  of  the  Soviet  style  election,  see  White,  Gill,  and  Slider, 
The  Politics  of  Transition,  pp.  34-38;  and  Stephen  L.  White,  "Soviet  Elections:  From  Acclamation  to 
Limited  Choice,  "  Coexistence,  vol.  28,  no.  4  (December  1991),  pp.  513-539. (Chapter  IV)  186 
10  )  Berezkin,  Kolosov,  Pavlovskaia,  Petrov,  and  Smirniagin,  "The  Geography  of  the  1989 
Elections  of  People's  Deputies  of  the  USSR,  "  pp.  616-620. 
11)  "Zakon  Soiuza  Sovetskikh  Sotsialisticheskikh  Respublik  o  vyborakh  narodnykh  deputatov 
SSSR,  "  Vedomosti  Verkhovnogo  Soveta  Soiuza  Sovetskikh  Sotsialisticheskii  Respublik,  no.  49  (7 
December  1988),  pp.  831-857,846-847. 
12)  Total  9,950  candidates  ran  for  the  election  to  the  CPD  of  the  USSR  in  the  initial  stage  of 
nomination.  After  the  pre-election  district  meetings,  2,195  candidates  for  the  territorial  districts,  1,967  for 
the  national-territorial  districts  and  912  for  social  organisations  were  finally  enrolled  as  candidates. 
Pravda,  6  October  1989,  p.  8.  Single  candidacies  were  registered  in  19  of  40  electoral  districts  in 
Armenia,  15  of  43  in  Moldavia,  35  of  73  in  Kazakhstan,  while  three  of  36  in  Estonia,  seven  of  40  in 
Latvia,  and  none  in Moscow  and  Lithuania.  Chiesa,  Transition  to  Democracy,  p.  230  (Table  4). 
13)  In  the  election  to  the  CPD  of  Russia,  total  7,017  candidates  were  registered  for  1,068  seats. 
Among  them,  1,314  candidates,  or  18.7  per  cent,  were  registered  in  Siberia,  and  411  candidates,  or  5.9  per 
cent  in  the  Russian  Far  East.  "Vybory-90:  tol'ko  tsif  y,  "  Sibirskaia  gazeta,  no.  9  (5.11  March  1990),  p.  6. 
14)  "Zakon  Soiuza  Sovetskikh  Sotsialisticheskikh  Respublik  o  vyborakh  narodnykh  deputatov 
SSSR,  "  pp.  846,849. 
1s)  For  instance,  A.  Ugumnova,  a  candidate  for  the  CPD  of  Russia  in  Tiumen  oblast,  proposed  that 
the  capital  of  Russia  should  move  to  a  geographically  central  city,  suggesting  Sverdlovsk  as  a  possible 
option.  Tiumenskaia  pravda,  2  February  1990,  p.  3.  According  to  a  survey  of  the  Scientific  Research 
Institute  of  the  Academy  Social  Sciences,  60  per  cent  of  constituents  showed  their  scepticism  on  the 
electoral  platforms  of  candidates,  regarding  them  as  unrealistic.  Izvestiia,  12  May  1989,  p.  3. 
16)  See  the  electoral  platform  of  Ia.  N.  Tikhonova,  inspector  of  railspolkom,  who  had  been  elected 
at  the  territorial  district  no.  219  in  Primorskii  krai.  Krasnoe  znamia,  9  February  1990,  p.  2. 
")  See  the  electoral  platform  of  V.  E.  Nikitich,  deputy  head  doctor  of  oblast  clinical  hospital  from 
Primorskii  krai.  Krasnoe  znamla,  25  January  1990,  p.  2. 
11  )  See  the  electoral  platforms  of  E.  V.  Nazdratenko  and  In.  S.  Sergeev.  Krasnoe  znamia,  I 
February  1990,  p.  2. 
")U.  I.  Gavrilovich,  the  head  of  Nakhodka  port,  even  went  further  than  'low'  politics  when  he 
proposed  to  create  a  regional  deputy  group  of  the  Far  Eastern  regions  to  protect  regional  interests. 
Krasnoe  znamia,  23  February  1990,  p.  2.  For  more  broad  examples  of  the  platforms  of  deputies  of  the 
CPD  of  Russia,  see  Martin  McCauley  (ed.  ),  Directory  of  Russian  MPs:  People's  Deputies  of  the  Supreme 
Soviet  of  Russia-Russian  Federation  (London:  Longman,  1992). 
20  )  For  instance,  in  Primorskii  krai,  electoral  platforms  of  candidates  often  contained  similar 
perceptions  on  the  situation  and  suggestions.  For  the  platforms  of  candidates  for  each  electoral  district  in 
Primorsldi  krai,  see  Krasnoe  znamia,  25  January  1990,  p.  2;  26  January  1990,  p.  2;  30  January  1990,  p.  1; 
1  February  1990,  p.  2;  2  January  1990,  p.  2;  8  February  1990,  p.  2;  9  February  1990,  p.  2;  14  February 
1990,  p.  2;  and  23  February  1990,  p.  2. (Chapter  I17  187 
21)  The  People's  Front  won  36  of  42  seats  in  Lithuania,  16  of  36  seats  in  Estonia,  and  11  of  40 
seats  in  Latvia. 
u)  For  instance,  82.5  per  cent  of  respondents  (N"967)  answered  that  elections  at  many  levels  are 
important.  For  more  details,  see  Jeffrey  W.  Hahn,  "Continuity  and  Changes  in  Russian  Political  Culture,  " 
British  Journal  of  Political  Science,  vol.  21,  part  4  (December  1991),  p.  413. 
xr  )  According  to  the  survey,  two-thirds  of  voters  regarded  the  personal  qualities  of  a  candidate  as 
the  most  important  factor,  and  concerned  more  about  local  problems  than  a  national  policy,  although  still 
34  per  cent  of  voters  answered  that  they  would  vote  for  the  candidates  in  accordance  with  authorities' 
instruction.  V.  Levanskii,  A.  Obolonskii  and  G.  Tokarevskii,  "Chto  dumaiut  liudi  o  vyborakh?  " 
Argumenty  i  fakty,  no.  10  (1-17  March  1989),  p.  2.  Popov's  survey  in  the  cities  such  as  Moscow, 
Novosibirsk,  and  Vil'nius  suggests  similar  tendencies.  Izvestiia,  22  April  1989,  p.  6.  For  a  further 
discussion,  see  Peter  Lentini,  "Reforming  the  Electoral  System:  the  1989  Elections  to  the  USSR  Congress 
of  People's  Deputies,  "  The  Journal  of  Communist  Studies,  vol.  7,  no.  1  (March  1991),  pp.  79-86. 
u)  The  result  was  one  of  ten  cities  where  surveys  were  conducted  on  the  sample  of  656  people. 
Among  the  respondents,  women  constituted  67  per  cent,  the  highly  educated  60.2  per  cent,  and  CPSU 
members  15.6  percent.  B.  Gavriliuk,  "Kakoi  byt'  nashei  vlasti?  "  Tiumenskala  gazeta,  21  February  1990, 
p.  3.  In  fact,  V.  V.  Iudin,  the  general  director  of  an  oil  complex  who  was  born  in  1940,  was  elected  to  the 
CPD  of  Russia  in  Tobol'sk. 
23)  For  instance,  in  a  electoral  meeting  in  Ulan-Ude,  a  Buriat  candidate  was  asked  a  question  in 
the  Buriat  language  which  featured  that  national  sentiments  clearly  played  a  major  role  in  politics  not  only 
in  the  union  republics,  but  also  at  the  lower  level  of  autonomous  regions.  Pravda,  20  February  1989,  p.  2. 
A  report  from  Siberia  also  commentated  that  they  never  had  an  election  campaign  like  this  before  when  a 
debate  on  nomination  lasted  until  the  morning.  Pravda,  IS  February  1989,  p.  1. 
26)  As  for  the  development  of  informal  organisations  during  1988.1992,  see  V.  N.  Berezovskii,  N. 
1.  Krotov,  and  V.  V.  Cherviakov,  Rossiia:  partii,  assotsiatsil,  soiu  y,  kluby:  sbornik  dokumentov  I 
materialov,  10  vols.  (Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo  RAU-Press,  1991-1993);  Vladimir  Pribylovskii,  Slovar' 
oppozitsil:  novye  politicheskie  partii  t  organisatsii  Rossii  (Moscow:  Postfactum,  1991);  Vneshtorgizdat 
Deita-Press,  Samodeiatel'nye  obshchestvennye  politicheskie  organtsatsit  I  dvi,:  henita  v  SSSR:  spravochnik 
serif  "Kto  est'  kto"  (Moscow:  VTI  Deita-Press,  1992);  Peter  J.  S.  Duncan,  et  al.,  The  Road  to  Post- 
Communism:  Independent  Political  Movements  In  the  Soviet  Union  1985-1991  (London:  Pinter,  1992); 
and  Michael  McFaul  and  Sergei  Markov,  The  Troubled  Birth  of  Russian  Democracy:  Parties, 
Personalities,  and  Programmes  (Stanford,  California:  Hoover  Institution  Press,  1993).  For  a  Rather 
discussion,  see  Chapter  6.3. 
_')  For  instance,  voter  turnout  in  the  previous  Supreme  Soviet  election  in  1984  reached  99.9  per 
cent  in  each  union  republic,  demonstrating  a  successful  mobilisation  rather  than  participation.  However, 
turnout  of  voters  in  the  election  to  the  CPD  of  the  USSR  as  a  whole  showed  quite  a  drop  (89.8  per  cent). 
In  particular,  it  was  lower  than  the  USSR  average  in  Armenia  (71.9  per  cent),  Lithuania  (82.5  per  cent), 
Latvia  (86.0  per  cent),  RSFSR  (87.0  per  cent),  and  Estonia  (87.1  per  cent).  Vedomosti  Verkhovnogo  Soveta 
SSSR,  no.  11(1984),  p.  19;  and  Izvestita,  5  April  1989,  p.  1. 
11  )  For  a  further  discussion,  see  Chiesa,  Transition  to  Democracy,  pp.  27.39. (Chapter  M  188 
29  )  Berezkin,  Kolosov,  Pavlovskaia,  Petrov,  and  Smirniagin,  `The  Geography  of  the  1989 
Elections  of  People's  Deputies  of  the  USSR,  "  pp.  618-619  (Table  3). 
30  )  For  a  further  discussion  see,  White,  "The  USSR  Supreme  Soviet:  A  Developmental 
Perspective,  "  in  Nelson  and  White  (eds.  ),  Communist  Legislatures  In  Comparative  Perspective,  pp.  125- 
159;  and  Ronald  J.  Hill,  "Continuity  and  Change  in  USSR  Supreme  Soviet  Elections,  "  British  Journal  of 
Political  Science,  vol.  2,  part  I  (January  1972),  pp.  47-67. 
")  Among  the  173  women  deputies  who  were  elected  from  the  territorial  and  national  territorial 
electoral  districts,  110  were  from  production  sectors.  Only  24  women  deputies  were  from  education  sector 
where  females  accounted  two-thirds  of  the  total  employees. 
32  )  According  to  the  election  law  of  1988,  one-third  of  seats  were  allocated  to  autonomous 
administrative  units  in  accordance  with  the  following  quota:  32  seats  to  each  union  republic,  11  seats  to 
each  autonomous  republic,  five  seats  to  each  autonomous  oblast,  and  one  seat  to  each  autonomous  okrug 
(Article  17). 
33)  For  instance,  the  proportion  of  Ossetians  accounted  for  0.6  per  cent  in  the  CPD  and  1.1  per 
cent  in  the  Supreme  Soviet,  which  was  nearly  three  to  five  times  the  size  of  Ossetian  population  (0.21  per 
cent).  By  contrast,  Poles  were  represented  by  only  half  the  numbers  of  Ossetians  with  more  than  double 
the  size  of  Ossetian  population  (0.43  per  cent).  In  sum,  32  autonomous  regions  including  autonomous 
republics  were  represented  by  16.7  per  cent  of  deputies  with  8.42  per  cent  of  the  USSR  population. 
74)  According  to  Kaiser,  the  trend  of  indigenisation  was  observed  not  only  in  the  USSR  CPD,  but 
also  in  the  Supreme  Soviets  of  the  union  republics.  Robert  John  Kaiser,  The  Geography  of  Nationalism  in 
Russia  and  the  USSR  (Princeton,  N.  J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  1994),  p.  349  (Table  7.2). 
16  )  Kolosov  asserts  that  gerrymandering  played  a  significant  role  in  minimising  the  representation 
of  ethnic  minorities  (including  Russians  in  this  context)  in  the  elective  bodies  of  the  Baltic  republics.  V. 
A.  Kolosov,  "The  Geography  of  Elections  of  USSR  People's  Deputies  by  National-Territorial  Districts 
and  the  Nationalities  Issue,  "  Soviet  Geography,  vol.  XXXI,  no.  10  (December  1990),  p.  756. 
36)  The  same  trend  was  witnessed  among  SIBFE  deputies,  although  Russians  formed  a  majority 
even  in  most  of  the  autonomous  administrative  units.  This  unequal  representation  provided  the  minor 
nationality  groups  with  a  more  solid  ground  to  claim  autonomous  status,  and  at  the  same  time,  made 
Russians  think  that  they  were  also  the  victims  of  the  current  electoral  system. 
")  Berezkin  and  his  colleagues  also  assert  that  a  'zonal'  factor  such  as  levels  of  economic 
development  and  'azonal'  factor  such  as  levels  of  urbanisation  may  affect  voters'  preference  on  first 
secretaries,  though  he  adds  that  more  detailed  study  is  required  to  find  the  reason  for  such  a  tendency. 
Berezkin,  Kolosov,  Pavlovskaia,  Petrov,  and  Smirniagin,  "The  Geography  of  the  1989  Elections  of 
People's  Deputies  of  the  USSR,  "  pp.  628-629. 
3$)  Among  454  deputies  from  rural  areas,  managers  and  workers  accounted  for  41.6  per  cent  and 
43.4  per  cent  respectively,  while  intellectuals  accounted  for  the  largest  proportion  (35.1  per  cent)  among 
895  deputies  from  large  cities  that  had  more  than  500,000  population  in  1989.  A  higher  proportion  of 
nomenklaturists  was  also  apparent  among  deputies  from  large  and  medium-sized  cities  (with  a  population (Chapter  M  189 
size  larger  than  100,000  but  less  than  500,000)-22.6  per  cent  and  19.3  per  cent  respectively-mainly 
because  of  their  administrative  status  as  regional  centres. 
39)  The  seat  allocation  to  the  social  organisations  contributed  to  the  increasing  representation  of 
intellectuals.  The  measure  provided  an  opportunity  for  the  reformers  who  might  have  had  difficulty  in 
acquiring  nominations  in  the  territorial  or  national-territorial  districts  not  only  because  of  the  obstacles 
posed  by  the  conservatives  in  the  process  of  the  nomination,  but  also  because  of  their  unpopularity. 
Among  them,  reformers  accounted  roughly  50,  including  Andrei  Sakharov,  Tatiana  Zaslavskaia,  Georgii 
Arbatov,  and  Egor  Iakovlev.  Chiesa,  Transition  to  Democracy,  pp.  29.30. 
')  Numbers  of  deputies  may  vary  because  some  deputies  joined  the  CPD  after  the  elections,  while 
others  left  the  Congress  in  order  to  take  governmental  positions. 
")  Sobyanin  asserts  that  deputies  often  joined  more  than  two  political  factions  at  the  same  time 
and  shifted  from  one  faction  to  another.  Alexander  Sobyanin,  "Political  Cleavages  among  the  Russian 
Deputies,  "  Thomas  F.  Remington  (ed.  ),  Parliaments  in  Transition:  the  New  Legislative  Politics  in  the 
Former  USSR  and  Eastern  Europe  (Boulder:  Westview  Press,  1994),  pp.  191,201. 
'_)  The  proportion  of  female  deputies  had  fallen  from  13.8  per  cent  and  16.2  per  cent  among 
RSFSR  deputies  in  the  CPD  and  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  the  USSR,  to  5.2  per  cent  and  8.0  per  cent  in  the 
CPD  and  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  Russia  respectively.  Workers  accounted  6.2  per  cent  and  7.2  per  cent  in 
the  CPD  and  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  Russia,  falling  by  more  than  8  per  cent  than  they  were  represented  in 
1989  election.  Representation  of  rural  areas  showed  a  sharper  decrease  when  the  proportion  of  deputies 
from  rural  area  dropped  from  17.5  per  cent  and  23.9  per  cent  among  RSFSR  deputies  in  the  CPD  and  the 
Supreme  Soviet  of  the  USSR  to  7.3  per  cent  and  3.0  per  cent  in  the  CPD  and  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  Russia 
respectively. 
")  Regina  A.  Smith,  "Ideological  vs.  Regional  Cleavage:  Do  the  Radicals  Control  the  RSFSR 
Parliament?  "  Journal  ofSoviet  Nationalities,  vol.  1,  no.  3  (1990),  p.  119  (Table  1). 
")  The  proportion  of  nomenklaturists  was  higher  in  stagnated  regions  (12.8  per  cent)  and 
stagnated  republics  (23.7  per  cent)  than  the  average  (11.3  per  cent),  while  a  larger  proportion  of  the 
intelligentsia  (49.9  per  cent,  the  Russian  average  is  11.4  per  cent)  was  elected  from  Moscow,  highly 
adapted  region  (X'160.3,  df=28,  p<0.001). 
")  Non-CPSU  members  accounted  for  a  considerably  large  proportion  of  deputies  from  Moscow 
(73.4  per  cent),  and  31.3  per  cent  of  deputies  from  adapted  regions  (M=24.3  per  cent,  X2"112.4,  df"4, 
p<0.001). 
")  For  instance,  54.8  per  cent  of  deputies  from  adopted  republics  were  less  than  4S  years  old, 
while  28.0  per  cent  from  stagnated  republics  (Xi-14.2,  df-4,  p<0.01). 
")  According  to  Sobyanin,  only  five  members-Eltsin,  Mikhail  Bocharov,  Nikolai  Travkin, 
Galina  Starovoitova  and  Iurii  Afanasev--reappeared  in  the  CPD  of  Russia.  Other  leading  figures  such  as 
Gavriil  Popov,  Anatolii  Sobchak,  Sergei  Stankevich,  Gennadii  Burbulis,  and  Ilia  Zaslavskii  ran  for  the 
local  Soviets.  Sobyanin,  "The  Current  Crisis,  "  in  Remington  (ed.  ),  Parliaments  in  Transition,  p.  184. (Chapter  IVJ  190 
ae  )  Membership  of  the  factions  is  based  on  the  work  of  Gleisner  and  his  colleagues.  See  Jeff 
Gleisner,  Andrei  Belaev,  Nikolai  Biriukov,  lakov  Dranev,  Victor  Sergeev,  Voting  in  the  Russian 
Parliament,  1990-93:  Database  (Leeds:  Centre  for  Democratisation  Studies,  University  of  Leeds,  1996). 
")  Among  SIBFE  deputies,  the  old  generation  constituted  52.5  per  cent,  while  63.1  percent 
among  deputies  from  the  European  part  of  Russia  (X"8.2,  df=1,  p<0.01). 
so)  Although  deputies  came  from  large  cities  constituted  nearly  half  the  numbers  of  deputies  from 
Western  Siberia  (46.2  per  cent),  a  smaller  proportion  of  deputies  was  elected  from  large  cities  in  the 
SIBFE  regions  as  a  whole  (31.6  per  cent)  than  in  the  European  part  of  Russia  (45.1  percent,  X2-18.2, 
df-3,  p<0.001). 
$1  )  Although  it  is  not  significant  at  the  0.05  level,  the  SIBFE  delegation  also  had  a  smaller 
proportion  of  nomenklaturists  than  their  Russian  colleagues  (11.4  per  cent,  X  11.2,  df-6,  p-0.08).  By 
contrast,  cadres  constituted  a  larger  proportion  among  SIBFE  deputies  (10.8  per  cent)  than  other  RSFSR 
deputies  (6.8  per  cent). 
13  )  For  instance,  deputies  of  hub/gate  regions  mainly  originated  from  large  cities  (58.1  per  cent), 
and  deputies  of  resource  regions  from  medium  and  small  cities  (31.9  and  29.2  per  cent  respectively). 
Quite  naturally,  deputies  were  mainly  elected  from  large  cities  (32.3  per  cent)  and  rural  areas  (38.7  per 
cent)  in  rural  regions  (X$30.1,  d=9,  p<0.001).  Similar  differences  were  also  found  when  deputies  were 
divided  based  on  planning  regions  such  as  Western  Siberia,  Eastern  Siberia,  and  the  Far  East.  Nearly  half 
the  deputies  from  Western  Siberia  (46.2  per  cent)  were  elected  from  large  cities,  while  more  than  half  the 
deputies  from  the  Russian  Far  East  from  medium-sized  cities  (32.1  and  33.9  per  cent  respectively, 
X2-16.8,  df-6,  p<0.01). 
ss)  Deputies  from  rural  areas  accounted  for  41.2  per  cent  of  deputies  from  stagnated  republics  and 
21.4  per  cent  of  deputies  from  stagnated  regions  (XI-22.2  dfa9,  p<0.05). 
s')  Although  they  were  not  significant  at  the  0.05  levels,  the  Far  Eastern  deputy  group  included  a 
higher  proportion  of  female  deputies  than  the  Siberian  deputy  group  (9.5  per  cent,  X'"5.2,  dfal,  ps0.07). 
The  young  generation  was  better  represented  from  highly  developed  regions  (62.5  per  cent)  than  poorly 
developed  regions  (29.4  per  cent,  X  9.0,  df-4,  p-0.06). 
55  )  White,  Gill,  and  Slider,  The  Politics  of  Transition,  p.  52. 
S6)  In  the  Second  Congress,  for  instance,  only  461  deputies  were  allowed  to  take  the  podium  out 
of  2,083  deputies  who  wanted  to  speak.  This  situation  caused  the  increasing  complains  of  favouritism  in 
the  selection  of  speakers.  Pravovedenie,  no.  5  (1991),  p.  15,  in  ibid.,  p.  37. 
")  Verkhovnyi  Sovet  SSSR,  Pervyl  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  25  mala-9  llunia  1989  g.: 
stenografcheskii  otchet,  6  vols.  (Moscow:  Izdanie  Verkhovnogo  Soveta  SSSR,  1989);  Vtorol  s  "ezd 
narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  12-24  dekabria  1989  g.:  stenograftcheskil  otchet,  5  vols.  (Moscow:  Izdanie 
Verkhovnogo  Soveta  SSSR,  1989);  Vneocherednol  tretfii  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR.  12.13  marta 
1990  g.:  stenograftcheskil  otchet,  3  vols.  (1990);  and  Chetvertyl  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  17.27 
dekabria  1990  g.:  stenograftcheskit  otchet,  4  vols.  (1991). 
11  )  These  categories  were  based  on  time  limits  set  by  the  Provisional  Standing  Orders  for  the 
Sessions  of  the  CPD.  According  to  Article  13  of  the  Orders,  a  maximum  one  and  half  hour  will  be (Ckapter  M  191 
allowed  for  reports,  thirty  minutes  for  co-reports  (category  A  speech),  fifteen  minutes  for  the  debates  on 
reports  and  co-reports  (category  B  speech).  Speakers  will  be  allowed  seven  minutes  for  further 
contribution  in  debates,  also  five  minutes  for  speeches  about  candidates  (category  C  speech).  "Vremennyi 
regulament  zasedanii  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  "  in  Pervyi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR, 
vol.  III,  p.  339. 
39  )  V.  P.  Khmel,  a  construction  team  leader  from  Angarsk  City  of  Irkutsk  oblast,  complained  that 
Siberian  deputies  had  been  silent  for  three  days,  while  Moscow  and  Leningrad  deputies  kept  coming 
forward.  Ibid.,  vol.  I,  p.  63. 
60)  See  the  speech  of  V.  I.  Sergienko,  the  Chairman  of  Krasnoiarsk  kraiispolkom,  in  ibid.,  vol.  II, 
p.  298;  also  see  the  speech  of  A.  I.  Ostroukhov,  a  secretary  of  the  party  committee  of  the  Sibkabel 
Production  Association  from  Tomsk  oblast,  in ibid.,  vol.  III,  pp.  226-227. 
61  )  Ianenko's  speech,  in  ibid.,  vol.  I,  pp.  494-495. 
62)  Kazarezov's  speech,  in  ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  64-65. 
61)  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  231-232, 
64)  See  the  speech  of  M.  I.  Mongo,  the  director  of  the  Department  for  the  Affairs  of  the  Peoples  of 
the  North  and  Arctic  of  the  Eastern  Department  of  the  USSR  Academy  of  Sciences,  from  Vladivostok,  in 
ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  420;  the  speech  of  E.  A.  Gaer,  a  Scientific  Associate  of  the  USSR  Academy  of  Sciences 
Far  East  Department  Institute  of  History,  Archaeology  and  Ethnography,  also  from  Vladivostok,  in  ibid., 
vol.  III,  pp.  85-86;  and  the  speech  of  Sergienko,  the  Chairman  of  Krasnoiarsk  kradspolkom,  in  ibid.,  vol. 
II,  p.  300. 
65)  Gustav  criticised  the  decision  to  build  petrochemical  industry  in  Tiumen  oblast.  Ibid.,  vol.  II, 
p.  232;  I.  A.  Egorova,  section  chief  of  the  Altai  Clinical  Hospital,  opposed  the  construction  of  a  nitrogen 
material  fertiliser  plant  which  was  to  be  built  in  Altai  in  exchange  of  gas  offer,  the  Katun  hydropower 
station  project,  and  the  nuclear  test  cite  in  Semipalatinsk.  Ibid.,  vol.  III,  p.  76. 
66  )  Kazarezov  insisted  that  investment  in  science  would  yield  the  greatest  effect  and  would 
provide  the  funds  which  enable  them  to  resolve  local  social  problems.  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  66-67.  By 
contrast,  I.  A.  Nazarov,  the  First  Secretary  of  the  Russko-Poliansk  Raikom  partii  in  Omsk  oblast, 
underlined  the  need  of  the  capital  investment  in  Siberia's  agrarian  sector,  "primarily  in  the  social 
development,  road  construction,  and  water  and  heat  supplies.  "  Ibid.,  vol.  III,  p.  65. 
67)  For  instance,  A.  A.  Sokolov,  the  Chairman  of  Gorkii  oblispolkom,  insisted  that  the  current 
attacks  on  the  CPSU  were  "aimed  not  at  rectifying  mistakes,  but  at  pooling  forces  to  undermine 
confidence  in  the  party  and  its  organs  and  to  break  its  ties  with  the  people.  "  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  411. 
69  )  Biddulph  asserted  that  local  leaders  were  "overwhelmingly  preoccupied  with  purely  local 
issues  in  their  proposal  to  the  Congresses  of  the  Brezhnev  era.  "  Howard  L.  Biddulph,  "Local  Interest 
Articulation  at  CPSU  Congresses,  "  World  Politics,  vol.  XXXVI,  no.  1(October  1983),  p.  39. 
69)  One  of  union-level  speech  was  made  by  lu.  V,  Golik,  from  Kemerovo  University,  when  he 
supported  the  idea  of  establishing  the  KKN.  Pervyi  s  "erd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  II,  pp.  141» 
142.  A.  P.  lanenko,  a  rector  of  the  Novosibirsk  Engineering  and  Construction  Institute,  also  made  a 
union-general  type  of  speech  by  suggesting  that  state  budget  should  be  approved  in  the  CPD,  criticising (Chapter  M  192 
the  USSR  Council  of  Ministers  for  its  ineffectiveness  in  the  process  of  budget  planning.  Ibid.,  vol.  I,  pp. 
492-493. 
70  )  For  instance,  Gustav  complained  that  there  left  nothing  for  workers  although  they  had 
produced  149  billion  foreign  currency  rubles'  worth  of  oil  for  export.  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  232.  Although  this 
type  of  speeches  accounted  for  only  a  small  proportion,  it  is  still  note  worthy  since  managers  and  workers 
had  less  opportunity  to  articulate  their  opinions  than  nomenklaturists  and  the  intelligentsia  in  the  First 
Congress  of  the  USSR. 
11)  George  W.  Breslauer,  "Is  there  A  Generation  Gap  in  the  Soviet  Political  Establishment?: 
Demand  Articulation  by  RSFSR  Provincial  Party  First  Secretaries,  "  Soviet  Studies,  vol.  XXXVI,  no.  1 
(January  1984),  p.  20.  In  his  further  studies,  he  asserts  that  high  political  position  is  "almost  a  necessary 
condition,  but  is  certainly  not  a  sufficient  condition,  "  for  publishing  impatient  demands,  suggesting  the 
importance  of  patron-client  linkage.  George  W.  Breslauer,  "Provisional  Party  Leaders'  Demand 
Articulation  and  the  Nature  of  Centre-Periphery  Relations  in  the  USSR,  "  Slavic  Review,  vol.  45,  no.  4 
(Winter  1986),  p.  667. 
"  l)  In  fact,  Breslauer  divided  the  demand  types  of  political  elites  into  the  first  four  groups 
excluding  demands  for  independence.  Although  it  was certainly  out  of  the  question  at  the  moment  of 
Breslauer's  analysis,  demands  for  independence  were  clearly  heard  in  the  CPD.  For  his  categories,  see 
Breslauer,  "Provisional  Party  Leaders'  Demand  Articulation,  "  p.  650;  and  Breslauer,  "Is  There  a 
Generation  Gap  in  the  Soviet  Political  Establishment?  "  pp.  5-8. 
")  The  main  difference  between  demands  for  devolution  and  independence  lies  whether  a  demand 
includes  the  changes  of  existing  political  and  economic  system  at  the  union  level. 
")  Breslauer  asserted  "the  structure  and  norms  of  bureaucratic  centralism"  continued  to  pose  strict 
limits  on  the  extent  of  the  middle-level  party  officials'  articulation  during  the  Brezhnev  period.  Breslauer, 
"Provisional  Party  Leaders'  Demand  Articulation,  "  pp.  652-653. 
71  )  Prunskene's  speech,  in  Pervyi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  III,  pp.  57-63,58, 
76)  For  instance,  see  the  remarks  of  V.  P.  Larianov,  a  deputy  chairman  of  the  Presidium  of  the 
Iakutsk  Scientific  Centre  under  the  Siberian  Department  of  the  USSR  Academy  of  Sciences  and  director  of 
the  Institute  for  Physical-Technical  Problems  of  the  North.  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  166-167. 
77  )  See  the  speech  of  Sergienko,  in  ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  298.  Also  see  Mongo's  speech,  in  ibid.,  vol.  II, 
pp.  422-423. 
7$)  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  97. 
Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  359. 
80)  See  the  speeches  made  by  N.  A.  Nazarbaev,  the  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of 
Kazakhstan,  in  ibid.,  vol.  I,  pp.  496-497;  and  by  A.  M.  Masaliev,  the  First  Secretary  of  Kyrgyzstan,  in 
ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  85-86.  V.  V.  Diusembaev,  a  mine  foreman  in  the  Tishinskii  Mine  form  Kazakhstan,  also 
asserted  that  the  transition  to  regional  cost  accounting  "definitely  needs  to  be  preceded  by  a  reform  of 
prices  on  raw  materials.  "  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  281. 
81  )  Ibid.,  vol.  I,  p.  489. (Chapter  M  193 
82)  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  133-134. 
83)  For  instance,  I.  Kh.  Toome,  the  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  Estonia,  proposed  a 
draft  USSR  law  "On  the  Conversion  of  the  Estonian  SSR  to  Republic  Cost  Accounting.  "  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p. 
104. 
°'  )  See  the  speech  of  V.  E.  Bresis,  the  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  Latvia,  in  ibid., 
vol.  III,  p.  234. 
es  )  He  argued  that  conversion  to  full  cost  accounting  and  self-finance  failed  to  solve  the  problems 
because  there  was  no  integral,  unified  concept  and  legal  normative  basis  for  territorial  cost  accounting  and 
regional  administration  of  the  economy.  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  299. 
66)  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  66. 
Gustav  insisted  that  cost  accounting  in  Tiumen  oblast  was  problematic  when  the  region 
received  drilling  rigs  and  equipment  from  Sverdlovsk  and  Volgograd,  pipes  from  the  Ukraine,  oil  field 
equipment  from  Azerbaijan,  and  rotating  brigade  from  Tatarstan,  Bashkortostan,  Belanis,  and  other 
republics.  In  his  conclusion,  he  proposed  to  create  "consortium-type  economic  association"  in  the 
strategic  sector  before  implementation  of  cost  accounting.  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  235. 
Be)  Nazarov's  speech,  in  ibid.,  vol.  III,  p.  63. 
/9)  See  the  speech  of  L.  P.  Larionov,  a  deputy  chairman  of  the  Presidium  of  the  Scientific  Centre 
of  the  USSR  Academy  Sciences  Siberian  Branch  from  Sakha.  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p,  166. 
90)  Ibid.,  vol.  III,  p.  224. 
See  Gorbunov's  speech,  in  ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  23.28.  Braszaukas  even  advocated  the  republics 
must  participate  in  shaping  and  exercising  foreign  policy  of  the  Union.  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  76. 
92)  Mutalibov's  speech,  in  ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  30;  Azizbekova's  speech,  in  ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  228;  and 
Nazarbaev's  speech,  in  ibid.,  vol.  I,  p.  500. 
9'  )  A.  A.  Plotnieks,  a  professor  at  the  Latvian  P.  Stuck  State  University  at  Riga,  for  instance, 
criticised  that  "to  give  even  the  most  competent  federal  organ  the  right  to  stop  its  action  (i.  e.  the  adoption 
of  republican  constitution  and  introduction  of  amendment  to  it)  meant  to  deprive  the  republic  of  its 
sovereignty  with  a  single  stroke  of  the  pen.  "  Ibid.,  vol.  III,  p.  140. 
94  )  See  the  speech  of  V.  N.  Kudriavtsev,  a  deputy  president  of  the  USSR  Academy  of  Sciences  in 
Moscow.  Ibid.,  vol.  III,  pp.  157-158. 
91)  Ibid.,  vol.  III,  p.  159. 
%)  A  regional-ethnic  type  speech  is  worth  mentioning  as  it  showed  existing  ethnic  conflict  within 
the  Baltic  deputies  regarding  the  issue  of  sovereignty.  V.  I.  larovoi,  the  director  of  a  production 
association,  criticised  that  "recent  legislative  activity  had  begun  bearing  an  more  illegal  nature,  and  the 
republic  violated  the  USSR  Constitution  when  a  session  of  the  Estonian  Supreme  Soviet  adopted  the 
amendment  to  the  Constitution  and  the  Declaration  on  Sovereignty  on  16  November  last  year.  "  He  also 
complained  that  majority  of  the  non-Estonian  population,  which  does  not  support  the  cult  of  priority  of 
ethnic  group,  "finds  itself  without  a  place.  "  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  462.463. (Chaperi0  194 
s')  K.  V.  Kogan,  the  chief  of  thermo-technical  laboratory  in  Tallinn,  an  ethnic  Russian,  also 
demanded  to  create  a  committee  for  constitutional  control  to  review  the  constitutional  amendments 
adopted  in  Baltic  republics,  particularly  in  Estonia.  Ibid.,  vol.  III,  pp.  137-138. 
98  )  Ibid.,  vol.  III,  pp.  141-142. 
99)  See  the  speech  of  Gaer  from  Vladivostok,  in  ibid.,  vol.  III,  pp.  84-91;  and  the  speech  of 
Mongo,  also  from  Vladivostok,  in  ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  423. CHAPTER  V 
Regionalism  in  the  CPD  of  the  USSR 
By  the  time  the  Congress  of  the  People's  Deputies  (CPD)  of  the  USSR 
convened,  cleavages  in  the  attitude  of  the  grassroots  towards  political  change  had 
emerged.  According  to  a  survey  carried  out  during  November-December  1989, 
ethnicity,  age,  CPSU  membership,  education  and  income  level,  gender,  urbanisation 
and  life  satisfaction  were  reported  to  affect  the  respondents'  attitude  towards  reform.  ' 
As  noted  in  the  content  analysis,  "socialist  pluralism"  in  Soviet  society  was  also 
reflected  in  the  Congress  in  terms  of  the  interests  of  the  various  socio-economic  sectors 
that  constituted  its  membership. 
In  the  Congress,  another  crucial  factor,  regional  groups,  emerged,  as  the 
formation  of  the  Interregional  Deputies'  Group  suggested.  Given  that  reform  measures 
had  a  different  impact  on  the  regions,  emerging  regional  groups  in  the  Congress  could 
make  it  more  difficult  to  adjust  conflicting  interests  in  a  decision-making  process  that 
had  already  become  more  complicated  than  before.  Such  difficulties  hampered  the 
central  authorities'  efforts  to  identify  clear  guidelines  for  regulating  reform  in  the 
peripheries,  which  in  turn  facilitated  an  intensification  of  regionalisation  of  reform  in 
the  implementation  process. 
In  this  chapter,  the  influence  of  regional  factors  upon  the  decision-making 
process  at  the  centre  that  was  reflected  in  the  voting  patterns  of  deputies  will  constitute 
a  main  focus.  Supposing  that  cleavages  at  the  grassroots  level  could  also  emerge 
among  deputies,  the  influence  of  the  variables  mentioned  above  will  be  examined 
together  with  the  regional  factor.  For  the  analysis,  17  of  the  63  roll-call  votes  that  were 
took  place  during  the  Second  to  Fourth  Congresses  of  the  USSR  were  selected.  The 
analysis  will  be  carried  out  in  two  stages:  firstly  each  of  the  variables  will  be  discussed 
separately,  then  the  overall  influence  of  these  variables  will  be  examined. (Chapter  n  196 
The  analysis  suggests  that  deputies  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole  were  divided  by 
regional  factors  (e.  g.  the  Union  republic  deputy  groups),  as  well  as  by  'class' 
background,  CPSU  membership,  and  personal  factors  such  as  generation  and  gender. 
Similar  cleavages  also  emerged  among  the  SIBFE  deputies  in  many  votes,  except  in 
votes  on  federal  issues.  Among  SIBFE  deputies,  the  diverse  socio-economic  situation 
of  an  individual  region,  as  well  as  'class'  and  generation  factors  weakened  unity. 
Among  the  regional  variables  tested  in  this  chapter,  conflicts  emerged  among  the 
regional  groups  based  on  economic  structure,  economic  performance,  and  federal 
status  depending  on  the  feature  of  votes  in  question,  suggesting  a  low  level  of 
cooridination  among  SIBFE  deputies.  Although  the  influence  of  these  factors 
depended  on  the  question  that  was  put  to  the  vote,  this  regional  cleavage  suggests  that 
SIBFE  deputies  were  more  attentive  to  the  interests  of  their  own  administrative  unit 
rather  than  those  of  the  SIBFE  as  a  whole. 
V.  1.  The  Agenda  Discussed  in  the  CPD  of  the  USSR 
V.  1  (1)  The  Agenda  of  the  Second  Congress 
After  the  First  Congress,  two  main  issues  were  given  priority  in  the  following 
Congress:  constitutional  amendments  that  were  to  enshrine  economic  and  political 
reform  of  the  old  Soviet  Constitution,  and  the  economic  programme  for  the  13th  Five- 
Year  Plan  (FYP).  The  agenda  for  the  Second  Congress  that  opened  on  12  December 
1989  was  adopted  by  the  eighty-member  commission  that  consisted  of  the  members  of 
the  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  and  representatives  from  the  political  groups 
within  the  Congress?  Although  a  majority  approved  the  agenda,  there  were  sharp 
differences  of  views  on  the  issues  of  the  leading  role  of  the  CPSU  in  Soviet  society,  the 
question  of  transition  to  a  "socialist  market,  "  the  election  system,  and  the  Constitutional 
Control  Committee  (Komitet  konstitutsionnogo  nadzora:  KKN). 
First  of  all,  a  striking  difference  was  evident  between  conservatives  and 
reformers  in  their  views  on  Article  6  of  the  Constitution.  Even  before  the  Congress 
convened,  the  left  wing  organised  a  general  strike,  demanding  the  abolition  of  Article 
6,  although  they  failed  to  receive  nationwide  support.  As  the  session  opened,  Mariu 
Lauristin  from  Estonia,  raised  the  question  of  Article  6,  claiming  that  it  could  be 
discussed  together  with  the  electoral  reform  issue.  '  Although  conservatives  supported 
Article  6,  it  had  already  been  an  empty  concept  4  While  recognising  the  legitimacy  of (Chapter  iq  197 
the  issue  and  considering  that  the  Party  was  not  yet  ready  for  the  changes,  Gorbachev 
opposed  immediate  discussion  of  the  matter.  Eventually,  the  question  was  put  to  a 
vote,  giving  a  short-lived  victory  to  conservatives  which  lasted  until  February  1990 
when  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Party  decided  to  change  Article  6. 
The  government  economic  programme,  called  "Ryzhkov's  plan,  "  was  the  second 
issue  discussed  in  the  Second  Congress.  The  Ryzhkov  plan  was  based  on  the  idea  that 
a  six-year  transition  period  was  required  to  establish  a  "socialist  market.  "  The  plan  was 
generally  accepted  by  conservatives  and  realistic  radicals,  but  for  different  reasons.  As 
for  the  conservatives,  the  plan  was  basically  acceptable,  mainly  because  it  left  the 
existing  administrative-command  economic  system  untouched.  Relatively  moderate 
reform  supporters  also  generally  agreed  that  an  immediate  and  radical  path  to  the  fully- 
fledged  market  economy  was  impossible.  However,  the  plan  failed  to  reassure  many 
deputies  who  regarded  it  as  containing  impractical  and  vague  methods  for  the 
establishment  of  a  "socialist  market.  "'  Further  discussions  took  place  in  three  working 
groups,  '  and  finally,  the  government  economic  programme  was  adopted  by  a  majority, 
Conflicts  between  conservatives  and  reformers  continued  on  the  question  of 
electoral  procedures.  Since  the  adoption  of  the  Law  on  the  Election  of  People's 
Deputies  of  the  USSR  on  1  December  1988,  several  questions  had  been  raised  such  as 
unequal  representation  in  national-territorial  and  territorial  districts,  the  selection  of 
deputies  from  all-union  public  organisations,  district  nomination  conferences,  and  so 
on.  '  In  particular,  debates  took  place  on  Articles  95  and  109  of  the  Constitution  and 
Article  18  of  the  Law  on  the  Election  of  People's  Deputies  of  the  USSR,  which 
stipulated  the  selection  of  750  deputies  from  all-union  public  organisations.  Discussion 
of  the  question  became  controversial,  particularly  when  the  RSFSR  and  Baltic 
republics  adopted  election  laws  for  establishing  the  republican  parliaments  which  were 
in  conflict  with  the  Union  Constitution.  ' 
At  the  Congress,  a  commission,  headed  by  Iurii  Manaenkov,  proposed  a 
compromise  so  that  a  portion  of  the  deputies  could  be  selected  from  all-union  public 
organisations  "if  so  specified  by  the  Constitution  of  the  republic.  "'  Despite  public 
support  for  the  changes,  "  neither  conservatives  nor  reformers  gained  the  two-thirds 
support  that  was  necessary  for  any  changes  in  the  Constitution,  although  the  issue  was 
put  to  the  vote  twice  at  the  Second  Congress.  In  the  end,  republic  elections  began  to 
proceed  from  7  January  1990  in  Turkmenia  until  28  October  1990  in  Georgia  under 
their  own  version  of  the  election  law. (Chapter  iq  198 
Among  the  agenda  items,  Article  125  of  the  Constitution  of  the  USSR,  which 
granted  the  KKN  the  right  to  nullify  any  law  contradicting  the  Constitution,  was  the 
most  controversial.  At  least  on  the  surface,  the  KKN  could  be  a  symbol  of  the  rule  of 
law.  However,  the  KKN  was  a  double-edged  sword  that  had  the  authority  not  only  to 
nullify  the  acts  promulgated  by  the  Council  of  Ministers  when  they  were  in 
contradiction  to  the  Constitution  and  laws,  but  also  to  suppress  separatist  movements  in 
the  republics.  In  this  regard,  deputies,  particularly  from  the  Baltic  republics,  regarded 
the  KKN  as  an  encroachment  on  the  republics'  sovereign  rights  and  refused  to  take  part 
in  discussion  of  the  matter.  "  Despite  the  resistance  in  the  Congress,  the  issue  was 
finally  settled  when  the  Congress  adopted  the  law  on  the  KKN,  and  elected  S.  S. 
Alekseev  as  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  23  December  1989.12 
V  1(2)  The  Agenda  of  the  Third  CPD 
Although  the  KKN  question  had  been  settled  in  the  Second  Congress,  the  KKN 
was  not  sufficient  authority  for  Moscow  to  cope  with  the  separatist  tendencies  that 
were  already  gaining  a  momentum.  "  Furthermore,  growing  opposition  to  his  policies 
within  the  CPSU  forced  Gorbachev  to  create  a  new  power  base,  the  post  of  president  of 
the  USSR"  An  extraordinary  Congress  was  called  in  March  1990,  and  lasted  only 
three  days  mainly  to  adopt  the  law  "On  Establishing  a  Presidency  of  the  USSR,  " 
In  the  Congress,  the  power  of  the  president  of  the  USSR  and  the  procedures  to 
elect  the  president  became  the  main  focus  of  debate.  According  to  the  draft  law  "On 
Establishing  a  Presidency  of  the  USSR,  "  the  president  was  to  be  provided  with  the 
important  power  to  nominate  and  to  propose  . the  resignation  of  the  main  posts  in  state 
bodies.  The  law  also  granted  the  president  a  veto  over  the  decisions  of  the  Supreme 
Soviet  and  the  right  to  issue  presidential  decrees,  although  the  decrees  of  the  president 
could  be  nullified  by  the  decision  of  the  CPD  if  they  violated  the  Constitution  and  laws 
of  the  USSR.  ' 
The  proposal  to  establish  a  strong  presidency  of  this  kind  gave  rise  to  a  vigorous 
debate  in  the  Congress.  As  for  the  conservatives,  a  strong  presidency  could  be  a  threat 
to  their  monopoly  of  power.  However,  at  the  same  time,  it  could  be  used  to  strengthen 
their  authority,  which  was  anyway  diminishing.  As  for  the  moderate  reformers, 
particularly  those  who  had  a  centrist  orientation,  the  post  of  president  was  regarded  as  a 
way  to  achieve  the  integrity  of  the  Union  and  stability  of  the  society,  16 (Chapter  i)  199 
However,  radicals  argued  that  establishing  a  strong  presidency  could  lead  to 
another  dictatorship.  "  In  particular,  radicals  tried  to  block  the  possibility  that  the 
president's  authority  could  be  used  to  strengthen  the  conservatives'  position.  As  a 
result,  the  question  of  combining  the  post  of  President  and  General  Secretary  of  the 
CPSU  caused  a  conflict  between  conservatives  and  radicals.  In  this  context,  V.  I 
Prokushev  proposed  to  amend  point  1  of  Article  127  of  the  Constitution  of  the  USSR, 
adding  that  "the  president  of  the  USSR  may  not  be  a  People's  Deputy  or  a  member  of 
leadership  bodies  of  any  political  parties  or  any  other  political  public  organisations.  " 
Prokushev's  amendment  won  the  support  of  1,303  deputies,  but  failed  to  earn  the  two- 
thirds  support  that  would  have  been  necessary  to  secure  its  adoption. 
As  for  the  union  republics  that  showed  separatist  tendencies,  the  power  of  the 
president  was  regarded  as  another  double-edged  sword,  as  was  the  KKN.  19  In  this 
regard,  Iu.  Afanas'ev's  remark  clearly  showed  the  perception  of  separatist  union 
republics  and  reformist  blocs  on  the  post  of  president.  On  behalf  of  the  Interregional 
Deputies'  Group,  he  expressed  worries  about  "emerging  dictatorship,  "  insisting  that  the 
five  pre-conditions  should  be  satisfied  in  advance  of  establishing  a  presidency.  "  In 
order  to  minimise  these  worries  about  excessive  centralisation,  Gorbachev  maintained 
that  the  prime  task  of  the  president  would  be  the  establishment  of  a  new  federation  "in 
the  interests  of  all  people.  ""  However,  for  the  Baltic  nationalists,  his  remark  only 
reinforced  their  scepticism  that  the  strong  presidency  was  a  symbol  of  unity  rather  than 
of  a  new  federation. 
The  procedure  to  elect  a  president  was  also  controversial,  when  Part  III  of  the 
draft  law  on  the  post  of  president  that  stipulated  the  first  president  should  be  elected  by 
the  CPD  was  discussed.  Deputies  such  as  Afanas'ev  preferred  a  general  election  to 
elect  the  president  of  the  USSR.  However,  others  including  Anatolii  Sobchak,  member 
of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  and  A.  N.  Iakovlev,  secretary  of  the  CPSU  Central  Committee, 
regarded  it  as  a  practical  option  to  elect  the  president  by  the  CPD  u  In  the  end,  the 
Congress  adopted  each  section  of  the  draft  law  separately,  and  elected  Gorbachev  as 
the  first  president  of  the  USSR  on  an  exceptional  basis. 
Me  AQenda  of-the  Lourth  GonQress  of'Peov(CY-Dev 
After  the  Third  Congress,  the  conflicts  between  `sovereign  republics'  and  strong 
president,  and  deteriorating  economic  situation  became  critical  issues.  The  Fourth 
Congress  that  convened  in  December  1990  discussed  three  main  questions:  the  state (Chapter  iq  200 
administrative  system,  a  new  Union  Treaty,  and  measures  to  overcome  the  continuing 
economic  crisis.  " 
The  constitutional  amendments  to  improve  the  state  administrative  system 
covered  the  powers  of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  President  and  Vice  President,  the  Federal 
Council,  the  Council  of  Ministers,  Arbitration  Court,  and  procurators,  and  were 
intended  to  provide  "more  clear-cut  demarcation  of  the  powers  of  the  state  organs.  " 
However,  the  discussion  of  the  procedures  to  annul  decrees  of  the  president  and 
resolutions  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  resulted  in  a  struggle  between  executive  and 
legislative  bodies.  V.  N.  Kudriavtsev,  Chairman  of  the  Editorial  Commission, 
proposed  that  the  right  to  annul  the  decrees  of  the  president  of  the  USSR  should  not  be 
given  to  the  Supreme  Soviet  but  to  the  CPD`  On  the  contrary,  A.  I.  Kazannik,  head  of 
the  department  of  Constitutional  Law,  Administration  and  Soviet  Development  at 
Omsk  State  University,  opposed  Kudriavtsev's  proposal,  mainly  because  the  Congress 
only  convened  once  a  year.  He  insisted  that  "presidential  decrees  should  be  annulled 
by  a  continuously  operating  body  of  state  power,  the  USSR  Supreme  Soviet  "  25 
Gorbachev  supported  Kazannik's  position,  maintaining  it  would  be  better  to  leave 
everything  as  it  was,  since  he  had  to  adopt  decrees  almost  "every  day.  ""  Finally,  an 
amendment  to  the  point  18  of  Article  113  was  passed,  providing  the  Supreme  Soviet 
with  the  right  to  annul  the  resolutions  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  " 
The  Congress  also  discussed  a  draft  resolution  on  measures  to  overcome  the 
crisis  point  by  point.  The  draft  stipulated  the  need  to  accelerate  work  on  preparing  and 
signing  a  Union  Treaty  (Article  1),  and  guarantee  the  delivery  of  necessary  goods. 
According  to  the  draft,  all  parties  engaged  in  economic  management  were  to  sign 
delivery  contracts  before  the  end  of  1990.  The  draft  also  specified  that  each  party 
should  provide  the  same  amount  of  output  that  they  had  delivered  in  the  previous  year 
during  the  first  quarter  of  1991.28  Eltsin  made  it  clear  that  the  way  out  of  this  crisis  was 
only  possible  through  discussion  between  centre  and  republics,  urging  that  the  Union 
leadership  should  recognise  the  sovereignty  of  the  republics  and  "decisively  and 
permanently  relinquish  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  republics  without  their 
consent,  ""  The  final  draft  was  approved  by  1,868  deputies  and  only  eight  deputies 
voted  against  it. 
After  adoption  of  the  resolution  on  measures  to  overcome  the  crisis,  the 
Congress  began  to  discuss  a  draft  resolution  on  the  concept  of  a  new  Union  Treaty. 
For  the  discussion,  fourteen  drafts  were  drawn  up  including  the  draft  prepared  by  the 
Supreme  Soviet  commission,  "  The  Congress  basically  agreed  to  speed  up  the  process (Chapter  i')  201 
of  concluding  the  Union  Treaty  (Article  1).  In  the  discussion,  the  Soiuz  Group 
supported  Gorbachev's  proposal,  but  the  Interregional  Deputies'  Group  was  divided.  ', 
There  were  also  several  amendments  to  the  draft.  For  instance,  Anatolii  Sobchak 
proposed  an  amendment  to  Article  3  of  the  draft  that  emergency  measures,  which  were 
mentioned  only  for  the  first  quarter  of  1991,  should  be  extended  to  the  end  of  the  year. 
He  also  proposed  a  rewording  of  Article  4  concerning  the  abolition  of  barriers  to  the 
transfer  of  products  across  the  country.  Both  proposals  were  turned  down.  As  the 
Congress  adopted  the  draft  by  1,616  against  181,  a  preparatory  committee  was  to  start 
work  in  January  1991.32 
V1  (4)  Roll-call  Votes  Analysed 
Since  the  first  roll-call  vote  at  the  Second  Congress,  63  issues  or  proposals  were 
decided  by  roll-call  vote  (24  votes  at  the  Second,  28  at  the  Third,  and  11  at  the  Fourth 
CPD),  giving  a  good  basis  for  analysing  the  voting  patterns  of  deputies.  For  the 
analysis,  17  votes  were  selected  based  on  the  following  three  principles.  First,  votes 
were  categorised  into  four  categories-federal,  presidential,  economic  and  other 
political  issues-depending  on  the  political  and  economic  meanings  of  issues  that  were 
in  question,  and  about  the  same  number  of  votes  were  selected  from  each  category  of 
questions.  Second,  about  the  same  number  of  votes  were  selected  from  each  Congress. 
And  finally,  a  vote  that  had  been  adopted  or  rejected  by  an  absolute  majority  was 
avoided  (for  the  list  of  votes  included  in  the  analysis,  see  Appendix  3.1). 
Among  the  votes  selected  for  the  analysis,  four  votes  were  related  to  the  federal 
structure,  four  to  the  post  of  the  president,  three  to  the  economic  situation,  and  six  to 
other  political  issues.  The  first  category  of  votes  includes  the  votes  on  the  proposal  to 
include  the  draft  law  on  the  constitutional  supervision  of  the  USSR  on  the  agenda 
(X2),  "  and  the  proposal  that  the  law  on  the  constitutional  supervision  should  first  be 
discussed  in  the  Supreme  Soviet  (X7),  34  which  were  both  put  to  the  vote  at  the  Second 
Congress.  Votes  on  the  retention  of  the  name  of  the  USSR  (Z2)33  and  E.  G.  Kozin's 
proposal  to  recognise  the  declaration  of  sovereignty  by  union  republic  parliaments  as 
an  expression  of  the  people's  will  (Z5)36  also  belong  to  this  category. 
Secondly,  four  votes  on  the  presidency  were  selected.  Among  the  amendments 
raised  when  the  draft  law  "On  Establishing  a  Presidency  of  the  USSR"  was  discussed 
at  the  Third  Congress,  votes  on  V.  I.  Prokushev's  amendment  to  Article  127  point  1  of 
the  Constitution  (Y2),  "  I.  0.  Bisers's  proposal  (Y3),  38  and  A.  A.  Zakharenko's (Chapter  ij  202 
amendment  to  Article  127  point  17  (Y4)39  are  considered.  The  proposal  to  adopt 
Section  III  of  the  draft  law,  stipulating  that  the  first  President  should  be  elected  by  the 
CPD  for  a  five-year  term  (Y5),  40  is  also  included  in  this  category. 
Concerning  the  economic  issues,  votes  on  the  Ryzhkov  plan  (X5),  41  and  G.  N. 
Podberezskii's  amendment  (Z3)42  and  A.  K.  Miloserdy's  amendment  to  Article  3  of  the 
draft  resolution  of  the  Fourth  CPD  "On  Measures  to  overcome  the  Crisis"  (Z4)4'  will 
be  analysed. 
Other  categories  of  issues  includes  two  votes  on  Article  6  (X1  and  Y1),  44  two  on 
the  selection  of  deputies  from  social  organisations  (X3  and  X4),  4s  and  the  amendment 
to  Article  96  of  the  Constitution  (X6).  46  Sazhi  Umalatova's  proposal  for  including  a 
vote  of  no  confidence  in  the  president  of  the  USSR  on  the  agenda,  made  at  the  Fourth 
Congress,  also  belongs  to  this  group.  " 
The  analysis  of  these  votes  is  expected  to  show  deputies'  general  attitude 
towards  political  and  economic  reform.  In  this  case,  we  can  use  the  term  conservative 
and  reformers.  However,  the  matter  is  not  that  simple  when  federal  and  presidential 
issues  are  concerned,  as  the  demarcation  between  centrists  and  federalists  does  not 
necessarily  coincide  with  conservatives  and  reformers  respectively.  Furthermore, 
deputies  regarded  constitutional  supervision  as  not  only  a  matter  of  the  federal  system, 
but  also  a  matter  of  blocking  ministerial  encroachment  on  local  authority.  Votes  on  the 
issue  of  the  presidency  may  have  more  complex  aspects.  They  may  reflect  the  struggle 
not  only  between  parliament  and  president  but  also  between  centrists  and  separatists, 
similar  to  the  KKN  question. 
However,  in  this  analysis,  conservative  voting  patterns  generally  overlapped 
with  centrist  voting  patterns,  as  both  supported  the  existing  federal  order.  In  the  same 
context,  the  term  `conservative'  refers  to  voting  patterns  that  supported  a  strong 
presidency.  The  term  `liberal'  generally  referred  to  reformist,  federalist,  and  anti. 
strong  presidential  tendencies.  In  accordance  with  this  simplification,  votes  are 
recoded  on  a  three-point  scale  (+10  for  a  liberal  vote,  -10  for  a  conservative  vote,  and  0 
for  abstention)  for  anova  and  T-test,  and  on  a  binary  coding  (1  for  a  liberal  vote  and  0 
for  other  votes)  for  logistic  regression  (for  the  coding,  see  Appendix  3.2). (Chapter  Y)  203 
V.  2.  Cleavages  among  Deputies  in  the  CPD  of  the  USSR 
A  striking  feature  of  the  working  patterns  of  the  CPD  was  the  segmentation  of  its 
deputies.  As  already  discussed,  the  CPSU  was  losing  its  binding  force  even  for  its 
member  deputies.  Furthermore,  the  absence  of  a  mechanism  for  recalling  deputies  left 
deputies  to  take  part  in  debates  and  votes  based  on  their  personal  preferences. 
Despite  the  segmentation  of  deputies,  however,  a  sign  of  emerging  voting  blocs 
based  on  regional,  ideological,  and  functional  interests  was  witnessed  in  the  CPD  as 
Although  a  deputy  could  enrol  him  or  herself  in  more  than  one  bloc  and  although  his  or 
her  commitment  to  a  bloc  did  not  necessarily  affect  voting  patterns,  the  formation  of 
deputy  groups  in  the  Congress  suggests  that  an  alignment  among  deputies  was  taking 
place  on  various  bases. 
V.  2  (1)  Regional  Cleavages 
As  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  deputies'  explicit  commitment  to  the 
interests  of  the  regions  they  represented  emerged  as  one  of  the  most  conspicuous 
changes  in  parliamentary  working  patterns.  First  of  all,  clear  differences  were  revealed 
among  the  republican  deputy  groups,  particularly  between  Baltic  and  Central  Asian 
deputies  in  their  voting  patterns  in  all  votes  that  included  in  the  analysis.  In  general, 
deputies  from  the  Central  Asian  republics  showed  conservative  voting  patterns  on  most 
questions  such  as  federal  system  issues,  economic  questions,  Article  6,  and  the 
selection  of  deputies  from  social  organisations.  Although  Slavic  and  Caucasian 
deputies  showed  similar  voting  patterns  at  the  beginning,  Caucasian  deputies  tended  to 
be  more  united  when  they  decided  not  to  take  part  in  the  vote,  copying  Baltic  deputies. 
In  particular,  deputies  from  the  Baltic  republics,  particularly  from  Estonia  and 
Lithuania,  and  deputies  from  Armenia  (at  the  Fourth  CPD),  were  so  strongly  united  in 
the  vote  that  other  factors  hardly  seemed  to  have  significant  influence  on  their  voting 
patterns.  After  the  Second  Congress,  deputies  from  Estonia  and  Lithuania  decided  not 
to  participate  in  the  vote,  demonstrating  their  unity  in  the  CPD.  The  tendencies  were 
followed  by  Armenian  deputies  and  in  a  less  degree  by  Latvian  and  Georgian  deputies 
at  the  Fourth  Congress. (Qiapter  t)  204 
<Table  5.2.1>  An  Indicator  of  the  Unity  of  Baltic  and  Caucasian  Deputy  Groups 
Estonian  Latvian  Lithuanian  Armenian  Georgian 
group  group  group  group  group 
(N=48)  (Na52)  (N=58)  (N=53)  (N=91) 
Y1  37.5  19.2  98.3  11.3  24.2 
Y2  66.7  21.2  98.3  9.4  30.8 
Y3  68.8  28.8  98.3  20.8  25.3 
Y4  71.1  32.7  94.8  18.9  30.8 
Y5  70.8  26.9  93.1  5.7  20.0 
Z1  47.9  15.4  96.6  90.6  76.9 
Z2  87.5  71.2  94.8  94.3  54.9 
Z3  83.3  61.5  94.8  94.3  63.7 
Z4  83.3  67.3  96.6  94.3  63.7 
Z5  85.4  51.9  96.6  94.3  45.1 
Figures  indicate  percentage  of  deputies  who  refrained  from  voting  in  the  Congress. 
Y:  votes  in  the  Third  Congress;  Z:  votes  in  the  Fourth  Congress  (see  Appendix  3.1) 
A  high  level  of  unity  was  also  apparent  among  Central  Asian  deputies.  More 
than  80  per  cent  or  roughly  360  Central  Asian  deputies  voted  to  support  the  existing 
federal  relations  and  the  government  economic  programme,  although  they  were  divided 
on  other  issues.  "  By  contrast,  Slavic  and  Moldavian  deputies  were  divided  on  most 
votes. 
In  the  Congress,  deputies  were  also  broken  down  by  their  urban-rural  origin.  As 
the  voting  patterns  of  Central  Asian  deputies  suggested,  rural  deputies  tended  to  be 
more  conservative  in  their  votes  than  urban  deputies,  revealing  differences  in  15  of  the 
17  votes  analysed  (see  Appendix  4.1).  In  particular,  a  majority  of  rural  deputies  voted 
for  Gorbachev's  position  on  the  federal  system  issue30  and  Ryzhkov's  plan.  " 
However,  the  level  of  urbanisation  in  an  electoral  district  did  not  always  positively 
correlate  with  the  level  of  deputies'  support  for  the  reform.  For  instance,  deputies  from 
small  cities  showed  more  liberal  voting  patterns  than  those  from  the  large  cities, 
particularly  in  the  votes  on  Article  6S2  and  the  selection  of  deputies  from  social 
organisations.  " 
One  of  the  reasons  for  this  trend  could  be  found  in  the  different  composition  of 
urban-rural  deputy  groups.  For  instance,  a  relatively  small  proportion  of  deputies  (23.2 
per  cent)  from  small  cities  was  elected  from  social  organisations,  and  therefore  a 
smaller  proportion  of  them  might  be  interested  in  preserving  the  existing  election 
system.  Secondly,  only  a  small  proportion  of  nomenklaturists  (3.8  per  cent)  and  the 
intelligentsia  (4.4  per  cent)  was  elected  from  small  cities.  By  contrast,  both  groups 
accounted  for  more  than  half  the  deputies  from  large  cities  (21.8  per  cent  and  33.8  per 
cent  respectively).  As  a  result,  deputies  from  small  cities  were  less  exposed  to  the 
conflicts  between  these  `classes'  than  those  from  large  cities. (Chapter  i)  205 
V.  2  (2)  Cleavages  between  'Class'  Groups 
In  association  with  the  development  of  regional  interest  articulation  in  the  central 
parliament,  functional  cleavages  have  particular  importance  because  of  their  cross- 
regional  features.  In  the  Congress,  the  diminishing  importance  of  an  arbitrary 
representation  of  particular  social  sectors  or  'classes'  resulted  . 
in  an  increasing 
representation  of  creative  and  production  sectors,  and  thus  increased  possibility  of 
conflicts  between  diverse  'class'  groups.  Although  it  is  difficult  to  maintain  that  'class' 
identity  was  fully  fledged,  'class'  groups  showed  different  political  and  economic 
orientations  in  the  vote  54 
As  suggested  in  Appendix  4.1,  `class'  cleavages  were  found  in  16  of  the  17 
votes  included  in  the  analysis.  In  general,  nomenklaturists  and  military  personnel 
formed  a  conservative  bloc,  and  the  intelligentsia  and  technicians  constituted  a  liberal 
bloc  in  the  CPD.  While  both  camps  showed  a  relatively  consistent  political  orientation, 
other  'classes'  such  as  cadres,  workers,  and  managers  showed  different  voting  patterns, 
depending  on  the  issue  in  question.  A  majority  of  workers,  for  instance,  tended  to 
strongly  support  the  existing  Union  system  and  the  government  economic  programme 
that  had  been  proposed  at  the  Second  Congress.  However,  they  showed  rather  similar 
voting  patterns  to  relatively  liberal  groups  such  as  the  intelligentsia  and  technicians  in 
the  vote  on  the  post  of  the  president.  Furthermore,  workers  as  a  whole  opposed  the 
allocation  of  seats  to  social  organisations  (M=4.1)  at  the  Second  Congress  and  the 
leading  role  of  the  CPSU  (M=1.2)  at  the  Third  Congress. 
Despite  the  'class'  cleavages,  however,  each  `class'  group  was  divided  in  many 
votes,  suggesting  that  'class'  identity  had  not  been  fully  developed  and  had  not  yet 
been  developed  into  a  particular  political  and  economic  orientation.  In  terms  of  level 
of  unity,  nomenklaturists  maintained  a  relatively  higher  level  of  unity  than  other  'class' 
groups.  For  instance,  sectoral  interests,  particularly  those  of  agricultural  and  industrial 
sectors,  seemed  to  divide  managers  and  workers  in  the  vote.  In  general,  deputies  from 
the  industrial  sector  were  more  liberal  or  less  conservative  than  those  from  the 
agricultural  sector.  This  trend  was  more  apparent  among  workers  than  managers.  ss 
For  instance,  more  than  40  per  cent  of  industrial  workers  (M=-0.9)  supported  a 
proposal  to  discuss  Article  6  at  the  Second  Congress,  while  only  19.2  per  cent  of 
agricultural  workers  (M=-5.0)  supported  it  (T-4.7,  p<0.001).  Another  clear  cleavage 
was  apparent  in  the  vote  on  Ryzhkov's  plan,  when  industrial  workers  (M=-5.8)  were 
less  supportive  than  agricultural  workers  (M=-8.4,  T=4.1,  p<0.001).  A  more (Chapter  1)  206 
conspicuous  difference  between  two  groups  appeared  when  the  proposal  to  declare  a 
moratorium  on  strikes  was  put  to  a  vote  at  the  Fourth  Congress.  In  the  vote,  a  majority 
of  industrial  workers  (58.6  per  cent,  M=3.7)  rejected  the  proposal,  while  nearly  half  the 
agricultural  workers  (48.6  per  cent,  M=-2.2)  supported  it  (T=-7.4,  p<0.001). 
In  connection  with  regionalism,  the  voting  patterns  of  cadres  are  also 
noteworthy,  since  critical  changes  were  taking  place  in  local  leaderships  at  the  end  of 
the  1980s  and  in  the  early  1990s.  In  the  Congress,  a  large  proportion  of  cadres 
appeared  to  keep  a  distance  from  nomenklaturists,  showing  significantly  different 
voting  patterns  in  thirteen  of  the  17  votes.  In  the  votes,  cadres  were  less  supportive  of 
the  leading  role  of  the  CPSU,  of  a  strong  presidency,  and  of  the  existing  federal  system, 
showing  their  readiness  to  accept  political  changes.  36 
A  clear  difference  between  cadres  and  nomenklaturists  was  also  revealed  in  the 
vote  on  a  moratorium  on  strikes.  In  the  vote,  about  45  per  cent  of  cadres  (M=2.3) 
rejected  the  proposal,  while  47.2  per  cent  of  nomenklaturists  (M=-2.5)  supported  it 
(T=-6.2,  p<0.001),  although  about  30  per  cent  of  each  group  abstained.  Given  that  the 
question  of  strikes  could  be  a  major  concem,  57  particularly  in  mining  regions  where 
strikes  had  been  launched  or  were  being  prepared,  the  voting  patterns  of  cadres  suggest 
that  a  growing  number  of  low  ranking  regional  political  leaders  were  loyal  to  regional 
interests. 
V.  2  (3)  Other  Cleavages 
Apart  from  regional  and  `class'  cleavages,  cleavages  based  on  personal  factors 
such  as  gender,  generation,  educational  level,  ethnic  origin  and  CPSU  membership  also 
emerged  among  deputies  in  the  Congress  (see  Appendix  4.1).  In  general,  male 
deputies,  the  younger  generation,  and  non-CPSU  members  tended  to  vote  in  a  more 
liberal  or  less  conservative  way  than  female  deputies,  the  older  generation,  and  CPSU 
members. (Chapter  i)  207 
<Table  5.2.2>  Number  of  Votes  Revealing  Differences  Among  the  Gender, 
Generation,  Education,  and  Party  Groups  in  the  USSR  CPD 
Federal  Presidency  Economic  Other  Total 
Issues  Issues  Issues  Issues 
(4  votes)  (4  votes)  (3  votes)  (6  votes)  (17  votes) 
Gender  2(l)  2(l)  2(l)  5(2)  11  (5) 
Generation  2(l)  4(3)  2(2)  5(5)  13(11) 
Education  level  4(3)  4  (3)  3(l)  2  (1)  13  (8) 
Ethnic  origin  4(3)  4  (2)  3  (2)  2  (0)  12  (7) 
CPSU  membership  4(4)  3  (3)  3  (1)  5(3)  15  (11) 
Significance  at  the  0.05  level  (0.001  level). 
In  the  USSR  CPD,  however,  it  is  difficult  to  say  that  the  higher  the  level  of 
education  a  deputy  attained,  the  more  likely  he  or  she  would  vote  in  a  liberal  way. 
Although  the  higher  the  level  of  education,  the  less  likely  a  deputy  was  to  support  the 
existing  federal  system  and  Ryzhkov's  plan,  it  did  not  necessarily  guarantee  liberal 
voting  on  other  issues.  " 
It  is  also  problematic  to  interpret  ethnic  cleavages  between  Russian  and  non- 
Russian  deputy  groups  that  appeared  in  twelve  votes,  since  both  groups  tended  to  be 
divided.  Furthermore,  ethnic  cleavages  were  often  closely  linked  with  cleavages 
between  the  union  republic  groups.  For  instance,  significant  differences  were  found 
between  Russians  from  the  Central  Asian  and  Caucasian  republics  in  the  vote  on  the 
proposal  to  prohibit  the  president  from  joining  any  political  parties.  "  Differences  were 
also  found  between  non-Russian  deputies  from  both  republic  deputy  groups  in 
economic  issues.  "  Accordingly,  ethnic  cleavages  are  more  appropriately  discussed  at 
the  union  republic  level,  rather  than  in  the  CPD  as  a  whole. 
Among  these  personal  factors,  CPSU  membership  and  generation  seemed  to 
have  a  strong  influence  on  deputies'  voting  patterns.  In  particular,  non-CPSU  members 
often  voted  in  a  more  liberal  or  less  conservative  way  than  party  members  in  the 
Congress,  revealing  significant  differences  in  15  votes  at  the  0.05  level.  For  instance, 
non-CPSU  members  were  less  supportive  of  the  CPSU's  leading  role,  Ryzhkov's  plan 
and  the  existing  federal  system.  61  However,  both  deputy  groups  were  divided  on  most 
votes,  and  only  in  a  limited  number  of  votes,  more  than  60  per  cent  of  deputies  in  each 
group  voted  the  same  way. 
Together  with  CPSU  membership,  the  generation  gap  was  also  evident, 
revealing  differences  in  thirteen  votes.  In  the  vote,  the  younger  generation  more 
supportive  of  political  and  economic  changes  than  the  older  generation.  For  instance, (Chapter  P)  208 
younger  deputies  were  more  supportive  of  the  abolition  of  the  selections  of  deputies 
from  social  organisations  and  of  the  CPSU's  leading  role.  62  They  again  showed  their 
liberal  orientation  when  nearly  47  per  cent  of  them  (M=1.8)  rejected  the  proposal  to 
declare  a  moratorium  on  strikes  (T=5.5,  p<0.001). 
Finally,  the  gender  factor  also  divided  deputies  in  the  Congress,  revealing 
differences  in  eleven  votes.  In  particular,  female  deputies  were  more  supportive  of  the 
existing  federal  system  and  of  Ryzhkov's  plan  than  male  deputies.  63  Although  65  per 
cent  of  female  deputies  were  either  workers  or  technicians,  the  gender  gap  appeared  in 
the  Congress  did  not  seem  to  be  solely  caused  by  the  'class'  composition,  since  the 
gender  gap  also  emerged  among  technicians  and  workers  (in  eleven  and  ten  votes 
respectively). 
V.  3.  SIBFE  Deputies  in  the  CPD  of  the  USSR 
In  the  CPD  of  the  USSR,  it  was  regarded  as  necessary  for  SIBFE  deputies  to 
form  a  common  front  to  defend  regional  interests  in  the  CPD,  as  changing 
parliamentary  working  patterns  had  provided  regions  with  better  opportunities  to 
articulate  their  interests.  Furthermore,  SIBFE  deputies  shared  the  perception  of  the 
`colonial  relationship'  between  centre  and  SIBFE  regions  and  the  need  to  collaborate  in 
their  competition  for  investment  with  other  administrative  units.  As  a  consequence, 
deputies  from  the  SIBFE  regions  held  a  series  of  meetings  to  coordinate  their  activities, 
in  order  to  increase  their  influence  in  the  Congress  6a 
However,  it  turned  out  to  be  a  thorny  path  to  work  out  the  common  interests  of 
the  regions.  Despite  a  general  consensus  in  favour  of  cooperation,  their  priorities  in 
measures  for  solving  the  regional  problems  varied  because  of  the  different  socio- 
economic  conditions  of  each  of  the  SIBFE  regions.  This  hampered  deputies'  efforts  to 
define  common  interests  in  a  series  of  meetings,  let  alone  formulate  a  binding 
resolution  for  their  coordination  or  general  reform  measures  that  would  affect  regional 
interests.  " 
As  a  result,  deputies  from  the  SIBFE  regions  as  a  whole  were  rather  divided  in 
their  votes,  excluding  votes  on  federal  system  issues  (see  Appendix  4.3).  This  trend  is 
also  observed  when  SIBFE  deputies  were  divided  into  two  groups-the  Siberian  and 
Far  Eastern  deputy  groups-considering  the  possible  linkage  between  the  emerging (Chapter  i)  209 
regional  associations  in  the  SIBFE  regions,  the  Siberian  Agreement  and  Far  Eastern 
Economic  Association,  and  their  deputy  groups  (see  Appendices  4.4  and  4.5). 
V.  3  (1)  The  General  Voting  Patterns  o  SIBFE  Deputies 
In  the  Congress,  SIBFE  deputies  tended  to  show  rather  moderate  voting  patterns 
in  general.  They  were  less  supportive  of  political  reform  including  changes  in  the 
leading  role  of  the  CPSU  and  the  selection  of  deputies  from  social  organisations  than 
Baltic  deputies,  but  more  supportive  than  Central  Asian  deputies.  As  far  as  federal 
system  issues  were  concerned,  SIBFE  deputies  were  more  supportive  of  the  existing 
federal  system  than  Baltic  deputies,  but  less  supportive  than  Central  Asian  deputies  as  a 
whole.  However,  SIBFE  deputies  were  less  supportive  of  the  government  economic 
plan,  the  establishment  of  the  presidency,  "  the  leading  role  of  the  CPSU,  67  and  the 
selection  of  deputies  from  social  organisations68  than  deputies  from  the  European  part 
of  Russia. 
Despite  these  relatively  moderate  voting  patterns  of  SIBFE  deputies,  they 
appeared  to  represent  regional  interests  in  their  votes.  For  instance,  SIBFE  deputies 
expressed  their  dissatisfaction  with  government  economic  policies  in  the  votes  on 
Ryzhkov's  plan  and  on  the  proposal  to  include  the  question  of  no  confidence  in  the 
president  on  the  agenda  of  the  Fourth  Congress  69  These  voting  patterns  suggest  that 
SIBFE  deputies  shared  worries  about  changing  economic  policy  and  investment 
priorities  for  the  12th  and  13th  FYP  with  regional  leaders.  70 
However,  specific  interests  of  smaller  deputy  groups  often  threatened  the  unity 
of  SIBFE  deputies  that  were  based  on  these  general  concerns.  For  instance,  cleavages 
between  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  deputies  emerged  in  the  vote  on  the  Podberezskii's 
proposal  on  the  political  and  economic  crisis  that  suggested  an  extreme  measure,  legal 
action  in  the  event  of  a  failure  to  deliver  goods.  Although  a  majority  of  Siberian  and 
Far  Eastern  deputies  rejected  the  proposal,  a  larger  proportion  of  deputies  from  the  Far 
Eastern  regions  (23.7  per  cent,  M=-3.1)  voted  for  it,  while  only  13.5  per  cent  of 
Siberian  deputies  (M=-5.4)  supported  it  (Ta-2.0,  p<0.05).  In  the  vote,  the  difficulties 
of  procurement  of  necessary  goods  in  the  remote  Far  Eastern  regions  that  were 
recipients  rather  than  donors  seemed  to  affect  the  voting  patterns  of  their  deputies. 
Considering  the  size  of  the  SIBFE  deputy  group-about  a  tenth  of  the  entire 
CPD-and  absence  of  binding  core  unlike  Baltic  deputies,  it  would  not  difficult  to (Chapter  9  210 
imagine  that  cleavages  among  deputies'that  were  observed  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole 
again  appeared  among  the  SIBFE  deputies.  As  suggested  in  Table  5.3.1,  the  socio- 
economic  features  of  a  region  including  economic  structure,  living  standards,  and  the 
federal  status  of  a  region,  'class,  '  and  personal  factors  such  as  generation  seemed  to 
divide  the  SIBFE  deputy  group.  As  a  result,  SIBFE  deputies  often  failed  to  maintain  a 
moderate  level  of  unity  in  more  than  half  the  votes  analysed.  Although  economic 
structure  and  the  federal  status  of  a  region  seldom  affected  the  voting  patterns  of  Far 
Eastern  deputies,  neither  Siberian  nor  Far  Eastern  deputies  appeared  to  be  strongly 
united. 
<Table  5.3.1>  Cleavages  among  SIBFE  Deputies  in  the  CPD  of  the  USSR 
Federal  Presidential  Economic  Other  Total 
Issues  Issues  Issues  Issues 
(4  votes)  (4  votes)  (4  votes)  (6  votes)  (17  votes) 
SIBFE  Deputies 
Regional  Factors 
Siberia  vs.  Far  East  0  (0)  1(1)  1(0)  1(0)  3  (1) 
Economic  structure  4  (3)  2  (1)  l  (O)  2  (0)  9(4) 
Living  conditions  4  (2)  3(3)  3  (1)  3  (2)  13  (8) 
Living  conditions  & 
Federal  status  4  (2)  2  (2)  2  (0)  1(0)  9  (4) 
Urban  vs.  rural  areas  0  (0)  1(0)  2  (0)  0  (0)  3  (0) 
Federal  status  1  (0)  2  (1)  1(0)  1(0)  5  (1) 
Functional  Factor 
'Class'  2(l)  2(l)  2(l)  3(2)  9(5) 
CPSU  membership  1  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  2  (0)  4  (0) 
Personal  Factors 
Gender  0(0)  0(0)  l  (O)  l  (O)  2(0) 
Generation  2  (1)  3  (1)  2  (0)  4(3)  11  (5) 
Education  level  1  (0)  2  (0)  0(0)  0  (0)  3  (0) 
Ethnic  origin  0  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  0(0)  1(0) 
Siberian  Deputies 
Regional  Factors 
Economic  structure  4(2)  2  (1)  2(0)  3(0)  11  (3) 
Living  conditions  4  (2)  4  (4)  3(t)  4  (0)  15(7) 
Living  conditions  & 
Federal  status  3(2)  3  (2)  2(0)  1(0)  9  (4) 
Urban  vs.  rural  areas  0  (0)  1(0)  1(0)  1(0)  3  (0) 
Federal  status  2(l)  3(l)  2(0)  1(0)  8  (2) 
Functional  Factor 
'Class'  l  (O)  1(1)  1(0)  3  (2)  6  (3) 
CPSU  membership  0(0)  1(0)  0  (0)  2  (0)  3  (0) 
Personal  Factors 
Gender  0  (0)  0  (0)  1(0)  1(0)  2  (0) 
Generation  1(0)  3(l)  2(0)  4(l)  10  (2) 
Education  level  2  (0)  1(0)  0(0)  0  (0)  3  (0) 
Ethnic  origin  l  (O)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  1  (0) 
Far  Eastern  Deputies 
Regional  Factors 
Economic  structure  1(0)  0  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  2  (0) (Chapter  i)  211 
Living  conditions  (1)  0(0)  3(0)  2(l)  2(0)  7  (1) 
Living  conditions  (2)  0(0)  2(0)  1  (1)  2  (1)  5  (2) 
Living  conditions  & 
Federal  status  1(0)  O  (Q)  1(0)  0(0)  2  (0) 
Urban  vs.  rural  areas  0  (0)  0(0)  0  (0)  0(0)  0  (0) 
Federal  status  1(0)  0(0)  0  (0)  0(0)  1  (0) 
Functional  Factors 
'Class'  0(0)  1(0)  1(0)  3(l)  5  (1) 
CPSU  membership  0(0)  0(0)  0  (0)  0(0)  0  (0) 
Personal  Factors 
Gender  0  (0)  0(0)  0  (0)  0(0)  0  (0) 
Generation  2  (0)  1(0)  0(0)  2  (1)  5  (1) 
Education  level  0(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0(0)  0  (0) 
Ethnic  origin  0  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  1  (0) 
Significance  at  the  0.05  level  (0.01  level). 
V3  (2)  Regional  Cleavages  among  SIB  FE  Deputies 
In  addition  to  cleavages  among  urban  and  rural  deputies  that  have  already  been 
discussed  at  the  Union  level,  the  differences  between  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  deputies 
suggest  that  the  socio-economic  conditions  of  a  region  also  affected  the  voting  patterns 
of  deputies.  Therefore,  the  regional  variables  that  were  already  discussed  in  Chapter  3 
are  included  in  the  analysis  to  examine  the  influence  of  the  socio-economic  features  of 
a  region  on  the  voting  patterns  of  its  deputies  in  the  Congress.  Furthermore,  growing 
ethno-nationalist  sentiment  also  increased  differences  between  the  deputy  groups  of 
autonomous  and  ordinary  administrative  units  in  their  voting  patterns.  " 
Firstly,  among  SIBFE  deputies,  rural  deputies  showed  more  conservative  voting 
patterns  than  urban  deputies  as  in  the  CPD  as  a  whole.  '  However,  deputies  from  large 
cities  often  showed  more  conservative  voting  patterns  than  deputies  from  medium- 
sized  and  small  cities  among  the  SIBFE  deputies.  "  Furthermore,  differences  between 
the  urban  and  rural  deputy  groups  in  their  voting  patterns  were  less  frequent  among 
SIBFE  deputies  than  among  deputies  form  other  Russian  regions.  In  particular,  no 
differences  between  urban  and  rural  deputies  emerged  among  Far  Eastern  deputies, 
Among  the  regional  factors  tested,  economic  features  such  as  economic  structure 
and  the  socio-economic  performance  of  the  regions  seemed  to  have  more  influence  on 
voting  patterns  among  SIBFE  deputies.  Considering  the  economic  structure  of  regions, 
deputies  from  rural  regions  showed  relatively  conservative  voting  patterns  as  compared 
with  those  from  resource  and  hub/gate  regions,  revealing  differences  in  nine  of  the  17 
votes.  In  particular,  differences  between  theses  regional  groups  were  revealed  in  the (Chapter  f)  212 
vote  on  political  issues"  including  federal  system  issues,  "  as  well  as  on  economic 
issues.  76 
Despite  the  general  assumption  that  differences  in  economic  structure  may  have 
modified  the  impact  of  reform  at  the  regional  level,  the  level  of  economic  performance 
and  living  conditions  varied  even  among  the  regions  that  had  a  similar  economic 
structure,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  3.  In  the  vote,  clearer  cleavages  emerged  when  the 
economic  performance  and  living  conditions  of  each  region  are  considered,  revealing 
significant  difference  in  the  voting  patterns  of  deputies  from  each  regional  group  in 
thirteen  of  the  17  votes.  " 
In  general,  the  higher  the  level  of  economic  performance  and  living  standards, 
the  more  likely  its  deputies  voted  in  a  liberal  or  less  conservative  way,  although 
deputies  from  well-developed  and  under-developed  regions  showed  similar  voting 
patterns  in  half  the  number  of  votes.  For  instance,  half  the  deputies  from  highly 
developed  regions  (50  per  cent,  M=0,8)  opposed  the  proposal  to  maintain  the  name  of 
the  union.  By  contrast,  55.2  per  cent,  77.0  per  cent,  and  89.7  per  cent  of  deputies  from 
well-developed  (M=-4.2),  under-developed  (M-6.6)  and  poorly  developed  (M=-8.8) 
regions  respectively  supported  the  proposal  (F=10.0,  p<0.001).  Significant  differences 
were  again  revealed  in  votes  on  economic  issues  such  as  Ryzhkov's  plan,  78  presidential 
issues  such  as  the  proposal  to  prohibit  the  president  from  joining  any  political  parties,  79 
and  other  political  issues  such  as  Article  6  and  the  selection  of  deputies  from  social 
organisations.  " 
The  cleavages  between  regions  at  various  levels  of  development  were  more 
clearly  revealed  among  Siberian  deputies  than  Far  Eastern  deputies.  The  Far  Eastern 
regions  were  relatively  more  homogeneous  in  their  socio-economic  conditions,  and 
thus  in  the  composition  of  their  deputy  groups  than  Siberian  regions.  "  Furthermore, 
deputies  from  under-developed  regions  in  the  Russian  Far  East  showed  somewhat  more 
liberal  voting  patterns  than  those  from  the  same  category  of  regions  in  Siberia,  " 
reducing  the  gap  between  two  main-deputies  from  well-developed  and  under- 
developed  regions-Far  Eastern  deputy  groups. 
The  federal  status  of  a  region  also  seemed  to  affect  the  voting  patterns  of  SIBFE 
deputies  (in  five  votes),  particularly  of  Siberian  deputies  (in  eight  votes).  However, 
socio-economic  situation  also  divided  deputies  from  autonomous  administrative  units. 
The  tendencies  become  clearer  when  the  socio-economic  performance  and  status  of  a 
region  in  the  federal  system  are  considered  in  combination.  For  instance,  economic (Chapter  213 
features  were  rather  more  important  in'the  vote  on  federal  issues  such  as  retention  of 
the  name  of  the  Union  (F=6.3,  p<0.001)  and  the  recognition  of  a  declaration  of 
sovereignty  as  an  expression  of  the  people's  will  (F=10.8,  p<0.001),  and  economic 
issues  such  as  Ryzhkov's  plan  (F  4.2,  p<0.001).  In  those  votes,  difference  emerged 
between  adapted  and  stagnated  administrative  units,  regardless  of  their  federal  status. 
<Table  5.3.2>  Influence  of  Socio-economic  Features  and  Federal  Status  of  a  Region 
Std.  Mean 
N  Mean  Dev.  df  Sq.  FP 
Include  the  KKN  Ouestion  on  the  Agenda  of  the  Second  Goneress  (X2) 
Adapted  regions  64  -6.3  7.2  Between  Group  3  283.6  3.4  0.019 
Stagnated  regions  107  .  7.0  6.8  Within  Group  200  83.1 
Stagnated  republics  17  -10.0  0.0 
Adapted  republics  16  -2.5  10.0 
Law  on  the  Constitutional  Supervision  must  be  discussed  in  the  Supreme  Soviet  First  (X7' 
Adapted  regions  64  -4.8  7.8  Between  Group  3  175.4  3.6  0.014 
Stagnated  regions  107  -7.0  6.6  Within  Group  200  48.1 
Stagnated  republics  17  -10.0  0.0 
Adapted  republics  16  -3.8  8.9 
Retention  of  the  Name  of  the  Union  (Z2) 
Adapted  regions  63  -3.3  7.8  Between  Group  3  277.2  6.3  0.000 
Stagnated  regions  106  -7.3  5.9  Within  Group  198  43.7 
Stagnated  republics  17  -8.8  3.3 
Adapted  republics  16  -3.8  8.1 
Recognise  the  Declaration  of  Sovereignty  as  an  Expression  of  the  People's  Will  (Z5) 
Adapted  regions  63  .  1.1  7.9  Between  Group  3  506.4  10.8  0.000 
Stagnated  regions  106  -5.9  6.7  Within  Group  198  46.7 
Stagnated  republics  17  -9.4  2.4 
Adapted  republics  16  .  1.3  6.2 
Meraine  the  Federal  Council  and  the  Presidential  Council  (Y;  1 
Adapted  regions  64 
Stagnated  regions  107 
Stagnated  republics  17 
Adapted  republics  16 
Rvzhkov's  Plan  (X5) 
Adapted  regions  64 
Stagnated  regions  107 
Stagnated  republics  17 
Adapted  republics  16 
-0.9  9.2  Between  Group  3  596.6  7.3  0.000 
-0.7  9.5  Within  Group  200  81.3 
7.1  6.9 
7.5  5.8 
-0.9  9.5  Betwccn  Group  3  314.7  4.2  0.007 
-5.0  8.3  Within  Group  200  75.1 
.  7.6  6.6 
-2.5  9.3 
According  to  these  observations,  the  voting  patterns  of  deputies  were  more 
significantly  affected  by  the  socio-economic  conditions  of  regions  than  the  status  of  the 
region  they  represented.  Of  course,  it  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  federal  status (Chapter  ;9  214 
of  a  region  could  be  ignored.  On  the'  contrary,  the  observation  rather  suggests  that 
deputies  were  considering  economic  and  political  features  of  their  regions.  As  the 
votes  on  the  questions  of  KKN  (X2)  and  the  Federal  Council  (Y3)  in  Table  5.3.2 
suggest,  it  is  the  political  and  economic  feature  of  an  issue  in  question  that  decided 
which  factor  should  be  put  forward. 
V3  (3)  'Class'  Cleaves  among  SIBFE  Deputies 
Another  factor  that  threatened  the  unity  of  the  SIBFE  deputy  groups  was  the 
'class'  cleavage  that  has  revealed  in  nine  of  the  17  votes.  In  general,  nomenklaturists 
and  military  personnel  formed  a  conservative  bloc,  and  the  intelligentsia  and 
technicians  formed  a  reformist  group  as  in  the  CPD  as  a  whole. 
However,  the  voting  patterns  of  cadres  and  workers  from  the  SIBFE  regions  are 
noteworthy,  as  they  were  rather  different  from  those  of  other  Russian  cadres  and 
workers  respectively.  For  instance,  cadres  from  the  SIBFE  regions  were  less 
supportive  of  Gorbachev  than  cadres  from  other  parts  of  Russia  in  the  votes  on 
Ryzhkov's  plan,  and  the  question  of  a  strong  presidency.  83  Furthermore,  almost  half 
the  cadres  from  the  SIBFE  regions  supported  the  proposal  to  include  the  question  of  no 
confidence  in  the  president  on  the  agenda  of  the  Fourth  Congress,  84  showing  increasing 
dissatisfaction  with  the  deteriorating  economic  situation  in  the  regions.  As  already 
discussed  at  the  Union  level,  the  voting  patterns  of  SIBFE  cadres  were  quite  different 
from  those  of  nomenklaturists.  SIBFE  cadres  were  more  supportive  of  the  changes  in 
the  CPSU's  leading  role  and  federal  system,  and  more  strongly  opposed  to  a  strong 
presidency  than  nomenklaturists.  "  The  voting  patterns  of  SIBFE  cadres  suggest  not 
only  the  diminishing  influence  of  nomenklaturists  on  their  deputies  but  also  the 
possible  intensifying  of  anti-centre  tendencies  in  the  regional  leadership,  as  cadres 
often  replaced  old  nomenklaturists  in  the  course  of  reform. 
Together  with  cadres,  SIBFE  workers  also  showed  quite  different  voting  patterns 
from  workers  from  the  European  part  of  Russia,  when  the  former  voted  in  a  more 
liberal  way  than  the  latter  in  every  category  of  votes.  86  For  instance,  slightly  more  than 
half  the  SIBFE  workers  (55.8  per  cent  or  M=-1.9)  supported  Ryzhkov's  plan,  while 
nearly  80  per  cent  of  workers  from  the  other  part  of  Russia  supported  it.  The  voting 
patterns  suggest  that  workers  from  the  SIBFE  regions  were  articulating  their 
dissatisfaction  with  the  central  economic  policy,  reflecting  deteriorating  socio- 
economic  conditions  in  the  SIBFE  regions.  As  a  result  of  the  rather  liberal  voting (Chapter  1)  215 
patterns  of  SIBFE  workers,  compared  to  those  of  workers  from  other  Russian  regions, 
differences  between  workers  and  managers  seldom  appeared  among  the  SIBFE  deputy 
group. 
Despite  the  similarity  between  managers  and  workers  in  the  vote,  however, 
managers  were  more  attentive  to  the  interests  of  their  own  regions,  rather  than  those  of 
the  SIBFE  regions  as  a  whole.  For  instance,  SIBFE  managers  showed  rather  similar 
voting  patterns  to  managers  from  other  Russian  regions,  although  they  were  divided  in 
terms  of  the  regional  economic  feature  of  regions  they  represented.  17  By  contrast, 
cadres  and  workers  among  SIBFE  deputies  were  more  attentive  to  the  general  interests 
of  the  SIBFE  regions,  rather  than  specific  economic  features  of  their  own 
administrative  units.  "  The  voting  patterns  of  cadres  and  workers  showed  that  the 
coalition  of  some  `class'  groups  had  been  broken  down  by  the  regional  factor,  and  thus 
had  not  always  emerged  on  a  cross-regional  basis. 
V.  3  (4) Other  Cleavages  among  SIBFE  Deputies 
As  suggested  in  Table  5.3.1,  the  influence  of  other  factors  was  less  important 
among  SIBFE  deputies.  For  instance,  cleavages  were  seldom  found  when  the  gender 
factor,  CPSU  membership,  educational  level,  ethnic  origin  of  SIBFE  deputies  were 
considered.  Among  SIBFE  deputies,  the  generation  gap  appeared  relatively  more 
frequently.  The  younger  generation  of  deputies  voted  in  a  rather  more  liberal  or  less 
conservative  way  than  the  older  generation  in  eleven  votes:  two  votes  on  federal 
questions,  three  on  presidential  issues,  two  on  economic  issues  and  four  on  other 
political  issues  such  as  Article  6  and  the  selection  of  deputies  from  social 
organisations  89 
However,  despite  these  general  tendencies,  it  is  noteworthy  that  a  regional 
variation  of  the  generation  gap  was  also  strongly  revealed.  First  of  all,  deputies 
belonged  to  the  older  generation  group  from  the  SIBFE  regions  showed  a  rather  more 
liberal  or  less  conservative  voting  patterns  than  older  deputies  from  the  European  part 
of  Russia.  Differences  between  them  were  revealed  in  seven  votes:  three  votes  on 
presidential  issues,  "  one  on  economic  issues,  91,  and  three  on  other  political  issues.  92  As 
a  result,  a  generation  gap  less  frequently  emerged  among  the  SIBFE  deputies  than 
among  RSFSR  deputies  in  the  USSR  CPD. (Chapter  T7  216 
These  regional  variations  of  the  generation  gap  were  also  evident  among  SIBFE 
deputies.  For  instance,  the  younger  generation  from  rural  and  hub/gate  regions  showed 
rather  similar  voting  patterns  to  older  deputies  from  the  same  type  of  regions, 
particularly  on  federal  issues.  "  As  a  result  the  generation  gap  almost  disappeared  in 
the  rural  and  hub/gate  deputy  groups,  making  itself  apparent  in  only  two  votes 
respectively.  By  contrast,  the  generation  gap  was  found  in  six  votes  among  deputies 
from  resource  regions.  Despite  the  general  assumption  that  the  younger  generation 
would  show  more  liberal  voting  patterns  than  the  older  generation,  the  evidence 
suggests  that  the  generation  gap  was  powerfully  affected  by  regional  variations, 
depending  on  the  issues  that  were  put  to  the  vote  and  the  economic  features  of  the 
region  that  deputies  were  represented. 
V.  4.  The  Overall  Effect  of  Regional  Factors  in  the  USSR  CPD 
According  to  the  above  analysis,  deputies  in  the  USSR  CPD  could  be  broken 
down  by  a  number  of  factors.  However,  their  influence  on  deputies'  voting  patterns 
overlapped.  In  order  to  identify  individual  variables  that  had  a  significant  influence 
and  the  overall  effect  of  regional  factors,  all  variables  were  put  into  a  model  for  each 
vote,  employing  logistic  regression.  For  the  analysis,  the  variables  available  are 
categorised  into  three  groups:  personal,  functional,  and  regional  factors  94  The  effect  of 
regional  factors  on  deputies'  voting  patterns  will  be  examined  by  investigating  the 
changes  in  the  log  likelihood  when  regional  factors  are  added  into  a  model  in  which 
other  variables  have  already  been  included.  Individual  factors  that  turned  out  to  have  a 
significant  impact  on  deputies'  preference  in  each  vote  will  be  also  discussed  in  order 
to  identify  the  most  important  factors. 
In  the  analysis,  data  availability  and  multicollinearity  between  variables  caused  a 
couple  of  practical  problems.  First,  data  for  membership  of  parliamentary  factions  that 
had  formed  in  the  USSR  CPD  were  not  available.  Thus,  a  factor  that  seemed  to  be 
significant  could  not  be  included  in  the  analysis.  Second,  it  is  difficult  to  identify  the 
regional  origins  of  deputies  representing  social  organisations.  Furthermore,  the 
economic  features  of  regions  in  Union  republics  other  than  the  RSFSR  have  been 
excluded,  as  regionalism  in  the  Russian  Federation  constitutes  the  main  focus  of  this 
analysis.  Therefore,  the  Union  republic  groups  and  the  autonomous  status  of  a  lower 
administrative  unit  are  considered  as  regional  factors  in  the  analysis  at  the  USSR 
Congress  level.  For  the  RSFSR  deputy  group,  alternative  regional  deputy  groups- (Chapter  F)  217 
Siberian,  Far  Eastern,  and  other  RSFSR  deputies-are  included  in  place  of  the  Union 
republic  groups.  The  economic  features  of  regions  are  only  considered  when  the 
voting  patterns  of  SIBFE  deputies  are  discussed  (see  Appendix  3.2). 
The  analysis  shows  that  regional  factors  had  a  significant  effect  on  deputies' 
voting  patterns  in  some  votes.  However,  the  impact  of  regional  factors  on  voting 
patterns  varied  from  deputy  group  to  deputy  group,  since  different  regional  variables 
are  considered.  For  instance,  at  the  Congress  level,  regional  factors  influenced 
deputies'  voting  patterns  particularly  when  federal  questions  and  Ryzhkov's  plan  were 
put  to  the  vote.  By  contrast,  regional  factors  such  as  the  SIBFE  regional  origin  and  the 
autonomous  status  of  a  region  had  little  influence  on  the  voting  of  RSFSR  deputies  on 
federal  questions  and  on  Article  6. 
As  far  as  SIBFE  regionalism  was  concerned,  the  effect  of  regional  factors  were 
limited  to  a  relatively  small  number  of  votes  that  might  closed  related  to  common 
concerns-e.  g.  votes  on  Ryzhkov's  plan  and  a  Russian  presidency-of  the  SIBFE 
regions  (see  Appendix  5.2).  However,  the  analysis  suggests  that  SIBFE  deputies  were 
also  divided  by  gender,  age,  `class'  background,  and  the  level  of  economic 
performance  of  the  administrative  unit  they  represented,  as  these  factors  more 
frequently  appeared  in  models  at  a  significance  level  of  0.05. 
V.  4  (1)  The  Overall  Influence  gfRegional  Factors 
In  the  USSR  Congress,  most  of  the  factors  included  in  the  analysis  had  a 
significant  influence,  suggesting  that  deputies'  voting  patterns  were  personalised.  In 
our  models,  almost  every  variable  was  of  significance  even  when  all  the  variables  were 
added  to  a  model.  For  instance,  'class'  and  Union  republic  group  turned  out  to  be 
meaningful  in  all  the  votes  analysed.  The  analysis  also  shows  that  age  and  gender 
factors  divided  deputies  in  16  and  in  15  of  the  17  votes  respectively.  The  level  of 
urbanisation  of  an  electoral  district  where  deputies  had  been  elected,  and  CPSU 
membership  also  had  significant  explanatory  power  in  thirteen  and  eleven  votes 
respectively.  Ethnic  origin,  on  the  other  hand,  had  only  a  limited  impact  in  seven 
votes. 
Although  almost  every  variable  seemed  to  have  a  significant  influence,  the 
changes  in  the  chi-square  suggest  that  regional  factors  had  a  stronger  effect  than  other 
variable  groups  in  the  Second  Congress.  For  instance,  the  chi-square  nearly  doubled (Chapter  P)  218 
after  regional  factors  were  added  to  the  models  for  the  vote  on  the  KKN  questions,  on 
Ryzhkov's  plan,  and  on  Article  6.  However,  their  influence  decreased  in  the  following 
Congresses,  mainly  because  the  Union  republic  groups  such  as  the  Baltic  group 
abstained  from  voting  after  the  Third  Congress  (see  Appendix  5.1). 
With  regard  to  RSFSR  deputies,  a  relatively  low  level  of  the  correct  expectation 
of  votes  suggests  that  models  could  be  improved  by  adding  faction  membership  and 
more  specified  regional  factors.  When  we  limit  the  discussion  to  the  given  factors, 
`class'  background,  gender,  age,  and  urban-rural  origin  had  a  significant  effect  in  the 
vote" 
Despite  the  influence  of  personal  and  functional  factors,  regional  factors  such  as 
the  federal  status  of  a  region  and  SIBFE  regional  origin  still  affected  deputies'  voting 
patterns,  as  they  appeared  in  the  final  model  of  ten  and  six  votes  respectively.  In 
particular,  these  regional  factors  improved  the  model  fit  by  more  than  10  per  cent  when 
they  were  added  to  models  for  the  vote  on  economic,  presidential  and  other  issues. 
However,  their  influence  was  limited  in  more  than  half  the  votes  analysed. 
Although  the  overall  effect  of  regional  factors  was  relatively  strong  in  votes  that 
are  included  in  Appendix  5.2,  compared  to  other  votes,  it  does  not  necessarily  mean 
that  SIBFE  deputies  were  united  in  those  votes.  Among  the  votes  listed  in  Appendix 
5.2,  SIBFE  deputies  were  united  in  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  abolish  the  selection  of 
deputies  representing  social  organisations.  In  the  vote,  161  of  217  SIBFE  deputies,  or 
74.2  per  cent,  voted  in  favour  of  the  proposal  (M=6.0).  A  model  for  this  vote  was 
considerably  improved  when  regional  variables  were  added.  However,  SIBFE  deputies 
were  divided  when  Zakharenko's  amendment  was  put  to  the  vote  at  the  Third 
Congress.  In  the  vote,  104  deputies,  or  47.9  per  cent,  supported  the  amendment,  while 
88  deputies,  or  40.6  per  cent,  voted  against  it  (M=0.7). 
V4  2)  Source  of  Weak  Unity  ef  SIB  FE  Deputies  in  the  USSR  CPD 
The  split  among  SIBFE  deputies  decreased  their  influence  and  thus  that  of  the 
SIBFE  regions  over  the  decision-making  process,  despite  their  effort  to  coordinate 
activities  in  the  Congress.  In  the  USSR  CPD,  SIBFE  deputies  were  divided  by  gender, 
age,  `class,  '  and  the  socio-economic  conditions  of  a  region  that  they  represented,  D6 
although  their  influence  varied  depending  on  the  vote.  For  instance,  gender  and  'class' 
factors  had  little  impact  on  the  vote  on  presidential  and  federal  questions  respectively. (Chapter  T9  219 
<fable  5.4.1>  Numbers  of  Votes  in  which  Factors  had  Significant  Overall  Influence 
Among  SIBFE  Deputies  in  the  USSR  CPD 
Federal  Presidential  Economic  Other  Total 
Issues  Issues  Issues  Issues 
(4  votes)  (4  votes)  (3  votes)  (6  votes)  (17  votes) 
Personal  &  'Azonal'  Factors 
Gender  2(l)  0(0)  2(0)  2(l)  6(2) 
Age  2(0)  2(0)  2(0)  3(l)  9(1) 
Ethnic  origin  0(0)  0(l)  0(0)  0(0)  0(l) 
Urbanity  0(l)  0(0)  2(0)  0(0)  2(l) 
Functional  Factors 
'Class'  0(0)  2(0)  2(0)  2(0)  6(0) 
CPSU  membership  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  1  (0)  1  (0) 
Regional  Factors 
Siberia  vs.  FE  0  (0)  1(0)  1  (0)  0  (0)  2  (0) 
Economic  structure"  1(0)  1  (1)  0  (0)  2  (0)  4  (1) 
Economic  performance2j  1(0)  3  (0)  1  (1)  1(2)  6  (3) 
Autonomous  status"  0  (1)  1(0)  0  (0)  1(0)  2  (1) 
Economic  performance  + 
Autonomous  status`)  n/a  1  (0)  1  (0)  1(0)  3(0) 
excluded  from  three  votes  (one  each  on  federal,  presidential,  and  economic  issue) 
excluded  from  six  votes  (three  on  federal  issues  and  one  each  on  other  categories  of  votes) 
excluded  from  three  votes  (one  each  on  presidential,  economic  and  other  issues) 
4)  added  to  three  votes  in  place  two  separate  variables,  economic  performance  &  the  autonomous  status 
Significance  at  the  0.05  (0.10level). 
Considering  regional  factors,  the  anlaysis  leads  us  to  a  couple  of  conclusions. 
Firstly,  an  investigation  of  the  chatnes  in  the  chi-squre  of  a  model  for  each  vote 
suggests  that  regional  factors  affected  deputies'  voting  patterns  in  all  categories  of 
votes.  In  particular,  regional  factors  brought  about  a  significant  improvement  in  the 
model  for  the  vote  on  federal  and  presidential  issues.  Secondly,  different  regional 
features  such  as  economic  performance  and  strcuture,  and  federal  status  of  a  region 
affected  deputies'  voting  patterns  depending  on  the  vote  (see  Appendix  5.3).  It 
suggests  that  it  would  be  difficult  for  SIBFE  deputies  to  form  a  `stable'  voting  bloc  in 
the  Congress.  Finally,  among  regional  factors,  the  level  of  economic  performance  of  a 
region  tended  to  have  a  considerable  importance  in  nearly  half  the  votes  analysed, 
although  it  was  combined  with  the  federal  status  of  a  region  (in  three  votes),  because  of 
multicollinearity. 
Although  details  are  not  included  in  Table  5.4.1,  functional  variables  as  a  whole 
had  little  effect  on  the  deputies'  voting  patterns  in  votes  in  which  the  influence  of 
regional  factors  was  relatively  strong.  9?  In  other  votes,  three  variable  groups  appeared 
to  have  a  similar  degree  of  influence  over  deputies'  votes. (Chapter  iq  220 
All  these  results  lead  us  to  the  following  conclusions  regarding  the  influence  of 
regional  factors  on  voting  patterns  in  the  USSR  Congress.  First  of  all,  regional  factors 
certainly  made  decision-making  process  more  complicated,  causing  difficulties  in 
adopting  reform  policies  in  the  Congress.  A  clear  example  could  be  found  in  the 
regionalised  voting  patterns  of  Baltic  and  Central  Asian  deputies,  "  Regionally 
differentiated  attitudes  towards  reform  could  be  found  also  among  the  RSFSR  deputies 
group,  as  the  voting  patterns  of  SIBFE  deputies  suggested.  However,  it  is  difficult  to 
establish  a  direct  linkage  between  regional  interests  and  each  vote  included  in  the 
analysis. 
Secondly,  SIBFE  deputies  were  segmented  into  smaller  groups,  although  their 
voting  patterns  were  different  from  those  of  other  RSFSR  deputies  in  some  votes,  for 
instance  on  Ryzhkov's  plan  and  on  Article  6.  In  particular,  they  were  divided  by 
features  such  as  economic  structure,  the  level  of  economic  development  or  the  living 
standards  of  the  region  they  represented.  Thus,  we  may  conclude  that  SIBFE  deputies 
were  more  loyal  to  the  interests  of  their  own  regions  than  to  those  of  the  SIBFE  region 
as  a  whole,  particularly  when  those  interests  were  in  conflict. 
Finally,  the  analysis  suggests  that  SIBFE  regionalism  could  be  attributed  to  a 
couple  of  smaller  regional  groups  sharing  similar  economic  features.  This  does  not 
necessarily  mean  that  SIBFE  regionalism  based  on  planning  regions-for  instance,  the 
Siberian  Agreement  and  the  Far  Eastern  Economic  Coordination-had  little  meaning. 
Smaller  regional  groups  had  common  problems  and  goals  simply  because  of  the 
Siberian  or  Far  Eastern  socio-economic  setting,  which  sometimes  united  them  in  their 
votes.  However,  if  we  look  at  each  of  the  smaller  regional  groups,  SIBFE  regionalism 
was  operating  even  when  SIBFE  regionalism  on  a  broad  scale  seemed  to  lose  its 
influence.  In  the  following  chapter,  a  further  examination  of  attitudes  of  smaller 
regional  groups  towards  reform  will  be  undertaken  at  the  Russian  Federation  level  as 
well  as  the  SIBFE  regional  level. 
I)  Ada  W.  Finifter  and  Ellen  Mickiewicz,  "Redefining  the  Political  System  of  the  USSR:  Mass 
Support  for  Political  Change,  "  American  Political  Science  Review,  vol.  86,  no.  4  (December  1992),  pp. 
857-874. 
I)  The  agenda  adopted  by  the  Supreme  Soviet  included  measures  to  improve  the  economic 
situation  and  the  report  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  USSR,  changes  in  the  election  system  and  a (Chapter  V)  221 
necessary  constitutional  amendment,  a  draft  law  on  the  Constitutional  Control  in  the  USSR,  and  the 
question  of  organised  crime.  Izvestiia,  14  November  1989,  p.  1.  However,  the  commission  decided  to 
exclude  issues  such  as  ownership,  land,  local  autonomy,  the  press,  and  pensions  which  had  already  been 
approved  by  the  Supreme  Soviet,  insisting  that  discussions  of  such  issues  in  haste  would  result  in  serious 
mistakes. 
3)  Verkhovnyi  Sovet  SSSR,  Ytoroi  s"ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  12-24  dekabria  1989  g.: 
stenograficheskil  otchet,  vol.  I  (Moscow: Izdanie  Verkhovnogo  Soveta  SSSR,  1989),  pp.  22-23. 
')  As  already  discussed,  the  CPSU  was  exposed  to  criticism,  and  Party  membership  had  decreased 
in  1989  for  the  first  time  since  1954.  Philip  Hanson  and  Elizabeth  Teague,  "Soviet  Communist  Party 
Loses  Members,  "  Report  on  the  USSR,  vol.  2,  no.  20  (18  May  1990),  pp.  1-3.  Furthermore,  about  11,000 
'independent'  associations  had  already  been  established,  and  about  20  nationwide  associations  described 
themselves  as  'political  parties'  by  the  late  1980s.  Glasnost,  no.  21  (1990),  p.  3. 
)  For  instance,  Mikhail  Bronshtein,  an  economist  from  Estonia,  criticised  the  government's 
agricultural  programme,  in  which  0.8  per  cent  of  increase  in  investment  was  proposed  to  increase  every  I 
per  cent  of  agricultural  production  "without  explaining  the  source  of  a  sudden  increase  of  agricultural 
productivity.  "  See  Mikhail  Bronshtein's  speech,  in  Ytoroi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  II,  p. 
272.  Gennadi  Filshin,  department  chief  of  the  Institute  of  Economics  and  Organisation  of  Industrial 
Production,  the  USSR  Academy  of  Sciences  Siberian  Department,  raised  another  question.  He  suggested 
that  investment  in  the  consumer  goods  sector  should  be  expanded  from  4.3  per  cent  in  the  12th  FYP  to  at 
least  10-12  per  cent  in  the  13th  FYP  to  supply  consumer  goods  properly.  He  also  urged  increasing  the 
investment  in  social  spending,  criticising  that  the  government  plan  to  invest  35  per  cent  of  government 
expenditure  on  the  social  sector  was  nothing  but  a  return  to  the  level  of  1960s.  For  Filshin's  speech,  see 
ibid.,  vol.  III,  p.  302. 
e)  Each  group  was  responsible  for  following  three  topics:  "Measures  for  the  Recovery  of  the 
Soviet  Economy,  "  "Stages  of  the  Reform,  "  and  "Fundamental  Guidelines  for  Drafting  the  13th  FYP.  " 
')  On  the  issue  of  electoral  reforms,  see  Stephen  White,  Graeme  Gill,  and  Darrell  Slider,  The 
Politics  of  Transition:  Shaping  a  Post-Soviet  Future  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1993),  pp. 
34-38. 
$)  Similar  laws  were  in  preparation  in  Moldova,  Belarus,  and  Ukraine,  Only  Kazakhstan  adopted 
a  law  on  elections  in  accordance  with  the  Constitution  of  the  USSR. 
')  Giulietto  Chiesa,  Transition  to  Democracy:  Political  Change  in  the  Soviet  Union  1987-1991 
(Hanover  and  London:  University  Press  of  New  England,  1992),  p.  143. 
10  )  According  to  a  nationwide  poll  conducted  by  the  All-Union  Centre  for  the  Study  of  Public 
Opinion,  an  absolute  majority  supported  the  changes,  while  far  fewer  favoured  the  guaranteed  nomination. 
In  particular,  only  17.2  per  cent  of  respondents  in  the  RSFSR  supported  the  existing  selection  procedure. 
Obshchestvennoe  mnenle  v  tsifrakh,  no.  2  (September  1989),  pp.  4-8,  in  Stephen  White,  After  Gorbachev 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1993),  p.  57. (Chapter  19  222 
11  )  On  behalf  of  Baltic  deputies  in  the  Congress  and  the  Supreme  Soviets  of  the  Baltic  republics, 
K.  V.  Moteka  from  Lithuania  announced  to  the  Congress  that  Baltic  deputies  were  not  in  a  position  to  take 
part  in  the  discussion  of  the  KKN  question.  Ytoroi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  III,  p.  456. 
12)  Although  Baltic  deputies  did  not  take  part  in  the  vote,  the  draft  law  was  adopted  with  the 
support  of  1,639  deputies  while  137  deputies  voted  against.  As  for  the  law,  see  Zakon  SSSR  "O 
konstitutsionnom  nadzore  v  SSSR,  "  in  ibid.,  vol.  N,  pp.  589-601. 
13  )  For  instance,  the  Lithuanian  Communist  Party  declared  its  separation  from  the  CPSU  on 
December  1989,  which  soon  followed  by  Estonian,  Latvian,  Armenian,  and  Georgian  Communist  Parties. 
Furthermore,  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  Lithuania  declared  independence  in  March  1990,  which  soon 
followed  by  other  Baltic  republics.  Pravda,  12  March  1990,  p.  2. 
14  )  Gorbachev  might  have  a  good  reason  to  create  the  post  of  president  as  a  leading  state  organ 
that  was  independent  from  the  Communist  Party,  as  there  was  a  possibility  that  he  could  be  removed  from 
the  General  Secretaryship  as  Khrushchev  had  been.  White,  Gill  and  Slider,  The  Politics  of  Transition,  p. 
72. 
IS  )  Points  3  and  8  of  Article  127  that  included  in  Part  II  of  the  law  on  the  President  which  added 
Chapter  15.1  to  the  Constitution.  Zakon  Soiuza  Sovetskikh  Sotsialisticheskikh  Respublik  "Ob  uchrezhenii 
posts  prezidenta  SSSR  i  vnesenii  izmenenii  i  dopolnenii  v  konstitutsiiu  (osnovnoi  zakon)  SSSR,  "  in 
Verkhovnyi  Sovet  SSSR,  Vneocherednot  treat  s"ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  12-15  marta  1990  g.: 
stenograficheskit  otchet,  vol.  III  (Moscow:  Izdanie  Verkhovnogo  Soveta,  1990),  pp.  192-207. 
16)  A.  I.  Luk'ianov's  speech  at  the  Third  Congress  on  13  March  1990.  Ibid.,  vol.  I,  pp.  157-160. 
17  )  In  his  interview  with  Argumenty  i  fakty,  Eltsin  suggested  "strong  republics"  as  a 
counterbalance  to  the  presidency.  Argumenty  ifaky,  no.  9  (3-9  March  1990),  pp.  4-5.  A.  N.  Iakovlev  also 
did  not  oppose  establishing  a  presidency,  but  advocated  a  strong  Supreme  Soviet  as  a  counterbalance. 
Komsomol'skaia  pravda,  13  March  1990,  p.  3. 
1  s)  Vneocherednoi  tretii  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR.  vol.  I,  pp.  391-392,396-416. 
19)  In  this  context,  V.  V.  Antanytis  from  Lithuania  declared  that  they  would  not  participate  in  the 
discussion  or  votes,  speaking  on  behalf  of  Lithuania  deputies  and  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  Lithuania.  Ibid., 
vol.  1,  pp.  120-122. 
w)  He  proposed  following  five  pre-conditions  for  a  new  presidency:  a  new  federal  treaty  that 
would  guarantee  sovereign  rights  of  the  union  republics;  the  strong  Supreme  Soviet  that  would  constitute  a 
'real'  counter-balance  against  the  power  of  the  president,  a  multi-party  system  that  would  allow  a 
competition  for  the  post  of  the  president;  separation  between  the  president  and  old  nomenklatura  that 
would  prevent  the  CPSU  and  party  conservatives  from  exerting  influence  on  the  president;  and  election  of 
the  president  on  the  basis  of  direct,  equal,  and  universal  suffrage.  Ibid.,  vol.  I,  pp.  45-46. 
21)  In  order  to  minimise  such  worries,  the  draft  law  clearly  stated  that  the  establishment  of  the  post 
of  president  would  not  change  the  legal  position  of  the  Union  republics  and  autonomous  republics  in  its 
first  section.  Zakon  Soiuza  Sovetskikh  Sotsialisticheskikh  Respublik  "Ob  uchrezhenii  posta  prezidenta 
SSSR,  "  in  ibid.,  vol.  III,  pp.  192-193. (Chapter  P)  223 
u)  Iakovlev  insisted  that  a  nationwide  election  would  not  only  make  the  CPD  "unnecessary"  and 
"ineffective,  "  but  also  hamper  the  CPD's  power  of  a  counterbalance  to  the  President.  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  384. 
For Sobchak's  speech,  see  ibid.,  vol.  H,  pp.  376-378. 
1)  Postanovlenie  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  Soiuz  Sovetskikh  Sotsialisticheskikh  Respublik 
"0  povestke  dnia  chetvertogo  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  "  in  Verkhovnyi  Sovet  SSSR, 
Chetvertyi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  17-27  dekabria  1990  g.:  stenograficheskil  otchet,  vol.  III 
(Moscow:  Izdanie  Verkhovnogo  Soveta  SSSR,  1991),  pp.  303-304. 
24)  He  pointed  out  that  a  law  adopted  by  the  Supreme  Soviet  did  not  automatically  annul  a 
presidential  decree,  calling  it  "war  of  laws.  "  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  409-416,411,450. 
Ibid.,  vol.  II,  p.  452. 
Ibid.,  vol.  1T,  p.  455. 
After  a  recess,  the  Editorial  Commission  decided  to  accept  Kazannik's  proposal.  Ibid.,  vol.  II, 
p.  477.  The  Congress  adopted  a  revised  version  with  the  support  of  1,543  deputies,  while  only  131 
opposed  it. 
2$)  The  draft  fixed  a  date  for  signing  an  interim  agreement  on  economic  questions  for  1991, 
making  it  possible  to  draw  up  budgets  of  the  Union  and  republics.  Postanovlenie  s"ezda  narodnogo 
deputatov  Soiuza  Sovetskikh  Sotsialisticheskikh  Respublik  "0  polozhenii  strany  i  pervoocherdnykh 
merakh  po  predoleniiu  slozhivsheisia  krizisnoi  sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi  i  politicheskoi  situatsii,  "  in 
ibid.,  vol.  111,  pp.  307-311,308. 
Eltsin's  speech  at  the  Fourth  Congress  on  19  December  1990,  in  ibid.,  vol.  1,  pp.  294-298. 
70)  Seven  drafts  were  independently  prepared  by  Belarus,  Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan,  Azerbaijan, 
Kirgizstan,  Turkmenia,  and  Tajikistan,  two  by  the  Institute  of  the  State  and  Law  of  the  USSR  Academy  of 
Sciences,  three  by  the  Interregional  Group,  and  one  by  representatives  of  a  group  of  political  parties.  See 
the  speech  of  R.  N.  Nishanov,  the  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Nationalities  of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  in 
ibid.,  vol.  1,  pp.  340-341. 
")  lurii  Afanas'ev,  leader  of  the  Interregional  Deputies'  Group,  opposed  the  discussion  of  the 
draft.  TASS,  IS  December  1990,  in  FBJS  SOV  90-242(17  December  1990),  pp.  35-36. 
32)  The  committee  consisted  of  the  USSR  President,  Chairman  of  the  USSR  Supreme  Soviet, 
Chairman  of  the  Soviet  of  Nationalities  of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  and  the  highest  officials  of  the  Union 
republics  and  autonomous  entities.  For  the  full  text  of  the  resolution,  see  Postanovlenie  s"ezda  narodnogo 
deputatov  Soiuza  Sovetskikh  Sotsialisticheskikh  Respublik  "Ob  obshchei  kontseptsii  novogo  Soiuznogo 
Dogovora  i  poriadke  ego  zakliucheniia,  "  in  Chetvertyi  s  "end  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  III,  pp.  311- 
313. 
Vtorot  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  I,  pp.  107-130. 
Ibid.,  vol.  I,  pp.  136-186. 
's)  Chetvertyl  s'  ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  II,  pp.  167-187. 
'6)  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  386-407. (Chapter  P)  224 
31)  The  proposal  was  intended  to  prohibit  the  president  from  being  a  People's  Deputy  or a  member 
of  the  leadership  bodies  of  any  political  parties  or  public  organisations,  Vneocherednoi  tretil  s  "ezd 
narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR.  vol.  1,  pp.  395-416. 
'B  )  Biser,  Deputy  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  the  Nationalities  of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  proposed 
that  the  Council  of  Federation  and  the  Presidential  Council  should  be  merged.  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  174-195. 
")  The  amendment  was  to  grant  the  CPD  the  right  to  appraise  the  activity  of  the  president.  Ibid., 
vol.  II,  pp.  152-174. 
I)  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  387-408. 
Vtoroi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  II,  pp.  594-616. 
'2)  He  urged  all  entities  in  economic  management  to  sign  contract  for  the  delivery  of  output  in  the 
first  six  months  of  1991.  He  also  proposed  that  those  who  deny  to  sign  contracts  "be  removed  from  their 
posts  and  that  criminal  charges  be  brought  against  them.  "  Chetvertyt  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR, 
vol.  II,  pp.  271-295. 
He  proposed  to  add  the  following  phrase  to  Article  3  of  the  resolution:  "in  order  to  avoid  a 
further  drop  in  production  and  a  further  decline  in  the  people's  standard  of  living,  a  moratorium  on 
resolving  collective  labour  disputes  by  means  of  strikes  or  refusals  to  work  is  to  be  declared  for  1991.  " 
Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  316-337. 
")  One  of  the  votes  was  on  the  question  whether  the  issue  should  be  included  on  the  agenda  of  the 
Second  Congress.  Vtorol  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  I,  pp.  40-63.  The  question  of  Article  6 
was  raised  again  when  the  Third  Congress  discussed  part  U  of  the  draft  law  on  Establishing  a  Presidency 
of  the  USSR.  In  the  discussion,  P.  A.  Akunov  proposed  to  rephrase  the  words  "the  Communist  Party  of 
the  USSR,  and  other  political  parties"  by  "all  political  parties,  "  which  failed  to  cam  the  two-thirds  of 
support.  Vneocherednoi  tretii  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  I,  pp.  237.257. 
")  Firstly,  the  proposal  to  abolish  the  selection  of  deputies  from  social  organisations  was  put  to  a 
vote.  Vioroi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  II,  pp.  499-522.  However,  after  the  vote,  another 
proposal,  this  time  to  maintain  the  representation  of  social  organisations,  was  also  raised  and  again  put  to 
the  vote.  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  526-548.  Both  proposals  were  abandoned. 
'16  )  Including  the  following  phrase  in  Article  96  of  the  Constitution:  "a  person  to  whom  applied 
forced  medical  treatment  according  to  the  law  and  a  person  who  is  recognised  as  incapacity  by  the  court.  " 
Vtorol  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  IA,  pp.  182-204. 
"1)  Chetvertyt  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  I,  pp.  34-51. 
48  )  For  instance,  at  the  Fourth  Congress  in  December  1990,  deputies  demanded  to  register  deputy 
groups  before  the  voting.  In  accordance  with  the  demand,  there  were  registered  regional  groups  (the 
Interregional  Deputies'  group  (229  deputies),  and  deputies  from  autonomous  formations  (229  deputies)), 
ideological  groups  (the  Communists'  group  (730  deputies),  the  Social  Democrats  (19  deputies),  the  Soiuz 
group  (561  deputies),  the  ecological  deputies'  group  (220  deputies)  and  the  Civic  Society  group  (38 
deputies)),  functional  groups  (workers'  group  (more  than  400  deputies)  and  the  group  of  agrarian  deputies (Chapter  19  22S 
(431  deputies)),  and  other  groups  (the  group  of  young  deputies  (125  deputies)  and  women  deputies 
(Zhizn',  216  deputies)).  Chetvertyi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  SSSR,  vol.  R,  pp.  421-422. 
49  )  Roughly  ±5.5,  ±6.0,  and  ±7.0  points  of  mean  score  (M)  appeared  in  Appendix  tables  indicate 
about  65  per  cent,  75  per  cent  and  more  than  80  per  cent  of  deputies  in  a  particular  group  voted  for  or 
against  respectively,  although  the  proportion  of  deputies  who  abstained  from  voting  may  increase  an  error 
level  in  this  way  of  reading.  In  general,  a  high  level  of  unity  in  the  thesis  refer  to  a  mean  score  of  higher 
than  6  points  in  an  absolute  value  (M>If6.0J).  When  a  deputy  group  is  described  as  "divided,  "  it  normally 
means  its  mean  score  is  lower  than  2  points  in  an  absolute  value  (M<±2.0I).  However,  the  reading  is  not 
relevant  to  describe  the  unity  level  of  Baltic  and  Armenian  deputies  who  did  not  take  part  in  the  vote  and 
thus  appeared  to  be  divided,  but  were  in  fact  strongly  united. 
$0  )  Deputies  from  rural  area  voted  for  the  proposal  to  include  the  KKN  question  on  the  agenda 
(M=7.8,  F=25.3,  p<0.001),  and  rejected  the  proposal  to  discussed  the  KKN  question  in  the  Supreme 
Soviet  first  (M=-7.3,  F=16.7,  p<0.001).  A  majority  of  rural  deputies  were  again  supported  retention  of  the 
name  of  the  Union  (M-7.3,  F=21.5,  p<  0.001).  In  the  votes,  deputies  from  large  cities  scored  -3.9,.  5.2, 
and  -4.3  respectively. 
sI  )  In  the  vote  on  Ryzhkov's  plan,  deputies  from  rural  areas  (M--7.7)  strongly  supported  the  plan, 
while  deputies  from  large  (M=-4.2),  medium-sized  (M-4.1),  and  small  (M'-4.5)  cities  moderately 
supported  it  (F=24.3,  p<0.001). 
s2)  For  instance,  in  the  vote  on  Akhunov's  rewording  on  Article  6,  deputies  from  small  cities 
(M=2.9)  weakly  supported  the  changes,  while  deputies  from  large  (M=0.6)  and  medium-sized  (M=0.8) 
cities  were  divided.  In  the  vote,  rural  deputies  (M-0.9)  were  also  divided,  although  they  rejected  the 
proposal  (F-11.5,  p<0.001). 
s')  For  instance,  in  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  maintain  the  selection  of  deputies  from  social 
organisations,  deputies  from  large  cities  (M=0.2)  and  rural  areas  (M=0.6)  were  divided,  showing  rather 
similar  voting  patterns,  while  deputies  from  medium-sized  (M32.1)  and  small  (M"3.3)  cities  were 
moderately  rejected  it  (F-12.8,  p<0.001). 
64  )  For  details,  see  Chiesa,  Transition  to  Democracy,  pp.  246-247  (Table  26-28). 
55)  Sectoral  differences  among  managers  were  observed  in  eight  of  17  votes  at  the  significant  level 
of  0.05.  However,  among  workers,  sectoral  differences  were  revealed  in  thirteen  of  17  votes  at  the  0.05 
level.  In  particular,  significant  differences  at  the  0.001  level  were  observed  between  industrial  and 
agricultural  workers  in  six  votes  (the  two  votes  on  Article  6,  two  on  economic  issues,  and  one  on 
presidential  issue  and  the  electoral  system  respectively). 
16  )  For  instance,  a  larger  proportion  of  cadres  (30.8  per  cent,  Mm-2.8)  supported  the  discussion  of 
Article  6  at  the  Second  Congress,  while  only  8.2  per  cent  of  nomenklaturists  (Mm-7.8)  supported  it  (T-- 
7.2,  p<0.001).  In  the  vote  on  Prokhushev's  proposal  to  prohibit  the  president  from  joining  any  political 
parties  at  the  Third  Congress,  the  former  supported  the  proposal  (M"2.8),  while  the  latter  (M-4.3) 
rejected  it  (T-8.5,  p<0.001).  At  the  Fourth  Congress,  cadres  (M-5.9)  moderately  supported  retention  of 
the  name  of  the  Union,  while  nomenklaturists  (Mm-7.3)  strongly  supported  it  (T'-2.8,  p<O.  01). (Chapter  P)  226 
")  The  question  of  strike  could  be  a  sensitive  issue  of  a  particular  sector  rather  than  a  particular 
region.  However,  considering  the  'socialist  division  of  labour,  '  sectoral  interests  could  easily  developed 
into  regional  interests  when  the  economic  structure  of  a  region  was  heavily  dominated  by  a  particular 
economic  sector,  as  coal  miners'  strike  in  Kemerovo  oblast  suggests.  In  the  vote,  ten  of  fourteen  deputies 
from  Tiumen  oblast  including  autonomous  okrugs  in  the  oblast,  and  eleven  of  fourteen  deputies  from 
Kemerovo  oblast  rejected  the  proposal  to  declare  a  moratorium  on  strikes. 
11  )  For  instance,  a  large  proportion  of  deputies  who  had  completed  a  doctoral  course  (M-2.8) 
were  less  supportive  of  retaining  the  name  of  the  Union  than  those  who  had  completed  a  candidate  of 
science  (M-4.2),  undergraduate  (Ms-5.2),  or  middle  level  (M-6.6)  of  education  (F-19.  S,  p<0.001).  In 
the  vote  on  Ryzhkov's  plan,  doctoral  degree  holders  (M-2.8)  were  less  supportive  of  the  plan  than  other 
deputy  groups  (M=-3.5,  -4.9,  and  -6.5  for  those  completed  a  candidate  of  science,  undergraduate,  or 
middle  level  of  education  respectively,  F=14.4,  p<0.001).  However,  in  the  vote  on  Article  6,  differences 
in  the  voting  patterns  were  more  evident  between  doctoral  degree  holders  (M-2.1)  and  those  who 
completed  a  candidate  of  science  (M-0.2)  than  between  the  former  and  others  of  lower  educational  level 
(F-2.8,  p<0.05). 
39  )  When  deputies  were  divided  into  four  groups  such  as  Russians  and  non-Russians  from 
Caucasus  and  Central  Asian  republics,  Russian  deputies  from Caucasus  voted  in  favour  of  the  vote  (N-75, 
M=3.3),  while  Russians  from  Central  Asian  republic  (N'16,  M-3.8)  opposed  the  proposal  (F.  3.9, 
p<0.01). 
60)  For  instance,  a  large  proportion  of  non-Russian  deputies  from  Central  Asian  republics  (N=286, 
M=-8.5)  voted  in  favour  of  Ryzhkov's  plan  than  non-Russians  from  Caucasus  (N-200,  M"-5.4,  F-12.6, 
P<0.01). 
61)  Nearly  60  per  cent  of  non-CPSU  members  (M-2.8)  supported  the  proposal  to  include  the 
question  of  Article  6  on  the  agenda  of  the  Second  Congress,  while  only  35.7  per  cent  of  party  members 
(M;  2.0)  supported  the  proposal  (T=7.8,  p<0.001).  In  the  vote  on  the  Ryzhkov  plan,  only  about  the  half 
the  non-party  members  (M=2.3)  supported  it,  while  more  than  70  per  cent  of  non-party  members  (M-. 
5.3)  voted  for  the  proposal  (Tm-5.7,  p<0.001).  Again  less  than  half  the  non-CPSU  members  (M-2,6) 
voted  for  the  proposal  to  retain  the  name  of  the  Union,  while  nearly  64  per  cent  of  party  members  (M-. 
5.6)  supported  it  (T=6.9,  p<0.001). 
62)  More  than  70  per  cent  of  younger  deputies  (M-S.  5)  opposed  the  selection  of  deputies  from 
social  organisations,  while  50.1  per  cent  of  deputies  more  than  45  years  old  (M-2.7)  supported  it  (T-8.1, 
p<0.001).  Again  when  the  Third  Congress  discussed  Article  6,  more  than  half  the  deputies  of  the  younger 
generation  (M-2.8)  supported  the  changes  in  the  leading  role  of  the  CPSU,  while  only  40.2  per  cent  of  the 
older  generation  (Ma0.5)  supported  it  (T-8.2,  p<0.001). 
63  )  For  instance,  281  female  deputies  or  80.1  per  cent  (M"-6.9)  supported  the  proposal  to  include 
the  question  of  the  KKN  on  the  agenda  of  the  Second  Congress,  while  1318  male  deputies  or  69.7  per  cent 
(Ms-4.9)  supported  the  proposal  (T-4.5,  p<0.001).  The  most  striking  difference  between  male  and  female 
deputies  was  revealed  in  the  vote  on  Ryzhkov's  plan.  In  the  vote,  287  female  deputies  or  81.8  per  cent 
(Ma-7.3)  supported  the  government  programme,  while  only  66.1  per  cent  of  male  deputies  (M--4.5) 
favoured  it  (T-6.1,  p<0.001). (Chapter  i9  227 
I)  Viktor  lukechev,  "Sibirskie  deputaty:  nakanune  rossiiskogo  s"ezda,  "  Si6iriskaia  gazeta,  no, 
20  (21-27  March  1990),  p.  13. 
6!  )  Such  an  effort  had  a  limited  success  when  Siberian  deputies  in  the  CPD  of  Russia  adopted  a 
resolution  at  the  First  Congress  of  the  People's  Deputies  of  Siberia  in  Krasnoiarsk  in  March  1992. 
66  )  SIBFE  deputies  were  significantly  different  from  deputies  from  the  European  part  of  Russia  in 
their  voting  patterns  in  ten  of  the  17  votes.  For  instance,  75.1  per  cent  of  SIBFE  deputies  (M-5.7) 
supported  the  proposal  to  prohibit  the  president  from  joining  any  political  parties,  while  63.4  per  cent  of 
other  RSFSR  deputies  (M=3.6)  supported  it  (T"3.3,  p<0.001).  In  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  merge  the 
Federal  Council  and  the  Presidential  Council,  SIBFE  deputies  (M-0.7)  supported  the  proposal,  while  52.5 
per  cent  of  other  deputies  (M=-2.1)  opposed  it  (T-4.2,  p<0.001). 
67)  For  instance,  a  larger  proportion  of  SIBFE  deputies  (64.1  per  cent,  M-3.4)  than  deputies  from 
the  European  part  of  Russia  (52.3  per  cent,  Ma1.2)  supported  the  re-wording  of  Article  6  proposed  by 
Prokushev  at  the  Third  Congress  (T"-3.0,  p<0.01). 
")  Again  74.2  per  cent  of  SIBFE  deputies  (M=6.0)  supported  the  proposal  to  abolish  the  selection 
of  deputies  from  social  organisations,  while  62.2  per  cent  of  deputies  from  the  European  part  of  Russia 
(M=3.9)  supported  it  (T-3.4,  p<0.001). 
69)  For  instance,  a  larger  proportion  of  SIBFE  deputies  (28.6  per  cent,  M-3.5)  voted  against  the 
Ryzhkov  plan  than  other  RSFSR  deputies  (19.1  per  cent,  M=-5.1,  T=2.6,  p<0.01).  SIBFE  deputies  were 
again  less  supportive  of  Gorbachev  in  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  include  the  question  of  no  confidence  in 
the  president  on  the  agenda  of  the  Fourth  Congress.  In  the  vote,  nearly  30  per  cent  of  SIBFE  deputies 
(M-2.5)  supported  the  proposal,  while  22.9  per  cent  of  deputies  from  the  European  part  of  Russia  (M-3.8) 
supported  it  (T-2.1,  p<0.05). 
70)  As  already  discussed  in  Chapter  2,  Gorbachev's  economic  policy  that  emphasised  the  efficient 
use  of  resources  and  industrial  capital  was  often  regarded  as  a  sign  of  a  shift  of  investment  priority  from 
the  eastern  region  to  the  European  part  of  Russia.  Theodore  Shabad,  'The  Gorbachev  Economic  Policy:  Is 
the  USSR  Turning  Away  from  Siberian  Development?  "  in  Alan  Wood  and  R.  F.  French  (eds.  ),  The 
Development  ofSlberia:  People  and  Resources  (London:  Macmillan,  1989),  pp.  256-260. 
")  For  instance,  110  deputies  from  autonomous  republics  and  lower  level  of  autonomous  regions 
made  a  statement  at  the  Third  Congress,  showing  their  own  interests  in  the  question  of  a  new  federal  treaty 
and  a  new  Constitution.  In  the  statement,  which  delivered  by  S.  N.  Khadzhiev  from  Chechen-Ingushetiia, 
they  demanded  that  a  new  Constitution  should  guarantee  the  right  of  self-determination  and  that  the  first 
president  must  express  his  opinion  about  the  question  of  the  right  of  people  in  autonomous  formations  to 
determine  their  political  status. 
n)  For  instance,  in  the  vote  on  Ryzhkov's  plan,  an  absolute  majority  of  deputies  from  rural  area 
(33  deputies  or  80.  S  per  cent,  M-6.8)  supported  it.  By  contrast,  a  larger  proportion  of  deputies  from 
medium-sized  (17  deputies  or  36.2  per  cent,  M'-1.5)  and  small  cities  (21  deputies  or  36.8  per  cent,  M-- 
2.1)  rejected  it  (F"3.2,  p<0.05). 
73  )  In  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  introduce  a  legal  measure  to  accelerate  the  implementation  of 
delivery  of  goods,  deputies  from  large  cities  showed  strong  support  for  it  (50  deputies  or  75.8  per  cent, (Chapter  P)  228 
M=7.0),  while  others  from  medium-sized  (59.6  per  cent,  M'-4.5)  and  small  cities  (56.1  per  cent,  M- 
3.0),  and  rural  areas  (57.5  per  cent,  M=-3.5)  showed  a  relatively  weak  support  (F-3.3,  p<0.05). 
7'  )  For  instance,  when  the  proposal  to  rephrase  Article  6  was  put  to  the  vote  at  the  Third  Congress, 
deputies  from  rural  regions  (M=-1.3)  as  a  whole  opposed  the  proposal,  while  deputies  from  resource 
(M=4.6)  and  hub/gate  (M=5.3)  regions  supported  it  (M-3.8,  p<0.05). 
7'  )  Deputies  from  resource  regions  (M=2.8)  were  less  supportive  of  retaining  the  name  of  the 
Union  than  deputies  from  other  regions  such  as  rural  regions  (M-9.0),  and  hub/gate  regions  (Mau-7.6, 
F=8.7,  p<0.001).  A  larger  proportion  of  the  former  deputy  group  (M=-1.4)  also  supported  the  proposal  to 
recognise  the  declaration  of  sovereignty  of  republics  as  an  expression  of  the  people's  will,  than  deputies 
from  rural  (M=9.0),  hub/gate  (M=5.3),  and  residual  (M"-4.9)  regions  (F-9.4,  p<0.001). 
76  )  For  instance,  in  the  vote  on  Ryzhkov's  plan,  a  majority  of  deputies  from  rural  (27  deputies  or 
87.1  per  cent,  M-7.4),  hub/gate  regions  (26  deputies  or  76.2  per  cent,  M--5.6),  and  residual  (50  deputies 
or  62.5  per  cent,  Ms-3.5  per  cent)  supported  the  plan.  By  contrast,  only  34  deputies  or  47.2  per  cent  of 
deputies  from  resource  regions  (M=-0.7)  voted  for  it  (F'5.2,  p<0.01). 
17)  In  the  analysis  at  the  SIBFE  level,  four  deputies  from  Kamchatka  (which  is  categorised  as  a 
moderately  developed  region)  are  excluded,  and  therefore  differences  were  examined  among  four  regional 
groups:  highly  developed,  well-developed,  under-developed,  and  poorly  developed  regions.  The  regional 
groups  showed  similar  voting  patterns  in  only  four  votes:  three  votes  on  other  political  issues  and  one  on 
the  proposal  to  merge  the  Federal  Council  and  the  Presidential  Council. 
")  In  the  vote,  90.7  per  cent  of  deputies  from  highly  developed  regions  (M-9.2)  rejected  the 
programme,  while  a  majority  of  deputies  from  well-developed  (60.3  per  cent,  M;  3.1),  under-developed 
(70.5  per  cent,  Ma-4.4),  and  poorly  developed  (81.4  per  cent,  M-6.9)  regions  supported  it  (F-13.5, 
p<0.001). 
79)  Again  deputies  from  highly  developed  regions  (100  per  cent,  M'10.0)  strongly  supported  the 
proposal,  while  only  55.9  per  cent  of  deputies  from  poorly  developed  regions  (M-1.5)  voted  for  the 
proposal  (F=8.3,  p<0.001).  In  the  vote,  deputies  from  well-developed  (80.9  per  cent,  M-7.1)  and  under- 
developed  (80.3  per  cent,  M=6.7)  regions  showed  a  rather  similar  voting  patterns. 
ao  )  For  instance,  in  the  vote  on  Akhunov's  proposal  to  rephrase  Article  6,  deputies  from  highly 
developed  regions  again  unanimously  supported  it  (100  per  cent,  M'10.0).  By  contrast,  deputies  from 
poorly  developed  regions  (M-0.5)  voted  against  the  proposal  (F-S.  9,  p<0.001).  Again,  in  the  vote  on  the 
proposal  to  maintain  the  selection  of  deputies  from  social  organisations,  the  former  (83.3  per  cent,  M'8.3) 
rejected  it,  while  the  latter  (M'-0.3)  were  divided  (Fs6.3,  p<0.001). 
'1  )  For  instance,  deputies  from  highly  and  poorly  developed  regions  that  would  show  conflicting 
attitudes  towards  reform,  consisted  42.8  per  cent  (12  deputies  from  or  7.9  per  cent  from  highly  developed 
region  (Tiumen  oblast),  and  53  deputies  or  34.9  per  cent  from  poorly  developed  regions)  of  Siberian 
deputies.  However,  no  regions  in  the  Russian  Far  East  were  categorised  as  highly  developed  regions, 
although  deputies  from  poorly  developed  regions  accounted  for  11.5  per  cent  of  Far  Eastern  deputies. 
Cross-tabulation  analysis  suggests  that  the  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  deputy  groups  were  significantly 
different  in  their  composition  in  this  aspect  (XI-28.1,  df-4,  p<0.001). (Chapter  ºJ  229 
a)  In  five  votes,  deputies  from  under-developed  regions  in  the  Russian  Far  East  voted  in  a 
different  way  from  those  from  under-developed  regions  in  Siberia.  For  instance,  in  the  vote  on  Akhunov's 
proposal  on  Article  6,  the  former  group  (M=8.3)  strongly  supported  the  proposal,  while  the  latter  (M;  2.1) 
weakly  supported  it  (T-2.8,  p<0.01).  More  striking  differences  were  revealed  in  the  vote  on  the  proposal 
to  merge  the  Federal  Council  and  the  Presidential  Council  when  the  former  group  (M-4.8)  voted  for  it, 
while  the  latter  group  (M;  2.9)  voted  against  it  (T-3.2,  p<0.01).  Again  in  the  Fourth  Congress,  deputies 
from  under-developed  regions  in  the  Far  East  (M=0.9)  were  divided,  but  rejected  the  proposal  to  declare  a 
moratorium  on  strikes,  while  Siberian  deputies  from  the  same  category  of  regions  (M-6.3)  strongly 
supported  the  idea  (T=-3.8,  p<0.001). 
it  )  In  the  vote  on  Ryzhkov's  plan,  a  larger  proportion  of  SIBFE  cadres  (21.7  per  cent  or  M"-4.3) 
voted  against  the  plan  than  cadres  from  the  other  part  of  Russia  (8.6  per  cent  or  M-7.8,  T-2.1,  p<0.05). 
At  the  Third  Congress,  SIBFE  cadres  (M=-0.9)  were  divided  in  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  appraise  the 
activities  of  the  president  annually.  By  contrast,  cadres  from  the  European  part  of  Russian  (M-6.9)  voted 
against  the  proposal  (T-3.1,  p<O.  01). 
In  the  vote,  almost  half  the  cadres  from  the  SIBFE  regions  (47.8  per  cent  or  M=-2.2)  supported 
proposal,  while  a  majority  of  cadres  from  the  European  part  of  Russia  (78.9  per  cent  or  M-6.7)  rejected  it 
(T=4.8,  p<0.001). 
")  For  instance,  a  larger  proportion  of  cadres  supported  the  abolition  of  the  CPSU's  leading  role 
(56.5  per  cent  or  M-1.3),  while  nomenklaturists  (73.3  per  cent  or  M"-6.0)  still  wanted  to  maintain  the  role 
(T-2.4,  p<0.05).  In  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  accept  the  declaration  of  sovereignty  of  the  union 
republics  as  an  expression  of  the  people's  will,  a  smaller  proportion  of  cadres  (56.5  per  cent  or  M-3.5) 
rejected  the  proposal  than  nomenklaturists  (86.7  per  cent  or  M-8.7,  T-2.3,  p<0.05).  A  striking 
difference  was  also  revealed  in  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  prohibit  the  president  from  joining  any  political 
party.  In  the  vote,  a  majority  of  cadres  (78.3  per  cent  or  M-5.7)  supported  the  proposal,  while  a  majority 
of  nomenklaturists  (73.3  per  cent  or  M-6.7)  rejected  it  (T--4.9,  p<0.001). 
86)  Differences  between  SIBFE  workers  and  those  from  the  European  part  of  Russia  in  their  voting 
patterns  were  revealed  in  six  votes:  2  votes  on  federal  and  presidential  issues  respectively,  and  one  on 
economic  and  other  political  issues  respectively. 
")  Differences  among  manager  groups  from  rural,  resource,  hub/gate  and  residual  regions  were 
revealed  among  nine  votes.  For  Instance,  managers  from  resource  regions  were  more  supportive  of  the 
changes  in  the  union  system  when  they  were  divided  (M-0.7)  in  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  retain  the 
name  of  the  union.  By  contrast,  managers  from  other  category  of  regions-rural  (M-8.6),  hub/gate  (Mm. 
7.5),  and  resource  (M'-8.5)  regions-strongly  supported  it  (F-6.0,  p<0.001).  In  the  vote  on  the  proposal 
to  introduce  legal  measure  against  the  failure  of  agreed  deliveries,  a  relatively  larger  numbers  of  hub/gate 
managers  (M-0.4)  supported  the  proposal,  while  managers  from  rural  (M=-8.2),  resources  (M=-6.  i)  and 
residual  (M-7.7)  regions  strongly  opposed  it  (F-3.3,  p<O.  OS). 
")  For  instance,  the  voting  patterns  of  SIBFE  workers  were  different  from  the  same  categories  of 
deputies  from  outside  of  the  SIBFE  regions  in  half  the  votes  analysed  as  discussed.  However,  differences 
were  not  revealed  among  SIBFE  workers  when  they  were  categorised  into  rural,  resource,  hub/gate,  and 
residual  regional  groups. (Chapter  fq  230 
19  )  For  instance,  the  younger  generation  were  less  supportive  of  the  proposal  to  retain  the  name  of 
the  Union  (M=-4.2,  T=2.6,  p<0.001),  Ryzhkov's  plan  (M-1.7,  T-2.7,  p<0.01),  and  the  leading  role  of  the 
CPSU  (M=2.2  and  5.4,  T-3.8  and  3.2,  p<0.001  respectively)  than  the  older  generation  (M-7.1,  -5.0,  -2.6 
and  1.5  respectively). 
9°  )  For  instance,  the  younger  generation  of  deputies  from  the  SIBFE  regions  (M-4.4)  were  more 
supportive  of  the  proposal  to  prohibit  the  president  to  join  a  political  party  than  those  from  the  European 
part  of  Russia  (M=1.9,  T=-2.6,  p<0.01). 
It  )  In  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  declare  a  moratorium  on  strikes,  SIBFE  deputies  who  were  older 
than  45  years  (M=1.2)  voted  for  the  proposal  while  the  same  category  of  deputies  from  the  European  part 
of  Russia  (M=1.2)  rejected  it  (T-2.7,  p<O.  01). 
')  The  older  generation  of  deputies  from  SIBFE  regions  (M-4.6)  were  more  supportive  of 
changes  in  the  deputy  selection  procedures  than  those  from  the  European  part  of  Russia  (M-2.4,  T-2.5, 
p<0.05).  In  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  include  the  question  of  no  confidence  in  the  president  on  the 
agenda  of  the  Fourth  Congress,  they  (M-2.9)  showed  rather  similar  voting  patterns  to  those  of  younger 
deputies  from  the  SIBFE  regions  (M=2.0),  and  thus  less  supportive  of  Gorbachev's  position  than  the  older 
generation  from  the  European  part  of  Russia  (M-5.3,  T-3.0,  p<0.01). 
9))  Difference  among  younger  deputies  from  rural,  resource,  hub/gate  and  residual  regions  were 
revealed  in  seven  votes:  four  votes  on  federal  issues,  each  one  vote  on  presidential,  economic,  and  other 
political  issues.  For  instance,  younger  deputies  from  resource  regions  (M--1.1)  were  divided  in  the  vote 
on  the  proposal  to  retain  the  name  of  the  Union,  while  a  majority  of  younger  deputies  from  rural  (M-8.6) 
and  hub/gate  (M=-6.2)  regions  supported  it  (F-4.3,  p<0.01).  Again  in  the  vote  on  Ryzhkov's  plan,  the 
former  group  (M-2.1)  rejected  the  plan,  while  the  latter  groups  (M--S.  7  and  .  5.4  respectively)  supported  it 
(F-4.  O,  p<0.01). 
4)  Personal  factors  include  gender,  age,  and  ethnic  origin.  The  level  of  urbanisation  in  terms  of 
the  size  of  urban  population,  'azonal'  factor,  is  grouped  together  with  personal  factors,  as  it  is  regarded  as 
a  cross-regional  factor.  A.  V.  Berezkin,  V.  A.  Kolosov,  M.  E.  Pavlovskaia,  N.  V.  Petrov,  and  L.  V. 
Smimiagin,  "The  Geography  of  the  USSR  Elections  of  People's  Deputies  of  the  USSR  (Preliminary 
Results),  "  Soviet  Geography,  vol.  XXX,  no.  8  (October  1989),  pp.  628-629.  'Class'  background  and 
CPSU  membership  make  up  the  functional  variables,  Finally,  the  Union  republic  groups,  the  autonomous 
status,  and  regional  groups  based  on  regional  economic  features  are  regarded  as  regional  factors.  Because 
of  multicollinearity,  some  regional  factors  are  removed  or  replaced  by  other  regional  variables.  For 
instance,  high  multicollinearity  is  found  between  the  regional  group  based  on  economic  performance  and 
the  regional  group  based  on  economic  structure  in  some  votes.  In  that  case,  the  variable  which  results  in 
higher  model  chi-square  is  put  to  a  model.  A  level  of  economic  performance  and  the  federal  status  of  it 
region  will  be  separately  put  to  a  model  at  the  cost  of  the  integrated  variable  that  formed  combining  these 
two  variables,  unless  the  latter  variable  increases  model  chi-square  value  significantly, 
°'  )  At  the  significance  level  of  0.05,  the  'class'  factor  was  included  in  the  model  of  16  votes,  age 
in  15  models,  gender  in  14  models  and  urbanity  in  13  models.  By  contrast,  ethnicity  had  significant 
meanings  in  only  two  votes,  and  the  CPSU  membership  in  eight  votes. (Chapter  i)  231 
%)  Among  these  variables,  the  gender  factor  seemed  to  have  little  significance  when  it  was 
separately  discussed  with  the  results  of  the  Anova  analysis  as  differences  between  male  and  female 
deputies  were  seldom  found  among  SIBFE  deputies. 
")  In  the  model  for  the  vote  on  the  KKN  questions  (X2  and  X7),  on  Zakharenko's  amendment 
(Y3),  and  on  the  deputy  selection  questions  (X4),  functional  factors  did  not  appear  to  improve  the  models 
significantly. 
9B)  For  instance,  Central  Asian  deputies  strongly  opposed  the  proposal  to  include  Article  6  on  the 
agenda  of  the  Second  Congress.  In  the  vote,  81.9  per  cent  of  Central  Asian  deputies,  or  298  deputies, 
voted  against  the  proposal.  By  contrast,  81.6  per  cent  of  Baltic  deputies,  or  129  deputies,  supported  it. CHAPTER  VI 
SIBFE  Deputies  In  the  CPD  of  Russia 
The  influence  of  the  regions  in  the  Congress  of  People's  Deputies  (CPD)  of 
Russia  that  was  operating  during  1990-1993  had  particular  importance  to  the 
development  of  centre-periphery  relations.  During  the  period,  the  structural  basis  of 
current  centre-periphery  relations  was  formed.  Furthermore,  the  CPD  was  supposed  to 
have  supreme  authority  in  the  central  decision-making,  although  presidential  decrees 
often  bypassed  the  CPD  in  practice.  Decisions  of  the  CPD  on  reform  measures  had  a 
different  impact  on  regional  socio-economic  conditions,  demarcating  'winner'  and 
'loser'  regions.  Accordingly,  the  regions  tried  to  increase  their  influence  over  the 
decision-making  process. 
However,  the  increasing  influence  of  the  regions  did  not  necessarily  mean  that 
the  influence  of  regional  associations  had  increased  as  much  as  it  could  have  done. 
Although  most  regions  were  engaged  in  regional  associations  in  one  way  or  another, 
regional  associations  themselves  had  their  own  limits  in  coordinating  the  activities  of 
their  member  regions.  In  the  course  of  reform,  the  gap  between  regions  in  terms  of 
living  standards  was  rather  wider  than  in  the  Soviet  period,  as  Dmitrieva  has  observed.  ' 
As  a  result,  the  member  regions'  attitudes  towards  reform  had  been  differentiated, 
which  weakened  the  unity  of  regional  associations.  When  we  limit  discussion  of  the 
question  to  the  Congress  level,  only  a  handful  of  leading  political  figures  who  were 
more  attentive  to  regional  interests  in  the  USSR  Congress-for  instance,  members  of 
the  Interregional  Deputies'  group-reappeared  in  the  Russian  Congress?  Furthermore, 
'primitive'  party  politics  emerged  in  the  Russian  Congress  in  the  form  of  political 
factions  and  blocs.  Despite  fluctuating  membership  and  the  lack  of  an  agreement  on 
critical  issues  among  members,  a  cross-regional  feature  of  political  factions  or  blocs 
hampered  the  unity  of  regional  deputy  groups  in  the  Congress, 
In  this  chapter,  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  deputies'  voting  patterns  will  be 
undertaken  in  order  to  examine  the  influence  of  the  regions  in  the  central  legislature. (Chapter  YI)  233 
The  availability  of  data  on  faction  membership  and  the  regional  origin  of  deputies 
makes  it  possible  not  only  to  employ  new  variables-political  factions  and  regional 
association  groups-in  the  analysis,  but  also  to  examine  the  influence  of  the  socio- 
economic  features  of  regions  on  the  decision-making  process  at  the  federal  level. 
The  analysis  draws  attention  to  some  features  that  appeared  in  the  Russian  CPD 
in  the  early  1990s.  In  general,  deputies'  voting  patterns  were  rather  personalised. 
However,  among  those  factors  included  in  the  analysis,  political  faction  and  bloc 
membership-particularly  the  Coalition  for  Reform  (Koalitsiia  reform:  CR)  and 
Russian  Unity  (Rossiiskoe  edinstvo:  RU)  -appeared  to  have  a  strong  influence  on  the 
voting  patterns  of  deputies,  after  the  Fifth  Congress.  Secondly,  despite  the  increasing 
influence  of  political  blocs,  regional  socio-economic  features  still  had  a  significant 
influence  over  the  central  decision-making  process,  although  it  was  rather  dependent 
on  the  characteristics  of  the  question  that  was  put  to  a  vote.  Thirdly,  the  peculiar  voting 
patterns  of  SIBFE  deputies,  particularly  those  of  cadres,  suggested  that  general  socio- 
economic  conditions  of  the  SIBFE  regions  affected  SIBFE  deputies'  attitudes  towards 
reform.  However,  an  increasing  number  of  deputies  tended  to  be  more  loyal  to  the 
interests  of  their  own  region  rather  than  those  of  regional  associations,  particularly 
when  the  issues  became  more  specific.  These  observations  lead  us  to  conclude  that 
regional  influence  was  more  likely  to  be  based  on  the  smaller  regional  groups  than  on 
the  regional  associations. 
VI.  1.  The  Political  Atmosphere  in  the  CPD  of  Russia 
In  the  aftermath  of  the  election  in  1990,  the  CPD  of  Russia  had  been  convened 
nine  times  before  President  Boris  Eltsin  dissolved  it  in  September  1993.  The  period 
from  1990  to  1993  may  best  be  characterised  as  a  transition  period  in  Russia.  During 
the  period,  it  was  all  but  inevitable  that  there  would  be  power  struggles  among  political 
leaders,  or competence  struggles  among  state  organs,  since  a  new  political  and  socio- 
economic  order  was  being  introduced  in  Russia. 
In  the  Congress,  deputies  were  divided  into  blocs  supporting  'market'  or 
'socialist  market'  relations  in  discussions  of  the  economic  system.  In  relation  to  the 
Soviet  Union,  deputies  were  again  split  into  the  'unionist'  group  who  supported 
maintaining  the  Union  and  the  Russian  'nationalist'  group  who  supported  secession 
from  the  Union.  Confrontations  also  emerged  over  the  issue  of  the  separation  of (Chapter  VI)  234 
powers:  one  group  of  deputies  advocated  a  'presidential  republic'  and  another  favoured 
a  'parliamentary  republic.  '  Another  issue  on  which  deputies  were  divided  was  the 
relationship  between  centre  and  administrative  peripheries.  Deputies  who  favoured 
decentralisation  hoped  to  secure  more  powers  in  the  local  authorities'  domain  and  to 
give  the  local  legislatures  supremacy  over  the  central  legislature,  particularly  on  the 
issue  of  local  interests. 
Based  on  the  issues  discussed  at  each  Congress  and  confrontations  between 
deputies,  the  transitional  period  can  be  divided  into  three  stages:  the  initial 
confrontation  stage  (May  1990-May  1991),  the  intensified  confrontation  stage  (June 
1991-November  1992),  and  the  paralysing  stage  (December  1992-September  1993),  3 
The  first  stage  covers  the  first  four  Congresses.  During  this  stage,  the  Soviet  Union 
collapsed  and  the  law  on  establishing  a  Russian  presidency  was  adopted.  The  second 
stage  could  be  characterised  as  the  'rule  of  presidential  decrees.  '  During  this  stage,  a 
competence  struggle  broke  out  between  legislative  and  executive  branches.  The  last 
stage  started  with  the  Seventh  Congress  of  December  1992  when  Eltsin's  emergency 
powers  were  due  to  expire.  At  this  stage,  the  adoption  of  a  new  constitution  that  would 
change  the  state  structure  became  the  main  issue.  However,  the  competence  struggle 
between  legislative  and  executive  branches  reached  a  deadlock  at  the  final  stage  of 
confrontation,  and  eventually  caused  the  dissolution  of  the  CPD  itself.  During  these 
confrontations,  both  sides  failed  to  gain  enough  support  to  dominate  the  Russian  CPD, 
causing  delays  in  adopting  critical  decisions  and  becoming  a  major  obstacle  to  the 
political  and  economic  reform.  " 
VI  1(1)  The  Initial  Stage  af  Confrontation  (Mav  1990-Mav  1991) 
During  the  first  stage,  the  confrontation  of  deputies  was  mainly  related  to  the 
introduction  of  a  'new'  political  and  economic  system  at  the  RSFSR  level.  The  First 
Congress  in  May-June  1990  was  devoted  to  organising  the  state  structure  by  electing 
the  chairman  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  and  the  Presidium.  In  the  Congress,  the  tensions 
between  deputy  blocs  developed  into  confrontations  between  the  right  and  left  wings. 
Eltsin  won  the  first  round  of  confrontation,  being  elected  as  chairman  of  the  Supreme 
Soviet  in  May  1990. 
However,  after  the  First  Congress,  Eltsin  sought  stronger  powers  as  he  was  faced 
with  a  two-tier  opposition:  not  only  from  the  Union  government  led  by  Gorbachev  but 
also  from  conservatives  within  Russia.  He  therefore  proposed  to  reorganise  the (Chapter  YI)  235 
Russian  government  by  introducing  a  presidency  of  the  RSFSR  at  the  Second  Congress 
in  November-December  1990. 
The  idea  of  a  Russian  presidency  was  added  to  the  referendum  on  the  question 
of  maintaining  the  Soviet  Union  on  17  March  1991  that  had  been  initiated  by  President 
Gorbachev.  A  majority  of  the  voters  in  Russia  voted  in  favour  of  the  presidency,  '  and 
therefore  it  became  a  main  issue  at  the  Third  Congress  in  March  1991.  However,  as 
the  Third  Congress  decided  to  postpone  discussing  the  issue  to  the  following 
Congress,  '  Eltsin  pursued  a  strong  leadership  by  strengthening  the  power  of  the 
Supreme  Soviet  and  its  chairman.  He  proposed  that  additional  powers  be  provided  to 
the  chairman  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  until  the  following  Congress  "in  order  to  ensure 
conditions  for  implementing  the  Congress'  decisions  to  overcome  the  socio-economic 
crisis.  `  The  Fourth  Congress  adopted  a  law  on  the  presidency  in  May  1991,  and  based 
upon  the  law,  Eltsin  was  elected  president  of  the  RSFSR  in  June  1991.8 
At  the  Congress,  deputies  particularly  criticised  Eltsin's  economic  policies. 
During  this  first  stage  of  confrontation,  land  reform  was  one  of  the  most  contentious 
economic  issues.  At  the  Congress,  Eltsin  raised  the  question  of  private  land  ownership, 
which  faced  strong  resistance  among  deputies,  particularly  from  the  countryside.  ' 
Expecting  resistance  from  the  conservatives,  Eltsin  maintained  that  peasants  would  be 
free  to  choose  among  five  types  of  land  ownership-collective,  cooperative-collective, 
cooperative,  state  and  private-and  that  the  sale  of  land  would  be  restricted.  10  The 
Second  Congress  eventually  adopted  Sergei  Shakhrai's  amendment,  which  included 
private  ownership  and  a  ten-year  moratorium  on  the  purchase  and  sale  of  the  land.  " 
However,  the  Congress  failed  to  adopt  other  amendments  to  Articles  11  and  12  of  the 
Constitution,  which  regulated  land  ownership. 
At  the  Third  Congress,  conservatives  launched  an  attack  on  the  economic 
performance  of  Eltsin's  economic  team,  blaming  Eltsin  himself  for  the  economic  crisis. 
Reflecting  growing  dissatisfaction  with  his  economic  policies,  M.  M.  Zakharov  and  V. 
V.  Kalashnikov  proposed  that  the  Russian  leadership's  work  be  classified  as 
unsatisfactory  in  the  resolution  of  the  Congress  on  the  political  and  economic  situation 
in  the  RSFSR.  12  However,  the  majority  of  deputies,  including  some  conservatives,  still 
supported  Eltsin,  and  rejected  the  proposal. 
Another  issue  that  divided  deputies  in  this  first  stage  of  confrontation  was  the 
relation  with  the  Union  government  led  by  Gorbachev.  At  the  Second  Congress,  the 
issue  of  the  Union  Treaty  proposed  by  Gorbachev  sparked  a  debate.  Eltsin  opposed  a (Chapter  VI)  236 
discussion  of  this  issue  at  the  Congress  and  urged  deputies  to  concentrate  on  the 
agricultural  issue  for  which  the  Congress  had  been  convened.  "  Although  the  issue  was 
still  on  the  agenda  in  the  Third  and  Fourth  Congresses,  Eltsin  gained  majority  support 
for  his  position  on  the  Union  Treaty  as  it  became  clear  that  the  Union  would  dissolve 
into  at  most  a  sort  of  weak  confederation,  " 
VI  1  (2)  The  Intensification  of  Confrontation  (June  1991-November  1992) 
During  the  second  stage  of  confrontation,  two  main  conflicting  blocs  were 
formed  in  line  with  their  views  on  the  economic  system  and  institutional  power  bases. 
At  one  end,  Eltsin  led  the  reformist  bloc  and  launched  the  'Shatalin'  or  `500-day  plan,  ' 
aiming  at  a  rapid  transition  to  market  relations.  At  the  other  end,  the  opposition  was 
led  by  Ruslan  Khasbulatov,  who  had  been  elected  chairman  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  in 
October  1991  and  was  seeking  to  control  the  reform  process  by  restricting  the  powers 
of  the  president  and  by  controlling  the  government.  15 
Faced  with  opposition,  Eltsin  introduced  a  draft  Constitution  which  strengthened 
the  president's  power  over  the  government  and  the  local  authorities,  establishing  a 
streamlined  executive  hierarchy.  However,  the  Fifth  Congress  refused  to  discuss  the 
adopting  of  a  new  Constitution,  regarding  it  as  a  question  that  could  destabilise  the 
political  situation  in  Russia.  Accordingly,  Eltsin  sought  extra-constitutional  solutions. 
On  the  one  hand,  he  accelerated  the  process  of  concluding  the  Federal  Treaty.  On  the 
other,  he  asked  the  Congress  for  broad  emergency  powers.  Two  resolutions  of  the 
Congress  endowed  him  with  powers  to  reorganise  higher  executive  organs 
"independently"  until  the  adoption  of  a  law  on  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the 
RSFSR,  "  and  to  issue  presidential  decrees.  ' 
The  confrontation  between  executive  and  legislative  branches  intensified  at  the 
Sixth  Congress  in  April  1992.  The  Sixth  Congress  started  with  the  proposal  of  a  vote 
of  no  confidence  in  the  government,  although  it  failed  to  gain  majority  support.  "  The 
Congress  again  classified  the  work  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  and  the  Central  Bank  as 
unsatisfactory.  It  also  requested  the  government  to  expand  expenditure  in  the  social 
sector,  to  cut  taxes,  to  refine  price  policy,  and  to  maintain  control  over  prices  for  fuel 
and  power  resources-"  Furthermore,  the  opposition  bloc  tried  to  limit  presidential 
power  over  the  government  by  relieving  Eltsin  from  his  duties  as  head  of  the 
government  and  removing  the  additional  powers  that  had  been  granted  by  the  Fifth 
Congress.  20 (Chapter  VI)  23  7 
Despite  the  adoption  of  the  resolution  "On  the  Course  of  Economic  Reform,  " 
Eltsin  managed  to  include  his  proposal  on  the  separation  of  the  executive  and 
legislative  powers  in  the  resolution,  thus  prohibiting  the  Supreme  Soviet  from 
interfering  in  the  operational  and  economic  activities  of  the  government  21 
Furthermore,  the  opposition  bloc  failed  to  include  the  resolution  of  the  Congress, 
particularly  on  the  control  over  the  government;  2  in  the  Constitution.  However,  neither 
side  seemed  to  win  the  confrontation  as  the  presidential  decree  on  the  right  to  sell  land 
plots  that  was  promulgated  in  March  1992  also  failed  to  be  endorsed.  2' 
The  gap  between  Eltsin  and  Khasbulatov  on  relations  between  executive  and 
legislative  branches  widened  at  the  Sixth  Congress.  In  his  draft  law  on  the 
government,  Eltsin  favoured  a  presidential  system  in  which  the  government  was 
accountable  to  the  president  rather  than  to  the  Congress,  and  was  organised  by  the 
president.  24  However,  Khasbulatov,  on  the  other  hand,  emphasised  that  the  government 
should  have  its  own  head  who  should  be  accountable  to  the  parliament  rather  than  to 
the  president  23  These  differences  constituted  a  solid  basis  for  the  confrontation 
between  them  in  the  following  Congress. 
VI  1  (3)  The  Stalemate  in  the  Congress  (December  1992-September  1993) 
At  this  stage,  the  differences  in  the  positions  between  legislative  and  executive 
branches  resulted  in  a  deadlock  at  the  Congress.  Accordingly,  the  president  sought  a 
breakthrough  by  directly  appealing  to  the  people,  Basically,  he  preferred  to  adopt  a 
new  Constitution  that  would  strengthen  presidential  power.  Furthermore,  he  began  to 
assert  that  it  should  be  prepared  by  authorities  other  than  the  Supreme  Soviet  or  its 
commission  and  adopted  by  referendum  rather  than  by  the  CPD,  particularly  after  the 
Seventh  Congress  26 
The  Seventh  Congress  that  convened  on  1  December  1992  was  a  critical 
Congress  for  both  sides.  The  emergency  powers  of  the  president  that  had  been  granted 
by  the  Fifth  Congress  would  expire  on  1  December  1992.  Furthermore,  decisions 
made  by  the  Congress  would  affect  not  only  the  content  of  the  new  Constitution  and 
the  procedure  by  which  it  would  be  adopted  but  also  the  fate  of  the  Congress  itself. 
Recognising  the  importance  of  the  Seventh  Congress,  Eltsin  proposed  to  postpone  it 
until  1  March  or  April  1993  at  the  All-Russia  Conference  of  Heads  of  Representatives 
and  Executive  Bodies  of  Power  on  11  September  1992  in  Cheboksary.  He  insisted  that 
it  would  take  some  time  to  prepare  a  draft  Constitution  since  "special  features  of (Chapter  VI)  238 
Russia's  political  and  socio-economic  situations"  should  be  reflected  in  it  2'  However, 
in  fact,  he  hoped  to  save  some  time  to  shift  the  power  balance  in  the  Congress  in  a 
manner  favourable  to  him.  28  Between  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congresses,  he  employed 
various  measures  to  win  the  support  of  economic  and  regional  groups,  and  of  political 
factions,  for  his  proposal.  " 
The  Seventh  Congress  started  with  an  `agenda  battle'  as  before,  and  went  on  to 
discuss  economic  and  political  issues.  Regarding  the  economic  issue,  the  Congress 
ruled  that  the  government  had  implemented  the  resolution  of  the  Sixth  Congress 
unsatisfactorily.  It  had  also  instructed  the  government  to  submit  a  new  programme 
within  a  month,  giving  priority  to  solving  the  fundamental  social  problems  of  citizens.  30 
However,  the  Seventh  Congress  concentrated  on  the  constitutional  issue.  It  considered 
a  total  of  338  amendments  of  and  additions  to  the  Constitution.  In  particular,  the 
amendments  and  additions  that  regulated  the  powers  of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  the 
president,  and  the  Council  of  Ministers  became  controversial.  Presidential  powers 
were  critically  weakened,  as  they  would  be  suspended  immediately  if  the  president 
tried  to  change  the  national  state  structure  or  to  dissolve  or  to  suspend  any  legally 
elected  bodies  of  state  power.  31  Regarding  the  government,  the  Congress  agreed  that  it 
should  be  accountable  not  only  the  Congress  and  the  president  but  also  to  the  Supreme 
Soviet.  32 
As  neither  side  won  two-thirds  support  on  the  critical  points  of  the  constitutional 
amendments,  33  compromises  between  legislative  and  executive  power  were  suggested, 
but  in  vain.  34  In  response  to  the  opposition  of  Khasbulatov's  bloc,  Eltsin  proposed  to 
hold  a  referendum  and  early  elections  for  the  Congress,  complaining  that  it  had  caused 
a  serious  danger  by  unleashing  a  "powerful  attack  against  the  course  being  pursued  by 
the  president  and  government.  ""  Upon  such  criticism,  Khasbulatov  offered  his 
resignation.  The  Congress  rejected  both  proposals. 
As  the  Congress  faced  stalemate,  Valerii  Zor'kin,  the  Chairman  of  the 
Constitutional  Court,  offered  a  compromise.  Based  upon  Zor'kin's  proposal,  the 
Congress  adopted  a  resolution  in  which  a  referendum  was  scheduled  for  14  April  1993, 
and  the  constitutional  amendments  that  the  Congress  had  already  adopted  were 
suspended.  36  As  a  result  of  this  compromise,  Eltsin  managed  to  escape  serious  damage 
to  his  powers,  although  the  speed  of  economic  reform  might  have  been  slowed  down 
when  he  chose  Viktor  Chernomyrdin  as  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  win 
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However,  the  compromise  between  Khasbulatov's  and  Eltsin's  blocs  in  the 
Seventh  Congress  did  not  last  long.  After  the  Seventh  Congress,  Eltsin  urged  the 
adoption  of  a  new  Constitution  and  the  holding  of  a  Congress  to  ratify  it.  Regarding 
the  Constitution,  Eltsin  underlined  a  clear  demarcation  of  powers  between  legislative 
and  executive  bodies.  But  at  the  same  time  he  cast  a  sceptical  eye  on  the  Congress  as  a 
system  of  the  past  Soviet  era,  blaming  it  for  political  tensions.  He  therefore  suggested 
holding  early  elections  for  the  CPD  and  the  president,  and  to  form  a  Constitutional 
Assembly  to  adopt  a  new  Constitution.  " 
In  order  to  discuss  its  countermeasures  against  Eltsin's  move,  the  Eighth 
Congress  was  convened  on  10  March  1993.  In  his  report,  N.  Riabov,  the  Chairman  of 
the  Council  of  the  Republics  of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  insisted  that  decision  of  the 
Seventh  Congress  to  hold  a  referendum  was  a  "mistake"  and  urged  that  the  resolution 
of  the  Seventh  Congress  "On  the  Stabilisation  of  the  Constitutional  System"  be 
nullified.  "  Against  this,  Eltsin  also  submitted  a  draft  resolution  that  would  grant 
government  the  power  to  develop  and  implement  an  anti-crisis  programme  in  the  socio- 
economic  sector.  As  a  compromise,  he  accepted  that  the  Central  Bank  and  some  other 
banks  could  be  under  the  control  of  the  Supreme  Soviet.  The  president  also  proposed 
to  declare  a  moratorium  on  the  legislative  activity  of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  which  would 
change  relations  between  legislative  and  executive  branches.  79  In  drafting  the  final 
version  of  the  resolution,  the  Congress  approved  the  president's  proposal  to  endow  the 
government  with  expanded  power,  even  to  control  the  Central  Bank.  However,  the 
Congress  nullified  the  resolution  of  the  Seventh  Congress  "On  the  Stabilisation  of  the 
Constitutional  System,  "  and  thus  freed  the  government  from  the  president's  control  40 
Furthermore,  it  reversed  its  decision  to  hold  a  referendum,  reallocating  the  funds  for 
the  soldiers  who  were  returning  from  the  East  European  countries.  " 
Upon  this  move,  Eltsin  issued  a  decree  on  24  March  1993  to  the  effect  that  a 
referendum  would  be  held  on  25  April  1993  on  the  questions  of  a  confidence  in  the 
president,  the  draft  Constitution  and  the  law  on  the  elections  of  the  federal  parliament. 
In  his  decree,  he  declared  that  decisions  aimed  at  suspending  presidential  decrees  and 
orders  had,  without  the  ruling  of  the  Constitutional  Court,  no  legal  force.  42  He  also 
issued  another  decree  to  set  up  the  vertical  subordination  of  the  local  executive  bodies 
to  the  president.  43  His  aim  was  clearly  to  establish  a  "special  form  of  administration,  " 
the  phrase  used  in  his  expression  in  his  televised  speech  on  20  March  1993.44 
The  Congress  hurriedly  convened  again  to  deal  with  the  new  situation.  The 
Congress  first  tried  to  impeach  the  president.  When  the  attempted  failed,  Zor'kin (Chapter  VI)  240 
initiated  another  compromise,  urging  the  both  sides  to  abide  by  the  principle  of  the 
separation  of  powers  and  to  declare  a  moratorium  on  changes  to  the  Constitution  at  the 
Ninth  Congress  43  However,  the  Congress  did  not  accept  the  compromise  and  adopted 
a  resolution  that  blamed  the  president  for  the  existing  confrontation.  The  Congress  also 
urged  the  president  and  chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  form  a  coalition 
government,  "  a  sign  that  the  confrontation  was  out  of  control.  The  Congress  finally 
decided  to  hold  a  referendum  scheduled  on  25  April  1993. 
As  the  result  of  the  referendum  was  favourable  to  Eltsin,  47  he  took  the  initiative 
to  shift  the  power  balance  between  legislative  and  executive  branches.  He  made  a 
double-tiered  approach  to  adopt  a  new  Constitution  that  would  grant  him  more  power. 
On  one  hand,  Eltsin  convened  a  Constitutional  Conference  in  June  1993,  at  which  he 
hoped  to  sharply  reduce  the  influence  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  over  the  drafting  of  a  new 
Constitution.  "  On  the  other  hand,  he  proposed  to  establish  a  Council  of  the  Federation, 
consisting  of  178  members-2  deputies  from  each  89  federal  subject-to  win  support 
of  regional  leaders,  particularly  on  the  question  of  federal  structure  49 
Despite  all  these  moves,  the  Supreme  Soviet  still  posed  an  obstacle  to  the 
implementation  of  economic  reform  in  general  and  to  the  adoption  of  a  new 
Constitution.  Finally,  Eltsin  dissolved  the  parliament  on  21  September  1993,  moving 
to  another  stage  in  the  prolonged  confrontation  between  the  president  and  the 
parliament. 
VZ  1  (4)  Roll-call  votes  analvsed 
At  the  Congresses,  hundreds  of  amendments  to  the  Constitution  and  proposed 
resolutions  had  been  decided  by  roll-call  votes.  Of  these,  22  votes  were  selected  for 
the  analysis  of  voting  patterns  of  deputies  (see  Appendix  6.1).  A  similar  number  of 
votes  was  selected  from  each  Congress:  three  votes  from  the  Second  to  Fifth,  and  five 
from  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congresses  respectively.  Again  about  the  same  numbers  of 
votes  were  selected  from  each  category:  seven  votes  on  the  power  balance  between 
legislative  and  executive  branches,  six  on  economic  issues,  five  on  the  presidency,  and 
four  on  other  questions. 
As  for  the  economic  questions,  land  reform  had  been  a  particularly  controversial 
issue.  Although  deputies  seemed  to  reach  an  agreement  on  the  question  of  private  land 
ownership  at  the  Second  Congress,  the  issue  of  the  sale  of  land  plots  remained (Chapter  VV  241 
contentious.  Prior  to  the  Seventh  Congress,  the  Constitution  (Article  12)  did  not 
comply  with  a  series  of  changes  in  the  land  code  and  presidential  decrees  on  the  land 
question.  "  For  the  analysis  three  votes  were  selected  in  this  category:  the  votes  on 
Shakhrai's  amendment  to  Articles  11  and  12  (P  1),  "  a  proposal  to  exclude  a  moratorium 
on  land  sale  (T4),  S2  and  I.  V.  Muravev's  amendments  (U3).  " 
Among  the  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Congress,  those  on  economic  situations  in 
Russia  revealed  deputies'  attitudes  towards  economic  reform  and  the  government's 
social  and  economic  policies  in  general,  although  they  contained  other  political 
questions.  For  the  analysis,  three  resolutions  on  the  economic  situation  passed  by  the 
Third  (Q2),  54  Sixth  (T2)"  and  Seventh  Congresses  (U2)S6  were  selected.  As  regards  the 
resolution  of  the  First  Congress  of  People's  Deputies  from  Siberia,  held  in  Krasnoiarsk 
in  March  1992,  these  votes  would  give  a  good  benchmark  for  the  evaluation  of  SIBFE 
deputies'  coordination  efforts  in  the  Russian  CPD. 
In  order  to  analyse  deputies'  attitudes  towards  political  reform,  votes  on  the  law 
on  the  presidency,  and  on  the  question  of  no  confidence  in  the  president  and  in  the 
government  were  selected.  Among  the  votes  cast  on  the  law  on  the  presidency,  three 
of  these  were  included  in  the  analysis:  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  postpone  adopting 
the  law  on  the  presidency  to  the  Fourth  Congress  (Q  1),  s'  the  vote  on  the  adoption  of  the 
draft  law  on  the  presidency  as  a  basis  for  a  further  discussion  (R1),  S8  and  the  vote  on  A. 
N.  Belonogov's  constitutional  amendment  (R2).  s'  The  votes  on  the  question  of  no 
confidence  in  the  government  (T1)60  and  in  the  President  (U1)61  were  included  in  the 
analysis  with  the  expectation  that  they  would  show  deputies'  overall  satisfaction  not 
only  with  economic  reform  but  also  with  political  changes. 
The  balance  of  power  between  legislative  and  executive  branches  was  also  one 
of  the  controversial  questions  of  the  Congress.  The  question  of  a  strong  presidency 
was  an  issue  of  concern  to  the  regions  as  it  was  likely  to  bring  about  changes  in  centre. 
periphery  relations.  The  question  developed  into  a  struggle  between  legislative  and 
executive  branches,  and  thus  might  not  directly  affect  centre-periphery  relations. 
However,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  regions,  they  could  benefit  from  articulating 
their  demands  as  both  Eltsin's  and  Khasbulatov's  blocs  sought  the  support  of  various 
groups  including  the  regional  ones  to  win  the  struggle.  Therefore,  votes  on  these 
questions  revealed  not  only  the  deputies'  attitudes  towards  the  state  structure  but  also 
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A  total  of  seven  votes  on  this  issue  were  included  in  the  analysis.  Firstly,  three 
votes-on  the  right  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  chairman  to  issue  decrees  (Q3),  62  on  a 
moratorium  on  local  election  (S2),  69  and  on  the  presidential  emergency  powers  (S3)84- 
were  related  to  a  strong  presidency  which  were  put  to  the  vote  during  the  second  stage 
of  confrontation.  Another  four  votes  included  in  this  category  were  put  to  the  vote  at 
the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congresses.  These  four  votes-on  Eltsin's  proposal  on  the 
resolution  of  the  Congress  on  economic  reform  (T3),  65  on  S.  B.  Sheboldaev's 
constitutional  amendment  on  the  appointment  of  chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers 
(T5),  66  on  Eltsin's  constitutional  amendment  on  the  accountability  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers  (U4),  67  and  on  Zor'kin's  proposal  for  a  truce  between  legislative  and 
executive  branches  (U5)68-were  mainly  concerned  with  the  power  balance  between 
legislative  and  executive  branches. 
The  analysis  also  covered  four  votes-on  B.  D.  Babaev  and  Tikhanov's  proposal 
(P2),  69  on  the  question  of  a  programme  for  the  Social  development  of  the  North  (M),  " 
on  Shakhrai's  proposal  to  adopt  the  law  on  the  Constitutional  Court  without  discussion 
(R3),  "  and  on  Isaev's  proposal  at  the  Fifth  Congress  to  postpone  the  election  of  the 
chairman  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  to  the  following  Congress  (S  1)n-as  others. 
VI.  2.  Cleavages  among  Deputies  in  the  Russian  Congress 
The  Russian  CPD  had  an  enormous  importance  as  the  supreme  decision-making 
body,  particularly  at  a  time  when  the  political,  economic  and  social  structures  of  Russia 
were  in  transition.  However,  deputies  were  divided  into  small  clusters,  and  often 
shifted  their  positions  when  political  and  economic  questions  were  discussed.  It  was 
even  worse  when  neither  the  reformist  nor  the  opposition  bloc  fully  controlled  the 
Congress.  The  results  were  obvious:  decisions  on  critical  questions  were  either 
delayed  or  ended  up  with  vague  compromises  that  were  often  conflicting.  For  instance, 
a  vague  demarcation  of  authority  between  legislative  and  executive  branches  caused  a 
deadlock  in  the  Congress,  inviting  the  president  to  resort  on  unconstitutional  measures. 
It  is,  of  course,  unnecessary  to  add  that  the  segmentation  of  deputies  also  made  it 
difficult  for  observers  of  Russian  politics  to  identify  factors  that  would  bind  those 
political  groups  in  the  Russian  Congress.  Sakwa  has  suggested  that  the  social  and 
occupational  structure  of  the  Congress  was  the  key  factor.  "  However,  Lane  and  Ross 
have  maintained  that  deputies  were  fundamentally  divided  along  political  and (Chapter  Yn  243 
ideological  lines,  even  though  they  partly  agree  with  Sakwa.  74  Although  these 
observations  explain  much  of  the  voting  patterns  of  deputies  in  the  Russian  CPD,  each 
of  them  seems  to  show  only  half  the  picture.  Therefore,  a  more  through  analysis  taking 
account  of  other  factors  is  needed.  " 
This  analysis  shows  that  membership  of  political  blocs,  'class,  '  generation,  and 
some  regional  factors  such  as  regional  association  membership,  the  economic  structure, 
and  socio-economic  conditions  of  regions  all  had  some  effect  on  deputies'  voting 
patterns.  By  contrast,  regional  factors  such  as  the  autonomous  status  of  the 
administrative  units  where  deputies  were  elected,  and  personal  factors  such  as  gender 
and  ethnic  origin,  were  of  much  less  influence  in  the  Russian  Congress. 
<Table  6.2.1>  Cleavages  among  Deputies  in  the  CPD  of  Russia  (1990-1993) 
Economic  Presidential  Issues  Balance  Other 
Issues  of 
land  resolu-  '  confi-  Presi-  Power  Issues 
reform  dons  dente  dent 
Regional  Factors 
Regional  associations 
Economic  structure 
Economic  performance 
Economic  performance 
+  Federal  status 
Urban  vs.  Rural  (I) 
Urban  vs.  Rural  (II)'» 
Federal  status) 
Functional  Factors 
'Class' 
Political  blocs 
CPSU  membership 
Personal  Factors 
Gender 
Total 
(3  votes)  (3  votes)  (2  votes)  (3  votes)  (7  votes)  (4  votes)  (22  votes) 
3  (2)  3  (3)  1(1)  3  (3)  7(4)  4(4)  21(17) 
2(l)  3(2)  1(0)  3(2)  6(2)  4(l)  19  (8) 
2(2)  2(t)  2(0)  3(3)  S(3)  3(3)  17(12) 
3  (2)  3(l)  2  (0)  3  (3)  5(4)  3(3)  19(13) 
2(l)  3(2)  2(2)  3(3)  6(5)  4(3)  20(16) 
2(l)  2(2)  2(l)  3(2)  5(l)  l  (o)  13  (7) 
0  (0)  1(1)  0  (0)  1(0)  2  (1)  1(0)  5  (2) 
2  (2)  3  (3)  2  (2)  3  (3)  5(5)  3(3)  18(18) 
3(3)  3(3)  2(2)  3(3)  6(6)  4(3)  21  (20) 
2(2)  3(3)  2(2)  3(3)  5(5)  4(3)  19(18) 
1(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  1  (0) 
3  (1)  2  (1)  3(3)  5(2)  4(3)  19(12) 
0  (0) 
Generation  2  (2) 
Ethnic  origin  1(0)  1  (1)  OR  2(l)  2Q)  0(0)  6  (3) 
Moscow  deputies  were  excluded. 
Deputies  from  Moscow  and  St.  Petersburg  are  included  in  the  non-autonomous  regional  group, 
Significance  at  the  0.05  (0.001)  level. 
Vl.  2  (1)  Differences  in  Voting  Patterns  among  Regional  Group, 
In  the  Russian  Congress,  regional  association  membership,  economic  features, 
and  the  level  of  urbanisation  of  the  place  where  deputies  had  been  elected  had  divided 
deputies.  First  of  all,  deputies  from  regions  that  joined  regional  associations  that  had 
formed  after  199076  tended  to  have  different  attitudes  towards  questions  put  to  the  vote (Chapter  Vo  244 
in  the  Congress,  revealing  differences  in  21  of  the  22  votes.  "  For  instance,  distinctive 
differences  were  revealed  between  the  Ural  and  Siberian  deputies  in  the  vote  on  the  law 
on  the  president  at  the  Fourth  Congress.  7S  Another  difference  was  found  between  the 
Ural/Siberian  deputy  groups  and  the  Central/Volga  deputy  groups  in  the  vote  on  the 
resolution  of  the  Fifth  Congress  "On  the  Legal  Guarantee  for  Economic  Reform" 
which  introduced  "rule  by  presidential  decrees.  ""  At  the  Seventh  Congress,  regional 
differences  were  revealed  when  deputies  voted  on  a  resolution  on  the  course  of  reform, 
which  describe  the  government's  performance  as  "unsatisfactory.  i80 
However,  a  closer  analysis  of  the  regional  association  deputy  groups  suggests 
that  the  influence  of  regional  associations  over  their  own  deputies  was  limited.  "  A 
reason  for  the  weak  unity  of  regional  association  groups  can  be  found  in  the  different 
living  standards  and  economic  conditions  of  their  member  regions.  As  discussed  in 
Chapter  3,  regional  associations  were  mostly  based  on  geographic  vicinity-often 
along  the  boundaries  of  planning  regions-regardless  of  the  socio-economic  conditions 
of  member  regions.  Therefore,  deputies  from  regions  that  joined  a  regional  association 
often  had  different  attitudes  towards  specific  questions,  and  this  was  reflected  in  their 
voting  patterns.  82 
Considering  the  economic  structure  of  the  regions,  deputies  from  hub/gate 
regions  tended  to  support  Eltsin's  reform  policies  more  than  other  regional  groups.  For 
instance,  the  hub/gate  deputy  group  was  more  supportive  of  Eltsin's  position  in  the 
vote  on  the  resolutions  on  economic  situation  and  on  the  question  of  no  confidence  in 
the  government  and  the  president.  "  Even  when  the  Congress  became  hostile  to  Eltsin 
in  relations  between  legislative  and  executive  branches,  hub/gate  deputies  showed  only 
a  moderate  level  of  opposition.  "  By  contrast,  deputies  from  rural  and  resource  regions 
turned  their  back  on  Eltsin,  particularly  after  the  Fifth  Congress,  since  their  socio- 
economic  condition  had  deteriorated  after  the  "shock  therapy"  of  1992.83  At  the  Fifth 
Congress,  for  instance,  deputies  from  resource  regions  supported  a  rule  by  presidential 
decrees,  while  those  from  other  types  of  regions  were  less  keen  on  this  issue.  " 
However,  they  gave  weaker  support  to  Eltsin's  proposals  on  relations  between 
legislative  and  executive  organs  than  other  regional  groups  at  the  Sixth  and  Seventh 
Congresses.  "' 
Regional  differences  emerged  more  clearly  when  the  socio-economic 
performance  of  regions  was  considered.  As  one  might  have  expected,  deputies  from 
`winner'  regions  showed  stronger  support  for  Eltsin's  policies  than  those  from  less 
successful  regions,  although  the  level  of  performance  did  not  always  correlate  with  the (Chapter  YO  245 
degree  of  support.  S"  Differences  were  also  revealed  between  deputies  from 
autonomous  and  other  administrative  units,  but  only  in  a  limited  number  of  votes.  89 
A  clearer  picture  appears  when  these  two  factors-the  socio-economic 
conditions  and  the  federal  status  of  a  region-are  considered  in  combination. 
Deputies'  votes  were  broken  down  by  the  level  of  economic  performance,  90  or  by  the 
federal  status  of  the  regions  where  deputies  had  been  elected,  "  or  by  both,  depending 
on  the  issue.  For  instance,  64  deputies  from  highly  adapted  regions  showed  higher  than 
a  moderate  level  of  unity  (M>I±41)  in  14  of  22  votes,  supporting  Eltsin's  position  in 
most  of  the  votes  analysed.  In  particular,  deputies  from  adapted  republics  were  more 
supportive  of  a  strong  presidency  and  a  balance  of  power  which  was  favourable  to  the 
president  during  the  first  stage  of  confrontation.  However,  they  withdrew  their  support 
at  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congresses,  becoming  less  supportive  of  Eltsin.  92  This  change 
seemed  to  be  a  reflection  of  strained  relations  between  centre  and  republics  on  budget 
relations  and  on  the  new  Constitution. 
Another  regional  factor  that  divided  deputies  in  the  Congress  was  their  urban  or 
rural  origins.  As  in  the  USSR  Congress,  deputies  from  rural  areas  showed  more 
conservative  voting  patterns  than  urban  deputies  in  almost  every  vote  that  included  in 
the  analysis.  "  Furthermore,  they  maintained  a  high  degree  of  unity-higher  than  a 
moderate  level  of  unity  in  eight  votes-compared  with  other  groups  94  However, 
differences  were  less  obvious  when  Moscow  and  St.  Petersburg  deputies  were 
excluded  from  the  analysis.  Furthermore,  the  level  of  urbanisation  did  not  correlate 
with  the  level  of  support,  as  clear  differences  emerged  between  deputies  from  rural 
areas  and  small  cities. 
VI.  2  (2)  'Class'  Cleavages 
In  the  Russian  Congress,  deputies'  votes  could  also  be  considered  in  terms  of 
their  'class'  origins.  As  in  the  CPD  of  the  USSR,  nomenklaturists  often  showed  clearly 
different  voting  patterns  from  the  intelligentsia  and  technicians,  revealing  differences  in 
18  of  the  22  votes.  However,  the  'class'  groups  in  the  Russian  Congress  showed  a 
couple  of  changes. 
First  of  all,  managers  frequently  sided  with  nomenklaturists,  showing  more 
conservative  voting  patterns  than  the  military  personnel  group,  one  of  the  most 
conservative  deputy  groups  in  the  Congress.  By  contrast,  workers  often  showed  rather (Chapter  VI)  246 
liberal  voting  patterns.  Secondly,  most  of  the  'class'  groups  were  often  divided,  failing 
to  maintain  a  moderate  level  of  unity  in  many  votes,  It  suggested  that  attitudes  towards 
reform  were  differentiated  even  among  deputies  who  belonged  to  the  same  category  of 
'class.  '95 
Divisions  within  a  `class'  were  clearly  found  among  deputies  who  were  engaged 
themselves  in  the  economic  sector.  For  instance,  differences  were  often  found  among 
managers,  particularly  between  those  from  the  agricultural  and  industrial  sectors.  In 
the  votes,  agricultural  managers  were  more  conservative  than  industrial  managers, 
revealing  differences  in  eleven  votes,  although  both  groups  showed  similar  voting 
patterns  in  the  votes  on  `other'  issues.  In  particular,  industrial  managers  were  more 
supportive  of  private  land  ownership,  "  and  more  satisfied  with  Eltsin's  economic 
policies  than  agricultural  managers,  97  although  the  gap  between  them  had  been 
significantly  reduced  at  the  Seventh  Congress  in  the  aftermath  of  "shock  therapy.  ""' 
Cadres  also  showed  another  clear  example  of  division  within  a  'class'  group. 
They  were  often  divided,  based  on  the  socio-economic  conditions  and  the  federal  status 
of  the  regions  they  represented.  For  instance,  cadres  from  highly  adapted  and  adapted 
regions  were  often  more  supportive  of  Eltsin's  position,  especially  more  than  those 
from  stagnated  regions  in  their  votes  on  economic  and  political  issues,  revealing 
differences  in  ten  votes.  '  However,  cadres  from  adapted  republics  often  showed  more 
conservative  voting  patterns  than  those  from  stagnated  republics,  although  both  groups 
were  far  more  conservative  than  cadres  from  adapted  regions. 
Regional  differences  were  also  revealed  among  nomenklaturists.  However, 
differences  tended  to  emerge  on  the  basis  of  the  federal  status  of  regions  where  they 
had  been  elected,  particularly  between  nomenklaturists  from  stagnated  regions  and 
stagnated  republics.  100  The  result  suggests  that  an  increasing  representation  of 
nomenklaturists  in  the  Russian  CPD  than  in  the  USSR  CPD  did  not  necessarily  mean 
that  the  conservative  bloc  had  been  bolstered  in  the  Russian  CPD.  As  in  the  CPD  of 
the  USSR,  these  observations  show  that  the  'class'  factor  had  not  always  a  cross- 
regional  impact  on  the  voting  patterns  of  deputies. (Chapter  VI)  247 
VIII  Political  Factions  as  'Primitive'  Party  Politics 
In  the  Russian  Congress,  political  factions  could  be  registered  when  they 
collected  more  than  50  deputies'  signatures.  Fourteen  factions  were  registered  in 
October  1991,  thirteen  in  May  1992,  and  then  fifteen  factions  in  February  1993.101 
Political  factions  based  on  sectoral  interests  or  ideological  orientation  emerged  as  one 
of  the  most  important  factors  in  explaining  the  voting  patterns  of  deputies,  revealing 
differences  in  all  votes  analysed  with  one  exceptional  case.  102 
Among  the  political  factions  in  the  Congress,  Radical  Democrats,  Democratic 
Russia,  and  Consensus  for  the  Sake  of  Progress  tended  strongly  to  support  reform, 
while  Fatherland,  the  Agrarian  Union,  Rossiia,  and  Communists  of  Russia  positioned 
themselves  on  the  opposite  side.  Of  course,  this  general  picture  needed  to  be  slightly 
modified  when  the  characteristics  of  conflicts  in  the  Congress  were  taken  into  account. 
During  the  first  stage  of  conflict  (i.  e.  until  the  Fifth  Congress),  the  liberal  camp  was 
bolstered  by  the  support  of  the  Left  Centre,  Free  Russia,  the  Workers'  Union,  and  Non- 
Party  Deputies. 
However,  as  the  conflict  in  the  Congress  had  developed  into  a  struggle  between 
legislative  and  executive  branches,  these  factions  became  more  conservative  than 
before,  and  were  inclined  to  lose  their  unity.  As  shown  in  Table  6.2.2,  these  tendencies 
were  apparent  among  the  deputies  who  formed  Sovereignty  &  Equality,  the  Industrial 
Union,  the  Workers'  Union,  and  Smena.  103 
As  the  confrontation  in  the  Congress  intensified  in  1992,  the  need  to  form  a 
coalition  had  been  sought  not  only  by  the  regional  deputy  groups  but  also  by  the 
political  factions.  Just  before  the  Sixth  Congress,  three  political  blocs  formed.  t04 
Reformers  grouped  together  in  which  the  factions  of  Democratic  Russia,  Radical 
Democrats,  Free  Russia,  the  Left  Centre,  and  Non-Party  Deputies  joined.  As  the  main 
counterpart,  an  opposition  bloc  called  Russian  Unity  was  also  established  in  April 
1992,  which  included  Rossiia,  Fatherland,  the  Agrarian  Union  and  Communists  of 
Russia.  `'  In  addition  to  these  blocs,  the  faction  leaders  of  the  Workers'  Union,  the 
Industrial  Union,  and  Smena  decided  to  form  the  bloc  of  Creative  Strength 
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However,  factions  within  these  blocs  tended  to  have  slightly  different  political 
and  economic  orientations,  which  made  it  difficult  for  them  to  maintain  a  high  level  of 
unity.  In  particular,  the  Creative  Strength  bloc  tended  to  be  divided  more  often  than 
any  other  bloc,  particularly  when  the  questions  of  land  ownership  (M=0.3)  and  no 
confidence  in  the  government  (M=0.6)  were  put  to  the  vote  at  the  Sixth  Congress. 
Disagreements  among  deputies  were  also  unveiled  within  the  Coalition  for  Reform  and 
Russian  Unity  blocs,  although  they  were  relatively  united  and  showed  a  consistent 
attitude  in  the  vote. 
For  instance,  Russian  Unity  urged  Eltsin  to  shuffle  the  government  by  adding 
representatives  of  entrepreneurs  and  to  make  government  personnel  responsible  to  the 
Congress  and  the  Supreme  Soviet.  The  bloc  also  demanded  that  the  Congress  should 
be  in  charge  of  economic  and  constitutional  questions,  and  its  members  seemed  to  be 
well  united  on  these  issues.  "'  However,  Russian  Unity  failed  to  work  out  either  its 
own  programme  for  economic  reform  or  an  integrated  opinion  regarding  a  draft 
constitution.  Mikhail  Astaf  ev,  the  coordinator  of  Russian  Unity,  admitted  that 
members  of  the  bloc  viewed  "many  things  differently.  "108  The  voting  patterns  of  the 
bloc  members  also  showed  that  they  were  divided  when  a  draft  resolution  on  the  course 
of  economic  reform  was  adopted  as  a  basis  for  the  further  discussion  (M=-1.8).  They 
were  also  weakly  united  against  Eltsin's  proposal  to  remain  the  head  of  the  government 
until  1  December  1992  (M=-2.7)  at  the  Sixth  Congress. 
Admittedly,  the  democratic  factions  were  not  an  exception  as  far  as  unity  was 
concerned.  In  particular,  Free  Russia  and  the  Left  Centre  tended  showed  different 
voting  patterns  unlike  other  relatively  united  factions  such  as  Russian  Democrats  and 
Democratic  Russia.  109  This  split  in  the  democratic  factions  was  not  a  transient  tendency 
as  Free  Russia  ceased  to  be  a  member  of  the  bloc  in  the  Sixth  Congress.  For  Eltsin, 
this  was  a  setback  at  a  critical  period  of  reform  and  before  another  round  of 
confrontation  at  the  following  Congress,  By  early  1993,  reformist  coalitions  were 
reshaped  under  the  name  of  the  Coalition  for  Reform  which  was  joined  by  Consensus 
for  the  Sake  of  Progress.  In  addition  to  existing  blocs,  Free  Russia  and  Left  Centre  left 
the  democratic  factions  and  formed  a  new  bloc,  the  Democratic  Centre 
(Demokraticheskii  tsentr:  DC),  together  with  Sovereignty  &  Equality  and  Motherland 
which  were  then  weakly  opposing  reform.  As  a  result,  four  blocs  were  established,  and 
around  830  of  1040  deputies  joined  the  bloc  at  the  Seventh  Congress  as  in  Table  6.2.2. (Chapter  Vo  250 
At  the  Seventh  Congress,  the  reformist  and  opposition  blocs  showed  a  high  level 
of  unity  in  opposing  each  other.  "'  However,  the  unity  of  the  reformist  blocs  dropped 
somewhat  in  the  vote  on  economic  issues  such  as  land  ownership  and  economic 
reform.  As  for  Russian  Unity,  the  unity  level  fell  even  lower  in  a  couple  of  votes.  "' 
As  in  the  Sixth  Congress,  other  blocs  did  not  seem  to  be  able  to  bind  their  members, 
maintaining  only  a  weak  level  of  unity  in  most  of  the  votes  analysed. 
VI.  2  (4) Other  Di  erences 
Among  other  factors  that  might  have  had  some  influence  on  the  voting  patterns 
of  deputies,  gender,  generation,  party  affiliation,  and  ethnic  origin  were  examined.  As 
shown  in  Table  6.2.1,  it  is  clear  that  deputies  of  the  younger  generation  and  those  who 
had  not  been  affiliated  with  the  Communist  Party  tended  to  be  more  supportive  of 
reform.  By  contrast,  the  gender  factor  and  ethnic  origins  had  only  limited  influence.  "' 
In  the  Russian  Congress,  roughly  equal  numbers  of  deputies,  477  and  585 
respectively,  belonged  to  the  younger  and  older  generation  groups.  As  a  group, 
younger  deputies  were  more  liberal  or  less  conservative  than  the  older.  In  particular, 
the  younger  generation  tended  to  be  more  supportive  of  Eltsin's  socio-economic 
policies  in  the  first  stage  of  confrontation,  "'  although  their  support  weakened  as  the 
Congress  confronted  Eltsin  in  the  later  period.  Despite  the  different  voting  patterns, 
however,  both  deputy  groups  were  divided  in  nine  to  eleven  votes  and  maintained  only 
a  weak  level  of  unity  in  eight  and  nine  votes  respectively. 
Another  factor  that  influenced  the  deputies'  voting  patterns  in  the  Congress  was 
affiliation  with  the  Communist  Party.  In  the  votes  analysed,  deputies  who  had  not  been 
affiliated  with  the  CPSU-253  deputies  or  23.8  per  cent-showed  more  liberal  voting 
patterns  than  those  who  had.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  mention  that  the  Communist 
Party  had  failed  to  maintain  its  unity,  and  membership  as  such  did  not  have  much 
influence  on  deputies'  attitudes  towards  reform  in  this  period.  In  particular,  non-CPSU 
members  showed  a  relatively  high  level  of  unity.  They  were  strongly  united  in  seven 
votes,  providing  a  solid  basis  for  Eltsin's  policies  at  least  until  the  Fifth  Congress. 
However,  when  the  confrontation  became  acute  after  the  Fifth  Congress,  they  became 
less  supportive  of  Eltsin,  although  they  still  supported  reform  policies  in  general.  '  14 (Chapter  YQ  251 
VI.  3.  SIBFE  Deputies  and  Their  Influence  in  the  Russian  Congress 
In  the  Congress,  the  SIBFE  regions  were  represented  by  234  of  the  1064 
deputies  or  22  per  cent,  which  was  a  considerable  proportion  as  key  questions  were 
often  decided  by  a  very  narrow  margin.  "'  In  particular,  the  tensions  between  pro- 
Eltsin  and  anti-Eltsin  blocs  became  more  acute  after  the  Fifth  Congress.  Accordingly, 
both  sides  were  competing  for  a  marginal  number  of  supporters.  Such  a  situation 
would  accommodate  the  regional  influence  over  the  decision-making  process,  if  a 
deputy  group  successfully  converted  its  number  of  seats  into  a  voting  bloc. 
Although  it  is  difficult  to  establish  a  direct  linkage,  some  questions  that  were  put 
to  the  vote  in  the  Congress  were  quite  evidently  related  to  regional  interests.  For 
instance,  a  social  development  programme  for  the  Far  Northern  regions  called  for  at  the 
Second  Congress  could  be  directly  related  to  many  SIBFE  regions,  although  its 
implication  for  reform  in  general  was  limited.  The  resolution  of  the  Seventh  Congress 
"On  the  Course  of  Economic  Reform"  could  also  be  strongly  related  to  the  demands  of 
the  Siberian  regions  that  were  included  in  the  resolution  of  the  First  Congress  of  the 
People's  Deputies  from  Siberia  in  March  1992. 
The  analysis  on  these  votes  suggests  that  the  interests  of  Siberian  and  Far 
Eastern  regions  affected  the  decisions  of  the  Congress.  Furthermore,  their  influence 
was  found  not  only  in  the  vote  on  specific  policies,  "'  but  also  in  the  vote  on  key 
political  and  economic  issues  that  had  general  and  nationwide  effects  on  reform. 
However,  the  unity  of  SIBFE  deputies  was  vulnerable  to  the  influence  of  other  factors 
such  as  political  bloc  membership,  'class'  and  the  generation  factor.  As  in  the  USSR 
Congress,  the  socio-economic  conditions  of  individual  regions  joined  the  list  of  factors 
that  determined  the  voting  patterns  of  SIBFE  deputies  in  the  Russian  Congress. 
VI13  (1)  Features  of  SIBFE  Deputies  in  the  Vote 
The  consistent  demands  of  SIBFE  deputies  could  be  depicted  as 
`decolonisation.  '"7  Decolonisation  often  meant  economic  decentralisation  of 
management  and  foreign  economic  activities,  and  special  arrangements  for  the  socio- 
economic  development  of  the  SIBFE  regions.  However,  an  attempt  to  define  common (Chapter  Yn  252 
goals  at  the  SIBFE  level  was  less  apparent  than  in  the  USSR  CPD,  in  accordance  with 
the  intensification  of  reform  and  specification  of  regional  initiatives. 
Differences  in  their  practical  approaches  to  attain  their  goals  became  more 
evident  between  the  two  regional  associations  that  emerged  in  the  SIBFE  regions.  As 
for  the  Siberian  regions,  they  were  successful  in  claiming  concessions  from  the  centre, 
when  Eltsin  signed  the  decree  "On  the  Issue  of  the  Activities  of  the  Inter-regional 
Association  <Siberian  Agreement>"  in  July  1991.  "8  However,  the  Siberian  Agreement 
became  politicised  when  the  concessions  of  the  centre  failed  to  be  accompanied  by  the 
necessary  financial  measures,  because  of  worsening  fiscal  situation  in  Russia.  In  this 
context,  the  Siberian  Agreement  organised  the  First  Congress  of  the  People's  Deputies 
of  Siberia  in  Krasnoiarsk  on  28-29  March  1992.19 
For  the  Far  Eastern  regions,  the  situation  was  more  or  less  the  same  as  that  of  the 
Siberian  regions,  as  the  government  programmes  for  the  socio-economic  development 
in  the  area  were  not  properly  implemented.  "'  By  contrast  to  the  Siberian  Agreement, 
however,  the  Far  Eastern  regions  gave  a  high  priority  to  economic  measures  in  their 
initiatives.  "  In  general,  they  supported  the  concept  of  Free  Economic  Zone  (FEZ)  that 
would  promote  economic  relations  with  the  adjacent  Asian-Pacific  countries.  '22  Since 
1990,  FEZs  have  been  established  in  the  Far  Eastern  regions  such  as  Nakhodka  in 
Primorskii  krai,  12'  Sakhalin  oblast,  124  and  the  Jewish  Autonomous  oblast.  '23 
These  two  different  approaches  brought  about  a  differentiation  in  their  attitudes 
towards  the  central  authorities.  The  Siberian  regions,  particularly  resource-rich  ones, 
were  primarily  concerned  with  expanding  their  control  over  the  regional  wealth.  This 
approach  increased  tensions  between  central  and  regional  authorities.  By  contrast,  the 
Far  Eastern  regions  were  relatively  more  dependent  on  central  support  not  only  for 
deliveries  of  necessary  goods  in  the  short-term  but  also  for  the  development  of 
infrastructure  in  the  medium  and  long  term.  If  a  Siberian  approach  can  be  depicted  as 
`disengagement'  of  the  centre,  a  stronger  emphasis  was  placed  on  the  'engagement' 
aspect  in  the  strategy  of  the  Far  Eastern  regions.  "' 
These  differences  were  clearly  revealed  in  the  vote  on  presidential  and  economic 
issues.  ''  Until  the  Fifth  Congress,  SIBFE  deputies  were  rather  less  supportive  of 
Eltsin's  effort  to  introduce  a  presidency  in  Russia  and  his  socio-economic  policies. 
However,  after  the  Fifth  Congress,  the  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  deputy  groups  showed 
different  voting  patterns,  when  the  economic  situation  deteriorated  after  the  'Shatalin 
plan'  and  the  Congress  became  hostile  to  Eltsin. (Chapter  Yo  253 
SIBFE  deputies  in  general  tended  to  be  less  supportive  of  establishing  a 
presidency  in  the  first  place.  At  the  Third  Congress,  SIBFE  deputies  as  a  group 
opposed  a  proposal  to  discuss  the  law  on  the  presidency  after  the  referendum  of  March 
1991.128  When  Eltsin  chose  an  alternative  option,  strengthening  his  power  as  chairman 
of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  SIBFE  deputies  again  showed  the  lowest  support  among  the 
regional  association  deputy  groups  in  the  Congress.  129  These  tendencies  were  more  or 
less  the  same  when  the  Fourth  Congress  adopted  the  law  on  "Establishing  a 
Presidency.  "13° 
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Q  1:  The  question  on  the  presidency  and  reforms  of  government  power  and  administrative  system  should 
be  discussed  in  the  following  Congress  at  the  Third  CPD  (adopted);  Q3:  Emergency  power  of  the 
chairman  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  (Eltsin)  at  the  Third  CPD  (rejected);  Rl  :  Law  on  the  President  at  the 
Fourth  CPD  (adopted);  S3:  Emergency  power  of  the  President  at  the  Fifth  CPD  (adopted);  and  US: 
Zor'kin's  proposal  at  the  Seventh  CPD  (adopted). 
The  Regional  Association  of  Chemozem  regions  was  formed  after  the  Fifth  CPD. 
Scores  ranged  from  +10  (strong  support  for  Eltsin)  to  .  10  (strong  opposition). 
However,  some  changes  began  to  emerge  at  the  Fifth  Congress  when  Eltsin 
sought  additional  powers.  When  the  Congress  adopted  the  resolution  "On  the  Legal 
Guarantee  of  Economic  Reform,  "  SIBFE  deputies  gave  stronger  support  for  the 
resolution  than  other  regional  groups.  "  '  Although  no  clear  evidence  was  found,  the 
changing  voting  patterns  might  be  related  to  the  concessions  of  the  centre  made  in 
1991.132  Furthermore,  the  voting  patterns  of  SIBFE  deputies  seemed  to  be  affected  by 
differentiation  of  the  strategies  employed  by  the  SIBFE  regions.  For  instance,  Siberian 
deputies  were  less  supportive  of  Eltsin  than  Far  Eastern  deputies  in  the  vote  on (Chapter  VI)  254 
Zor'kin's  proposal  at  the  Seventh  Congress  that  nullified  restrictions  on  the  presidential 
powers.  "' 
Similar  tendencies  were  also  found  in  the  vote  on  the  Congress's  resolution  on 
the  economic  situation  in  Russia.  Considering  two  votes  on  Zakharov  and 
Kalashnikov's  proposal  at  the  Third  Congress  and  on  the  resolution  of  the  Seventh 
Congress  "On  the  Course  of  Economic  Reform,  "  changes  in  deputies'  attitudes  towards 
socio-economic  conditions  were  evident. 
<Figure  6.2>  Regional  Association  Deputy  Groups  in  the  vote  on  the  Economic  Issues 
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Q2:  Assessing  the  performance  of  the  government  as  unsatisfactory  at  the  Third  CPD  (rejected); 
U2:  The  resolution  of  the  Seventh  CPD  "On  the  Course  of  Economic  Reform  in  the  Russian  Federation" 
(Editorial  Commission  version,  adopted). 
The  Regional  Association  of  Chernozem  regions  was  formed  after  the  Fifth  CPD. 
Scores  ranged  from  +10  (strong  support  for  Eltsin)  to  -  10  (strong  opposition). 
First  of  all,  comparison  of  these  two  votes  clearly  showed  that  deputies  in  the 
Congress  as  a  whole  opposed  Eltsin's  socio-economic  policies  at  the  Seventh 
Congress.  Secondly,  deputy  groups  that  were  relatively  more  supportive  of  Eltsin's 
policies  at  the  Third  Congress  shifted  their  positions,  becoming  far  less  supportive  of 
them.  For  instance,  deputies  from  the  regions  that  joined  the  regional  associations  of 
the  North  Caucasus  and  the  Great  Urals  had  become  far  less  supportive  than  other 
regional  groups  at  the  Seventh  Congress.  In  particular,  a  wide  gap  again  emerged 
between  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  deputies.  In  the  vote,  an  increasing  number  of 
Siberian  deputies  voted  in  favour  of  the  resolution.  By  contrast,  Far  Eastern  deputies 
were  divided  in  the  vote,  revealing  significant  differences  between  the  two  deputy 
groups.  134 
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Despite  their  peculiar  voting  patterns,  however,  SIBFE  deputies  did  not  seem  to 
be  united  in  the  Congress.  "'  Among  the  explanatory  factors  included  in  the  analysis, 
functional  factors  appear  to  have  a  stronger  influence  than  other  factors.  The  situation 
was  more  or  less  the  same  among  the  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  deputy  groups,  although 
the  latter  group  appeared  to  be  somewhat  more  united  than  the  former.  However,  the 
reason  for  the  division  seemed  to  be  quite  different  between  the  Siberian  and  Far 
Eastern  delegations,  partly  because  of  the  different  composition  of  deputies,  as  already 
discussed  in  Chapter  4. 
<Table  6.3.1>  Cleavages  among  SIBFE  Deputies  in  the  CPD  of  Russia  (1990-1993) 
Economic  Issues  Presidential  Issues  Balance  Other 
land  resolu-  confi-  Presi-  of  Issues  Total 
reform  tions  dence  dent  Power 
(3  votes)  (3  votes)  (2votes)  (3  votes)  (6  votes)  (4  votes)  (22  votes) 
<SIBFE  Deputies> 
Regional  Factors 
Siberia  vs.  Far  East  1(0)  1(0)  0  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  3  (0) 
Economic  Structure  1(0)  0(0)  0(0)  0  (0)  4  (1)  1(0)  6  (1) 
Economic  conditions  1(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  1(0)  1(0)  1(0)  4  (0) 
Economic  conditions 
&  Federal  status  0  (0)  1(0)  0(0)  l  (O)  1(0)  2(0)  5  (0) 
Urban  vs.  Rural  2(0)  1(0)  1(0)  2(l)  1(0)  1(0)  8  (1) 
Federal  Status  0  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  1(1)  2  (0)  1(1)  4  (2) 
Functional  Factors 
`Class'  1(0)  3(l)  0(0)  2(l)  2(l)  3(l)  11  (4) 
CPSU  membership  3(2)  3(3)  2(l)  3(3)  5(2)  3  (3)  18(14) 
Political  blocs  3  (3)  3(3)  2  (2)  3(3)  7(6)  4  (3)  22  (20) 
Personal  Factors 
Gender  0  (0)  0  (0)  0(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0(0)  0  (0) 
Generation  2(l)  3(l)  1(0)  3(l)  2(l)  3(l)  14  (5) 
Ethnic  origin  2  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  1(0)  2  (0)  1(0)  7  (0) 
<Siberian  Deputies> 
Regional  Factors 
East  &  West  Siberia  0(0)  0(0)  0(0)  0(0)  1(0)  1(1)  2  (1) 
Economic  Structure  0(0)  0(0)  1(0)  0  (0)  3  (2)  1(0)  5  (2) 
Economic  conditions  0  (0)  0(0)  0(0)  1(0)  2(0)  1(0)  4  (0) 
Economic  conditions 
&  Federal  status  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  l  (O)  1(0)  2  (0) 
(Adapted  vs. 
Stagnated  regions)  0(0)  1(0)  0  (0)  1(1)  1(0)  2  (1)  5  (2) 
Urban  vs.  Rural  2(0)  2(0)  2  (0)  2  (0)  0  (0)  1(0)  9  (0) 
Federal  Status  0  (0)  0  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  1(0)  1(0)  3  (0) 
Functional  Factors 
'Class'  1(0)  2  (0)  0  (0)  1(0)  1(0)  1(0)  6  (0) 
CPSU  membership  2  (2)  3  (3)  2  (2)  3  (3)  4  (2)  3  (3)  17  (15) 
Political  blocs  3(2)  3(3)  2  (2)  3  (3)  5(4)  3(3)  19(17) 
Personal  Factors 
Gender  0  (0)  0(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0(0)  0  (0)  0  (0) 
Generation  1(1)  2(0)  1(0)  2(l)  2(l)  3(0)  11  (3) 
Ethnic  origin  0(0)  0(0)  0  (0)  1  (0)  1  (0)  0  (0)  2  (0) (Chapter  VI)  256 
<Far  Eastern  Deputies> 
Rezional  Factors 
Economic  Structure  2  (0)  0(0)  1(0)  1(0)  1(0)  2  (0)  7  (0) 
Economic  conditions  2  (1)  1(0)  1(0)  1(0)  1(0)  "l  (O)-  7  (0) 
Economic  conditions)  2  (1)  1(1)  0  (0)  1  (1)  2  (0)  1(0)  7  (1) 
(Stagnated  regions  vs. 
Adapted  republics))  2  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  1(0)  1(0)  4  (0) 
Urban  vs.  Rural  0  (0)  0  (0)  0(0)  0(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0) 
Federal  Status  0  (0)  0  (0)  0(0)  0(0)  1  (0)  0  (0)  1  (0) 
Functional  Factors 
'Class'  0  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  1  (0) 
CPSU  membership  1(0)  0(0)  0(0)  1(0)  1(0)  0(0)  3  (0) 
Political  blocs  3  (2)  3(2)  2(2)  3  (2)  7  (5)  4  (2)  22  (15) 
Personal  Factors 
Gender  0  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  1  (0) 
Generation  2  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  3  (0) 
Ethnic  origin  2  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0(0)  2  (0)  2  (0)  6  (0) 
1)  Excluding  three  deputies  from  Kamchatka  oblast 
Significance  at  the  0.05  (0.001)  level. 
Table  6.3.1  shows  that  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  deputies  were  divided  by 
political  bloc  membership.  The  influence  of  the  `class'  factor  had  decreased,  compared 
with  deputies  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole.  However,  Siberian  deputies  were  more 
likely  to  be  divided  by  the  generation  factor  and  CPSU  membership,  but  Far  Eastern 
deputies  by  regional  factors.  These  cleavages  placed  limits  on  the  influence  of  SIBFE 
deputies  over  reform  policies. 
VI.  3  (2)  Regional  Differences  among  SIBFE  De  uties 
Some  regional  factors  were  noteworthy  for  their  impact  on  emerging  cleavages 
among  SIBFE  deputies.  Among  the  regional  factors  discussed  in  the  analysis,  the  level 
of  urbanisation  and  the  economic  structure  of  a  region  appear  to  have  had  a  stronger 
influence  than  other  regional  factors  (see  Table  6.3.1).  As  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole, 
SIBFE  deputies  from  large  cities  voted  in  a  more  liberal  way  than  other  urban  or  rural 
groups,  particularly  on  economic  issues.  13'  However,  they  were  still  less  supportive  of 
Eltsin  than  those  from  large  cities  in  the  European  part  of  Russia,  reducing  the  gap 
between  urban  and  rural  groups.  As  a  result,  urban-rural  differences  were  less  obvious 
among  SIBFE  deputies  than  for  the  Congress  as  a  whole.  "' 
Among  the  regional  factors,  the  economic  structure  of  the  regions  frequently 
divided  SIBFE  deputies.  In  the  early  stages  of  confrontation  at  the  Congress,  SIBFE (Chapter  YI)  257 
deputies  from  rural,  hub/gate,  and  residual  regions  were  less  supportive  of  reform  than 
each  corresponding  deputy  group  from  the  European  part  of  Russia.  "'  As  a  result, 
differences  among  the  regional  groups  based  on  their  economic  structure  were  revealed 
only  in  the  vote  on  the  Programme  of  the  Social  Development  of  the  North.  139 
However,  differences  more  often  emerged  in  the  votes  on  the  balance  of  power 
between  legislative  and  executive  branches  that  were  put  to  the  vote  after  the  Fifth 
Congress.  After  the  Fifth  Congress,  rural  and  hub/gate  deputies  were  more  supportive 
of  the  president,  while  deputies  from  the  resource  and  residual  regions  voted  in  less 
supportive  ways  than  the  same  category  of  deputies  from  the  European  part  of 
Russia.  140 
At  first  sight,  the  socio-economic  conditions  and  the  federal  status  of  the  region 
where  deputies  had  been  elected  had  limited  influence  over  SIBFE  deputies'  voting 
patterns,  when  these  two  factors  were  separately  discussed.  However,  their  influence 
became  clearer  when  these  two  variables  were  considered  in  combination.  141 
These  observations  can  be  extended  to  analyse  the  voting  patterns  of  Siberian 
deputies,  with  a  few  modifications.  The  Siberian  delegation  from  large  cities  was  more 
supportive  of  reform  than  deputies  from  less  urbanised  areas.  The  number  of  votes 
where  differences  were  revealed  among  urban-rural  groups  or  Hanson's  regional 
groups  was  about  the  same  as  that  in  respect  of  SIBFE  deputies  as  a  whole. 
Furthermore,  the  economic  features  of  the  regions  seemed  to  be  more  important  than 
their  federal  status  of  regions,  since  no  differences  were  revealed  between  the  deputy 
groups  of  the  autonomous  administrative  formations  and  ordinary  regions  in  Siberia. 
However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  Far  Eastern  deputies  showed  different  voting 
patterns,  being  more  united  than  the  Siberian  delegation.  First  of  all,  no  urban-rural 
differences  were  found  among  Far  Eastern  deputies.  This  tendency  was  partly  because 
Far  Eastern  deputies  tended  to  be  more  homogeneous  in  their  composition.  For 
instance,  only  four  of  them  originated  from  rural  areas,  In  addition,  33  Far  Eastern 
deputies  from  large  cities  voted  in  a  less  liberal  way  than  the  corresponding  deputy 
groups  of  other  regional  associations.  "'  By  contrast,  deputies  of  medium-sized  or 
small  cities  were  more  supportive  of  reform.  Accordingly,  the  urban  deputy  groups 
revealed  similar  voting  patterns. 
The  peculiarities  of  Far  Eastern  deputies  surfaced  again  when  the  socio- 
economic  differentiation  among  Far  Eastern  regions  was  considered.  First  of  all,  those 
Far  Eastern  deputies  who  originated  from  hub/gate  regions  tended  to  be  more (chapter  i?  )  238 
supportive  of  Eltsin's  economic  policies  than  other  types  of  regions.  "'  By  contrast, 
Congress  members  from  the  Far  Eastern  resource  regions  were  less  satisfied  with  the 
economic  situation,  supporting  changes  in  the  course  of  economic  reform  and  a  weak 
presidency.  '"  Therefore,  Hanson's  regional  groups  tended  to  vote  differently,  not  only 
in  votes  on  political  issues  but  also  in  votes  on  economic  questions.  Secondly,  the 
regional  deputy  groups  based  on  their  socio-economic  conditions  showed  different 
voting  patterns  more  frequently  than  Siberian  deputies.  In  general,  deputies  from  well- 
developed  regions-the  Republic  of  Sakha  and  Magadan  oblast-were  more 
supportive  of  Eltsin,  although  they  often  shifted  their  position.  I's  By  contrast,  deputies 
from  poorly  developed  regions  strongly  opposed  Eltsin  in  many  occasions. 
VI  3  (3)  Cleavages  in  the  'Class'  and  Political  Factions 
The  `class'  background  of  SIBFE  deputies  also  turned  out  to  be  a  main  source  of 
division  within  the  deputy  groups,  revealing  differences  in  eleven  votes.  However,  the 
general  picture  of  the  `class'  cleavages  among  SIBFE  deputies  was  slightly  different 
from  that  of  the  Congress  as  a  whole.  First  of  all,  reformist  groups  such  as  the 
intelligentsia  and  technicians  voted  in  a  less  liberal  way  than  the  intelligentsia  and 
technicians  from  elsewhere.  146  Furthermore,  workers  showed  quite  similar  voting 
patterns  to  the  reformist  `class'  groups. 
With  regard  to  the  demands  of  the  SIBFE  regions  in  general,  it  is  worth  noting 
the  voting  patterns  of  cadres  from  the  SIBFE  regions.  Cadres  from  the  SIBFE  regions 
were  inclined  to  be  more  liberal  than  cadres  from  other  regions  in  eighteen  votes, 
although  significant  differences  were  revealed  in  only  three  votes.  However,  these 
three  votes  were  closely  related  to  the  demands  of  the  SIBFE  regions,  suggesting  that 
SIBFE  cadres  were  more  attentive  to  regional  demands  in  the  Congress.  147  As  a  result, 
SIBFE  cadres  joined  the  reformist  camp,  while  nomenklaturists,  managers,  and  military 
personnel  remained  in  the  conservative  camp. 
When  we  considered  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  deputies  separately,  'class' 
cleavages  emerged  far  less  frequently.  Among  Siberian  deputies,  'class'  cleavages 
were  evident  in  only  six  votes,  as  the  two  main  reformist  'class'  group-the 
intelligentsia  and  technicians-were  less  supportive  of  reform  than  the  corresponding 
'class'  from  other  regions  in  about  half  the  vote  analysed.  148 (Chapter  VI)  259 
In  particular,  'class'  background  seldom  divided  Far  Eastern  deputies,  Among 
them,  'class'  cleavages  were  revealed  in  a  single  vote,  because  of  homogeneity  in  their 
'class'  composition19  and  reformist  voting  patterns  of  managers1S°  and  cadres'"  from 
the  Far  East. 
Another  important  factor  that  weakened  the  unity  of  SIBFE  deputies  was  their 
affiliation  with  political  fractions  in  the  Congress.  As  in  Table  6.3.2,  the  composition 
of  SIBFE  deputies  in  respect  to  political  factions  or  blocs  was  almost  the  same  as  that 
of  the  Congress  as  a  whole. 
In  general,  both  the  Coalition  for  Reform,  a  main  reform  supporting  bloc,  and 
Russian  Unity,  a  main  opposition  bloc,  maintained  a  high  level  of  unity,  strongly 
opposing  each  other  in  all  votes  analysed.  By  contrast,  those  political  factions  that 
constituted  the  Democratic  Centre  and  Creative  Strength  were  less  united,  maintaining 
a  high  level  of  unity  in  less  than  five  votes.  These  tendencies  are  quite  understandable 
as  the  Democratic  Centre  and  Creative  Strength  consisted  of  political  factions  that  often 
failed  to  maintain  a  high  level  of  unity.  "'  Furthermore,  these  political  factions  often 
opposed  one  another  even  after  they  formed  a  political  bloc  in  early  1992.133  Similar 
trends  emerge  when  we  consider  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  deputies  separately. 
However,  Far  Eastern  deputies  belonging  to  the  political  blocs,  particularly  the 
Coalition  for  Reform134  and  Russian  Unity,  '33  tended  to  be  more  united  than  Siberian 
deputies  in  the  same  blocs. 
Considering  the  demands  made  by  SIBFE  deputies,  those  who  belonged  to  the 
two  opposing  blocs-the  Coalition  for  Reform  and  Russian  Unity-seemed  to  vote  in 
accordance  with  the  general  guidelines  of  their  political  blocs  or  fractions  rather  than 
those  of  the  regional  association.  Of  course,  this  does  not  mean  that  they  did  not 
respond  to  the  declaration  of  regional  associations  at  all.  156  For  instance,  the  voting 
patterns  of  deputies  belonging  to  the  Workers'  Union  and  Sovereignty  &  Equality 
factions  showed  quite  a  shift  from  reformist  to  conservative  positions  even  at  the  same 
Congress.  "'  In  this  regard,  leaders  of  regional  associations  tended  to  rely  on 
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VI  ,3 
(4)  Other  Cleavages 
As  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole,  also  SIBFE  deputies  could  be  divided  by  age 
group  and  CPSU  membership.  By  contrast,  the  ethnic  origin  of  deputies  and  the 
gender  factor  had  limited  influence  over  their  voting  patterns.  However,  as  in  Table 
6.3.1,  this  generalisation  needs  to  be  modified  as  Far  Eastern  deputies  were  more  likely 
to  be  divided  along  ethnic  lines,  rather  than  by  age  group  or  CPSU  membership. 
With  regard  to  the  voting  patterns  of  SIBFE  deputies  as  a  whole,  the  generation 
factor  seemed  to  be  as  important  as  `class'  background.  As  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole, 
the  younger  generation  of  SIBFE  deputies  tended  to  be  more  supportive  of  reform  than 
older  deputies.  In  particular,  the  generation  gap  was  clearly  revealed  among  Siberian 
deputies,  revealing  differences  in  twelve  votes.  By  contrast,  Far  Eastern  deputies 
tended  to  show  different  voting  patterns  from  Siberian  deputies  as  the  generation  gap 
was  revealed  in  only  three  votes.  "  The  trend  was  mainly  caused  by  the  older 
generation  from  the  Far  East,  who  was  more  supportive  of  reform  than  other  senior 
deputies  in  the  Congress.  "° 
SIBFE  deputies  were  again  divided  by  their  affiliations  with  the  CPSU.  Among 
them,  deputies  who  had  not  been  affiliated  with  the  CPSU  were  more  supportive  of 
reform  policies  than  CPSU  members.  However,  after  the  Fifth  Congress,  their  unity 
level  fell  from  a  strong  to  a  weak  level  or  even  lower.  Furthermore,  this  trend  can  be 
found  in  all  categories  of  votes.  ",  Therefore,  distance  from  the  Communist  Party  did 
not  necessarily  guarantee  support  for  Eltsin's  policies,  particularly  when  the  tensions 
between  legislative  and  executive  branches  became  acute  in  the  Congress,  although 
non-CPSU  members  in  general  were  still  slightly  more  supportive  of  Eltsin.  162 
Also  for  CPSU  membership,  Far  Eastern  deputies  differed  from  Siberian 
deputies.  For  instance,  fourteen  Far  Eastern  deputies  who  had  not  been  affiliated  with 
the  CPSU  were  less  supportive  of  Eltsin's  position  than  30  corresponding  Siberian 
deputies  in  most  of  the  votes  analysed.  By  contrast,  Far  Eastern  deputies  who  held 
membership  of  the  CPSU  were  inclined  to  vote  in  more  liberal  or  less  conservative 
ways  than  their  Siberian  counterparts.  As  a  result,  CPSU  membership  accounted  for 
different  voting  patterns  among  Far  Eastern  deputies  in  only  three  votes  (Ql,  Q3,  and 
T4).  "3  By  contrast,  it  divided  Siberian  deputies  in  seventeen  votes. (Chapter  VV  262 
Finally,  another  source  of  division  among  deputies  was  their  ethnic  origin. 
Among  SIBFE  deputies,  non-Russian  deputies  accounted  for  63  or  about  27  per  cent. 
In  general,  non-Russian  SIBFE  deputies  did  not  appear  to  be  united,  although  they 
tended  to  be  less  supportive  of  reform  than  Russian  deputies,  revealing  differences  in 
seven  votes.  In  particular,  these  differences  were  mainly  caused  by  Far  Eastern 
deputies. 
Ethnic  differences  among  Far  Eastern  deputies  were  mainly  revealed  in  the  votes 
on  the  questions  of  introducing  new  types  of  land  ownership  and  accountability  of  the 
government,  when  Russian  deputies  were  more  liberal  in  the  vote.  -  However,  with 
regard  to  regional  interests,  ethnic  groups  seldom  revealed  differences  in  the  vote  on 
economic  resolutions  and  other  presidential  issues.  Furthermore,  even  in  votes  where 
differences  were  revealed,  the  economic  features  of  the  regions  from  which  they  were 
originated  seemed  to  be  more  important  than  ethnic  origin  in  itself.  For  instance,  the 
titular  ethnic  groups  of  the  republics  tended  to  vote  differently  although  they  were  still 
less  liberal  than  their  Russian  colleagues  from  the  same  republics.  1u 
VI.  4.  The  Overall  Influence  of  Regional  Factors 
As  in  the  USSR  CPD,  deputies'  voting  patterns  were  rather  personalised  in  the 
Russian  Congress.  However,  the  analysis  of  the  overall  influence  of  these  factors 
suggests  that  conspicuous  changes  were  developing  in  the  Russian  Congress.  Firstly, 
bloc  and  regional  association  memberships,  and  regional  economic  features  emerged  as 
the  main  sources  of  cleavages  among  deputies  in  accordance  with  the  acceleration  of 
reform  and  the  changing  features  of  tensions  in  the  Congress.  Secondly,  the  influence 
of  factors  varied  depending  on  the  question.  In  relation  with  SIBFE  regionalism, 
SIBFE  deputies  were  relatively  united  in  votes  that  were  closely  related  to  their 
common  goals.  However,  their  unity  was  brittle  when  other  questions  were  put  to  the 
vote,  which  decreased  their  general  influence  over  the  decision-making  process  in  the 
Congress.  Finally,  despite  the  increasing  influence  of  blocs  and  regional  groups,  none 
of  these  groups  controlled  the  Congress.  As  a  result  of  the  segmentation  of  deputies, 
changes  in  the  electoral  system  had  been  introduced  in  December  1993. (Chapter  VI)  263 
VI.  4  (1)  Chafes  in  the  Voting  Patterns  of  Deputies  in  Terms  of  rime  Sequence 
During  the  first  stage  of  the  confrontation  in  the  Congress,  deputies'  preferences 
were  personalised,  as  many  factors  were  involved  in  the  votes  that  were  taken.  In  the 
Congress  as  a  whole,  age,  'class,  '  CPSU  and  political  faction  membership,  and  some 
regional  factors  such  as  the  economic  structure  of  the  regions  and  membership  of 
regional  associations  turned  out  to  have  a  significant  influence  upon  deputies'  voting 
patterns. 
However,  striking  changes  had  taken  place  in  deputies'  voting  patterns  after  the 
Fifth  Congress  as  the  influence  of  age,  `class'  background,  and  CPSU  membership 
decreased.  Among  the  regional  factors,  membership  of  regional  associations  also 
seemed  to  lose  its  significance  as  regional  associations  themselves*  were  on  a  down- 
slope  by  early  1993.  By  contrast,  political  bloc  membership  emerged  as  a  crucial 
factor.  In  addition,  the  economic  structure  of  a  region  consistently  affected  deputies' 
preference  in  the  vote,  regardless  of  tensions  in  the  Congress. 
<Table  6.4.1>  Numbers  of  Votes  in  which  Factors  had  Significant  Overall  Influence  in 
the  Russian  CPD  in  Terms  of  Time  Sequence 
CPD  as  a  Whole  SIBFE  Deputies 
2nd  -  6th  -  2nd  -  6th  - 
5th  7th  Total  Sth  7th  Total 
CPD  CPD  CPD  CPD 
12  votes  10  votes  22  votes  12  votes  10  votes  22  votes 
Personal  &  'Azonal'  Factors 
Gender  0  (0)  4  (0)  4  (0)  2  (1)  0  (1)  2  (2) 
Age  8(0)  2(0)  10(0)  4(0)  2(2)  6(2) 
Ethnic  Origin  4  (1)  1(0)  5  (0)  2  (0)  1(2)  3(2) 
Urban-rural  0  (0)  2  (0)  2  (0)  1(0)  2  (0)  3  (0) 
Functional  Factors 
'Class'  9  (0)  4  (0)  13(0)  3(2)  1(1)  4  (3) 
CPSU  Membership  8(0)  1(2)  9  (2)  3  (3)  1  (1)  4  (4) 
Bloc  Membership  12  (0)  10  (0)  22  (0)  11  (1)  10  (0)  21(l) 
Regional  Factors 
Regional  Associations  8(0)  4  (1)  12  (1)  1  (1)  3(t)  4  (2) 
Economic  Structure  5(2)  5  (1)  10  (3)  S  (O)  50)  10  (1) 
Economic  Performance  3(1)  1  (1)  4  (2)'»  3(t)  2  (0)  5  (1)3) 
Autonomous  Status  1  (1)  3(0)  4(1)1)  3(0)  2  (4)  5(4)4) 
Economic  Performance 
+  Federal  Status  2  (0)  2  (0)  4(0)2)  2  (0)  0  (0)  2(0)3) 
excluded  from  four  votes  (P1,  Q2,  T3,  and  U3) 
included  in  four  votes  in  place  of  Economic  Performance  and  the  Federal  Status 
3  excluded  from  seven  votes  (P  1,  R1,  R2,  T2,  T3,  U3,  and  US) 
4)  excluded  from  three  votes  (P1,  R2,  and  U3) 
n  included  in  three  votes  in  place  of  Economic  Performance  and  the  Federal  Status 
Significance  at  the  0.05  (0.10)  level. (Chapter  VI)  264 
Among  SIBFE  deputies,  a  similar  tendency  can  be  traced.  However,  a  couple  of 
features  are  noteworthy  among  SIBFE  deputies.  For  instance,  the  influence  of  CPSU 
membership  and  `class'  had  decreased  even  before  the  Fifth  Congress  among  SIBFE 
deputies.  By  contrast,  the  economic  features  of  the  SIBFE  regions  consistently 
affected  deputies'  voting  patterns  throughout  the  Congresses.  In  particular,  differences 
between  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  deputies  became  clearer  after  the  Fifth  Congress, 
reflecting  the  split  between  the  two  regional  groups  outside  the  Congress. 
Furthermore,  the  federal  status  and  economic  structure  of  the  regions  more 
significantly  affected  SIBFE  deputies'  voting  patterns  in  the  Russian  Congress  than  in 
the  USSR  Congress.  As  a  result,  regional  factors  and  political  bloc  membership 
became  quite  solid  sources  of  division  among  SIBFE  deputies,  particularly  after  the 
Fifth  Congress. 
VI  4  /2)  The  Voting  Patterns  oleputies  in  Terms  of  T  pes  of  Issues 
Although  the  influence  of  deputies'  regional  background  and  bloc  membership 
upon  their  voting  patterns  increased,  it  was  dependent  on  the  questions  that  were  put  to 
the  vote.  For  instance,  bloc  membership  appeared  to  be  a  decisive  factor  in  the  vote  on 
no  confidence.  In  the  vote  on  the  resolutions  on  the  course  of  reform,  bloc  membership 
and  regional  association  membership  turned  out  to  have  the  dominant  influence.  By 
contrast,  more  factors  were  involved  in  the  vote  on  land  reform  and  on  relations 
between  the  parliament  and  the  president  (See  Table  6.4.2). 
<Table  6.4.2>  Numbers  of  Votes  in  which  Factors  had  Significant  Overall  Influence  in 
the  Russian  CPD  in  Terms  of  Topics 
Land  Eco.  Presi-  No  Balance  Other  Total 
reform  resolu  dency  confi-  of  power 
-tions  dence 
3  votes  3  votes  3  votes  2  votes  7  votes  4  votes  22  votes 
CPD  as  a  whole 
Personal  &  Azonal  Factors 
Gender  2  (0)  1  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  4  (0) 
Age  2  (0)  1  (0)  2  (0)  0  (0)  4(0)  1  (0)  10  (0) 
Ethnic  Origin  1(0)  0  (0)  2  (0)  0  (0)  1(0)  1  (0)  5(0) 
Urban-rural  1(0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  2  (0)  0  (0)  2  (0) 
Functional  Factors 
`Class'  2  (0)  1(0)  3(0)  1(0)  3  (0)  3(0)  13  (0) 
CPSU  Membership  1(0)  1  (0)  3  (0)  0  (0)  1(0)  3  (0)  9  (2) 
Bloc  Membership  3  (0)  3  (0)  3  (0)  2  (0)  7  (0)  4  (0)  22  (0) 
Regional  Factors 
Regional  Associations  2  (0)  3  (0)  1  (0)  1(0)  2  (1)  3  (0)  12  (1) (Chapter  Yo  265 
Economic  Structure  3  (0)  1(1)  0  (0)  0  (0)  4  (1)  2  (1)  10  (3) 
Economic  Performance  1(0)  0  (1)  1(0)  0  (0)  1  (0)  1  (0)  4(2)1) 
Federal  Status  0(0)  1(0)  0(l)  0(0)  3(0)  0(0)  4  (1)'» 
Economic  Performance 
+  Federal  Status  2  (0)  1(0)  n/a  n/a  1  (0)  n/a  3  (0)2 
SIBFE  Deputies 
Personal  &  Azonal  Factors 
Gender  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (1)  0  (0)  1  (1)  1  (0)  2  (2) 
Age  2(0)  1(0)  0(0)  0(l)  2(1)  1(0)  6(l) 
Ethnic  Origin  1(0)  1  (1)  0  (0)  0  (0)  1  (1)  0  (0)  3  (2) 
Urban-rural  2  (0)  1  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0(0)  0  (0)  3(0) 
Functional  Factors 
`Class'  0(i)  0(l)  1  (1)  0(0)  I  (o)  2(0)  4(3) 
CPSU  Membership  1(0)  0  (1)  2  (0)  0  (1)  0  (0)  1  (2)  4  (4) 
Bloc  Membership  3  (0)  3  (0)  3  (0)  2(0)  7  (0)  3  (1)  21(l) 
Regional  Factors 
Regional  Associations  1(1)  1  (0)  0  (0)  1  (0)  1  (1)  0  (0)  4  (2) 
Economic  Structure  2  (1)  0  (0)  1(0)  0(0)  6  (0)  1(0)  10  (1) 
Economic  Performance  1(0)  1(0)  1(0)  0  (0)  1  (1)  1(0)  5(1)3) 
Federal  Status  0  (1)  2  (0)  1(0)  0  (0)  1(3)  1(0)  5(4)4) 
Economic  Performance 
+  Federal  Status  1  (0)  n/a  1  (0)  n/a  n/a  n/a  2  (0f 
excluded  from  four  votes  (P1,  Q2,  T3,  and  U3) 
included  in  four  votes  in  place  of  Economic  Performance  and  the  Federal  Status 
'excluded  from  seven  votes  (P1,  R1,  R2,  T2,  T3,  U3,  and  US) 
excluded  from  three  votes  (P  1,  R2,  and  U3) 
included  in  three  votes  in  place  of  Economic  Performance  and  the  Federal  Status 
Significance  at  the  0.05  (0.10)  level. 
These  trends  were  also  found  among  SIBFE  deputies.  In  particular,  the 
economic  structure  of  the  regions  clearly  emerged  as  a  powerful  influence  upon  the 
voting  patterns  of  SIBFE  deputies,  particularly  in  the  vote  on  relations  between  the 
parliament  and  the  president.  In  the  vote,  bloc  membership  and  the  economic  structure 
of  the  regions  that  deputies  were  representing  determined  SIBFE  deputies'  voting 
patterns,  as  the  influence  of  personal  and  functional  factors  decreased  significantly 
after  the  Fifth  Congress. 
An  investigation  of  changes  in  the  chi-square  also  showed  similar  results. 
Among  deputies  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole,  regional  factors  seemed  to  play  quite  an 
important  role  when  deputies  cast  their  votes.  As  in  Appendix  tables  7.1  and  7.2, 
regional  factors  significantly  improved  the  score  for  the  the  vote  on  land  reform,  the 
resolution  on  the  course  of  reform,  and  on  rule  by  presidential  decree. 
In  particular,  the  regional  factors  included  in  the  analysis  significantly  affected 
SIBFE  deputies'  voting  patterns  in  the  vote  on  the  relationship  between  the  president 
and  the  parliament  even  after  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congress. (Chapter  VI)  266 
V.  4  (3)  Limits  of  Political  Blocs  as  Voting  Blocs 
Among  the  factors  discussed  in  this  analysis,  political  bloc  membership  turned 
out  to  have  a  significant  influence  on  the  voting  patterns  of  deputies.  However,  it  is 
difficult  to  say  that  political  faction  (or  bloc)  membership  was  the  most  influential  or 
`sufficient'  factor  in  explaining  voting  patterns  of  deputies  in  the  Congress.  It  should 
be  recalled  that  main  political  blocs  were  formed  in  April  1992,  just  before  the  Sixth 
Congress.  Until  the  Sixth  Congress,  a  `political  bloc'  in  the  table  meant  a  group  of 
political  factions  which  would  join  the  bloc  later,  and  the  term  was  used  to  maintain  the 
consistency  of  the  analysis.  "" 
Even  after  the  Sixth  Congress,  political  factions  or  blocs  were  rather  unstable  in 
their  membership.  Deputies  often  joined  more  than  one  faction  at  the  same  time  and 
shifted  from  faction  to  faction.  167  Furthermore,  more  than  half  the  deputies  who  joined 
the  political  factions  did  not  seem  to  be,  strongly  affiliated  with  their  factions.  They 
often  failed  to  work  out  an  agreement  even  with  other  deputies  who  belonged  to  the 
same  faction  as  no  factions  had  an  alternative  reform  policy  with  which  members  were 
agreed.  "' 
As  in  Appendix  8.1,  political  faction  leaders  in  the  Congress  often  appeared  to 
be  in  dispute  with  their  members,  particularly  in  factions  such  as  Left  Centre,  Free 
Russia,  and  the  Workers'  Union.  Therefore,  it  is  not  strange  that  deputies  often 
showed  rather  different  voting  patterns  from  those  of  their  leaders  in  those  factions. 
For  instance,  among  SIBFE  deputies,  only  those  who  joined  five  factions-Radical 
Democrats,  Democratic  Russia,  Fatherland,  Rosslia,  and  Communists  of  Russia 
tended  to  show  similar  voting  patterns  to  their  leading  figures  as  compared  with  other 
deputies.  This  observation  suggests  that  political  bloc  membership  was  more 
influential  for  those  who  joined  one  of  two  blocs-the  Coalition  for  Reform  that 
strongly  supported  reform,  or  the  Russian  Unity  that  strongly  opposed  reform-than 
deputies  who  joined  other  blocs. 
One  of  the  reasons  for  the  relatively  strong  unity  of  the  Coalition  for  Reform  and 
Russian  Unity  can  be  found  in  their  relatively  homogeneous  composition.  As  for  the 
Coalition  for  Reform  bloc,  its  members  mainly  came  from  the  intelligentsia,  cadres, 
and  technicians,  who  provided  82.8  per  cent  of  the  members  of  the  bloc.  Considering 
the  regional  background  of  members,  89.9  per  cent  were  from  large  cities  and  62.4  per 
cent  were  from  hub/gate  regions.  Russian  Unity  also  consisted  of  deputies  who  tended (Chapter  YI)  267 
to  share  a  common  background.  They  were  mainly  nomenklaturists,  managers 
(particularly  managers  in  the  agricultural  sector),  and  military  personnel,  who  together 
accounted  for  221  members  or  77.2  per  cent.  Furthermore,  most  deputies  from  rural 
areas,  72.4  per  cent  of  them,  joined  Russian  Unity. 
By  contrast,  two  other  blocs,  the  Democratic  Centre  and  Creative  Strength, 
tended  to  lack  homogeneity  in  their  composition.  As  a  result,  `class'  and  regional 
cleavages  emerged  among  deputies  who  joined  the  factions  that  consisted  of  these  two 
blocs  in  1992.  Even  at  the  Sixth  Congress  when  the  political  blocs  were  established, 
significant  regional  or  'class'  differences  were  revealed  particularly  among  the 
Democratic  Centre,  although  they  almost  disappeared  at  the  Seventh  Congress. 
<Table  6.4.3>  `Class'  and  Regional  Cleavages  within  the  Political  Blocs  in  the  Russian 
CPD 
2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  7th  Total 
CPD  CPD  CPD  CPD  CPD  CPD 
3  votes  3  votes  3  votes  3  votes  5  votes  5  votes  22  votes 
Coalition  for  Rem 
'Class'  2(0)  0(l)  0(0)  1(0)  0(0)  0(0)  3(l) 
Economic  structure  1  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  1(0)  1  (0)  1  (1)  4  (1) 
Democratic  Centre 
'Class'  2  (0)  3(0)  3  (0)  2  (0)  3  (0)  0  (0)  13  (0) 
Economic  structure  0  (1)  3(0)  2  (0)  1  (0)  3(l)  1  (0)  10  (2) 
Creative  Strength 
'Class'  2(0)  3(0)  2(0)  1(0)  2(1)  0(2)  10(3) 
Economic  structure  0  (1)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (0)  0  (1) 
Russian  Unity 
'Class'  1(0)  2(0)  1(0)  0(1)  1(1)  0(1)  5(3) 
Economic  structure  0  (0)  1(0)  1(0)  0  (0)  2  (0)  2  (1)  6  (1) 
Others 
'Class'  3(0)  3(0)  3(0)  1(0)  2(0)  0(0)  12(0) 
Economic  structure  3  (0)  3(0)  2  (0)  1(0)  OR  0(1)-  9  (1) 
Bloc  membership  as  of  1992. 
Numbers  of  votes  in  which  differences  were  revealed  at  the  0.05  (0.10)  level. 
This  trend  was  also  found  among  SIBFE  deputies,  although  the  sample  size  is 
often  too  small  to  analyse  possible  'class'  and  regional  differences  within  the  political 
blocs.  However,  it  is  noteworthy  that  the  economic  structure  of  the  regions  divided 
SIBFE  deputies  who  joined  the  Russian  Unity  bloc.  By  contrast  to  the  general  trend 
that  regional  cleavages  within  a  bloc  tended  to  diminish  among  deputies  in  the 
Congress  as  a  whole,  regional  cleavages  among  SIBFE  deputies  who  were  members  of 
Russian  Unity  clearly  emerged  even  at  the  Seventh  Congress  (see  Table  6.4.4).  This 
result  suggests  that  the  influence  of  the  political  blocs  could  be  weaker  among  SIBFE 
deputies  than  among  deputies  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole. (Chapter  Yo  268 
<Table  6.4.4>  Regional  Differences  within  `Russian  Unity'  at  the  Seventh  CPD 
N  Mean  SD  df  MS  F  sig. 
the  Resolution  on  the  Course  of  Economic  Reform.  (U2) 
Rural  regions  7  4.29  7.87  between  groups  3  331.28  14.81  0.000 
Resource  regions  26  -8.08  4.02  within  groups  69  22.36 
Hub/gate  regions  12  -7.50  6.22  total  72 
Residual  regions  28  -8.57  3.56 
Total  73  -6.99  5.94 
Muravev's  constitutional  amendment  to  Art.  12  (the  right  to  sell  land.  U3) 
Rural  regions  7  0.00  5.77  between  groups  3  141.40  3.25  0.027 
Resource  regions  26  -4.23  7.58  within  groups  69  43.45 
Hub/gate  regions  12  -4.17  7.93  total  72 
Residual  regions  28  -7.86  4.99 
Total  73  -5.21  6.89 
Eltsin's  constitutional  amendment  to  Art.  122  (U4) 
Rural  regions  7  -5.71  7.87  between  groups  3  85.85  3.73  0.015 
Resource  regions  26  -5.77  6.43  within  groups  69  23.07 
Hub/gate  regions  12  -10.00  0.00  total  72 
Residual  regions  28  -9.29  2.62 
Total  73  -7.81  5.07 
Zor'kin's  proposal  on  the  Resolution  on  the  stabilisation  of  the  Structure  of  the  RF 
Rural  regions  7  -1.43  6.90  between  groups  3  166.52  5.22  0.003 
Resource  regions  26  3.08  5.49  within  groups  69  31.87 
Hub/gate  regions  12  -4.17  6.69  total  72 
Residual  regions  28  -1.07  4.97 
Total  73  .  0.14  6.12 
Mean  scores  range  from  +10  (pro-reform)  to  -10  (anti-reform). 
Although  these  observations  still  leave  a  lot  to  be  explained,  they  provide  some 
clues  for  an  understanding  of  general  tendencies  in  the  Congress,  their  implications  for 
the  question  of  regionalism,  and  further  political  developments  in  Russia.  First  of  all,  it 
is  needless  to  say  that  any  single  factor  cannot  provide  a  whole  picture.  Even  deputies' 
political  orientation  was  related  to  other  functional  and  regional  factors.  Although  I 
suggested  some  combination  of  factors,  a  revised  set  of  regional  groups  may  produce 
some  improvement  in  explanation. 
Secondly,  despite  the  development  of  regional  associations,  their  influence  over 
deputies'  voting  patterns  was  rather  limited.  Considering  the  unity  level,  deputies  from 
the  Urals,  Siberian  and  Far  East  regions  appeared  to  be  reasonably  well  united  only 
when  they  are  compared  with  other  deputy  groups  of  regional  associations,  but  not  in 
an  absolute  sense.  Furthermore,  deputies  were  divided  into  smaller  regional  groups  as 
the  reform  policies  were  specified  in  accordance  with  the  acceleration  of  reform. (Chapter  Yo  269 
Thirdly,  this  vague  division  of  deputies  made  it  difficult  for  the  government  to 
adopt  necessary  measures.  Decisions  made  at  the  Congress  often  end  up  with  vague 
guidelines,  because  of  conflicting  interests  of  various  political  blocs,  sectors,  and 
regions.  This,  in  turn,  led  to  the  regionalisation  of  reform. 
Finally,  the  experience  in  the  Congress  encouraged  Eltsin  to  consider  changes  in 
the  political  system  including  election  procedures.  In  connection  with  the  electoral 
system,  Sobyanin  suggested  that  changes  should  be  introduced  for  new  elections: 
...  the  independent  position  of  deputies  who  were  elected  as  individuals  has 
made  parliament  politically  ill  organised,  unpredictable  and  unstable.  As  a  result, 
it  may  become  a  hostage  of  the  hands  of  a  narrow  group  of  deputies, 
... 
This 
negative  experience  of  the  Russian  parliament,  pregnant  with  the  constant  threat  of 
acute  and  profound  political  crises,  must  be  considered  in  preparing  for  new 
elections  which  may  occur  in  the  near  future.  169 
Although  Sobyanin  did  not  mention  specific  changes,  it  became  clear  when  the 
State  Duma  was  elected  in  December  1993.  The  size  of  the  parliament  was  reduced 
from  1068  seats  in  1990  to  628  seats  (450  seats  for  the  Duma  and  178  seats  for  the 
Council  of  the  Federation)  in  1993.  Furthermore,  half  the  Duma  seats  that  were 
allocated  to  parties  that  gained  more  than  5  per  cent  of  the  votes  across  the  country, 
which  also  reduced  the  influence  of  regional  parties  on  the  national  decision-making.  "' 
I)  Dmitrieva  has  observed  that  an  equalising  policy  over  several  decades  has  been  less  successful, 
resulting  in  an  increasing  degree  of  differentiation  between  regions  in  their  living  standards.  She  also  has 
observed  that,  against  a  degree  of  growth  in  imbalance  in  economic  output,  an  "explosive  growth  of 
differences"  in  living  standards  would  emerge  in  a  year  or  two.  Oksana  Dmitrieva,  Regional 
Development:  The  USSR  and  After  (London:  UCL  Press,  1996),  p.  189. 
_)  According  to  Sobyanin,  members  of  the  Interregional  Deputies'  group  in  the  USSR  Congress 
tried  to  secure  their  seats  in  the  local  soviets  rather  than  in  the  Russian  Congress.  Alexander  Sobyanin, 
"The  Current  Crisis,  "  Thomas  F.  Remington  (ed.  ),  Parliaments  In  Transition:  the  New  Legislative  Politics 
in  the  Former  USSR  and  Eastern  Europe  (Boulder  Westview  Press,  1994),  p.  184. 
3)  Remington  and  his  colleagues  also  divided  eight  Congresses,  from  the  Second  to  Ninth,  into 
three  stages:  from  the  Second  to  Fourth,  the  Fifth  and  Sixth,  and  the  Seventh  to  Ninth  Congress.  Thomas 
F.  Remington,  Steven  S.  Smith,  D.  Roderick,  Kiewiet,  and  Moshe  Haspel,  "Transitional  Institutions  and 
Parliamentary  Alignments  in  Russia,  1990-1993,  "  in  ibid.,  pp.  159-180. 
4)  White  and  his  colleagues  have  also  observed  that  the  conflict  between  legislative  and  executive 
branches  became  "a  distinguishing  feature  of  politics  and  a  major  source  of  instability.  "  Stephen  White, (Chapter  Vn  170 
Graeme  Gill,  and  Darrell  Slider,  The  Politics  of  Transition:  Shaping  a  Post-Soviet  Future  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  1993),  p.  116.  A  good  example  of  the  effect  of  the  power  struggle  on  reform 
could  be  seen  in  the  revision  of  the  Constitution.  White,  Rose  and  McAllister  have  noted  that  the 
Constitution  of  1978  had  become  a  "self-contradictory  document,  "  granting  "conflicting  authorities  to 
both  parliament  and  the  president  after  being  repeatedly  amended.  "  As  a  result,  they  argued,  the  task  of 
governing  Russia  was  becoming  "virtually  impossible.  "  Stephen  White,  Richard  Rose,  and  Ian 
McAllister,  How  Russia  Votes  (Chatham,  New  Jersey:  Chatham  House  Publishers,  1997),  p.  80.  Also  see 
John  Löwenhardt,  The  Reincarnation  of  Russia:  Struggling  with  the  Legacy  of  Communism,  1990-1994 
(Durham:  Duke  University  Press,  1995),  pp.  168-173. 
S)  69.9  per  cent  of  the  voters  supported  the  introduction  of  a  Russian  presidency.  For  a  discussion 
of  the  referendum  of  March  1991,  see  White,  Rose,  and  McAllister,  How  Russia  Votes,  pp.  73-77;  and 
Ann  Sheehy,  "The  All-Union  and  RSFSR  Referendum,  "  Radio  Liberty  Report  on  the  USSR,  vol.  3,  no.  13 
(26  March  1991),  pp.  19-23.  For  a  general  discussion  of  the  Union  question,  see  Commission  on  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe,  Referendum  in  the  Soviet  Union:  A  Compendium  of  Reports  on  the  March  17 
199  Referendum  on  the  Future  of  the  U.  S.  S.  R  (Washington,  D.  C.:  US Government  Printing  Office,  1991); 
and  A.  A.  Sobianin,  and  V.  G.  Sukhovol'skii,  Demokratila,  organlchennaia  fal'sifikatsllaml:  vybory  I 
referendumy  v  Rossii  v  1991-1993  gg.  (Moscow:  INTU,  1995). 
6)  Eltsin  failed  to  include  the  question  on  the  agenda  by  a  narrow  margin  of  13  votes.  Verkhovnyi 
Sovet  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  Tretil  (vneocherednoi)  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  28  marta-S 
aprella  1991  goda:  stenografcheskii  otchet,  vol.  II  (Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo  "Respublika",  1992),  pp.  227, 
308  (11).  Then  the  question  of  presidency  was  postponed  to  the  next  Congress.  Ibid.,  pp.  228-229,309 
(13). 
')  The  CPD  adopted  the  resolution  "On  the  redistribution  of  authority  among  higher  government 
organs  of  the  RSFSR  for  the  realisation  of  anti-crisis  measures  and  the  implementation  of  the  decisions  of 
the  CPD  of  the  RSFSR,  "  which  granted  the  chairman  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  the  right  to  issue  decrees. 
Ibid.,  vol.  V,  pp.  154-155. 
)  For  a  discussion  of  the  presidential  election,  see  White,  Rose,  and  McAllister,  How  Russia 
Votes,  pp.  35-40;  Stephen  White,  Ian  McAllister  and  Olga  Kryshtanovskaya,  "El'tsin  and  His  Voters: 
Popular  Support  in  the  1991  Russian  Presidential  Elections  and  After,  "  Europe-Asia  Studies,  vol.  46,  no.  2 
(1994),  pp.  285-303;  and  Michael  E.  Urban,  "Boris  Eltsin,  Democratic  Russia  and  the  Campaign  for  the 
Russian  Presidency,  "  Soviet  Studies,  vol.  44,  no.  2  (1992),  pp.  187-207. 
)  For  instance,  Nikolai  Grishin  from  Saratov  oblast  criticised  introducing  private  land  ownership 
as  "it  would  be  set  up  on  the  ruins  of  the  state  and  collective  farms.  "  Verkhovnyi  Sovet  Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii,  Vtoroi  (vneocherednoi)  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  27  noiabria-15  dekabria  1990 
goda:  stenograJicheskii  otchet,  vol.  I  (Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo  "Respublika",  1992),  pp.  102.105.  An 
opinion  poll  showed  that  40  per  cent  of  peasants  and  farm  workers,  and  about  the  same  proportion  of 
agricultural  managers  and  specialists  opposed  private  ownership.  Only  12  to  17  per  cent  of  respondents  in 
each  group  supported  it.  Pravda,  27  November  1990,  p.  1. 
10)  Eltsin's  news  conference  on  3  December  1990.  Moscow  Domestic  Service  in  Russian  (19:  33 
GMT  3  December  1990).  in  FBIS  SOV  90-233  (4  December  1990),  P.  29.  In  relation  with  the  view  that 
the  land  reform  would  result  in  the  collapse  of  the  state  and  collective  farms,  Ivan  Silaev  also  underlined (Chapter  YI)  271 
that  the  government  supported  multiple  forms  of  land  ownership  and  the  right  of  the  peasant  to  choose  his 
own  ownership  type.  He  also  unveiled  the  government  plan  to  allocate  about  20  billion  rubbles  to  the 
collective  and  state  farms  in  his  speech  at  the  seventh  session.  Ytoroi  (vneocherednol)  s  "ezd  narodnykh 
deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  I,  p.  371.  For  his  report  to  the  Congress,  see  Doklad  Soveta  Ministrov  RSFSR  "0 
programme  vozrozhdeniia  rossiiskoi  derevni  i  razvitiia  agropromyshlennogo  kompleksa,  "  in  ibid.,  vol.  1, 
pp.  56-76. 
11)  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  344  (34),  408-428. 
12)  Tretii  (vneocherednoi)  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  III,  pp.  54,58,116  (38).  Even 
Ivan  Polozkov,  leader  of  the  Russian  Communist  Party,  opposed  such  a  move,  maintaining  that  it  was  not 
a  proper  time  to  change  the  leadership.  Ibid.,  vol.  III,  pp.  62-63. 
13)  In  his  speech  to  the  Congress,  he  warned  that  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  rush  the  concluding  of 
the  Union  Treaty  before  the  Union  republics  made  their  decisions.  Eltsin's  speech  on  11  December  1990, 
in  Viorol  (vneocherednoi)  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  IV,  pp.  224-230,225. 
14)  Despite  the  opposition,  Eltsin  won  the  support  of  a  majority  of  deputies  and  the  Second 
Congress  decided  not  to  discuss  the  draft  Union  Treaty  proposed  by  Gorbachev,  but  to  exchange  views  on 
the  principles  for  concluding  a  Union  Treaty.  After  the  discussion,  the  Second  Congress  adopted  a 
resolution  on  the  Union  Treaty  declaring  the  supremacy  of  the  Russian  Constitution  and  RSFSR  law  on 
RSFSR  territories  at  the  end  of  the  Congress.  Sovetskaia  Rosslia,  13  December  1990,  p.  1. 
1s)  For instance,  at  the  Fifth  Congress  (10-17  July  and  28  October-2  November  1991),  opponents 
gave  a  blow  to  the  government  by  assessing  its  work  as  "unsatisfactory"  in  a  resolution  on  the  socio- 
economic  situation  in  the  RSFSR.  Postanovlenie  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskoi  Sovetskoi 
Federativnoi  Sotsialisticheskoi  Respubliki  "0  sotsial'no-ekonomicheskom  polozhenii  v  RSFSR,  "  in 
Verkhovnyi  Sovet  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  Piatyi  (vneocherednoi)  s"ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  10- 
17  ilulia,  28  oktiabrla-2  notabria  1991  goda:  stenograicheskil  otchet,  vol.  III  (Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo 
"Respublika",  1992),  pp.  263-264  (Point  2). 
16)  The  Congress  resolution  also  declared  a  moratorium  on  elections  of  the  heads  and  executive 
organs  at  all  levels  until  1  December  1992  and  subordinated  the  lower  executive  power  to  higher  organs. 
Postanovlenie  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiskoi  Sovetskoi  Federativnoi  Sotsialisticheskoi 
Respubliki  "Ob  organizatsii  ispolnitel'noi  vlasti  v  period  radikal'noi  ekonomicheskoi  reformy,  "  in  ibid., 
vol.  III,  pp.  264-265. 
")  In  particular,  the  president  was  endowed  with  powers  to  issue  presidential  decrees  on  almost 
every  aspect  of  economic  life-banking,  stock  exchange,  monetary-financial  policy,  investment,  customs, 
budget,  pricing,  taxation,  property,  land  reform,  employment,  and  foreign  economic  relations--and  on 
activities  of  the  executive  organs.  Postanovlenie  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiskoi  Sovetskoi 
Federativnoi  Sotsialisticheskoi  Respubliki  "0  pravovom  obespechenii  ekonomicheskoi  reformy,  "  in  ibid, 
vol.  11I,  pp.  265-267. 
11  )  412  deputies  voted  in  favour  of  the  proposal  while  447  deputies  rejected  it.  Verkhovnyi  Sovet 
Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  Shestol  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  6-21  aprelia  1992  goda: 
stenograficheskii  otchet,  vol.  I  (Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo  "Respublika",  1992),  pp.  31,485  (6),  500.524, (Chapter  VI)  272 
")  Postanovlenie  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  khode  ekonomicheskoi 
refomy  v  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  "  in  ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  289-294,290-292.  These  demands  were  so 
contradictory  to  the  content  of  the  government  plan  that  the  cabinet  submitted  its  resignation  to  the 
president  after  the  resolution  had  been  adopted.  Izvestiia,  13  April  1992,  p.  1. 
20  )  According  to  the  resolution  of  the  Congress  "On  the  Course  of  Economic  Reform,  "  the 
president  was  instructed  to  submit  a  draft  law  on  the  government  to  the  parliament  and  to  present 
candidates  for  the  head  of  the  government  within  three  months  (Article  3).  Initially,  Eltsin  proposed  to 
present  the  law  before  1  September  and  to  have  the  Supreme  Soviet  adopt  it  before  1  December  1992, 
which  was  rejected  by  the  Congress.  Shestoi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  II,  pp.  245-246,357 
(123),  608-627.  As  a  compromise,  the  Congress  accepted  N.  Riabov's  proposal  which  allowed  the 
president  three  months.  Ibid.  vol.  II,  pp.  248,358  (124),  608-627.  The  resolution  also  requested  the 
president  to  abolish  the  presidential  representatives  in  the  localities  (Point  2  and  6).  Postanovlenie  s"ezda 
narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  khode  ekonomicheskoi  reformy  v  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  "  in 
ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  293-294. 
_1)  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  227-228,353  (110),  568-587. 
22  )  Sheboldaev's  proposal  to  bestow  the  Supreme  Soviet  with  the  power  to  endorse  the 
appointment  of  key  personnel  of  the  government  fell  short  of  the  two-thirds  majority  that  was  required. 
Key  personnel  in  this  context  included  the  chairman,  the  first  deputy  chairman,  the  deputy  chairmen  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers,  the  Ministers  of  Defence,  Security,  Internal  Affairs,  Finance,  Economics,  Foreign 
Affairs,  Justice,  and  the  Press  and  Media.  Ibid.,  vol.  IV,  pp.  522  (25),  576-598.  Six  other  proposals  on 
Article  109  of  the  Constitution  were  all  rejected.  Ibid.,  vol.  III,  pp,  501  (85);  and  ibid.,  vol.  IV,  pp.  333 
(10,13),  335  (16),  339  (28). 
_1)  The  presidential  decree  "On  the  sale  of  land  plots  to  citizens  and  legal  entities  during  the 
privatisation  of  state  and  municipal  enterprises"  on  25  March  1992  allowed  the  sale  of  plots  which  were 
privatised.  Ukaz  prezidenta  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  prodazhe  zemel'nykh  uchastkov  grazhdanam  i 
iuridicheskim  litsam  pri  privatizatsii  gosudarstvennykh  i  munitsipal'nykh  predpriiatii,  "  Vedomosti  s  "ezda 
narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskol  Federatsil  I  Verkhvnogo  Soveta  Rossliskol  Federatsil,  no.  14  (2  April 
1992),  p.  994. 
u)  Eltsin  signed  on  a  draft  law  on  the  government  of  the  RSFSR  when  the  Sixth  Congress  was  in 
its  session  (in  April  1992).  The  draft  law  stipulated  that  the  consent  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  should  be 
required  only  for  the  appointment  of  chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers.  Kuranty,  22  April  1992,  p.  1. 
zs  )  His  view  was  clearly  reflected  in  his  report  on  a  draft  Constitution.  Enumerating  three  types  of 
state-the  parliamentary  republic,  the  presidential  republic,  and  the  mixed  republic-he  preferred  the 
parliamentary  republic  to  the  presidential  one.  He  insisted  that  the  president  should  appoint  the  highest 
officials  with  the  consent  of  the  parliament,  and  relieve  ministers  of  their  duties  when  the  parliament 
requested  it  or  that  the  parliament  could  dismiss  ministers  on  its  own  authority.  Doklad  Predsedatelia 
Verkhovnogo  Soveta  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  Khasbulatova  R.  I.  "0  prockto  Konstitutsii  Rossiiskoi 
Federatsii,  "  in  Shestol  s  "erd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  IV,  pp.  293-309. 
26)  The  positions  of  both  blocs  were  revealed  at  the  meeting  of  the  Constitutional  Commission  in 
July  1992.  In  his  report  to  the  Constitutional  Commissions  on  the  State  of  Constitutional  Reform  in  the (Chapter  YQ  273 
Russian  Federation,  Eltsin  proposed  to  rephrase  Point  S  of  Article  98  of  the  draft  Constitution,  suggesting 
that  the  president's  veto  would  be  overruled  not  by  a  majority  but  by  two-thirds  of  the  deputies.  He  also 
proposed  that  the  president  should  be  included  among  the  bodies  who  could  request  a  national  referendum, 
and  that  a  new  Constitution  should  be  adopted  by  referendum.  In  response  to  Eltsin's  report,  Sergei 
Filatov,  First  Deputy  Chairman  of  the  Supreme  Soviet,  insisted  that  a  new  Constitution  should  be  based 
upon  the  basic  concept  that  was  approved  by  the  Sixth  Congress  and  should  be  adopted  by  the  Congress. 
Izvestiia,  30  July  1992,  p.  2. 
I)  In  return  for  the  postponement,  Eltsin  maintained  that  he  would  give  up  the  emergency  powers. 
He  also  opened  the  possibility  of  adopting  the  Constitution  at  the  Congress.  Nezavisimaia  gazeta,  16 
October  1992,  p.  1. 
28)  It  was  believed  that  a  couple  of  practical  considerations  were  behind  his  proposal.  Firstly,  it 
was  thought  that  Eltsin  expected  some  positive  results  from  his  economic  policy  including  the 
privatisation.  Secondly,  the  postponement  would  provide  him  with  an  opportunity  to  appease  some 
opposition  factions  such  as  the  Civic  Union  by  adjusting  the  course  and  speed  of  economic  reform. 
Thirdly,  Eltsin  was  also  intended  to  win  support  from  the  regional  leaders  by  promising  them  more  power. 
Finally,  he  could  consolidate  his  own  supporters  by  purging  some  of  his  cabinet  members  who  held 
different  views.  Ibid. 
29)  New  energy  policy  was said  to  be  introduced  in  1993  and  would  free  the  price  of  12  major 
items  including  oil,  petroleum,  and  coal  products.  The  report  appeared  in  the  newspapers  even  before  it 
was  fully  adopted.  Izvestiia,  10  September  1992,  p.  I.  In  order  to  win  the  support  of  regional  leaders, 
Eltsin  asserted  the  need  to  guarantee  the  legal  term  of  the  heads  of  regional  legislative  and  executive 
bodies  which  left  two  and  a  half  years  more  even  after  the  moratorium  on  elections  was  lifted.  He  also 
accepted  various  models  of  development,  promising  that  the  government  would  take  account  of  specific 
features  of  the  regions  in  completing  investment  and  structural  policy  at  the  All-Union  Conference  of  the 
Heads  of  Representatives  and  Executive  Bodies  of  Power.  He  even  mentioned  that  there  were  40 
documents  granting  privileges  to  individual  regions,  inviting  regions  to  separate  negotiations  with  the 
centre.  Nezavisimaia  gazeta,  16  October  1992,  p.  1.  At  a  meeting  with  65  enterprise  directors  in 
November  1992  in  Toglatti,  Egor  Gaidar,  acting  Prime  Minister,  uncovered  the  government  plan  in  which 
demands  of  entrepreneurs  were  accepted.  For  instance,  according  to  the  plan,  VAT  would  be  cut  from  28 
per  cent  to  20  per  cent  and  90  per  cent  of  joint  stock  share  would  be  allowed.  Rossliskala  gazeta,  27 
October  1992,  p.  2.  Furthermore,  Eltsin  issued  a  decree  on  16  November  1992  which  stipulated  that  the 
state  would  retain  "a  controlling  block  of  shares  for  3  years  only  in  a  limited  part  of  the  economy  in  the 
process  of  privatisation.  "  Ukaz  prezidenta  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  merakh  po  realizatsii  promyshlennoi 
politiki  pri  privatizatsii  gosudarsvennykh  predpriiatii,  "  Vedomosti,  no.  47  (26  November  1992),  pp.  3493- 
3495,3493  (Article  2).  He  also  adopted  an  appeasement  policy  towards  centralist  factions  such  as  the 
Civic  Union  by  appointing  Chernomyrdin  rather  than  Gaidar  as  Prime  Minister. 
30  )  Postonovlenie  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiskoi  Federatsii  "0  khodo  ekonomicheskoi 
reformy  v  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  "  in  Verkhovnyi  Sovet  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  Sed'moi  s  "ead  narodnykh 
deputatov  RSFSR,  1-14  dekabria  1992  goda:  stenogrgJIcheskii  otchet,  vol.  I  (Moscow:  izdatel'stvo 
"Respublika",  1993),  pp.  537-538  (Points  1  and  2). (Chapter  Vt)  274 
")  The  Supreme  Soviet,  then,  acquired  the  power  to  suspend  resolutions  passed  by  the  presidium 
of  the  Supreme  Soviet  and  its  presidium,  and  decrees  of  the  president  in  accordance  with  the  decision  of 
the  Constitutional  Court.  The  Supreme  Soviet  was  also  given  the  right  to  suspend  the  president's  power  to 
overrule  decisions  made  by  the  government,  and  the  effect  of  presidential  decrees  until  the  decision  of  the 
Constitutional  Court  had  ruled  on  their  constitutionality  (Point  19  of  Article  109  of  the  Constitution).  785 
deputies  supported  this  amendment  to  the  Constitution,  while  91  voted  against  it.  Ibid.,  vol.  11,  pp.  181, 
375  (57),  490-509.  In  a  footnote  to  this  point,  however,  it  was  made  clear  that  the  Supreme  Soviet's  right 
to  suspend  decrees  and  orders  of  the  president  did  not  enter  into  force  until  a  referendum  was  held  on  the 
basis  of  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution.  The  Congress  also  granted  the  Supreme  Soviet  the  right  to 
share  the  power  with  the  president  to  initiate  the  legislative  activity  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  (Article 
110).  The  question  had  been  rejected  in  an  open  vote,  before  it  was  adopted  in  a  secret  vote.  Rossiiskaia 
gazeta,  8  December  1992,  p.  1. 
72)  Amendment  to  Article  122  of  the  Constitution.  For  the  result  of  the  vote,  see  Sed'moi  s  "ezd 
narodnykh  deputalov  RSFSR,  vol.  I,  p.  510. 
33)  For  instance,  the  opposition  bloc  failed  to  obstruct  the  president  from  forming  the  government 
independently.  The  Congress  failed  to  pass  the  amendments  to  Point  3  of  Article  109  and  Point  5  of 
Article  121  of  the  Constitution  to  the  effect  that  key  figures  of  the  government  should  be  appointed  to  their 
offices  and  relieved  of  their  duties  with  the  consent  of  the  Supreme  Soviet.  In  the  vote,  these  amendments 
were  rejected  by  a  narrow  margin.  For  instance,  the  president's  amendment  to  Point  3  of  Article  109  (the 
Supreme  Soviet  forms,  reorganises,  and  abolishes  ministries,  state  committees  and  departments  upon  the 
representations  of  the  president)  was  rejected  by  a  margin  of  a  single  vote.  Another  president's 
amendment  that  key  figures  should  be  appointed  with  the  consent  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  could  have  been 
adopted  if  four  more  deputies  supported  it.  Ibid.,  vol.  I,  pp.  508-509. 
34)  Ivan  Rybkin,  coordinator  of  Communist  Russia,  suggested  to  the  president  that  deputies  be 
granted  the  right  to  give  consent  to  appoint  heads  of  "power  yielding  ministries"  such  as  Defence, 
Security,  and  Internal  Affairs.  Eltsin  agreed  to  this  proposal.  Ibid.,  vol.  II,  pp.  105-106. 
33)  For  Eltsin's  speech  at  the  Seventh  Congress,  see  B.  N.  El'tsin  "0  stabilizatsii  konstitutionnogo 
stroia  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  "  in  A.  I.  Miliukov  (comp.  ),  Sed'mol  s"ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskol 
Federatsil:  doklady,  soobshcheniia,  dokumenty  (Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo  "Respublika",  1993),  pp.  151,153- 
154. 
76  )  The  resolution  "On  the  Stabilisation  of  Constitutional  System  in  the  Russian  Federation" 
consisted  of  9  points.  According  to  Point  2  of  the  resolution,  the  Supreme  Soviet's  right  to  suspend 
presidential  decrees  (Point  19  of  Article  109  of  the  Constitution)  and  to  initiate  legislation  (Article  I10), 
and  the  immediate  suspension  of  the  president's  rights  (Point  6  of  Article  121)  would  not  come  into  force 
until  the  referendum.  Furthermore,  additions  to  the  law  on  referenda  that  prohibited  the  president  from 
calling  a  referendum  became  no  longer  valid  (Point  5).  In  return  for  these  changes,  the  president  was 
instructed  to  represent  multiple  candidates  for  the  post  of  chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  the 
Congress,  and  to  nominate  one  of  three  candidates  who  received  the  most  votes.  Postanavlenie  s"ezda 
narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  stabilizatsii  konstitutsionnogo  stroia  Rossiiskoi  Fcderatsii,  " 
in  Sed'moi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  IV,  pp.  301.303, (Chapter  YI)  275 
37)  Rossiiskie  vesti,  20  February  1993,  p.  1. 
")  See  N.  Riabov's  report  to  the  Congress.  Doklad  Zamestitelia  Predesedatelia  Verkhovnogo 
Soveta  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  Riabova  N.  T.  "0  postanovlenii  sed'mogo  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov 
Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  '0  stabilizatsii  konstitutsionnogo  stroia  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  "  in  Verkhovnyi  Sovet 
Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  Vos'moi  (vneocherdnoi)  s"ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  10-13 
marta  1993  goda:  stenograficheskii  otchet  (Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo  "Respublika",  1993),  pp.  51-67. 
79)  The  president  proposed  a  draft  resolution  of  the  Congress  "On  the  Cooperation  among  the 
Branches  of  Government  in  Overcoming  the  Crisis  and  Ways  to  Achieve  Accord  (On  the  resolution  of  the 
Seventh  Congress  "On  the  Stabilisation  of  the  Constitutional  System  in  the  Russian  Federation).  "  See 
Rossiiskie  vesti,  12  March  1993,  p.  1. 
40)  Postanovlenie  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  merakh  osushchestvleniia 
konstitutsionnoi  reformy  v  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  (o  postanovlenii  sed'mogo  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov 
Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  stabilizatsii  konstitutsionnogo  stroia  Rossiskoi  Federatsii"),  "  in  Vos',  noi 
(vneocherdnoi)  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  pp.  415-417.  The  president  was 
defeated  in  the  vote  when  he  proposed  to  remove  Points  2  and  7  of  the  resolution  which  nullified  the 
agreement  of  the  Seventh  Congress  and  animated  the  effect  of  Articles  109,110,  and  121.6  of  the 
Constitution. 
")  Point  2  of  the  resolution  stipulated  that  20  million  rubles  should  be  spent  on  accommodating 
returning  soldiers.  Postanovlenie  s"ezda  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  vserossiiskom 
referendume,  "  in  Vosmoi  (vneocherdnoi)  s  "ead  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskoi  Federatsli,  pp.  418-419. 
,_)  Ukaz  prezidenta  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  deiatel'nosti  ispolnitel'nykh  organov  do  preodoleniia 
krizisa  vlasti  (24  March  1993),  "  Izvestiia,  25  March  1993,  p.  1. 
")  Ukaz  prezidenta  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "Ob  otventstvennosti  dolzhnostnykh  lits  ispolnitel'noi 
vlasti  v  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  "  Rossiiskie  vest!,  24  March  1993,  p.  1. 
")  "Boris  El'tsin  predlozhil  strane  mirnyi  put'  vykhoda  iz  krizisa,  "  Rossitskie  vestt,  23  March 
1993,  pp.  1-2.  However,  his  words  of  "special  form  of  administration"  disappeared  in  his  decree. 
41  )  His  proposal  was  based  on  the  compromise  of  both  sides,  accepting  the  president's  position  on 
Articles  104  and  109  of  the  Constitution  that  these  provisions  should  be  in  line  with  the  principle  of  the 
separation  of  powers.  He  also  proposed  to  hold  early  presidential  elections  and  elections  to  the  Congress 
in  the  autumn  of  1993.  Rossiiskaia  gazeta,  27  March  1993,  pp.  1.2. 
")  The  resolution  pointed  out  "serious  violation  of  the  Constitution"  and  Eltsin  should  take 
"personal  responsibility"  for  the  culmination  of  the  confrontation.  It  farther  contained  a  motion  to  appeal 
to  the  Constitutional  Court  for  the  constitutionality  of  five  presidential  decrees.  Postanovlenie  s"ezda 
narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  neotlozhnyh  merakh  po  sokhrancniiu  konstitutsionnogo 
stroia  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  (29  marta  1993  soda),  "  in  A.  I.  Miliukov  (comp.  ),  Vos'moi  I  deviatyi 
(vneocherdnye)  s  "ezdy  narodnykh  deputatov  Rossiiskol  Federatsii:  dokumenty,  doklady,  soobshchenlia, 
zaiavleniia  (po  materialam  stenogramm)  (Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo  "Respublika",  1993),  pp.  240-242. 
")  In  the  referendum,  58.7  per  cent  of  the  voters  supported  Eltsin  while  39.2  per  cent  voted 
against  him  on  the  first  question.  53.0  per  cent  voted  in  favour  of  his  social  and  economic  policy  although (Chapter  VI)  276 
44.6  per  cent  voted  against  it.  The  percentage  of  voters  supporting  early  elections  of  the  Congress  (43.1 
per  cent)  was  higher  than  those  supporting  early  presidential  elections  (31.7  per  cent).  Only  19.3  per  cent 
of  voters  were  against  early  elections  of  the  CPD,  while  30.2  per  cent  rejected  early  presidential  elections. 
Izvestiia,  6  May  1993,  p.  2.  For  a  more  detailed  discussion,  see  Ralph  S.  Clem  and  Peter  R.  Craumer, 
"The  Geography  of  the  April  23  (1993)  Russian  Referendum,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol.  34,  no.  8 
(October  1993),  pp.  481-496;  White,  Rose,  and  McAllister,  How  Russia  Votes,  pp.  77-86;  and  Richard 
Rose,  Irina  Boeva,  and  Viacheslav  Shironin,  How  Russians  Are  Coping  with  Transition:  New  Russia 
Barometer  II  (Glasgow:  Centre  for  the  Study  of  Public  Policy,  University  of  Strathclyde  Studies,  1993) 
(Studies  in  Public  Policy,  no.  216). 
'e  )  The  Constitutional  Conference  was  composed  of  representatives  of  the  federal  state  bodies,  the 
state  bodies  of  the  federal  constituent,  local  self-government,  political  and  public  organisations,  and 
representatives  of  production  sectors  and  entrepreneurs.  The  representatives  of  the  federal  state  bodies 
included  members  of  the  Constitutional  Commission  of  the  Congress,  one  deputy  from  each  political 
faction  within  the  Congress,  and  50  presidential  representatives.  Ukaz  prezidenta  Rossiskoi  Federatsii  "0 
sozyve  konstitutsionnogo  soveshchaniia  i  zavershenii  proekta  konstitutsii  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  (20  May 
1993),  "  Izvestiia,  22  May  1993,  p.  1. 
49)  The  idea  of  creating  a  Federal  Council  was  proposed  at  the  third  Conference  of  the  Council  of 
the  Heads  of  the  Republics  in  August  in  Petrozavodsk,  in  which  representatives  of  eight  inter-regional 
associations  including  the  Siberian  Agreement  and  the  Far  Eastern  Association  took  part.  The  Federal 
Council  was  supposed  to  be  a  consultative  body  for  the  president  on  social  and  economic  policies, 
security,  and  other  federal  issues.  The  heads  of  regional  administrations  supported  Eltsin's  proposal. 
Rossiiskie  vesti,  14  August  1993,  p.  1;  and  Izvestiia,  25  August  1993,  p.  2. 
'0)  Shelia  Mamie,  "The  Unsolved  Question  of  Land  Reform  in  Russia,  "  RFE/RL  Research  Report, 
vol.  2,  no.  7  (12  February  1993),  pp.  35-37. 
s'  )  The  amendment  recognised  multiple  forms  of  property  ownership  but  placed  a  ten-year 
moratorium  on  land  sale  from  the  time  of  acquiring  the  property  rights  for  plots  of  land.  Vtorol 
(vneocherednoi)  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  II,  pp.  91-92,344  (34),  408428. 
a=)  Shestoi  s  -e--d  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  IV,  pp.  133-134,518  (14),  553-575. 
")  At  the  Seventh  Congress,  Muravev  proposed  a  moratorium  on  the  sale  of  land  plots  for  ten 
years  if  the  plot  was  distributed  free  of  charge,  and  for  five  years  if  it  was  paid  in  the  process  of 
privatisation.  Sed'mol  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  II,  pp.  87,236  (26),  288.310. 
")  In  the  analysis,  Zakharov  and  Kalashnikov's  proposal  to  insert  a  reference  to  the  government's 
work  as  "unsatisfactory"  constituted  a  main  concern.  Tretii  (vneoeherednoi)  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov 
RSFSR,  vol.  III,  pp.  116  (38),  202-226. 
ss)  The  vote  to  adopt  the  third  version  of  a  draft  resolution  "On  the  Progress  of  Economic  Reform 
in  the  Russian  Federation"  as  a  basis  for  a  further  discussion.  The  draft  resolution  contained  an  evaluation 
of  the  government's  work  as  'unsatisfactory'  and  ordered  the  president  to  submit  a  draft  law  on  the 
government  within  a  month.  Shestol  s  "ad  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  11,  pp.  296  (2),  297.316. (Chapter  VI)  277 
56  )  The  vote  on  a  resolution  "On  the  Course  of  Economic  Reform  in  the  Russian  Federation 
(Editorial  Commission  version).  "  The  draft  also  pointed  out  that  the  government  made  a  mistake  in 
undertaking  economic  reform  and  instructed  the  government  to  submit  an  alternative  economic 
programme  within  a  month.  Sed'mol  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  I,  pp.  489,636  (6),  637- 
661. 
07  )  Tretii  (vneocherednoi)  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  II,  pp.  309  (13),  336-359. 
d8  )  Verkhovnyi  Sovet  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  Chetvertyi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  21-25 
maia  1991  goda:  stenograficheskii  otchet,  vol.  I  (Moscow:  Izdanie  Verkhovnogo  Soveta  RSFSR,  1991), 
pp.  281  (3),  284-308. 
39)  Belagov's  constitutional  amendment  to  Point  3  of  Article  121  prohibiting  the  president  from 
being  a  member  of  any  political  parties,  in  ibid.,  vol.  IT,  pp.  141  (35),  238-262. 
60)  V.  B.  Isakov's  proposal  to  include  the  question  of  no  confidence  in  the  government  on  the 
agenda  of  the  Sixth  Congress,  in  Shestol  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  I,  pp.  31,485  (6),  500. 
524. 
61)  G.  B.  Saenko's  (a  member  of  the  Communists  of  Russia)  proposal  to  include  the  question  of  no 
confidence  in  the  president  on  the  agenda  of  the  Seventh  Congress,  in  Sed'moi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov 
RSFSR,  vol.  I,  pp.  549  (16),  571-590. 
67  )  The  vote  on  the  resolution  of  the  Third  Congress  on  the  redistribution  of  authorities  which 
granted  the  chairman  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  the  right  to  issue  decrees,  in  Tretii  (vneocherednoi)  s  "ezd 
narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  V,  pp.  165  (4),  286-310. 
6])  In  the  Fifth  Congress,  Eltsin  initiated  a  draft  resolution  on  the  organisation  of  the  executive.  A 
main  purpose  of  the  resolution  was  to  introduce  a  moratorium  on  the  election  of  all  levels  of  heads  of 
administrative  organs  until  1  December  1992.  The  vote  included  in  the  analysis  was  on  a  proposal  to 
allow  the  president  to  appoint  the  heads  of  administration  at  the  krai,  oblast  and  lower  levels  of 
administration.  Piatyi  (vneocherednoi)  s"ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  III,  pp.  44-45,296  (27), 
359-381. 
60  )  The  vote  on  the  resolution  of  the  Fifth  Congress  "On  the  Legal  Guarantee  for  Economic 
Reform"  that  introduced  a  "rule  by  presidential  decrees"  in  Russia,  in  ibid.,  vol.  III,  pp.  80,304  (56),  428. 
450. 
65)  The  resolution  of  the  Sixth  Congress  instructed  the  president  to  prepare  a  draft  law  on  the 
government  within  a  month.  In  his  response  to  the  resolution,  Eltsin  asked  the  Congress  to  allow  him  to 
head  the  government  until  1  December  1992,  giving  him  six  months,  instead  of  one  month,  to  prepare  a 
draft  law  on  the  government.  Shestol  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  II,  pp.  245-246,357  (123), 
608-627. 
')  Sheboldaev's  constitutional  amendment  to  Point  3  of  Article  109  to  grant  the  Supreme  Soviet 
rights  to  endorse  the  appointment  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  in  ibid.,  vol.  IV,  pp.  522 
(25),  576-598. (Chapter  VI)  278 
')  In  his  amendment,  he  proposed  that  the  Council  of  Ministers  should  be  accountable  to  the 
president.  Sedmot  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  II,  pp.  97,239  (34),  311-333. 
6$)  Ibid.,  vol.  IV,  pp.  191-194,367  (1),  368-411. 
69  )  They  proposed  that  economic  policies  of  the  RSFSR  should  be  in  line  with  those  of  the  Soviet 
Union.  Vtoroi  (vneocherednoi)  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  III,  pp.  91.93,213  (11),  267-287. 
70)  The  vote  on  the  proposal  to  instruct  the  government  to  work  out  a  programme  for  the  social 
development  of  the  North  in  connection  with  the  resolution  of  the  Second  Congress  "On  the  Measures  for 
Stabilisation  and  Transition  to  the  Market  Economy,  "  in  ibid.,  vol.  III,  pp.  132,226  (49),  331.350. 
Chetvertyi  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  IV,  pp.  98  (2),  103-127. 
'2)  Isaev  also  proposed  that  Khasbulatov  be  remain  in  his  office  as  acting  chairman  to  which 
Eltsin  agreed.  Piatyi  (vneocherednoi)  s  "ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  RSFSR,  vol.  I,  pp.  670  (6), 671-693. 
Sakwa  has  maintained  that  "the  social  and  occupational  structure"  of  the  Congress  constituted 
the  key  factor  in  deputies'  voting  patterns.  Richard  Sakwa,  Russian  Politics  and  Society  (London  and 
New  York:  Routledge,  1993),  p.  61. 
74)  David  Lane  and  Cameron  Ross,  "The  Changing  Composition  and  Structure  of  the  Political 
Elites,  "  in  Lane  (ed.  ),  Russia  in  Transition:  Politics,  Privatisation  and  Inequality  (London  and  New  York: 
Longman,  1995),  pp.  62-63. 
")  For  instance,  Embree  employed  several  factors  such  as  occupation,  generation,  and  urban-rural 
factors  in  his  analysis  of  deputies'  voting  patterns  in  the  USSR  and  Russian  CPD.  Gregory  J.  Embree, 
"RSFSR  Election  Results  and  Roll  Call  Votes,  "  Soviet  Studies,  vol.  43,  no.  6  (1991),  pp.  1065-1084. 
76)  By  early  1991,  eleven  regional  associations,  including  four  associations  of  cities,  were  formed 
in  the  territory  of  Russia.  For  the  development  of  the  regional  associations  in  Russia,  see  N.  V.  Petrov,  S. 
S.  Kikheyev  and  L.  V.  Smirnyagin,  "News  Notes:  Russia's  Regional  Associations  in  Decline,  "  Post-Soviet 
Geography,  vol.  34,  no.  1  (January  1993),  pp.  59-66.  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  regional 
associations,  particularly  the  Ba!  'shaia  Volga  and  the  Ba!  'shoi  Ural,  see  G.  V.  Marchenko,  Regional'nye 
problemy  vosstanovlenlia  novoi  Rossiiskoi  gosudarstvennosti  (Moscow:  Rossiiskii  nauchnyi  fond,  1996), 
pp.  118-151. 
")  In  general,  deputies  from  the  associations  of  the  Central,  Ural,  and  Far  Eastern  regions  voted  in 
support  of  Eltsin,  scoring  higher  than  the  average  in  more  than  twelve  votes.  By  contrast,  deputies  from 
the  regions  that  joined  the  Association  of  Economic  Cooperation  of  the  Oblasts  of  the  Central  Chernozem 
Regions  and  the  Siberian  Agreement  were  less  supportive  of  Eltsin,  scoring  less  than  average  in  most  of 
the  votes.  However,  their  stances  could  be  changed,  depending  on  the  question  put  to  a  vote. 
78)  In  the  vote,  the  Siberian  deputy  group  (M=23)  scored  the  lowest  points  among  the  deputy 
groups  of  regional  associations,  while  Ural  deputies  (M=6.0)  strongly  supported  the  adoption  of  the  law 
(F=4.0,  p<0.001). 
")  In  the  vote,  Ural  and  Siberian  deputies  (M"4.8  and  4.7  respectively)  moderately  supported  rule 
by  presidential  decrees,  while  deputies  from  the  Central  and  Volga  regions  (Ma1.2  respectively)  were 
divided  (F-5.8,  p<0.001). (Chapter  VI)  279 
eo)  As  the  economic  situation  was  deteriorated  in  the  course  of  reform,  deputies  from  the  Urals 
(M-5.7),  North  Caucasus  (M-6.0)  and  Siberia  (M"-4.7)  strongly  opposed  the  government's  socio- 
economic  policies.  By  contrast,  deputies  from  the  Central  (M=l.  0),  Northwestern  (M-1.3),  and  Far 
Eastern  regions  (Ma-1.5)  were  divided  (F=4.6,  p<0.001). 
31  )  Most  of  the  regional  association  deputy  groups  maintained  higher  than  a  moderate  level  of 
unity  (M>If41)  only  in  two  votes.  Only  the  Ural  deputy  group  and  deputies  from  regions  which  did  not 
belong  to  any  regional  associations  maintained  higher  than  a  moderate  level  of  unity  (in  five  votes  for  the 
Ural  deputies,  and  in  twelve  for  the  latter  group). 
9=)  It  is  needless  to  say  that  it  depends  on  the  issue  in  question.  For  instance,  in  the  vote  on  the 
proposal  to  include  a  social  development  programme  for  the  Far  North  in  the  stabilisation  measures, 
deputies  from  the  Northwestern  and  Far  Eastern  regions  showed  relatively  strong  support  (M-6.9  and  4.8 
respectively).  However,  deputies  from  the  southern  regions  that  might  have  little  interests  in  the  proposal 
such  as  the  Urals  and  Central  regions  (M=1.2  and  1.6  respectively)  were  divided  (F'5.0,  p<0.001).  In  this 
case,  regions  of  the  Northwestern  and  Far  Eastern  Economic  Cooperation  were  rather  competing  with  the 
other  regional  association  groups. 
°3)  In  the  vote  on  Isakov's  proposal  to  include  the  question  of  a  no  confidence  in  the  government 
on  the  agenda  at  the  Sixth  Congress,  the  hub/gate  deputies  (M-1.4)  as  a  whole  rejected  it.  By  contrast, 
deputies  from  resource  (M=-0.2)  and  residual  regions  (Ma-0.4)  supported  the  proposal  (F=2.7,  p<0.05). 
Although  there  were  no  significant  differences  at  the  0.05  level,  deputies  from  hub/gate  regions  (M-0.3) 
again  supported  Eltsin's  position,  rejecting  the  proposal  to  include  the  question  of  a  no  confidence  in  the 
president  on  the  agenda  at  the  Seventh  Congress.  In  the  vote,  deputies  from  rural  (M'-1.4),  resource  (M- 
.  1.5),  and  residual  regions  (M-1.0)  voted  in  favour  of  the  proposal  (F-2.4,  pß.  06). 
e4)  When  Eltsin's  constitutional  amendment  to  Article  122  on  the  accountability  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers  was  put  to  the  vote,  deputies  from  hub/gate  regions  voted  against  his  amendment.  However,  still 
nearly  half  of  them  supported  the  amendment  (M--0.5),  while  the.  larger  proportions  of  deputies  from 
residual  (M-3.5),  resource  (M=3.3)  and  rural  regions  (M-2.5)  opposed  it  (F-8.3,  p<0.001). 
")  It  becomes  clear  when  the  two  votes-the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  assess  the  government's 
performance  as  "unsatisfactory"  that  was  put  to  the  vote  at  the  Third  Congress  and  the  vote  on  the 
proposal  to  adopt  a  draft  resolution  on  economic  reform  at  the  Seventh  Congress-are  compared.  The 
hub/gate  regional  group  (M-3.7)  supported  Eltsin's  economic  policies  at  the  Third  Congress  (F'.  4, 
p<0.001),  and  was  divided  at  the  Seventh  Congress  (M'-2.0).  By  contrast,  deputies  from  rural  and 
resources  regions  who  supported  the  president's  policies  at  the  Third  Congress  (M-1.1  and  2.9 
respectively)  turned  their  back  on  him  at  the  Seventh  Congress  (M'-5.0  and  -4.2  respectively). 
t6)  For  instance,  deputies  from  resource  regions  (M-5.2)  showed  stronger  support  than  those  from 
rural  (M-2.1),  hub/gate  (M-3.1),  and  residual  regions  (M-2.9)  In  the  vote  on  a  resolution  of  the  Fifth 
Congress  which  introduced  a  rule  by  presidential  decrees  (F-2.9,  p<0.05). 
17)  For  instance,  when  Eltsin  asked  the  Sixth  Congress  to  head  the  government  until  1  December 
1992,  the  resource  regional  group  (M-0.2)  was  divided  while  a  majority  of  deputies  from  rural  (M-2.8), 
and  hub/gate  (M-'2.8)  regions  supported  Eltsin  (F-3.9,  p<0.01).  Again.  at  the  Seventh  Congress,  deputies (Chapter  Vl)  280 
from  resource  regions  (M=3.3)  was  less  supportive  of  Eltsin's  constitutional  amendment  to  Article  122 
(accountability  of  the  government)  than  those  from  hub/gate  regions  (M-O.  S,  F-8.3,  p<0.001). 
98  )  For  instance,  113  deputies  from  highly  developed  regions  showed  their  satisfaction  with  the 
government's  performance  at  the  Third  (M=6.8,  F=11.8,  p<0.001)  and  Sixth  Congresses  (M=5.1,  F=2.8, 
p<0.05).  They  were  also  the  most  supportive  of  Eltsin's  position  in  the  vote  on  the  presidency,  followed 
by  deputies  from  the  well-developed  administrative  units.  In  particular,  they  remained  supportive  of 
Eltsin  on  many  occasions,  while  other  regional  groups  in  this  context  opposed  Eltsin  at  the  Sixth  and 
Seventh  Congresses.  In  particular,  differences  were  evident  in  the  vote  on  the  question  of  no  confidence 
in  the  government  and  in  the  president  on  the  agenda,  on  the  appointment  of  the  chairman  of  the  Council 
of  Ministers  (Sheboldaev's  proposal),  and  on  the  accountability  of  the  Council  of  Ministers, 
99  )  Differences  between  deputies  from  autonomous  administrative  regions  and  other  deputies  were 
apparent  only  in  five  votes.  For  instance,  the  former  group  (M-5.4)  was  more  strongly  supported  a 
resolution  "On  the  Course  of  Economic  Reform  in  the  Russian  Federation"  than  the  latter  (M-2.8)  at  the 
Seventh  Congress  (T-4.1,  p<0.001).  Unfortunately,  the  analysis  does  not  include  the  vote  on  the 
question  of  centre  and  periphery  relations  in  which  these  two  deputy  groups  might  have  different  attitudes. 
90)  Deputies  from  highly  adapted  regions  (M=6.7)  strongly  opposed  the  proposal  to  postpone  the 
discussion  on  the  law  on  the  president  that  was  put  to  a  vote  in  the  Third  Congress.  By  contrast,  deputies 
from  stagnated  republics  (M-5.2)  and  stagnated  regions  (M"-2.2)  supported  it.  In  the  vote,  deputies  from 
adapted  regions  (M=0.2)  and  adapted  republics  (M=-1.2)  were  divided  (F=19.3,  p<0.001). 
91)  Differences  were  evident  between  deputies  from  the  republics  and  other  regions  when  the 
Seventh  Congress  adopted  a  resolution  "On  the  Course  of  Reform.  "  In  the  vote,  deputies  from  the 
republics  (M-5.5  and  -5.3  for  those  from  the  adapted  and  stagnated  republics  respectively)  were  more 
strongly  against  the  president  than  other  deputies  from  non-autonomous  regions  (M"-2.0,  -2.5,  and  -3.2 
for  those  from  highly  adapted,  adapted,  and  stagnated  regions  respectively,  F-3.4,  p<0.01). 
92)  Deputies  from  adapted  republics  (M=7.3)  strongly  supported  a  moratorium  on  elections  of  the 
heads  of  regional  administrations  that  was  put  to  a  vote  at  the  Fifth  Congress.  However,  they  showed  a 
lower  level  of  support  than  any  other  deputy  groups  in  some  other  votes.  For  instance,  at  the  Sixth 
Congress,  they  were  divided  when  Eltsin  asked  the  Congress  to  head  the  government  until  1  December 
1992  (M=0.5).  They  also  opposed  Eltsin's  position  when  Sheboldaev  proposed  to  grant  the  Supreme 
Soviet  powers  to  endorse  the  appointment  of  the  chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  (M'-3.9),  Again  at 
the  Seventh  Congress,  they  opposed  Eltsin's  constitutional  amendment  to  Article  122  (accountability  of 
the  government),  scoring  lower  points  (M-4.8)  than  highly  adapted  (M=2.  I),  adapted  (Ma-0.5)  and 
stagnated  (M=-2.9)  regions  (F=9.3,  p<0.001). 
91)  77  rural  deputies  showed  anti-Eltsin  tendencies  in  most  categories  of  votes.  The  rural  group  as 
a  whole  voted  against  the  introduction  of  private  land  ownership  and  showed  its  dissatisfaction  with  the 
government's  socio-economic  policies.  Rural  deputies  also  voted  against  the  government  or  the  president 
in  the  vote  on  the  question  of  a  no  confidence  and  on  the  question  of  balance  of  power  between  legislative 
and  executive  branches. 
9')  For  instance,  rural  deputies  (M-6.7)  strongly  opposed  the  proposal  to  introduce  a  moratorium 
on  the  sale  of  land,  while  deputies  from  large  cities  (M-1.3)  were  divided  (F"28.5,  p<0.01)  in  the  vote. (Chapter  YI) 281 
They  also  strongly  opposed  Eltsin's  constitutional  amendment  to  Article  122  at  the  Seventh  Congress  to 
make  the  government  accountable  to  the  Congress  and  the  president  (M=6.2),  and  moderately  opposed 
Sheboldaev's  amendment  to  Point  3  of  Article  109  of  the  Constitution  at  the  Sixth  Congress  (M=-4.7).  In 
the  votes  on  the  question  of  a  no  confidence  in  the  government  and  the  president,  they  moderately 
supported  the  proposals  (M-5.5,  and  -4.5  respectively),  while  other  urban  groups  were  divided  or 
maintained  only  a  weak  level  of  unity. 
95  )  Although  nomenklaturists,  the  intelligentsia,  and  technicians  maintained  higher  than  a 
moderate  unity  in  more  than  eight  votes,  other  'class'  groups  were  often  divided.  For  instance,  managers 
and  workers  were  divided  in  nine  votes,  while  they  maintained  higher  than  a  moderate  level  of  unity  in 
five  votes.  In  particular,  cadres  and  military  personnel  were  often  divided  (in  eleven  and  ten  votes 
respectively).  By  contrast,  45  deputies  from  the  cultural  sector  were  relatively  united,  showing  higher  than 
a  moderate  level  of  unity  in  thirteen  votes. 
%)  For  instance,  103  agricultural  managers  in  the  Congress  were  divided  (M=0.1)  in  the  vote  on 
Shakhrai's  amendment  to  Article  12  at  the  Second  Congress,  and  strongly  rejected  (M"-6.3)  the  removal 
of  a  moratorium  on  the  sale  of  land  plots  at  the  Sixth  Congress.  By  contrast,  83  industrial  mangers 
moderately  supported  (M=4.0)  the  introduction  of  private  land  ownership,  and  weakly  opposed  the 
removal  of  the  moratorium  (T-2.9,  p<0.01  in  each  case). 
97)  In  the  vote  on  the  resolution  of  the  Sixth  Congress  "On  the  Progress  of  Economic  Reform,  " 
agricultural  managers  (M"-1.3)  as  a  group  rejected  the  draft,  while  industrial  managers  (M-1.8)  supported 
it  (T=2.5,  p<0.05).  The  former,  in  particular,  showed  no  confidence  in  the  government  (M-5.2)  and  in 
the  president  (M-4.6)  at  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congresses  respectively,  while  the  latter  group  (M-2.0 
and  -1.9  respectively)  was  divided  (T-  -2.6,  p<0.01,  and  T-2.3,  p<0.05  respectively). 
98  )  For  instance,  both  groups  showed  rather  similar  voting  patterns  (M-6.0  for  agricultural 
managers  and  -5.1  for  industrial  managers)  in  the  vote  on  the  resolution  "On  the  Course  of  Economic 
Reform"  at  the  Seventh  Congress  in  which  government  performance  was  assessed  as  "unsatisfactory.  " 
99  )  For  instance,  S5  cadres  from  highly  adapted  and  adapted  regions  (M-'-0.  S)  were  divided  in  the 
vote  on  the  proposal  to  label  the  government's  performance  as  "unsatisfactory,  "  showing  significant 
differences  from  cadres  from  stagnated  regions  (N=112,  M-5.5),  stagnated  republics  (N-18,  Ma-7.8), 
and  adapted  republics  (NN20,  M-6.5,  F=6.6,  p<0.001).  Again  in  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  discuss  the 
question  of  a  no  confidence  in  the  government  at  the  Sixth  Congress,  cadres  from  highly  adapted  and 
adapted  regions  (M=2.4)  weakly  opposed  the  proposal,  while  cadres  from  stagnated  regions  (M-2.2) 
weakly  supported  it  (F-3.4,  p<0.05). 
100)  In  the  Third  Congress,  a  larger  proportion  of  nomenklaturists  from  stagnated  regions  (M=-5.5) 
showed  their  dissatisfaction  with  the  government's  socio-economic  policies,  while  those  from  stagnated 
republics  (M=0.0)  were  divided  (F-2.7,  p<0.05).  Again,  when  the  question  of  no  confidence  in  the 
government  was  put  to  a  vote  at  the  Sixth  Congress,  the  former  group  (M"-2.5)  voted  against  the 
government,  while  the  latter  (M"3.8)  supported  the  government  (F-3.3,  p<0.05).  Although  the  number  of 
nomenklaturists  within  regional  groups  varied  significantly-73  from  stagnated  regions,  20  from 
stagnated  republics,  12  from  adapted  regions,  and  5  from  adapted  republics-differences  among  these  four 
groups  were  found  in  eight  votes. (Chapter  VI)  282 
!  °'  )  David  Lane  (ed.  ),  Russia  in  Transition,  p.  7.  The  number  of  deputies  in  factions  varied  from 
less  than  fifty  to  more  than  a  hundred  for  the  Agrarian  Union.  However,  the  number  of  deputies  in  each 
faction  kept  changing,  partly  because  a  deputy  was  allowed  to  join  more  than  one  faction.  A  restriction 
that  prevented  deputies  from  enrolling  in  more  than  one  faction  in  the  Congress  had  not  been  introduced 
until  December  1992.  Furthermore,  deputies  were  shifting  from  one  political  faction  to  another. 
Inaccurate  data  could  also  be  a  reason.  In  this  analysis,  the  data  is  drawn  from  the  work  of  Jeff  Gleisner 
and  his  colleagues.  Jeff  Gleisner,  Andrei  Belayev,  Nikolai  Biryukov,  Yakov  Dranyov,  and  Victor 
Sergeyev,  Voting  in  the  Russian  Parliament,  1990-93:  Database  (Leeds:  Centre  for  Democratisation 
Studies,  University  of  Leeds,  1996). 
103  )  No  significant  differences  were  revealed  among  political  factions  when  a  programme  for  the 
social  development  of  the  Far  North  was  put  to  a  vote  at  the  Second  Congress. 
103  )  Members  of  the  Workers'  Union  maintained  a  high  degree  of  unity  until  the  Fourth  Congress, 
but  were  divided  in  most  votes  analysed  afterwards.  At  least  in  the  votes  analysed,  Left  Centre  and  Free 
Russia  were  also  frequently  divided,  particularly  at  the  Fifth  and  Sixth  Congresses,  although  they  were 
still  united  in  some  votes.  Among  the  political  factions  in  the  Congress,  Sovereignty  &  Equality  and  the 
Industrial  Union  were  most  frequently  divided. 
104  )  In  particular,  the  Sixth  Congress  had  a  significant  meaning  not  only  for  reformers  but  also  for 
the  opposition.  Firstly,  the  need  to  change  the  course  of  economic  reform  was  widely  recognised. 
Secondly,  presidential  rule  was  due  to  end  on  1  December  1992,  which  inevitably  raised  the  question  of 
the  structure  of  the  government.  Furthermore,  the  Congress  was  expected  to  discuss  a  draft  constitution. 
Under  these  circumstances,  Eltsin's  bloc  and  the  opposition  tried  to  win  enough  support  to  enforce  their 
own  position  or  at  least  to  block  the  other  side's  initiatives  by  forming  a  coalition  bloc  with  other  factions. 
￿°  1)  ITAR-TASS,  6  April  1992,  in  FBIS  SOV  92-068s  (8  April  1992),  pp.  14-15. 
106)  Interfax,  9  April  1992,  in  FBISSOV  92-072s  (14  April  1992).  p.  12. 
101)  For  the  demands,  see  Post  Factum.  6  April  1992,  in  FBIS  SOV  92-068s  (8  April  1992),  pp. 
14-15.  In  the  vote  on  the  question  of  no  confidence  in  the  government,  Russian  Unity  as  a  whole  voted 
strongly  against  the  government  (M.  -6.3). 
101)  Post  Factum,  6  April  1992,  in  FBIS  SOY92-068s  (8  April  1992),  p.  14. 
104  )  For  instance,  when  Sheboldaev's  constitutional  amendment  that  the  Supreme  Soviet  should 
endorse  the  appointment  of  the  head  of  the  government  was  put  to  the  vote,  Free  Russia  (M-1.6)  and  Left 
Centre  (M=1.9)  were  divided.  By  contrast,  other  factions  in  the  bloc  were  moderately  united  (M-5.0  for 
Radical  Democrats  and  5.2  for  Democratic  Russia)  in  rejecting  the  proposal. 
10  )  For  instance,  in  the  vote  on  the  question  of  no  confidence  in  the  president,  the  Coalition  for 
Reform  strongly  opposed  the  proposal  (Ma7.2),  while  Russian  Unity  strongly  supported  it  (Ma-7.1). 
III)  For  instance,  deputies  belonging  to  Russian  Unity  weakly  supported  Muraev's  amendment  on 
the  right  to  sell  land  plots  (M.  -3.9),  and  were  divided  in  the  vote  on  Zor'kin's  proposal  through  which 
legislative  and  executive  powers  could  manage  to  reach  a  compromise  (Ma.  -0.3). (Chapter  VI)  283 
112  )  Although  there  were  significant  differences  in  six  votes,  229  deputies  other  than  Russians  did 
not  seem  to  consider  their  ethnic  origins  in  the  vote.  Perhaps,  the  vote  on  the  resolution  of  the  Seventh 
Congress  on  the  course  of  economic  reform  could  be  an  exception.  In  the  vote,  non-Russian  deputies 
moderately  supported  changes  in  the  course  of  economic  reform.  However,  this  result  also  seemed  to  be 
caused  by  other  factors  such  as  the  economic  situation  of  the  regions  where  they  had  been  elected  or  their 
occupations  rather  than  their  ethnic  origin  itself. 
"'  )  For  example,  they  supported  Shakhrai's  proposal  on  the  land  question  at  the  Second  Congress 
(M=3.9),  the  adoption  of  a  resolution  on  the  redistribution  of  authority  among  higher  organs  of  the  RSFSR 
(M=4.1)  at  the  Third  Congress,  and  the  law  on  the  presidency  at  the  Fourth  Congress  (M-4.9).  In  these 
votes,  the  older  generation  (M=0.9,0.1,  and  2.5  respectively)  was  divided  (T"5.3,7.8,  and  4.9,  p<0.001 
respectively).  At  the  Third  Congress,  younger  deputies  (M-4.2)  also  supported  Eltsin's  policy  in  the  vote 
on  the  proposal  to  assess  the  government's  performance  negatively,  while  older  deputies  (M.  0.2)  were 
divided  (T=7.6,  p<0.001). 
"'  )  The  majority  of  them  still  supported  the  government  when  they  voted  moderately  against  the 
question  of  no  confidence  votes  at  the  Sixth  and  the  Seventh  Congresses.  However,  nearly  half  of  them 
(M=0.9)  shifted  their  attitudes  towards  Eltsin's  reform  policies  when  the  resolution  of  the  Seventh 
Congress  on  the  course  of  reform  was  put  to  a  vote.  Again  deputies  who  had  not  been  affiliated  with  the 
CPSU  tended  to  be  divided,  becoming  less  supportive  of  Eltsin  in  the  vote  on  the  accountability  of  the 
Council  of  Ministers  and  the  appointment  procedures  of  its  chairman  (M=2.0,  and  1.3  respectively). 
Ins  )  For  instance,  a  draft  resolution  of  the  Fifth  Congress  that  had  introduced  the  rule  by 
presidential  decrees  was approved  by  529  supporting  votes,  only  three  votes  more  than  required.  In  the 
Seventh  Congress,  Zor'kin's  proposal,  which  turned  all  opposition's  effort  to  rein  the  President's  power  in 
vain,  was  adopted  with  20  more  votes  than  required.  The  competition  for  support  became  intense  when 
amendments  to  the  Constitution  were  put  to  the  vote  in  the  Congress,  as  changes  required  the  support  of 
two-thirds  of  deputies.  For  instance,  a  constitutional  amendment  to  Article  123  was  turned  down  when  it 
fell  short  of  four  votes.  A  more  dramatic  result  occurred  when  the  constitutional  amendment  to  Article 
109  was  put  to  a  vote  at  the  Seventh  Congress.  The  amendment  that  would  grant  the  Supreme  Soviet 
powers  to  review  the  president's  decision  on  forming,  reorganising  and  abolishing  ministries,  departments, 
and  state  committees  was  rejected  when  it  lacked  only  a  single  vote. 
16)  For instance,  Far  Eastern  deputies  played  a  key  role  in  the  establishment  of  FEZs in  Nakhodka 
and  the  Kurils.  At  the  Seventh  Congress,  Valentin  Fedorov,  governor  of  Sakhalin  oblast,  threatened 
Eltsin,  raising  raise  the  question  of  a  Far Eastern  republic,  unless  he  speeded  up  drafting  the  development 
programme  for  the  Kuril  Islands.  Interfax,  2  December  1992,  in  FBIS  SOV  92-232s  (3  December  1992), 
p.  18.  Eltsin  signed  a  decree  on  the  development  of  the  Kuril  Islands  on  8  December  1992,  while  the 
Seventh  Congress  was  still  in  session.  Ukaz  prezidenta  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  "0  sotsial'no. 
ekonomicheskom  razvitii  Kuril'skikh  ostrovov,  "  Vedomosti,  no  50  (17  December  1992),  pp.  3719-3721. 
A.  Dudenko,  Commercial  Director  of  the  FEZ  administration  in  Nakhodka,  also  regarded  political 
lobbying  through  parliament  as  extremely  important.  Peter  Kirkow  and  Philip  Hanson,  "The  Potential  For 
Autonomous  Regional  Development  in  Russia:  The  Case  of  Primorskiy  Kray,  "  Post  Soviet  Geography, 
vol.  35,  no.  2  (February  1994),  p.  76  (footnote  15). (Chapter  Yn  284 
"")  At  the  First  Congress  of  People's  Deputies  of  Siberia  in  Krasnoiarsk  in  March  1992,  Siberian 
deputies  urged  the  Supreme  Soviet  and  the  president  to  take  urgent  measures  for  the  de-colonisation  of 
Siberia.  Izvestiia,  30  March  1992,  p.  2;  and  Rossiiskala  gazeta,  2  April  1992,  p.  2.  Far  Eastern  regional 
leaders  also  gathered  in  Khabarovsk  in  August  1990  to  sign  the  Agreement  on  the  Basic  Principles  of 
Economic  and  Social  Cooperation  between  the  lakut  ASSR  and  other  regions,  declaring  the  formation  of 
the  Far  Eastern  Association.  The  agreement  stipulated  that  enhancing  the  economic  independence  of  the 
Far  Eastern  regions  would  be  their  basic  purpose.  Point  2  of  the  agreement  "On  the  Basic  Principles  of 
Economic  and  Social  Cooperation  between  the  lakut  Autonomous  Socialist  Republic,  Primorskii  Kral, 
Khabarovsk  Krai,  Amur  Oblast,  Evreskii  Autonomous  Oblast,  Kamchatka  Oblast,  Magadan  Oblast,  and 
Sakhalin  Oblast  of  the  Far  Eastern  Economic  Area  of  the  RSFSR.  "  "Far  Easterners  Pool  Efforts,  "  Far 
Eastern  Affairs,  no.  1(1991),  pp.  13.15. 
"")  For  instance,  Eltsin  signed  the  decree  "On  the  Issue  of  the  Activities  of  the  Inter-regional 
Association  <Siberian  Agreement>"  in  July  1991.  It  recognised  the  Siberian  Agreement  as  an  authority  in 
charge  of  economic  activities  including  foreign  trade.  It  also  allowed  the  Siberian  Agreement  to  determine 
the  use  of  10  per  cent  of  products  produced  in  Siberian  regions,  and  mining  enterprises  to  sell  25  per  cent 
of  their  output  at  the  free  price  market.  Eltsin  also  agreed  to  finance  the  development  of  science  and 
technology  by  setting  up  an  Innovation  Fund  in  which  he  promised  to  invest  ISO  million  rubles.  In  return 
for  these  arrangements,  Siberian  regions  were  to  transfer  all  income  from  taxes  to  the  Russian  Federation. 
Rasporiazhenie  predsedatelia  Verkhovnogo  Soveta  RSFSR  "Vopros  deiatel'nosti  mezhregional'noi 
assotsiatsii  <Sibirskoe  soglashenie>,  "  Vedomosti,  no.  27  (4  July  1991),  pp.  1065-1067;  and  Vera  Tolz, 
"Regionalism  in  Russia:  The  Case  of  Siberia,  "  RFE/RL  Research  Report,  vol.  2,  no.  9  (26  February  1993), 
p.  3. 
119  )  At  the  Congress  of  People's  Deputies  of  Siberia,  participants  demanded  decentralisation  of 
management,  economic  independence  for  geographic  areas,  and  a  single-track  system  for  forming  the 
budget,  and  freedom  for  foreign-economic  activities.  Furthermore,  they  made  an  important  step  when  they 
adopted  a  resolution  that  demanded  to  strip  the  President  of  his  additional  powers  and  to  abolish 
"unnecessary  and  even  harmful"  presidential  representatives  at  the  local  level.  Izvestlia,  30  March  1992, 
p.  2;  Rossiiskaia  gazeta,  2  April  1992,  p.  2;  and  M.  Aleksandrova,  "S"ezd  narodnykh  deputatov  Sibiri: 
eshche  odno  preduprezhdenie  tsentru,  "  Krasnoiarskaia  gazeta,  no.  39  (2  April  1992),  p.  2. 
120)  In  fact,  a  blueprint  for  regional  development  up  to  the  year  2000  was  unveiled  in  1987  by 
Gorbachev  just  after  his  Vladivostok  speech  in  1986.  However,  it  failed  to  survive  the  budget  deficit  in 
1989.  The  fate  of  the  plan  that  was  revived  in  1991  and  in  1992  was  almost  the  same  as  that  of  previous 
ones.  John  J.  Stephan,  "The  Russian  Far  East,  "  Current  History,  vol.  92,  no.  576  (October  1993),  p.  332. 
121  )  For  instance,  Primorskii  kraisovet  adopted  a  document  on  the  basic  concept  of  autonomy  and 
economic  independence  of  the  krai  in  April  1990.  "Primor'e:  put'  k  samostoiatel'notti  (kontseptiia 
formirovaniia  samoupravleniia  i  ekonomicheskoi  samostoiatel'notsi  kraia,  "  Krasnoe  znamia,  20  April 
1990,  p.  2.  Far  Eastern  deputies  worked  out  "A  Concept  of  Resolving  the  Crisis  and  Stimulating  the 
Social  and  Economic  Development  of  the  Far  Eastern  Economic  Region  and  Trans-Baikal  Region  Until 
the  Year  2000"  in  1991.  Again  in  May  1992,  the  Coordination  Council  of  the  Association  of  Far  Eastern 
Deputies  in  the  Congress  considered  a  new  concept  of  the  development  of  the  Far  East,  the  Buriat (Chapter  Yo  285 
Republic  and  the  Chita  oblast  until  the  Year  2000.  V.  Vorontsov  and  A.  Muradyan,  "Far  Eastern 
Regionalism,  "  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  no.  1  (1992),  p.  31. 
lu  )  The  FEZ  could  be  an  attractive  alternative  to  a  Far  Eastern  republic.  Firstly,  the  geographic 
location  with  hub/gate  features  supported  demands  of  the  Far  Eastern  regions  for  establishing  the  FEZs  in 
the  area.  Secondly,  the  FEZ  would  provide  the  regional  authorities  with  more powers  authority  in  their 
domestic  and  foreign  economic  activities  including  setting  up  a  special  tax  and  customs  regime.  In 
particular,  attracting  foreign  investment  would  be  of  interest  to  the  centre  as  well.  Thirdly,  it  would 
facilitate  accommodation  of  foreign  and  domestic  investment.  Fourthly,  the  FEZ  concept  had  already 
gained  its  supporters  on  a  nationwide  basis.  Furthermore,  in  addition  to  all  these  merits,  the  concept  of  the 
FEZ  was  more  likely  to  avoid  unnecessary  confrontation  with  centrists  than  a  Far  Eastern  republic.  For 
further  discussion  see  V.  Savin,  "Forms  of  Economic  Cooperation,  "  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  no.  4  (1991),  pp. 
9-17;  Pyotr  Baklanov,  "A  Concept  of  the  Development  of  the  Soviet  Far  East,  "  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  no.  4 
(1991),  pp.  3-8;  and  Pavel  Minakir,  "The  Economy  of  the  Soviet  Far  East:  Challenging  the  Crisis,  "  Far 
Eastern  Affairs,  no.  6  (1991),  pp.  92-106.  For  the  legal  background  of  the  FEZ,  see  V.  Savin,  "Free 
Economic  Zone  in  Russia:  The  Legal  Background,  "  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  no.  4-5  (1994),  pp.  5  1-55. 
11  )  Nakhodka  was  declared  a  FEZ  for  the  first  time  by  the  decree  of  the  Russian  Council  of 
Ministers  "On  Priority  Measures  for  the  Development  of  a  Free  Economic  Zone  in  the  District  of 
Nakhodka  of  Primorskii  Krai"  on  23  November  1990.  For  a  brief  discussion,  see  Denis  J.  B.  Shaw  and 
Michael  J.  Bradshaw,  'Free  Economic  Zones  in  the  Russian  Republic;  '  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol.  33, 
no.  6  (June  1992),  pp.  409-417,413.  After  the  declaration,  Primorskii  krai  also  considered  extending  FEZ 
under  the  name  of  "Great  Vladivostok"  with  a  view  to  upgrading  itself  to  a  republic.  Kirkow  and  Hanson, 
"The  Potential  For  Autonomous  Regional  Development  in  Russia,  "  pp.  76-77;  and  Tamara  Troyakova, 
"Regional  Policy  in  the  Russian  Far  East  and  the  Rise  of  Localism  in  Primorye,  "  The  Journal  of  East 
Asian  Affairs,  vol.  IX,  no.  2  (Summer/Fall  1995),  p.  429.  For  "Greater  Vladivostok,  "  see  Robert  B. 
Krueger  and  Leon  A.  Polott,  "Greater  Vladivostok:  A  Concept  for  the  Economic  Development  of  South 
Primorie  (Appendix  2),  "  in  Mark  J.  Valencia,  The  Russian  Far  East  in  Transition:  Opportunities  for 
Regional  Economic  Cooperation  (Boulder.  Westview  Press,  1995),  pp.  195-226.  To  facilitate  a  discussion 
of  the  question  of  turning  Primorskii  krai  into  a  FEZ,  the  Presidium  of  the  kraisovet  put  forward  two 
options.  "Free  Enterprise  Zone  in  the  Nakhodka  Area  and  the  Maritime  Territory,  "  Far  Eastern  Affairs, 
no.  2  (1991),  pp.  8-14. 
124  )  The  Presidium  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  Russia  passed  a  resolution  that  declared  Sakhalin  a 
FEZ  on  27  May  1991.  Sakhalin  had  been  given  tax  relief  and  preferential  tariffs.  Furthermore,  a 
simplified  export  and  import  procedure  would  apply  to  foreign  economic  activities  in  the  region.  Sakhalin 
authority  could  strengthen  its  position  vis-ä-vis  the  centre  in  accordance  with  an  agreement  to  form  a  FEZ 
Administration  Board  and  a  State  Investment  Corporation  that  would  deal  with  the  question  of  exploiting 
natural  resources  in  the  area.  Rasporiazhenic  Predsedatelia  Verkhvnogo  Soveta  RSFSR  "0  sozdanii 
svobodnoi  ekonomicheskoi  zony  <Sakhalin>  (SEZ  <Sakhalin>),  "  Yedomosti,  no.  22  (30  March  1991),  pp. 
894-896;  V.  Vorontsov  and  A.  Muradyan,  "Far  Eastern  Regionalism,  "  p.  31;  and  Denis  J.  B.  Shaw, 
"News  Notes:  Special  Economic  Zone,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol.  32,  no.  2  (February  1991),  p.  635. 
For  the  views  of  the  Sakhalin  authorities  towards  the  establishment  of  a  FEZ  In  the  oblast,  see  Valentin 
Fiodorov,  "The  Experiment  in  Sakhalin,  "  Far  Eastern  Affairs,  no.  1(1991),  pp.  16-33. (Chapter  VV  286 
'u  )  The  FEZ  was  established  on  3  June  1991.  Rasporiazhenie  Predsedatelia  Verkhovnogo  Soveta 
RSFSR  "0  khoziaistvenno-pravovom  statuse  svobodnoi  ekonomicheskoi  zony  v  Evreiskoi  avtonomnoi 
oblasti,  "  Vedomosti,  no.  23  (6  June  1991),  p.  911. 
126  )  For  a  further  discussion,  sec  Chapter  6.1. 
t27)  In  fact,  these  votes  could  be  mainly  related  to  the  regional  interests.  Among  seven  votes  in 
which  differences  were  revealed  between  SIBFE  deputies  and  other  deputies,  five  votes  were  directly  or 
indirectly  related  to  the  presidential  powers,  showing  SIBFE  deputies'  effort  to  prevent  the  central 
authority  from  expanding  its  influence  at  the  local  level.  By  contrast,  the  peculiarities  of  SIBFE  deputies 
were  seldom  revealed  on  other  issues  such  as  land  questions,  the  accountability  of  government  and  other 
categories  of  votes. 
123)  In  the  vote,  94  Siberian  deputies  (55  per  cent,  M--1.9)  and  35  Far  Eastern  deputies  (55.6  per 
cent,  M=2.4)  opposed  the  proposal  together  with  other  regional  association  groups.  Only  deputies  from 
regions  that  were  not  affiliated  with  any  regional  associations  (M-4.3)  moderately  supported  it. 
129)  In  the  vote  on  the  draft  resolution  of  the  Third  Congress  "On  the  Redistribution  of  Authority 
among  Higher  Government  Organs  of  the  RF  for  the  Realisation  of  Anti-crisis  Measures,  "  Siberian 
(M-0.6)  and  Far  Eastern  (M-0.5)  deputies  were  divided.  Again  deputies  from  regions  that  were  not 
affiliated  with  any  regional  associations  (M-6.4)  strongly  supported  Eltsin.  Deputies  from  the  regions  that 
joined  the  regional  association  of  the  Great  Urals  (M-2.4)  also  showed  relatively  stronger  support  than 
other  regional  association  groups.  In  the  vote,  SIBFE  deputies  as  a  whole  (M-0.6)  were  less  supportive  of 
Eltsin  than  other  deputies  from  the  European  part  of  Russia  (M-2.2,  T-2.5,  p<0.05). 
170)  In  the  vote  Siberian  deputies  (M-2.1)  again  showed  the  lowest  support,  followed  by  Far 
Eastern  deputies  (M-2.9).  By  contrast,  deputies  from  the  regional  association  of  the  Great  Urals  (M-6.0) 
were  strongly  in  favour  of  it.  In  the  vote,  SIBFE  deputies  as  a  whole  (M-2.3)  showed  different  voting 
patterns  from  deputies  from  the  European  part  of  Russia  (M-3.9,  T-2.7,  p<0.01). 
13t  )  In  the  vote,  Siberian  (M=4.7)  and  Far  Eastern  (M-4.0)  deputies  moderately  supported  the 
resolution  together  with  deputies  from  the  regions  that  joined  the  Great  Urals  (Ma4.8). 
11)  Before  and  during  the  Fifth  Congress  (July  and  October  1991),  Eltsin  signed  agreements  with 
the  Siberian  Agreement  and  other  regions  including  Tiumen  oblast.  Furthermore,  since  March  1991,  FEZs 
were  established  in  the  SIBFE  regions  as  already  discussed. 
133)  In  the  vote  on  Zor'kin's  proposal,  Far  Eastern  deputies  (M-5.4)  strongly  voted  for  it,  only 
surpassed  by  deputies  from  the  regions  outside  the  regional  associations  (M-5.6).  In  the  vote,  Siberian 
deputies  showed  a  moderate  level  of  support  (M-3.6). 
13"  )  In  the  vote,  107  Siberian  deputies  or  63.3  per  cent  (M..  4.7)  supported  the  resolution,  while 
only  29  Far  Eastern  deputies  or  46.0  per  cent  (M=-1.5)  voted  in  favour  (T--2.3,  p<0.05). 
'")For  instance,  they  were  divided  in  eleven  votes,  including  the  votes  on  the  question  of  no 
confidence  in  the  government  (M=0.6)  and  the  president  (M=0.4)  while  maintaining  a  moderate  level  of 
unity  in  only  three  votes.  It  means  that  the  unity  level  of  SIBFE  deputies  in  each  vote  was  very  similar  to 
that  of  other  deputies  in  the  Congress. (Chapter  VV  287 
16)  Deputies  from  large  cities  (Ma4.3)  moderately  supported  the  proposal  to  introduce  private 
land  ownership.  By  contrast,  deputies  from  medium  (Ma2.1)  and  small  cities  (Ma1.3)  were  divided  and 
rural  deputies  (Ma-2.1)  moderately  opposed  it  (F=3.6,  p<0.01).  This  trend  was  revealed  again  when  the 
proposal  to  remove  a  moratorium  on  the  right  to  sell  the  land  plots  was  put  to  the  vote  at  the  Sixth 
Congress.  SIBFE  deputies  from  large  cities  (M-0.6)  were  divided,  while  deputies  from  rural  areas  (M- 
6.3)  strongly  opposed  it  (F-2.7,  p<0.05).  Deputies  from  large  cities  also  tended  to  evaluate  economic 
reform  more  positively  than  other  urban  and  rural  deputies  did.  When  the  question  of  labelling  the 
government's  work  as  unsatisfactory  was  put  to  the  vote  at  the  Third  Congress,  deputies  from  large  cities 
(M=2.5)  weakly  opposed  the  proposal,  while  other  groups  were  divided  or  weakly  supported  it  (F=2.7, 
p<0.05).  Also  in  the  vote  on  the  resolution  of  economic  reform  which  was  adopted  by  the  Seventh 
Congress,  deputies  from  large  cities  (M=-2.0)  were  divided,  while  other  groups  moderately  or  strongly 
supported  to  introduce  significant  changes  in  economic  reform  (Fa4.6,  p<0.01). 
"I)  Compared  to  deputies  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole,  the  gap  between  urban-rural  groups  tended 
to  be  bridged  as  SIBFE  deputies  from  large  cities  voted  in  a  less  liberal  way  than  those  from  large  cities  in 
the  European  part  of  Russia. 
1d  )  For  instance,  SIBFE  deputies  from  the  hub/gate  region  were  divided  (M=0.9)  when  the 
question  of  the  reorganisation  of  higher  government  organ  was  put  to  the  vote  at  the  Third  Congress.  In 
the  vote,  other  deputies  from  the  same  category  of  regions  in  the  European  part  of  Russia  voted  in 
moderate  support  (M-4.5)  of  the  proposal  (T-2.8,  p<0.01). 
19  )  In  the  vote,  deputies  from  the  resource  and  residual  regions  (M-4.8  respectively)  moderately 
supported  the  proposal  while  the  rural  (M-'-0.4)  and  hub/gate  groups  (M=2.0)  were  divided  (F-4.9, 
p<0.01). 
140  )  When  Eltsin's  proposal  to  allow  him  to  head  and  form  the  government  until  1  December  1992 
was  put  to  a  vote  at  the  Sixth  Congress,  deputies  from  rural  (M-4.6)  and  hub/gate  regions  (Ma3.0) 
supported  for  the  proposal,  while  deputies  from  resource  (M=1.0)  and  residual  regions  (M-0.4)  were 
divided  (F-3.0,  p<0.05).  Again  in  the  vote  on  Sheboldaev's  constitutional  amendment  that  the  Supreme 
Soviet  endorse  the  appointment  of  the  chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers,  the  former  two  groups 
(M=0.8  and  0.7  respectively)  supported  the  proposal,  while  the  latter  two  (Ma-1.3  and  -4.4  respectively) 
opposed  it  (F=4.9,  p<0.01).  This  trend  is  quite  understandable,  as  the  rural  regions  were  much  more 
dependent  on  subsidies  from  the  Centre.  Hub/gate  regions  also  preferred  an  integrated  economic  system 
to  a  regionalised  one.  By  contrast,  deputies  from  resource  regions  tended  to  believe  that  their  socio- 
economic  situation  could  be  enhanced  by  denying  'exploitation'  of  resources  by  the  centre  or  by  other 
regions. 
141  )  Although  differences  between  the  deputy  groups  from  the  autonomous  and  other 
administrative  units  were  revealed  in  five  votes  (P3,  RI,  S2,  T2,  and  US),  differences  between  the  republic 
deputy  groups  (i.  e.  between  stagnated  and  adapted  republics)  also  emerged  in  five  votes  (P3,  S3,  T2,  T5, 
and  US).  However,  this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  the  political  status  of  the  regions  could  be  ignored. 
For  instance,  deputies  from  autonomous  regions  tended  to  defend  their  interest  when  questions  related  to 
the  devolution  of  power  were  put  to  the  vote.  In  the  vote  on  the  resolution  of  the  Sixth  Congress  on 
economic  reform,  SIBFE  deputies  differed  when  they  were  grouped  Into  an  autonomous  regional  group 
(M-6.3)  and  an  ordinary  regional  group  (M-3.4,  T-2.6,  p<0.01).  Differences  between  deputies  from  the (Chapter  Yo  288 
autonomous  and  ordinary  administrative  units  were  revealed  again  at  the  Seventh  Congress  when  deputies 
from  the  autonomous  formations  (M6.1)  strongly  supported  Zor'kin's  proposal  while  other  deputies 
(M=3.8)  weakly  supported  it  (T=2.3,  p<0.05).  However,  in  these  votes,  deputies  from  the  Republic  of 
Sakha  (M=8.0  respectively),  an  adapted  republic,  voted  more  in  favour  of  Eltsin  than  those  from  the 
stagnated  republics  (the  Republics  of  Altai  and  Tyva,  M-2.2,  T-2.9,  p<0.01  respectively).  Different 
voting  patterns  of  Sakha  deputies  might  have  been  a  result  of  their  relatively  good  relations  with  Moscow, 
or  by  the  better  conditions  of  the  republic,  compared  to  other  republics.  By  contrast,  differences  were 
seldom  revealed  between  deputies  from  the  Republic  of  Sakha  and  Tiumen  oblast.  Both  regions  were 
similar  in  their  rich  resources. 
142  )  Far  Eastern  deputies  from  large  cities  (M-1.2)  were  divided  over  the  proposal  to  label  the 
work  of  the  government  as  'unsatisfactory'  in  the  Third  Congress.  In  the  vote,  they  recorded  the  lowest 
points  among  the  corresponding  groups  of  seven  regional  associations,  while  31  deputies  from  large  cities 
of  the  Northwest  regions  (M=6.8)  voted  strongly  against  the  proposal.  In  the  vote  on  the  redistribution  of 
authority  among  the  higher  organisations  of  the  government,  only  deputies  from  the  large  cities  (M-0.9) 
voted  against  the  proposal,  although  they  were  divided.  This  trend  continued  at  the  Sixth  Congress  when 
they  voted  for  Sheboldaev's  proposal  to  endow  the  Supreme  Soviet  with  the  power  to  endorse  the 
appointment  of  the  head  of  the  government.  In  the  vote,  they  again  scored  the  lowest  points  (M-3.6). 
143  )  Reformist  tendencies  of  the  Far  Eastern  hub/gate  regions  were  clearly  revealed  when  land 
questions  were  put  to  the  vote.  Deputies  from  the  Far  Eastern  hub/gate  regions  supported  Shakhrai's 
proposal  to  introduce  private  ownership  of  land  almost  unanimously  (M=8.2)  and  the  proposal  to 
introduce  right  to  sell  land  freely  (M=3.2),  while  deputies  from  resource  and  residual  regions  were  divided 
or  opposed  them  (F=6.9,  p<0.01,  and  F=3.2,  p<0.05  respectively).  They  (M=6.1)  also  strongly  rejected 
the  proposal  to  include  the  question  of  no  confidence  in  the  government  on  the  agenda  of  the  Sixth 
Congress,  while  deputies  of  the  residual  region  (M'-3.2)  voted  against  the  government  (F-6.6,  p<0.01). 
144  )  They  (M=7.5)  voted  strongly  in  favour  of  the  draft  resolution  of  the  Sixth  Congress  on 
economic  reform  was  adopted  as  a  basis  for  a  further  discussion.  The  draft  resolution  urged  the 
government  to  increase  expenditures  for  the  social  development  and  recommended  the  president  to  abolish 
the  presidential  representatives  at  the  local  level  and  duplicated  bodies  in  the  government  such  as 
presidential  advisors. 
14s  )  For  instance,  in  the  vote  on  Eltsin's  constitutional  amendment  to  Article  122  (accountability 
of  the  Council  of  Ministers)  which  was  put  to  a  vote  at  the  Seventh  Congress,  deputies  from  poorly 
developed  regions  (M-7.1)  showed  strong  opposition.  However,  deputies  from  well-developed  regions 
(Ma-4.6)  also  opposed  Eltsin  stronger  than  those  representing  under-developed  regions  (M"0.9),  and  no 
significant  differences  were  revealed  in  the  vote  between  these  deputy  groups. 
146  )  The  SIBFE  intelligentsia  was  less  supportive  of  the  president  than  the  intelligentsia  from  the 
European  part  of  Russia  in  most  votes,  particularly  on  the  political  issue.  Among  technicians,  SIBFE 
deputies  showed  less  liberal  voting  patterns  than  other  technicians,  revealing  significant  differences  in  six 
votes.  In  particular,  SIBFE  technicians  voted  against  introduction  of  a  full-fledged  land  ownership  and  the 
strengthening  of  presidential  powers.  For  instance,  they  (M"-1.  S)  rejected  the  proposal  to  remove  a 
moratorium  on  the  sale  of  land,  while  other  technicians  (M"2.4)  weakly  supported  it  (T-2.2,  p<0.05). (Chapter  VI)  289 
"I  )  For  instance,  in  the  vote  on  a  draft  resolution  of  the  Sixth  Congress,  SIBFE  cadres  (M=6.3) 
were  more  supportive  of  the  proposal  than  other  SIBFE  'class'  groups  (F-2.4,  p<0.05).  Furthermore,  the 
former  group  more strongly  supported  the  proposal  than  other  cadres  (M-1.3)  from  the  European  part  of 
Russia  (T-4.0,  p<0.01). 
"$)  In  eleven  votes,  the  Siberian  intelligentsia  scored  more  than  two  points  less  than  the  average 
score  of  the  intelligentsia  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole,  and  so  did  technicians  from  Siberia  in  ten  votes. 
ßa9  )  For  instance,  only  two  workers,  four  members  of  the  intelligentsia,  and  five  military  personnel 
had  been  elected  in  the  Far  Eastern  regions. 
,  so)  Far  Eastern  managers  scored  higher  than  other  managers  in  thirteen  votes.  For  instance,  they 
were  divided  (M=0.0)  when  a  resolution  of  the  Seventh  Congress  was  put  to  a  vote,  while  mangers  in  the 
Congress  as  a  whole  moderately  supported  the  resolution  (Ma-S.  6).  In  the  vote,  managers  from  Siberia 
(M=-8.3),  and  regions  that  joined  the  regional  associations  of  the  Great  Urals  (M-7.8)  and  North 
Caucasus  (M-10.0)  strongly  supported  the  resolution. 
151  )  In  particular,  the  voting  patterns  of  cadres  from  the  Far  Eastern  regions  are  noteworthy.  They 
recorded  higher  scores  than  average  score  of  cadres  in  the  Congress  in  twenty  votes,  and  even  higher  than 
average  by  two  points  in  fifteen  votes.  Among  the  votes,  cadres  from  Far Eastern  regions  scored  highest 
in  ten  votes  among  cadres  from  other  regional  associations.  For  instance,  they  voted  in  favour  of 
introducing  private  land  ownership  at  the  Second  Congress  (M=5.7)  and  in  favour  of  removing  a 
moratorium  on  the  right  to  sell  land  plots  (M=2.9).  Far  Eastern  cadres  also  voted  for  Eltsin  in  the  votes  on 
the  question  of  no  confidence  in  the  president  (M-2.9)  and  on  Zorkin's  proposal  (M-7.1)  at  the  Seventh 
Congress  (M=2.9),  while  all  other  cadre  groups  were  vote  against  Eltsin  or  divided.  Furthermore,  Far 
Eastern  cadres  were  even  more  liberal  than  Far  Eastern  technicians  in  twelve  votes. 
's')  Among  SIBFE  deputies,  Free  Russia  and  the  Workers'  Union  were  possibly  an  exception  as 
they  attained  a  high  level  of  unity  in  eight  and  seven  votes  respectively,  and  were  divided  in  less  than  four 
votes.  For  example,  political  factions  belonging  to  these  blocs  remained  divided  or  moderately  united 
when  the  constitutional  amendment  on  Article  12  was  put  to  a  vote  at  the  Seventh  Congress. 
153  )  For  instance,  the  Democratic  Centre  included  Free  Russia,  Left  Centre,  Sovereignty  & 
Equality,  and  Motherland.  However,  according  to  Sobyanin's  work,  the  first  two  factions  were  weakly 
supporting  reform,  whereas  Sovereignty  &  Equality  was  weakly  opposing  reform.  When  Eltsin  asked  the 
Congress  to  be  allowed  to  head  the  government  until  1  December  1992,  SIBFE  deputies  who  joined  Free 
Russia  and  Left  Centre  strongly  supported  Eltsin  (M=8.0  and  6.7  respectively),  while  Sovereignty  & 
Equality  members  were  divided  (M"O.  0).  See  Alexander  Sobyanin,  "The  Current  Crisis,  "  in  Remington 
(ed.  ),  Parliaments  In  Transition,  pp.  196.197. 
"I  )  At  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congresses,  after  blocs  were  formed,  Far  Eastern  deputies  who 
joined  the  Coalition  for  Reform  bloc  maintained  a  higher  level  of  unity  in  seven  of  the  ten  votes,  but  were 
not  divided  in  any  vote.  By  contrast,  Siberian  deputies  of  the  Coalition  for  Reform  were  strongly  united  in 
five  votes,  while  they  were  divided  in  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  remove  a  moratorium  on  the  sale  of  land. 
rss)  Considering  ten  issues  that  were  put  to  the  vote  at  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congress,  Siberian 
deputies  who  joined  the  Russian  Unity  bloc  maintained  strong  unity  in  five  votes  and  were  divided  in  two 
votes.  By  contrast,  Far  Eastern  deputies  who  joined  the  Russian  Unity  were  highly  united  in  eight  votes, (Chapter  Yn  290 
but  were  divided  in  one  vote.  The  more  obvious  differences  were  revealed  when  all  votes  analysed  were 
taken  into  consideration  as  political  factions  which  constituted  two  highly  united  blocs,  the  Coalition  for 
Reform  and  the  Russian  Unity  appeared  to  be  consistent  in  their  voting  patterns  even  before  they  formed 
blocs.  In  this  case,  Siberian  deputies  from  the  Russian  Unity  maintained  strong  unity  in  nine  votes  and 
were  divided  in  three  votes,  whereas  Far  Eastern  deputies  in  the  same  bloc  voted  strongly  against  the 
reform  in  fourteen  votes  and  were  divided  only  in  the  vote  on  Zor'kin's  proposal. 
ts6  )  For  instance,  SIBFE  deputies  belonging  to  Democratic  Russia  faction  (M-9.4)  almost 
unanimously  supported  the  third  draft  resolution  of  the  Sixth  Congress  on  economic  reform  which 
included  an  item,  recommending  the  president  to  abolish  presidential  representatives  in  the  local 
administrative  units.  But  in  the  vote  on  the  proposal  to  remove  the  moratorium  on  the  right  to  sell  land, 
they  (M=3.0)  rendered  only  weak  support,  whereas  other  members  from  other  Russian  regions  (M=6.3) 
strongly  supported  it.  Among  Russian  Unity  members,  SIBFE  deputies  of  the  Fatherland  faction  (M-2.7) 
appeared  to  be  more  attentive  to  the  regional  goals  than  other  factions  within  the  Russian  Unity.  In  the 
vote  on  a  draft  of  economic  resolution  in  the  Sixth  Congress,  the  former  group  weakly  supported  the  draft 
resolution,  while  the  latter  group  weakly  opposed  it. 
'r  )  For  instance,  SIBFE  members  of  the  Workers'  Union  unanimously  supported  the  draft 
resolution  of  the  Sixth  Congress  (Ms10.0).  They  also  moderately  supported  a  proposal  to  allow  Eltsin  to 
head  the  government  until  1  December  1992  (M=4.2).  However,  they  voted  against  the  question  of  a 
moratorium  on  the  right  to  sell  land  (M'1.7)  and  Sheboldaev's  Constitutional  amendment  to  Point  3  of 
Article  109  which  would  have  given  the  Supreme  Soviet  the  right  to  endorse  the  appointment  of  the 
Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  (Ma-3.3). 
is'  )  In  the  votes  on  the  draft  resolution  of  the  Sixth  Congress  and  Zor'kin's  proposal  in  the 
Seventh  Congress,  63  Siberian  deputies  voted  in  support  of  both  proposals,  just  like  Vitalii  Mukha,  the 
Executive  Director  of  the  Siberian  Agreement.  Of  a  total  of  63  deputies,  twelve  were  members  of  Creative 
Strength,  eleven  of  the  Coalition  for  Reform,  six  of  Democratic  Centre,  and  only  four  of  Russian  Unity. 
About  three-quarters  of  SIBFE  deputies  who  showed  the  same  voting  patterns  to  those  of  Mukha 
represented  either  moderate  blocs  or  no  blocs  at  all. 
1SI)  The  younger  generation  from  the  Far  Eastern  regions  more  eagerly  supported  the  introduction 
of  a  private  land  ownership  (M-7.2)  and  removing  the  ban  on  the  right  to  sell  land  plots  (M-4.0).  The 
older  generation  (Ms1.8  and  -2.1  respectively)  was  less  supportive  of  those  questions  (T-2.4,  p<0.05  and 
T-2.8,  p<0.01  respectively).  In  the  vote  to  label  the  work  of  the  government  as  'unsatisfactory'  which 
was  put  to  the  vote  at  the  Third  Congress,  the  former  group  (M-4.4)  voted  in  favour  of  the  government, 
while  the  latter  (M-1.3)  voted  against  it  (T-'2.5,  p<0.05). 
160  )  The  older  generation  from  the  Far  Eastern  regions  recorded  higher  scores  in  about  half  the 
votes  analysed  than  the  average  scores  of  the  same  category  of  deputies  in  the  Congress  as  a  whole.  By 
contrast,  older  deputies  from  Siberia  did  so  in  only  three  votes.  Older  deputies  from  the  Far  Eastern 
regions  (M=2.6)  were  more  supportive  of  the  government  than  older  deputies  from  other  regions  as  a 
whole  (M-0.5)  when  the  question  of  a  no  confidence  in  the  government  was  put  to  a  vote  at  the  Sixth 
Congress.  In  the  vote,  they  were  even  more  supportive  of  the  government  than  younger  deputies  from  the 
Far  Eastern  regions  (M=0.8). (Chapter  Yo  291 
16'  )  For  instance,  53  SIBFE  deputies  who  had  not  been  members  of  the  CPSU  were  divided  over 
the  right  to  sell  land  plots  (M-1.3)  and  over  a  resolution  on  economic  reform  (M-0.4)  that  were  put  to  the 
vote  at  the  Seventh  Congress.  They  were  again  divided  in  the  vote  on  political  issues  such  as 
Sheboldaev's  constitutional  amendment  to  Article  109  point  3  at  the  Sixth  Congress  (M"0.2),  and  Eltsin's 
constitutional  amendment  to  Article  122  at  the  Seventh  Congress  (M=2.1). 
161  )  In  the  vote  on  the  question  of  no  confidence  in  the  government  and  the  president,  non-CPSU 
deputies  were  more  supportive  of  government  and  Eltsin  (M-3.8  in  the  both  votes)  than  CPSU  members 
from  the  SIBFE  (M=-0.3,  T=-2.9,  p<0.01  and  M-0.6,  T=-3.3,  p<0.001  respectively). 
113  )  At  the  Third  Congress,  the  CPSU  members  among  Far  Eastern  deputies  (M-4.1)  voted  for 
the  proposal  to  postpone  the  discussion  of  the  law  on  the  presidency  to  the  following  Congress,  while 
other  deputies  (M=3.6)  voted  against  it  (Ts-3.0,  p<0.01).  Again  at  the  same  Congress,  the  CPSU 
members  (M=-1.1)  voted  against  the  proposal  to  adopt  a  resolution  on  the  redistribution  of  authority 
among  Russian  higher  organs,  while  other  Far  Eastern  deputies  (M=5.7)  voted  in  favour  of  it  (T-.  2.4, 
p<0.05).  At  the  Sixth  Congress,  the  former  group  (M"-1.1)  rejected  the  idea  of  removing  the  ban  on  the 
right  to  sell  land,  while  the  latter  group  (M=5.0)  supported  it  (T-2.3,  p<0.05). 
'")  In  addition  to  this,  they  (M-5.2)  also  supported  a  proposal  that  economic  programmes  should 
be  in  accordance  with  those  of  other  Union  republics,  while  the  Russian  deputies  (M-1.1)  rejected  this 
proposal  (T=2.6,  p<0.05). 
161  )  For  instance,  each  titular  deputy  group  from  the  Republics  of  Sakha  (a  resource  region,  seven 
Iakut  deputies)  and  Buriatiia  (a  rural  region,  six  Buriat  deputies)  seemed  to  be  united,  scoring  higher  than 
six  points  in  nine  and  thirteen  votes  respectively.  However,  they  showed  different  voting  patterns.  For 
instance,  fakuty  from  the  Republic  of  Sakha  (M;  5.7)  voted  against  full-fledged  land  ownership  including 
the  right  to  sell  land  plots  at  the  Sixth  Congress.  By  contrast,  Buriaty  from  the  Republic  of  Buriatia 
(M=1.7)  were  divided  in  the  vote. 
I")  As  there  are  too  many  factions  in  the  Congress,  they  were  categorised  into  three  groups:  the 
Coalition  of  Reform,  Russian  Unity  and  other.  As  those  political  factions  which  joined  the  Coalition  of 
Reforms  and  Russian  Unity  in  1992  showed  rather  consistent  voting  patterns  than  other  factions,  they  were 
grouped  together  even  before  they  explicitly  formed  political  blocs. 
167)  For  instance,  Communists  of  Russia  faction  experienced  drastic  changes  in  their  members.  It 
had  357  members  in  October  1991,  but  was  reduced  to  59  in  May  1992. 
168  )  Sobyanin  pointed  out  that  platforms  of  factions  were  "vague"  and  "occasionally 
indistinguishable.  "  He  also  noted  that,  sometimes,  even  faction  leaders  failed  to  act  in  accordance  with  the 
platforms  of  their  own  factions.  Sobyanin,  "Political  Cleavages  among  the  Russian  Deputies,  "  in 
Remington  (ed.  ),  Parliaments  in  Transition,  pp.  191,201. 
169)  Ibid.,  p.  202. 
170)  For  the  changes  in  the  electoral  process  in  1993,  see  Stephen  White,  Russia's  New  Politics: 
The  Management  of  a  Postcommunist  Society  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2000),  pp.  37.39. CHAPTER  VII 
Regionalism  within  Regionalism 
The  analysis  of  deputies'  voting  patterns  showed  that  the  regions'  efforts  to 
increase  their  influence  in  the  Congress  of  People's  Deputies  (CPD)  were  less 
successful  than  they  might  have  been.  Despite  the  emergence  of  regional  associations 
inside  and  outside  the  CPD  and  weakening  centralising  forces,  the  vigorous  efforts  of 
deputies  and  regional  leaders  to  increase  their  influence  in  the  Congress  appeared  to  be 
far  from  satisfactory  for  many  regional  leaders.  ' 
As  the  division  of  deputies  in  the  Congress  on  the  basis  of  smaller  regional 
groups  suggests,  the  different  socio-economic  features  of  regions  became  a  major 
obstacle  for  their  coordination  efforts?  In  the  course  of  reform,  the  different  impact  of 
reform  on  the  regions  resulted  in  the  diversification  of  regional  goals  and  development 
strategies.  Accordingly,  discord  emerged  among  political  actors  in  the  regions  not 
only  among  deputies,  as  already  discussed,  but  also  among  regional  leaderships  and 
the  grassroots.  In  particular,  regional  leaders  had  to  be  attentive  to  the  demands  of 
their  own  electorate  in  order  to  survive  the  elections,  which  also  hampered  their  efforts 
to  increase  coordination.  In  this  regard,  the  decision-making  procedure  of  the  Siberian 
Agreement  that  demanded  a  unanimous  agreement  only  revealed  the  reluctance  of 
regional  leaders  to  risk  their  own  particular  needs  for  collective  goals. 
Discord  among  regional  political  actors  at  each  level  also  caused  problems  in 
their  vertical  linkages.  Although  the  attitudes  of  each  political  actor  towards  reform 
policies  seemed  to  reflect  regional  socio-economic  features  in  general,  they  lacked  an 
institutionalised  mechanism-for  instance,  political  parties-which  would  link  them 
together.  In  the  process  of  democratisation,  the  influence  of  regional  leaders  over  their 
deputies  was  much  less  than  it  used  to  be  during  the  Soviet  period.  Against  this 
development,  the  poor  performance  of  regional  parties  that  advocated  regional  goals 
indicated  that  SIBFE  regionalism  lacked  a  mechanism  for  the  collection  and (Chapter  Y!!  )  293 
coordination  of  diverse  regional  interests,  and  thus  failed  to  adapt  to  the  changing 
environment. 
Finally,  the  regional  policy  of  the  centre  facilitated  the  diversification  of 
regional  goals.  Many  argued  that  Eltsin  had  no  regional  policy  at  all,  and  encouraged 
copy-cat  demands  which  encouraged  the  development  of  regionalism  as  discussed  in 
Chapter  3.  However,  Eltsin's  separate  and  unsystematised  negotiations  with  individual 
administrative  units  successfully  contained  regionalism  within  a  'federal'  structure  by 
providing  separate  treatments  and,  at  the  same  time,  'equalising  measures'  through 
multyparty  pacts  or  even  through  bilateral  negotiations.  The  contents  of  bilateral 
negotiations  showed  that  Eltsin  had  employed  only  a  couple  of  types  of  pacts. 
This  chapter  will  consider  in  more  detail  the  diverse  views  on  the  inter-regional 
associations  and  regional  development  strategies  within  the  SIBFE  regions,  the 
influence  of  regional  leaders  over  their  deputies  in  the  Congress,  linkage  between 
regional  political  actors,  and  Eltsin's  regional  policy. 
VII.  1.  Diversity  among  Regional  Leaderships 
The  consistent  demands  of  the  SIBFE  regions  could  be  depicted  as 
'decolonisation,  '  which  meant  decentralisation  of  management  and  foreign  economic 
activities,  and  special  arrangement  for  the  socio-economic  development  of  the  SIBFE. 
However,  the  individual  administrative  units  in  the  SIBFE  seemed  to  have  different 
outlooks  on  the  region's  future  and  the  role  of  inter-regional  associations,  which  led 
them  to  various  paths.  By  the  end  of  1993,  at  least  three  different  approaches  to  inter- 
regional  cooperation  had  emerged:  political  and  economic  independence,  economic 
independence,  and  horizontal  cooperation. 
Furthermore,  individual  regions  specified  their  own  development  strategies  in 
order  to  make  best  use  of  their  own  political  and  socio-economic  capitals  in  the  course 
of  reform.  In  general,  three  main  strategies  could  be  identified:  'go  it  alone,  ' 
'republicanisation,  '  and  devolution  through  Free  Economic  Zones  (FEZs).  These 
diversification  of  regional  strategies  caused  discord  among  regional  leaderships 
outside  and  inside  the  CPD. (Chapter  VII)  294 
VII.  1  (1)  Different  Levels  oflnter-regional  Cooperation 
Regarding  the  inter-regional  association,  there  was  an  approach  for  full 
independence  which  mainly  aimed  at  the  creation  of  a  Siberian  republic  or  a  Far 
Eastern  republic.  In  particular,  some  regional  parties  such  as  the  Party  of  Siberian 
Independence,  the  Union  for  the  Unification  of  Siberia,  and  the  Far  Eastern  Republican 
Party  of  Freedom  advocated  full  independence  4  For  instance,  Boris  Petrov,  leader  of 
the  Party  of  Siberian  Independence  and  deputy  of  the  Russian  CPD  from  Tiumen 
oblast,  insisted  that  Siberia  could  get  out  of  its  crisis  by  achieving  independence  as  its 
production  capacity  was  far  greater  than  it  was  needed  to  resolve  its  own  socio- 
economic  problems.  ' 
However,  political  leaders  also  used  the  idea  of  independence  to  strengthen  their 
position  in  bargaining  with  Moscow.  In  particular,  Aman  Tuleev,  the  Chairman  of 
Kemerovo  oblsovet,  became  an  ardent  advocate  of  this  position.  His  approach  seemed 
to  be  rather  a  reflection  of  the  frustrating  socio-economic  situation  of  the  oblast.  The 
industrial  structure  of  the  oblast  was  largely  dominated  by  coal  mining  and  this  could 
hardly  be  a  sound  source  of  finance.  Coal  mines  were  heavily  dependent  on  subsidies 
from  the  centre,  and  faced  possible  closure  which  threatened  the  social  stability  of  the 
region.  '  During  the  early  1990s,  the  region  was  a  main  basis  of  strikes  of  coal  miners 
who  considered  politicising  their  organisations  as  one  of  the  best  options  to  deal  with 
their  problems.  '  In  this  context,  Tuleev's  separatist  programme  had  two  purposes:  to 
win  grassroots  support  and  to  place  extra  pressure  on  central  government.  ' 
The  idea  of  re-establishing  a  Far  Eastern  republic  was  also  used  as  a  bargaining 
card  by  regional  leaders  and  the  Far  Eastern  Association  of  Economic  Cooperation  9 
In  particular,  Valentin  Fedorov,  governor  of  Sakhalin  oblast,  often  used  his  support  for 
establishing  a  Far  Eastern  republic  in  his  dealings  with  Moscow.  When  the  question  of 
Kuril  Islands  was  discussed  between  Moscow  and  Japan,  he  denounced  Moscow's 
position  as  a  "national  betrayal,  "  insisting  that  a  Far  Eastern  republic  "must  save 
Russia  and  Moscow  itself  from  territorial  repatriation  of  the  Kuril  Islands.  "'°  Again, 
he  warned  Eltsin  in  December  1992  that  he  would  raise  the  question  of  re-establishing 
a  Far  Eastern  Republic,  urging  Eltsin  to  draft  a  government  programme  on  the  socio- 
economic  development  of  the  Kuril  Islands.  He  won  the  bargain  as  the  president 
signed  a  decree  "On  the  Social  and  Economic  Development  of  the  Kuril  Islands" 
which  included  the  creation  of  a  special  economic  zone  in  the  islands.  I  I (Chapter  YIV  295 
However,  the  idea  of  creating  a  Siberian  or  Far  Eastern  republic  was  even 
unpopular  among  regional  leaders.  "  For  instance,  Tuleev  raised  the  issue  again  as  a 
counter  measure  to  Eltsin's  dissolution  of  the  parliament  at  the  Extraordinary  Congress 
of  All  Siberian  Congress  of  Chairmen  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  Republics,  Krais,  and 
Oblasts  in  September  1993.  However,  only  Anatoli  Chaptynov,  the  Chairman  of  the 
Republic  of  Altai  Soviet,  joined  him.  13 
At  the  meeting,  Vitalii  Mukha,  governor  of  Novosibirsk  oblast  and  director  of 
the  Council  of  the  Siberian  Agreement,  opposed  the  idea  of  establishing  a  Siberian 
republic,  depicting  it  as  a  `maximum'  programme.  Instead,  he  took  rather  a  moderate 
path,  which  was  described  as  a  `minimum'  programme  at  that  moment,  suggesting  to 
turn  the  Siberian  Agreement  into  an  inter-regional  association  with  a  single  budget: 
I,  as  chairman  of  the  Council  of  the  Siberian  Agreement,  will  not  sign  a 
document  of  building  up  a  Siberian  republic,  even  if  a  majority  supports  it.... 
Create  single  budget  first,  then  solve  the  question  of  federal  status.  " 
Despite  these  moves,  most  SIBFE  regions  considered  an  inter-regional 
association  as  an  organisation  for  accelerating  horizontal  cooperation  in  more  practical 
terms;  dealing  with  environmental  problems,  establishing  business  representation  in 
foreign  countries,  raising  an  inter-regional  development  fund,  adjusting  industrial 
structure  and  so  on.  For  instance,  there  was  a  question  of  coordinating  foreign 
business  representatives,  which  were,  at  that  time,  under  the  separate  administration  of 
individual  regions.  "  The  Far  Eastern  Economic  Association  also  discussed  the 
question  of  establishing  an  inter-regional  fund  to  support  their  own  investment 
policy.  16 
In  addition,  inter-regional  production  was  suggested  as  a  way  of  adjusting 
industrial  structures  or  industrial  capacities  to  meet  changing  needs.  For  instance, 
Vladimir  Sagonov,  the  Chairman  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  of  the  Buriat  Republic, 
maintained  in  an  interview  with  Sibirskaia  gazeta  that  the  inter-regional  association 
could  play  a  major  role  in  the  conversion  of  the  military-industrial  complex  by  drafting 
its  own  conversion  programme  in  which  regions  launched  joint  ventures.  He  also 
made  it  clear  that  he  opposed  the  idea  of  `republicanisation'  of  inter-regional 
association,  describing  it  as  forming  "a  government  within  a  government.  "" (Chapter  YIQ  296 
VII.  1  (2)  Varie  ofRegionalised  Development  Strategies 
Although  most  of  the  SIBFE  regions  agreed  the  need  of  cooperation,  discord 
among  member  regions  of  the  regional  associations  emerged.  They  pursued  their  own 
regional  development  strategies  on  the  basis  of  their  own  socio-economic  and  political 
needs  at  the  cost  of  inter-regional  unity.  " 
First  of  all,  the  federal  republics  were  exploring  favourable  terms  based  on  their 
federal  status.  As  for  republics,  declaration  of  sovereignty  and  supremacy  over  federal 
law  on  their  territories  could  be  a  powerful  bargaining  card.  "'  In  particular,  the  process 
of  signing  the  Federal  Treaty  provided  good  opportunities  for  republics  to  obtain  more 
favourable  terms  than  for  ordinary  administrative  units.  For  instance,  the  Republic  of 
Sakha,  one  of  the  resource  regions,  concluded  a  bilateral  agreement  on  economic 
questions  with  the  central  government  on  31  March  1992,  when  the  republic  finally 
signed  the  Federal  Treaty.  According  to  the  agreement,  the  republic  would  be 
allocated  11.5  per  cent  of  precious  metals  produced  in  the  republic,  20  per  cent  of 
jewellery  diamonds  and  all  diamonds  for  the  industrial  use,  45  per  cent  of  hard- 
currency  gains  from  the  sale  of  diamonds  on  the  world  market,  and  25  per  cent  of  hard- 
currency  gains  from  Sakha's  gold  that  was  exported  by  the  Russian  Gold  Committee. 
Furthermore,  75  per  cent  of  resources  excluding  diamonds  and  gold  that  was  exported 
in  1992  was  to  remain  at  the  disposal  of  the  republic  as  a  regional  fund.  2° 
Against  the  favoured  status  of  republics,  other  ordinary  administrative  units, 
particularly  economically  self-sufficient  regions,  pursued  'republicanisation'  as  a 
strategy  in  their  relations  with  the  centre?  `  This  group  included  Krasnoiarsk  and 
Primorskii  krais,  Irkutsk  oblast,  and  autonomous  okrugs  such  as  Iamalo-Nenets  in 
Tiumen  oblast,  and  Chukotka  in  Magadan  oblast.  For  instance,  Krasnoiarsk  krai 
demanded  the  same  rights  that  had  been  granted  to  republics  in  October  19911  The 
attempts  to  acquire  equal  rights  with  those  enjoyed  by  republics  were  reiterated  when 
Mukha  raised  a  question  of  consolidating  a  budget  within  Siberia.  Viacheslav 
Novikov,  the  Chairman  of  the  Krasnoiarsk  kraisovet,  observed  that  the  krai  "appears  to 
be  a  self-sufficient  region  and  deserves  a  republic  status.  "'a  Irkutsk  oblast  also  made  a 
similar  demand,  insisting  that  the  central  government  violated  the  Constitution  on  the 
territory  of  the  oblast,  which  became  an  obstacle  for  the  local  authority  to  carry  out 
their  duty  to  protect  the  economic,  social  and  legal  rights  of  its  population.  " (Chapter  VII)  297 
However,  'republicanisation'  seemed  to  be  rather  a  more  complicated  matter  for 
Tiumen  oblast,  a  more  'self-sufficient'  region  than  Krasnoiarsk  krai.  In  Krasnoiarsk 
krai,  the  economic  role  of  two  autonomous  okrugs  was  marginal  (see  Table  7.1.1). 
However,  two  autonomous  okrugs  in  Tiumen  produced  most  of  its  natural  resources, 
while  Tiumen  'proper,  '  mainly  an  agricultural  region,  dominated  the  administration  of 
the  oblast.  Therefore,  the  oblast  authority  itself  became  a  target  of  challenges  by 
autonomous  okrugs. 
<Table  7.1.1>  Economic  Profile  of  Autonomous  Okrugs  in  Tiumen  Oblast  and 
Krasnoiarsk  Krai  (1993) 
Tiumen  oblast  Krasnoiarsk  krai 
Total  Khanty-  Iamalo-  Total  Taimyr  Evcnkii 
Mansi  aok  Nenets  aok  aok  aok 
Territory  size  1,435.2  36.4  52.3  2,239.7  38.5  34.3 
Population  3,120.0  41.7  14.9  3,048.0  1.7  0.8 
Industrial  production  7,577.0  71.4  19.8  4,451.0  0.14  0.03 
Oil  (gas  condensed)  236,396.0  82.0  18.0  1.0  0.0  0.0 
Natural  gas  562,794.0  3.6  96.4  - 
Electricity  62.3  83.3  1.8  50.5  0.2  0.2 
Total  in  actual  figures;  aok  figures  in  terms  of  percentage  to  oblast  or  krai  total. 
Sources:  Territory  size  (1000  km2),  in  Goskomstat,  Rossiiskaia  Federatsifa  v  1992  godu:  Staiisticheskil 
ezhegodnik,  1993,  pp.  5-10;  Population  (1000  people),  in  Goskomstat,  Rossiiskil  statisticheskil 
ezhegodnik  1994,  pp.  441-443;  Industrial  production  (billion  rubles),  in  Goskomstat,  Promyshlennost', 
1996,  pp.  254-256;  Gas  condensed  oil  production  (1000  t),  in  ibid.,  p.  283;  Natural  gas  production  (1000 
m'),  in  ibid.,  p.  284;  and  Electricity  (billion  lcw/h),  in  ibid.,  pp.  280-282, 
In  November  1990,  Iamalo-Nenets  autonomous  okrug  applied  for  republican 
status,  though  Valerii  Chirlov,  the  Chairman  of  the  Soviet  of  Khanty-Mansi 
autonomous  okrug,  declared  that  it  would  remain  as  a  autonomous  okrug  as  "political 
stability  of  the  region  is  crucial"  for  the  country's  future  2S  Facing  such  challenges, 
Tiumen  oblsovet  decided  to  ask  the  Supreme  Soviet  of  the  RSFSR  to  reject  the  demand 
of  Iamalo-Nenets  autonomous  okrug.  It  also  asked  the  Supreme  Soviet  to  elaborate 
principles  of  economic  relations  between  all  levels  of  administrations  in  the  oblast.  2s 
As  a  result,  an  economic  and  political  power-sharing  agreement  was  concluded 
between  the  oblast  and  autonomous  okrugs  in  December  1991,  though  it  was  far  from 
a  demarcation  of  rights  to  resources.  27 
Partly  because  of  these  domestic  problems,  the  demands  of  Tiumen  oblast  were 
rather  moderate  and  emphasised  economic  issues,  nonetheless  the  oblast  supported  a 
slogan  of  "strong  regions,  strong  centre": 
...  in  order  to  set  spinning  the  mechanism  of  the  use  of  natural  wealth  for 
the  benefit  of  Russia  and  the  region  alike,  it  is  necessary  to  draft  and  approve  more (Chapter  Y1l)  298 
than  15  various  normative  acts,  rules,  instructions  and  provisions.  ...  We  table  a 
proposal  in  the  government  to  allow  the  authorities  and  administrative  bodies  of 
Tiumen  oblast,  in  cooperation  with  autonomous  districts,  to  begin,  as  a  trial  run,  to 
improve  the  mechanism  of  using  natural  wealth  and  to  set  up  appropriate  structures 
before  a  package  of  normative  acts  is  approved  at  the  federal  level.  ...  I  am  sure 
that  any  region  will  find  solution  of  its  socio-economic  problems  more  expediently 
and  efficiently  if  it  is  granted  a  certain  freedom  of  action  with  an  obligatory 
observance  of  unified  state  rules  established  by  law.  2' 
Finally,  FEZ  status  became  a  useful  lever  in  bargaining  with  the  centre. 
Although  the  idea  of  FEZ  began  to  be  discussed  in  the  late  1980s,  its  realisation  was 
delayed  because  of  the  worries  of  conservatives  and  centrists  who  believed  that  FEZs 
could  be  a  means  of  achieving  regional  autonomy.  First  of  all,  the  FEZ  granted 
investors  favoured  conditions  in  terms  of  taxation,  tariffs,  credits,  and  administrative 
surroundings  through  'a  special  legal  regime.  "'  The  FEZ  status  also  provided  regions 
with  investment  from  the  centre,  particularly  on  the  development  of  infrastructure  in 
the  area.  30  Furthermore,  the  regional  authorities  were  provided  with  more 
opportunities  to  expand  their  control  over  the  economic  activities  in  the  zone. 
Considering  the  rights  that  would  be  transferred  to  the  regional  authorities,  the 
idea  of  the  FEZ  could  be  a  variation  of  'republicanisation'  which  was  mainly 
concentrated  on  economic  aspects.  For  instance,  two  proposals  of  the  Presidium  of  the 
Primorskii  kraisovet  contained  a  long  list  of  'special  rights'  of  the  kraisovet,  clearly 
showing  its  intention  to  expand  its  jurisdiction  over  economic  activities  and  regional 
resources.  In  'option  1,  '  which  contained  more  broad  rights  than  'option  2,  '  the 
kraisovet  declared  that  the  land,  subsoil  thereof,  the  forests,  inland  bodies  of  water,  and 
200  mile  sea  zone  be  the  property  of  the  krai,  which  could  constitute  a  'maximum' 
demand.  In  addition,  the  kraisovet  also  declared  itself  the  highest  organ  in  the  FEZ.  " 
However,  economic  activities  in  the  FEZs  did  not  seem  to  be  satisfactory,  " 
which  led  regions  to  develop  their  own  version  of  development  programmes,  clearly 
revealing  their  interests.  For  instance,  the  Nakhodka  FEZ  administration  accused  the 
central  government  of  neglecting  necessary  investment,  demanding  that  the  central 
government  implement  investment  projects  and  grant  the  FEZ  authorities  more 
rights.  `  In  particular,  the  Primorskii  kraisovet  drafted  a  'Greater  Vladivostok'  concept 
in  1992  which  also  recognised  an  FEZ  model  as  an  unsuitable  option.  '  In  the 
programme,  the  krai  demanded  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  responsibility  of  the 
federal  government,  and  an  agreement  between  Moscow  and  regional  authorities 
demarcating  rights  to  resources.  "  However,  the  federal  government  rather  seemed  to 
be  interested  in  the  Tuman  River  Project,  which  was  supported  by  Khabarovsk  krai. (Chapter  YI!  )  299 
One  of  reasons  for  the  declaration  of  a  republic  by  Primorskii  krai  on  8  July  1993, 
which  was  supported  by  the  tin  mining  workers,  entrepreneurs  and  directors  of 
enterprises,  "'  could  be  found  in  this  context. 
In  the  Russian  Far  East,  Sakhalin  oblast  also  followed  a  similar  path,  but  with  a 
slightly  different  variation  on  a  different  background.  Here  again,  Valentin  Fedorov, 
governor  of  the  oblast,  rejected  a  FEZ  model  originating  from  the  centre,  nonetheless 
he  accepted  the  FEZ  concept  itself.  His  rejection  seemed  to  stem  from  the 
development  of  Russian-Japanese  relations,  particularly  the  territorial  dispute  on  four 
islands"  In  particular,  the  development  of  Sakhalin  offshore  oil  and  gas  projects 
encouraged  Sakhalin  oblast  to  strengthen  their  control  over  resources"  He  claimed 
that  the  region  had  been  "robbed"  by  the  centre  and  now  would  declared  itself  "a 
special  territory  with  exclusive  rights  of  self-government": 
The  central  authorities  robbed  Sakhalin  of  all  it  used  to  have:  its  people 
have  no  access  to  local  products.  ...  we  shall  buy  our  freedom,  but  we'll  pay  in 
instalments,  and  thus  be  beneficial  both  for  the  central  authorities  and  the  so-called 
provinces.  The  first  step  to  freedom  is  a  region's  right  to  manage  its  own  resources 
on  a  commercial  basis.  ... 
Undoubtedly,  Sakhalin  has  always  been  part  of  Russia, 
and  now  Sakhalin  with  all  nearby  islands  is  to  be  declared  a  special  territory  with 
exclusive  rights  to  self-government.  This  means  that  democratically  elected  local 
governments  will  be  free  to  handle  at  all  local  problems--economic,  social,  and 
political-as  they  see  fit.  " 
Instead  of  a  FEZ,  he  suggested  a  `fourth  way'  which  supported  to  establish  a 
FEZ  not  only  on  the  Southern  Kuril  Islands  but  also  on  nearby  Japanese  territory  to 
develop  the  region  jointly.  "  The  concept  was  developed  further  to  form  a  globalised 
bloc,  a  Northeast  Asia  Cooperation  Zone,  which  included  Sakhalin,  Republic  of  Korea, 
Hokkaido,  and  three  provinces  of  Northeast  China" 
V11.2.  Decreasing  Role  of  Regional  Leaders  in  the  CPDs 
The  political  and  socio-economic  diversity  of  regions  often  resulted  in  discord 
among  regional  leaders,  which  hampered  inter-regional  cooperation.  After  the 
political  reform  including  changes  in  electoral  procedures,  regional  leaders  were 
forced  to  respond  to  pressures  from  below.  "'  Furthermore,  regional  leaderships  were 
reshuffled  as  Eltsin  began  to  appoint  his  representatives  and  governors.  As  some 
deputies  were  selected  as  governor  or  presidential  representatives,  regional  leaderships 
in  the  Russian  CPD  became  a  mixture  of  'old'  and  'new'  leaders  who  were  often (Chapter  VII)  300 
opposed  to  each  other.  In  particular,  '  the  new  posts  were  accountable  to  different 
entities.  Governors  and  presidential  representatives  were  responsible  to  the  president 
and  the  local  soviet,  while  local  soviet  chairmen  and  the  president  of  the  federal 
republics  answered  to  the  grassroots.  As  a  result,  disputes  between  heads  of  regional 
administration  and  regional  soviets  or  between  governors  and  old  leaders,  first 
secretaries  of  the  republican  CPSU,  were  found  in  addition  to  the  discord  among 
leaders  along  the  borders  of  administrative  units. 
Discord  among  regional  leaders  not  only  hampered  their  efforts  to  strengthen 
their  position  in  the  Congress  by  forming  a  common  front  against  the  centre,  but  also 
decreased  their  influence  over  their  deputies  inside  the  Congress.  In  fact,  the  eroding 
`leading  role'  of  regional  leaders  had  been  noticed  since  the  late  1980s  when  the  role 
of  the  CPSU  was  called  into  question  and  it  began  to  lose  popularity.  The  weak 
linkage  between  regional  leaders  and  their  deputies  weakened  the  influence  of  inter- 
regional  associations  in  the  central  decision-making  body. 
VII.  2  (1)  Discord  among  Regional  Leaders  in  the  CPDs 
Discord  among  regional  leaders  appeared  even  in  the  Congress  of  People's 
Deputies  of  the  USSR,  although  they  shared  common  social  background  as  old 
nomenklaturists.  Among  ten  first  secretaries  of  the  Siberian  regions  who  were  elected 
to  the  CPD  of  the  USSR,  those  of  Novosibirsk,  Irkutsk,  and  Chita  oblasts,  and  the 
Republic  of  Altai  (Gorno-Altai  autonomous  oblast  then)  voted  in  less  conservative 
ways.  By  contrast,  the  First  Secretaries  of  the  Republics  of  Tyva  and  Buriatiia,  and 
Altai  and  Krasnoiarsk  krais  voted  in  a  conservative  way.  In  particular,  V.  V. 
Kazarezov,  the  First  Secretary  of  Novosibirsk  oblast  where  `anti-establishment 
movements'  were  strong,  43  showed  an  example  of  the  adaptation  of  a  communist 
leader  to  the  new  situation.  In  addition,  discord  between  the  first  secretaries  and  their 
ispolkom  chairmen  was  also  revealed,  particularly  in  Altai  and  Krasnoiarsk  krais  where 
comparison  was  possible. ýäý 
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The  gap  between  regional  leaders  became  clearer  in  the  CPD  of  Russia,  despite 
the  development  of  inter-regional  cooperation.  For  instance,  fourteen  out  of  38 
regional  leaders  who  constituted  the  Council  of  the  Siberian  Agreement  were  elected 
to  the  Congress  of  Russia.  However,  their  voting  patterns  showed  a  wide  range  of 
differences  (see  Figure  7.1).  At  the  Congress,  V.  F.  Raifikesht,  governor  of  Altai  krai, 
M.  B.  Kisiliuk,  governor  of  Kemerovo  oblast,  and  Iu.  A.  Nozhikov,  the  Irkutsk 
oblispolkom  Chairman,  supported  reform.  By  contrast,  G.  N.  Maimago,  the  Chairman 
of  the  Soviet  of  Taimyr  autonomous  okrug,  and  A.  M.  Tuleev,  the  Chairman  of 
Kemerovo  oblsovet,  showed  rather  anti-Eltsin  tendencies.  Differences  among  the 
members  of  the  Council  of  Siberian  Agreement  in  the  vote  were  reduced  as  some  of 
the  conservative  leaders  such  as  V.  A.  Churilov,  the  Chairman  of  the  Soviet  of  Khanty- 
Mansi  autonomous  okrug,  and  V.  Mukha,  governor  of  Novosibirsk  oblast,  shifted  their 
positions  at  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congresses. 
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In  general,  the  regional  leaders  who  constituted  the  leadership  of  the  Siberian 
Agreement  were  more  united  when  political  questions  such  as  relations  between 
legislative  and  executive  branches  and  the  question  of  no  confidence  in  the  president 
were  put  to  the  vote  at  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congresses.  However,  as  far  as 
economic  issues  were  concerned,  K.  A.  Bicheldei,  the  Chairman  of  the  Presidium  of (Chapter  VII)  303 
the  Supreme  Soviet  of  the  Republic  of  Tyva,  and  Sh.  D.  Oorzhak,  the  Chairman  of 
ispolkom  of  Tyva,  joined  a  conservative  bloc,  leaving  the  gap  yet  to  be  bridged. 
The  differences  among  regional  leaders  were  more  clearly  revealed  when  other 
regional  leaders  were  taken  into  consideration  (see  Table  7.2.2).  Here  again,  discord 
can  be  found  between  the  leaders  of  the  executive  and  legislative  branches  at  the 
regional  level,  reflecting  the  struggles  between  two  branches  at  the  centre,  or  personal 
rivalries  at  the  region,  or  both.  In  this  regard,  leaders  of  these  two  regional  branches 
were  opposing  each  other  in  most  regions-Kemerovo,  Novosibirsk,  Chita,  Amur  and 
Primorskii-where  comparisons  are  possible.  In  general,  governors  were  more 
supportive  of  Eltsin  than  regional  soviet  leaders,  as  they  were  appointed  by  Eltsin, 
although  some  (e.  g.  Shichkin  of  Chita  oblast)  were  less  supportive  than  other 
governors. 
<Table  7.2.2>  Regional  Leaders  in  the  Russian  CPD  (1990-1993) 
Administrative  Regional  Leaders  average  score 
Units  Name 
2nd-  6th-7th  CPD 
Position  5th  Total  Eco-  Pol- 
CPD  nomic')  litical2) 
12  votes  10  votes  5  votes  5  votes 
West  Siberia 
Rep  Altai  V.  I.  Chaptynov*  1st  secretary/rep  sov  chair  -9.17  2.00  0.00  4.00 
V.  I.  Petrov*  rep  government  head  -7.50  2.00  0.00  4.00 
Altai  kr  V.  F.  Raifikesht*  governor/sov  chair  (1991)  7.50  8.00  6.00  10.00 
I.  I.  Zhiltsov  Ispolkom  chair  0.00  5.00  4.00  6.00 
Kemerovo  ob  M.  B.  Kisliuk*  governor/sov  chair  (1991)  7.50  6.00  4.00  8.00 
A.  M.  Tuleev*  sov  chairl'Fatherland'  head  -0.83  -10.00  -10.00  .  10.00 
Novosibirsk  ob  V.  P.  Mukha*  sov  chair/'SA'  executive  dir  -5.00  3.00  0.00  6.00 
V.  A.  Bokov  ispolkom  chair  -5.00  -5.00  -4.00  -6.00 
Omsk  ob  A.  P.  Leontsev*  Ist  secretary  0.00  -2.00  .  4.00  0.00 
Tomsk  ob  V.  N.  Egor  ispolkom  deputy  chair  -5.83  -6.00  -10.00  "2.00 
Khanty-Mansi  V.  A.  Churilov*  soviet  chair  -3.33  6.00  4.00  8.00 
East  Siberia 
Rep  Buriatiia  S.  N.  Buldaev  soviet  chair  -3.33  0.00  2.00  .  2.00 
Rep  Tyva  Ch.  B.  Ondar  soviet  chair  -3.33  -1.00  0.00  -2.00 
Rep  Khakassiia 
Krasnoiarsk  kr 
Evenkii  aok 
Taimyr  aok 
Irkutsk  ob 
Chita  ob 
Agin-Buriat  aok 
Far  East 
Rep  Sakha 
K  A.  Bicheldei*  VS  presidium  chair  (1991)  5.00  -1.00  -4.00  2.00 
Sh.  D.  Oorzhak*  ispolkom  chair  1.67  1.00  -4.00  6.00 
V.  N.  Shtygashev*  soviet  chair  -5.00  2.00  2,00  2.00 
Iu.  N.  Moskovich  presidential  representative  5.00  9.00  8.00  10.00 
V.  S.  Sokolov  2nd  secretary  -0.83  -7.00  -8.00  -6.00 
V,  V.  Uvachan  1st  secretary  -7.50  -8.00  -8.00  -8.00 
G.  N.  Maimago*  soviet  chair  -5.00  -5.00  -4.00  -6.00 
Tu.  A.  Nozhikov*  ispolkom  chair/governor  5.00  4.00  4.00  4.00 
V.  A.  Shishkin  governor  -3.33  1.00  -4.00  6.00 
N.  I.  Malkov  soviet  chair  -3.33  -8.00  -8.00  -8.00 
B.  V.  Aiushivev*  soviet  chair  -1.67  -1.00  0.00  -2.00 
M.  E.  Nikolaiev  governor/president  0.00  4.00  2.00  6.00 
V.  P.  Shamshin  Council  of  Ministers  chair  0.00  -5.00  -6.00  -4.00 (Chapter  Y!!  )  304 
Evreiskii  ao  M.  M.  Kaufman  ispolkom  chair  -4.17  0.00 
Primorskii  kr  E.  I.  Nazdratenko  governor  (1993-)  6.67  8.00 
A.  A.  Volyntev  soviet  chair  -5.00  -7.00 
Khabarovsk  kr  A.  I.  Vialkov  ispolkom  deputy  chair  3.33  6.00 
Amur  ob  A.  A.  Kirvchenko  governor  (-1993)  8.33  8.00 
Sakhalin  ob 
A.  N.  Belonogov  soviet  chair  -7.50  -9.00 
V.  P.  Fedorov  governor  0.83  3.00 
V.  N.  Zhigailo  Ist  secretary  -4.17  -6.00 
Economic  issues  included  votes  on  Ti,  T2,  T4,  U2  and  U3  questions  in  Appendix  6.1. 
ýý  Political  issues  included  votes  on  T3,  T5,  U1,  U4,  and  U5  questions  in  Appendix  6.1. 
2.00  -2.00 
8.00  8.00 
.  10.00  -4.00 
6.00  6.00 
6.00  10.00 
-10.00  -8.00 
6.00  0.00 
-6.00  .  6.00 
*  Members  of  the  Council  of  the  Siberian  Agreement  in  "Council  of  the  Siberian  Agreement  Association,  " 
International  Affairs,  no.  4  (April  1993),  pp.  70-86. 
Scores  ranged  from  -10  (anti-reform)  to  +10  (pro-reform). 
Among  the  regional  deputy  groups  in  which  first  secretaries  and  newly 
appointed  governors  represented,  the  two  leaders  were  also  opposed  to  each  other.  For 
instance,  among  Sakhalin  deputies,  differences  were  quite  evident  between  V.  P. 
Fedorov,  governor,  and  V.  N.  Zhigailo,  the  former  First  Secretary  of  the  CPSU,  in  their 
voting  patterns,  as  the  latter  had  anti-reform  tendencies.  Although  it  may  not  have 
been  a  conflict  between  `old'  and  `new'  leaders,  a  similar  conflict  was  found  within 
the  Sakha  leadership  in  the  Congress. 
Furthermore,  leaders'  voting  patterns  shifted  depending  on  the  questions, 
resulting  in  more  diverse  voting  patterns.  For  instance,  V.  A.  Shashlcin,  governor  of 
Chita  oblast,  supported  the  president  when  political  issues  were  put  to  the  vote,  while 
he  voted  against  on  economic  reform  policies.  By  contrast,  Fedorov  and  S.  N. 
Buldaev,  the  Chairman  of  the  Buriat  Republic  Soviet,  supported  economic  reform,  but 
refused  to  support  the  president  when  political  issues  were  put  to  the  vote. 
Considering  all  these  observations,  regional  leaders  were  rather  individualistic 
in  the  congress  in  their  votes,  failing  to  form  a  coherent  basis  for  regional  and  inter- 
regional  interest  articulation. 
VII  2  (2)  Limited  in  uence  ofregional  leaders  over  their  deputies  in  the  CPDs 
The  linkage  between  the  Siberian  Agreement  and  Siberian  deputies  to  the 
Russian  CPD  were  officially  established  when  they  organised  the  First  Congress  of 
People's  Deputies  of  Siberia  in  Krasnoiarsk  in  March  1992.  However,  we  may 
presume  that  a  de  facto  inter-linkage  existed  already  as  leading  figures  of  the  Siberian 
Agreement  were  represented  at  the  central  level  of  the  CPD.  To  examine  regional (Chapter  VII)  303 
leaders'  influence  over  deputies  elected  from  their  own  regions,  regional  leaders' 
voting  patterns  are  compared  with  those  of  deputies  from  the  same  region.  " 
In  the  Congress  of  the  USSR,  the  influence  of  regional  leaders,  mostly  first 
secretaries  of  the  CPSU  at  that  time,  over  `their'  deputies  was  obviously  decreased.  As 
in  Table  7.2.3,  deputies  showed  rather  similar  voting  patterns  to  those  of  their  regional 
leaders'  when  federal  issues  were  put  to  the  vote.  However,  the  influence  of  regional 
leaders  was  less  in  most  regional  deputy  groups  when  Article  6  and  presidential  issues 
were  put  to  the  vote.  In  particular,  deputies  from  the  republics  of  Sakha  and  Buriatiia, 
Krasnoiarsk  and  Khabarovsk  krais,  Novosibirsk  oblast,  and  Jewish  autonomous  oblast 
were  alienated  from  their  leaders  in  relative  terms.  Perhaps  among  the  regional  groups 
included  in  the  Table  7.2.3,  deputies  from  the  Republics  of  Altai  and  Tyva,  Altai  krai, 
Irkutsk  and  Amur  oblasts-mostly  conservative  regions-tended  to  have  similar 
voting  patterns  to  those  of  their  political  leaders. 
<Table  7.2.3>  Distance  of  SIBFE  Deputies  from  their  Leaders  in  the  USSR  CPD 
Administrative  Leaders  Position  N  Art.  6  Feder-  Presi-  Eco-  Other  Total 
Units  ation  dent  nomy 
24434  17 
votes  votes  votes  votes  votes  votes 
West  Siberia 
Rep  Altai  V.  V.  Gusev  1st  secretary  4  5.00  10.00  5.00  1.67  8.75  6.19 
Altai  kr  F.  V.  Popov  Ist  secretary  14  0.00  10.00  4.49  6.41  2.44  4.99 
Novosibirsk  ob  V.  V.  Kazarezov  I  st  secretary  15  1.33  7.56  1.33  5.33  4.22  3.64 
Omsk  ob  E.  D.  Pokhitailo  Ist  secretary  11  0.91  4.85  2.42  10.00  10.00  4.26 
East  Siberia 
Rep  Buriatiia  A.  M.  Beliakov  1st  secretary  15  1.33  8.11  2.27  6.43  -2.11  3.22 
Rep  Tyva  G.  Ch.  Shirshin  1st  secretary  13  3.08  10.00  3.74  6.92  2.05  5.39 
Krasnoiarsk  kr  O.  S.  Shenin  1st  secretary  22  0.91  5.83  2.20  3.02  0.76  2.95 
Irkutsk  ob  V.  I.  Potapov  1st  secretary  13  0.00  5.83  10.00  4.87  6.67  5.91 
Chita  ob  A.  P.  Orekhov  ispolkom  chair  7  3.33  4.72  5.83  5.00  0.00  4.21 
Far  East 
Rep  Sakha  Iu.  N.  Prokopev  1st  secretary  16  -3.13  2.50  1.88  4.17  5.63  2.39 
Evreiskii  ao  lu.  N.  Prokopev  1st  secretary  5  -6.00  4.00  10.00  .  0.67  4.00  2.62 
Khabarovsk  kr  N. N.  Daniliuk  ispolkom  chair  8  -7.50  8.75  7.14  0.42  3.75  3.85 
Amur  ob  L.  V.  Sharin  1st  secretary  6  5.00  10.00  6.67  8.89  5.56  7.21 
Scores  ranged  from  -10  (totally  different  from  regional  leaders'  voting  patterns)  to  +10  (identical  voting 
patterns). 
It  is  more  difficult  to  examine  the  influence  of  regional  leaders  in  the  Russian 
CPD.  "'  Despite  the  possible  methodological  limits,  the  analysis  suggests  that  the  role 
of  regional  leaders  was  less  in  the  Russian  CPD  than  in  the  USSR  CPD.  In  the  Russian 
CPD,  only  a  few  leaders-N.  I.  Malkov,  the  Chairman  of  Chita  oblsovet,  S.  N. 
Buldaev,  the  Chairman  of  the  soviet  of  the  Republic  of  Buriatiia,  and  Belonogov,  the (Chapter  YIn  306 
Chairman  of  Amur  oblsovet-showed  a  high  level  of  similarity  in  their  voting  patterns 
with  deputies  from  the  same  administrative  units.  By  contrast,  most  regional  leaders 
who  constituted  the  Council  of  the  Siberian  Agreement  such  as  Mukha,  Tuleev, 
Oorzhak,  Moskovich,  and  Nozhikov  did  not  seem  to  have  strong  influence  over  the 
deputies  from  their  own  regions  (see  Table  7.2.4). 
<Table  7.2.4>  Distance  of  SIBFE  Deputies  from  their  Leaders  in  the  Russian  CPD 
2nd-  6th-7th  Total 
Administrative  Regional  5th  CPD 
Units  Leaders  Position  N  CPD  total  eco'l  poll) 
12  10  55  22 
votes  votes  votes  votes  votes 
West  Siberia 
Altai  kr  V.  F.  Raifikesht*  governor/sov  chair 
Kemerovo  ob  M.  B.  Kisliuk*  governor  (1991-) 
A.  M.  Tuleev*  soviet  chair 
Novosibirsk  ob  V.  P.  Mukha*  soviet  chair 
Omsk  ob  A.  P.  Leontsev*  1st  secretary 
Tomsk  ob  V.  N.  Egor  Ispolkom  dep  chair 
Khanty-Mansi  V.  A.  Churilov*  soviet  chair 
t  Siberia 
Rep  Buriatiia  S.  N.  Buldaev 
Rep  Tyva  Ch.  B.  Ondar 
Sh.  D.  Oorzhak" 
Rep  Khakassia  V.  N.  Shtygashev* 
Krasnoiarsk  kr  Iu.  N.  Moskovich" 
Irkutsk  ob  lu.  A.  Nozhikov* 
Chita  ob  V.  A.  Shishkin 
N.  I.  Malkov 
Far  East 
Rep  Sakha  M.  E.  Nikolaiev 
V.  S.  Shamshin 
Primorskii  kr  E.  I.  Nazdratenko 
A.  A.  Volyntev 
Khabarovsk  kr  A.  I.  Vialkov 
Amur  ob  A.  A.  Kirvchenko 
A.  N.  Belonogov 
Sakhalin  ob  V.  P.  Fedorov 
17  4.31  2.35  2.94  1.88  2.99 
20  3.40  0.68  2.75  -1.42  2.20 
0.61  0.04  0.00  0.10  0.31 
18  1.50  2.89  4.17  2.04  1.96 
13  2.60  5.05  5.19  4.62  3.63 
7  -0.20  0.42  -0.67  2.22  0.17 
7  -0.54  5.00  6.43  4.29  1.84 
soviet  chair  10  4.00  7.83  7.33  8.33  5.64 
soviet  chair  6  1.83  4.77  4.69  5.00  4.12 
ispolkom  chair  -0.28  2.02  5.21  -2.22  0.96 
soviet  chair  6  1.00  6.67  6.67'  6.67  3.25 
presidential  rep  19  0.22  -1.41  -2.54  0.05  -5.70 
gov/ispolkom  chair  18  0.97  1.94  1.94  1.94  1.46 
governor  8  6.28  1.67  2.71  -2.50  4.56 
soviet  chair  5.63  4.22  4.38  4.06  5.06 
governor  10  3.70  3.25  5.67  1.80  3.50 
chair,  Council  of  1.98  2.65  2.89  2.40  2.20 
Ministers 
governor  (1993-)  16  3.69  4.77  4.69  5.00  4.12 
soviet  chair  -2.29  -3.06  -3.88  -2.03  -2.62 
ispolkom  dep  chair  12  1.98  2.08  1.50  2.67  2.04 
governor  (-1993)  7  -3.21  -3.25  -2.00  -4.86  -3.24 
soviet  chair  5.06  4.76  4.86  4.64  4.93 
governor  5  3.43  2.86  2.67  3.00  3.14 
'>  Economic  issues  included  votes  on  Ti,  T2,  T4,  U2  and  U3  questions  in  Appendix  6.1. 
2)  Political  issues  included  votes  on  T3,  TS,  U1,  U4,  and  US  questions  in  Appendix  6.1. 
*  Members  of  the  Council  of  the  Siberian  Agreement,  in  "Council  of  the  Siberian  Agreement 
Association,  "  pp.  70-86. 
Scores  ranged  from  -10  (totally  different  from  regional  leaders'  voting  patterns)  to  +10  (identical  voting 
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VII.  2  (3)  Weak  Linkage  between  Leaders  ofInter-regional  Bodies  and  Deputies 
Considering  the  situation  in  which  regional  leaders  were  losing  their  influence 
even  over  deputies  of  their  own  regions,  it  is  not  difficult  to  imagine  that  the  role  of 
inter-regional  leaders  could  also  be  very  limited  in  the  CPD.  In  order  to  examine  the 
possible  linkage  between  inter-regional  association  leaders  and  SIBFE  deputies,  three 
leaders  are  selected.  Firstly,  N.  N.  Daniliuk,  the  Chairman  of  Khabarovsk 
kraiispolkom  and  the  First  Director  of  the  Far  Eastern  Association  for  the  Economic 
Cooperation,  had  been  elected  to  the  USSR  CPD.  His  voting  patterns  are  compared 
with  those  of  Far  Eastern  deputies  in  the  USSR  CPD.  Secondly,  V.  Mukha,  the 
Executive  Director  of  the  Siberian  Agreement,  and  A.  Tuleev,  the  Chairman  of 
Kemerovo  oblsovet,  who  advocated  rather  a  radical  programme,  are  selected  to 
compare  their  voting  patterns  with  Siberian  deputies  in  the  Russian  CPD. 
As  for  Daniliuk,  his  voting  patterns  in  general  were  quite  similar  to  those  of 
deputies  from  Primorskii  krai  and  Amur  oblast  as  in  Figure  7.2.  However,  the  picture 
is  not  that  simple  as  deputies'  voting  patterns  shifted  depending  on  the  questions. 
<Figure  7.2>  Distance  of  Far  Eastern  Deputies  from  N.  N.  Daniliuk  in  the  USSR  CPD 
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Regional  Deputy  Groups 
Scores  ranged  from  -10  (totally  opposite  vote)  to  +10  (totally  identical  vote). 
Numbers  of  deputies  in  each  deputy  groups  in  the  bracket. 
For  the  categories  of  votes,  see  Appendix  3.1. 
-*-  Total 
a  Art.  6 
A  Federal 
X  Economy 
O  Other 
For  instance,  Far  Eastern  deputies  in  the  USSR  Congress  tended  showed  similar 
voting  patterns  when  federal  issues  were  put  to  the  vote.  However,  regional  groups (Chapter  Yii)  308 
distanced  themselves  from  Daniliuk  as  far  as  economic  issues  and  Article  6  were 
concerned.  Let  alone  other  deputies,  he  even  failed  to  mobilise  deputies  from  own 
region.  In  the  vote  on  economic  issues,  about  half  the  Khabarovsk  deputies  did  not 
follow  his  voting  patterns.  Furthermore,  in  the  vote  on  Article  6,  most  of  them  voted 
in  the  opposite  way  to  Daniliuk,  supporting  the  changes  in  the  Article. 
The  weak  influence  of  inter-regional  association  leaders  continued  in  the 
Russian  CPD  although  inter-regional  associations  had  reached  their  peak  point  of 
cooperation.  As  for  Mukha,  his  attitude  towards  Eltsin's  reform  policies  shifted  from 
anti-Eltsin  tendencies  during  the  Second  to  Fifth  Congresses  (M=-5.0)  to  pro-reform 
tendencies  during  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congresses  (M=3.0).  Mukha's  changing 
voting  patterns  could  be  a  reflection  of  changing  relations  with  Eltsin  or  pressures 
from  him.  ' 
First  of  all,  Mukha's  influence  over  regional  leaderships  was  rather  limited.  As 
discussed  before,  regional  leaders  were  rather  segmented,  and  only  three-Chaptynov, 
Petrov,  and  Churilov-of  fourteen  members  of  the  Council  of  the  Siberian  Agreement 
who  had  been  elected  to  the  Russian  Congress  followed  Mukha's  voting  patterns, 
shifting  their  positions  after  the  Fifth  Congress  (see  Table  7.2.2). 
Mukha's  influence  over  Siberian  deputies  also  appeared  to  be  very  marginal. 
Most  Siberian  regional  deputy  groups  became  more  conservative-for  instance, 
Kemerovo,  Omsk,  Tiumen,  Krasnoiarsk  and  Chita  deputies-or  held  more  or  less  the 
same  position  throughout  the  Congresses.  Perhaps,  only  Altai  deputies  as  a  group 
became  somewhat  more  supportive  of  Eltsin's  position  during  the  Sixth  and  Seventh 
Congresses  than  before  (see  Table  7.2.5). 
Considering  individual  Siberian  deputies,  about  40  deputies  showed  identical 
voting  patterns  in  more  than  70  per  cent  of  the  votes  included  in  the  analysis. 
However,  among  38  deputies  whose  voting  patterns  were  identical  to  those  of  Mukha 
during  the  Second  and  Fifth  Congresses,  about  half  of  them  or  18  deputies  showed 
totally  different  voting  patterns  from  those  of  Mukha  during  the  Sixth  and  Seventh 
Congresses.  This  suggests  that  about  half  the  deputies  who  showed  identical  voting 
patterns  during  the  Second  and  Fifth  CPD  had  escaped  from  Mukha's  control  and 








-ö  o> 
F  v+ 
ý v 
äÜ> 














.ýä>  qUr", 
N  .r ý 
z 
ý 
r'!  .MV;  Cr  ý, 
Gý 
.+Op   "  QQ~ 
ONO  O 
;I  Ný  N 
lý 
.  ý+  pÖ  et  ^ý  ý+  N 
M  ý+  %0  00  00  MN 
OýD  OIO  C  v1  M 
ý  fV  Ö999 
ha  ýo  :$  ý2 
. 
ý..  O 
.  -ý  Q  .  -+  OÖÖÖ 




ýj  "r  eV  lV  .wr  It 
.rOOo,  r+  OO 
tr1  ^;  Y1  ýO  llý  V1  O 
p  .r  .r... 
i  ÖÖ  fV 
-t oý 
°ry  ýö 
cOO,  oý  oo 
Ö  "+  O  lV  .+O  l'V 
oNq  ö kel  ý  ;;  r 
."ý  ry  rý 
.r901  -4  ^'  M 
NÖ  ry  hý00  0  00 
1;  V1  Oý 
O  ri  O  .+  r+  eV  eV 
OMNO  00  00 
O  V1  O  1O  l+  M 
00Ö99  .- 
ONPO  00  t+1 
V1  V1  d  V1  N  .  -+  ý 
"r  O  .. 
i  ÖM 
%0  M  Oý  00  ýO 
yý  V1  Y1  M  ýD  V1 
pý  ÖÖQ4 
M  0*1  M  .r 
en  00  N  ^+ 
.. 
i  p 
.. 
i 
.  -i  2ö 
ýM 
NýÖOh  vi 
N-  !VÖ  lr1  0 
OO  It  t.  t-  00 
Oh  V1  00  W  ýO  c+1 
OÖ6Ö  d' 




OO  .+NO  .ý 
0'1  h 
114:  Y1  fý 
ý 
-1  q  .:  9M 
(n  vi  `O  `t  GZ  a 
hO  00  e+t  lý  00  lý 
,..  4  N  .e  .r 
00  00 
.....  .. 























,ýý  a 















ý  y u 
3 





'1;  ýý  flu 
(D  0 
Z%  ue 
1ý°ýQý 
C4výJý  uA 
WwhV 
fT  ý 
ýý (Chapter  VII)  310 
The  situation  was  more  or  less  the  same  with  Tuleev,  although  an  increasing 
number  of  deputies  had  identical  voting  patterns  to  his  own  as  the  tensions  between 
Eltsin  and  Khasbulatov  intensified.  "  His  position  was  rather  unpopular  among  SIBFE 
deputies  including  those  from  Kemerovo  oblast  as  well  as  among  the  leaders  of  the 
Siberian  Agreement.  Considering  his  anti-Eltsin  voting  patterns,  his  possible 
supporters  could  be  found  among  deputies  from  Omsk  and  Chita  oblast,  and  perhaps 
Amur  oblast  in  the  Russian  Far  East,  nonetheless  anti-Eltsin  tendencies  could  not 
necessarily  be  regarded  as  separatist  tendencies  in  themselves. 
In  this  regard,  SIBFE  regional  leaders  in  general  failed  to  mobilise  deputies 
from  the  regions  at  the  CPD.  Even  after  the  `politicisation'  of  the  Siberian  Agreement, 
more  than  the  half  the  Siberian  regional  deputy  groups-seven  out  of  thirteen-kept  a 
distance  from  their  leaders  such  as  governors,  chairmen  of  the  soviets  or  ispolkoms, 
and  leaders  of  the  inter-regional  association  such  as  Mukha  and  Tuleev-at  the 
Congress.  This  alienation  of  regional  leaders  from  their  deputies  critically  weakened 
their  bargaining  power  with  the  centre. (Chapter  Y1l)  311 
VII.  3.  Lack  of  Linkages  between  Regional  Leaderships  and  the  Grassroots 
During  1989-1993,  the  political  participation  of  the  grassroots  had  an  increasing 
importance.  In  particular,  Eltsin  often  appealed  to  the  grassroots,  facing  growing 
opposition  in  the  Congress.  During  1991-1993,  one  presidential  election  (June  1991) 
and  three  referendums  (March  1991,  April  1993,  and  December  1993)  were  held  at  the 
Federation  level,  as  well  as  elections  at  the  lower  levels  of  the  state  system.  48  As 
tensions  in  the  Congress  intensified,  Eltsin  launched  appeasement  policies  towards  the 
regions  in  order  to  win  those  referendums.  Under  these  circumstances,  it  would  have 
been  easier  for  the  regions  to  achieve  their  goals  if  the  grassroots  and  regional  leaders 
had  been  horizontally  and  vertically  linked. 
However,  as  the  discord  among  regional  leaders  suggested,  lack  of  a 
coordination  mechanism  between  regional  political  actors  critically  damaged  the 
influence  of  regional  associations  over  the  centre.  Despite  the  re-emergence  of 
`independent'  political  parties,  associations,  movements,  and  political  clubs  since  the 
late  1980s,  such  a  development  did  not  seem  to  enhance  a  vertical  linkage  between 
regional  political  leaders  and  the  grassroots.  49  In  particular,  those  regional 
organisations  that  advocated  regionalist  programmes  and  inter-regional  collaboration 
failed  to  coordinate  their  activities  with  those  organisations  of  similar  political 
orientation  in  neighbouring  regions,  let  alone  playing  a  major  role  in  the  mobilising  the 
grassroots.  so 
As  a  result,  signs  of  failed  mobilisation  of  the  grassroots  were  clearly  revealed 
in  these  election  and  referendums.  The  grassroots  were  divided  on  the  basis  of  the 
socio-economic  conditions  of  their  regions  in  general,  more  or  less  the  same  as  their 
political  leaders  and  deputies  in  the  Congress.  3'  Furthermore,  regional  leaderships  did 
not  seem  to  control  the  grassroots  in  their  regions  in  general,  although  the  grassroots 
were  also  attentive  to  regional  socio-economic  conditions. 
VII  3  (1)  Poor  Performance  of  Regional  Parties  in  the  SIBFE  Reg  c 
After  democratisation  had  been  initiated,  `independent'  political  organisations 
began  to  emerge  in  Russia.  Since  1985,  awakening  concerns  on  human  rights  and 
ecological  conditions,  and  growing  ethnic  identities  began  to  be  accommodated  in (Chapter  VII)  312 
more  organised  forms  s=  Furthermore,  when  a  competitive  election  procedure  was 
introduced,  electoral  groups  and  'historical  parties'  such  as  the  Social-Democratic, 
Christian-Democratic  and  Anarcho-Syndicalist  Parties,  revived  on  the  surface  of  the 
political  arena.  In  particular,  perestroika  supporters'  groups  were  formed  'from 
above'  in  many  regions  to  assist  those  candidates  who  supported  reforms  under  the 
auspices  of  regional  branches  of  the  CPSU.  As  a  result,  as  many  as  1,200  political 
parties  were  operating  in  Russia  by  the  end  of  1992.  " 
Although  exact  numbers  are  not  available,  more  than  250  political  parties, 
associations,  movements,  and  clubs  were  also  established  in  major  cities  of  the  SIBFE 
regions.  "'  Despite  the  development  of  regional  `political  parties'  and  their  coalition 
efforts,  however,  their  performance  was  rather  limited.  In  particular,  regional  parties, 
which  are  noteworthy  in  connection  with  SIBFE  regionalism,  were  rather  close  to  a 
`cadet'  party,  and  thus  alienated  from  the  grassroots.  The  situation  was  more  or  less 
the  same  in  the  coalition  bodies  of  political  parties  including  the  People's  Fronts  as 
their  member  organisations  had  different  ideological  orientations.  Furthermore,  the 
performance  of  these  People's  Fronts  in  the  elections  varied  region  by  region. 
For  instance,  a  People's  Front  had  not  been  formed  at  all  in  Altai  krai.  In  the 
krai,  four  major  `parties'-the  Agrarian  Party,  New  Will,  the  City  Party,  and 
Democratic  Russia-were  actively  operating  in  the  early  1990s.  Among  them,  the 
Agrarian  Party,  led  by  Aleksei  Kuleshov  who  became  the  First  Secretary  of  the 
kraikom  in  1990  and  Aleksandr  Nazarchuk,  the  Chairman  of  the  Agroprom  Union,  was 
the  largest  party  in  the  krai,  reflecting  the  socio-economic  situation  of  the  krai  as  an 
agricultural  region.  The  Agrarian  Party  supported  the  sovkhoz  and  kolkhoz  system, 
which  had  a  great  appeal  to  a  rural  population,  and  controlled  two-thirds  of  230 
kraisovet  deputies.  By  contrast,  the  City  Party  led  by  Iurii  Zhitel'tsov,  the  Chairman 
of  the  kraiispolkom,  advocated  the  idea  of  creating  a  FEZ  in  the  krai,  which  was 
largely  supported  by  the  industrial  sector.  It  gained  control  over  about  one-fourth  of 
the  kraisovet  deputies.  Democratic  Russia  started  to  operate  in  the  krai  in  September 
1990,  and  its  influence  began  to  expand  in  1991.  By  July  1991,  it  controlled  one 
deputy  to  the  CPD  of  the  USSR,  six  deputies  to  the  Russian  CPD,  and  had  twenty 
branches  in  the  cities  and  raions  of  the  krai.  Although  the  Agrarian  Party  maintained  a 
majority  in  the  kraisovet,  the  influence  of  `Democratic  Russia'  increased,  particularly 
in  the  major  cities  of  the  krai  such  as  Barnaul,  Biisk,  and  Slavgorodsk  in  the  middle  of 
1991Sä (Chapter  VII)  313 
Among  the  People's  Fronts  operating  in  the  SIBFE  regions,  those  in  Tomsk, 
Krasnoiarsk  and  Sakhalin  seemed  to  be  relatively  more  successful  than  those  in  other 
SIBFE  regions.  For  instance,  democratic  blocs  under  the  People's  Front  in  Tomsk 
oblast  controlled  about  50  per  cent  of  the  gorsovet  seats,  and  slightly  less  than  50  per 
cent  of  the  oblsovet  seats.  S6  In  Krasnoiarsk,  the  People's  Front  also  made  quite  a 
success  when  it  gained  about  40  per  cent  of  gorsovet  and  about  30  per  cent  of  the 
kraisovet  seats.  "  Another  outstanding  performance  of  the  People's  Front  was  seen  in 
Sakhalin  oblast.  The  Democratic  Movement  for  Perestroika  in  Sakhalin  oblast,  which 
became  a  main  body  of  the  Sakhalin  People's  Front,  supported  V.  V.  Guliia  in  the 
election  to  the  CPD  of  the  USSR  as  an  alternative  to  the  obkom  first  secretary  in  1989. 
It  also  supported  V.  P.  Fedorov  as  oblispolkom  chairman  who  eventually  became 
governor  of  the  oblast  in  1991  S8 
However,  in  Tiumen  and  Omsk  oblasts,  the  People's  Front  seemed  to  be 
somewhat  weaker.  In  Tiumen  oblast,  the  People's  Front  was  established  in  1988  in 
Tiumen  City,  which  expanded  to  an  oblast  level  of  organisation  by  December  1990. 
Although  its  programme  supported  democratisation  and  regional  economic 
development,  it  won  limited  support  from  the  grassroots  in  the  elections  in  1990.  In 
the  election  to  the  Russian  CPD,  three  of  its  eight  candidates  won  the  election. 
Furthermore,  the  People's  Front  nominated  only  13  candidates  for  the  oblsovet,  and 
sixteen  candidates  for  the  gorsovet  of  Tiumen  City,  39  The  influence  of  Omsk  People's 
Front  was  also  limited  to  the  major  cities  of  the  oblast,  and  its  activities  eventually 
faded  at  the  end  of  1990  60 
However,  regardless  of  their  performance  in  the  short  term,  People's  Fronts  had 
potential  obstacles  to  further  development  within  themselves.  First  of  all,  the  People's 
Fronts  included  various  political  groups  of  all  ranges  of  ideological  orientations,  from 
right  to  left  wing  (see  Table  7.3.1),  61  whose  common  goals  could  be  depicted  as  'anti- 
establishment.  "'  In  particular,  a  nationalist  platform  which  formed  the  main  basis  of 
the  People's  Front  in  the  Baltic  States  was  not  available  to  the  People's  Fronts  in 
Russia,  "  which  reduced  the  possibilities  of  horizontal  co-operation  among  the  People's 
Fronts  in  the  regions.  Furthermore,  when  the  electoral  system  favoured  Moscow-based 
large  parties  with  a  party-list  vote  system,  the  influence  of  small  parties  including 
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The  regionalist  or  separatist  organisations,  which  amounted  to  as  many  as 
fifteen  out  of  250  political  organisations  operating  in  the  SIBFE  regions  in  the  early 
1990s,  also  suffered  similar  problems.  First  of  all,  only  a  few  regionalist  organisations 
seemed  to  be  able  to  mobilise  a  significant  number  of  the  population  as  they  lacked 
close  relations  with  the  general  public.  In  particular,  many  of  them  seemed  to  be 
nothing  more  than  a  `cadet  party'  with  their  members  being  largely  recruited  from  the 
higher  echelons  of  administrative  bodies  or  enterprises  who  became  a  main  support 
group  for  a  regionalist  or  separatist  platform,  "  For  instance,  the  Association  of 
Siberian  Cities,  although  its  platform  was  far  from  a  separatist  one,  consisted  of  heads 
of  enterprises  and  organisations  from  90  cities  of  Siberia.  "  The  Party  of  Siberian 
Independence  also  seemed  to  be  mainly  based  on  the  support  of  officials  from 
administrative  organs  and  entrepreneurs.  7 
In  particular,  support  for  the  separatist  idea  had  begun  to  wane  as  suggested  in 
the  self-dissolution  of  the  Party  of  Siberian  Independence  in  1993.  In  an  interview 
with  the  correspondent  of  Sibirskaia  gazeta,  Boris  Perov,  the  leader  of  the  party, 
mentioned  that  the  question  of  self-dissolution  had  arisen  in  the  party  when  many  of 
the  entrepreneurs  and  officials  of  administrative  organisations  expressed  their  worries 
that  `independence'  no  longer  served  their  interests.  " 
Those  regionalist  or  separatist  `parties'  also  sought  to  enhance  their  influence  by 
joining  coalition  bodies.  In  this  regard,  three  organisations  were  notable:  the  Siberian 
Democratic  Union,  the  Union  of  Unification  of  Siberia,  and  the  Far  Eastern 
Association  of  Democratic  Movements. 
The  Siberian  Democratic  Union,  which  was  established  at  the  Siberian 
Conference  of  the  regional  branches  of  the  Democratic  Union  in  April  1990  in 
Novosibirsk,  advocated  'decolonialisation'  of  Siberia  as  a  part  of  its  goal  6'  In  July 
1990,  branches  of  the  Siberian  Democratic  Union  in  Krasnoiarsk  and  Achinsk,  and 
other  separatist  organisations  also  agreed  to  form  the  Union  of  Unification  of  Siberia, 
aimed  at  eliminating  colonial  conditions  in  political,  economic,  and  cultural  relations 
between  Moscow  and  Siberia.  The  Union  also  urged  the  creation  of  all-Siberian  self- 
government  and  the  revival  of  the  white-green  Siberian  flag.  "  In  the  Far  East, 
democratic  blocs  from  twelve  Far  Eastern  cities,  initiated  by  the  Khabarovsk  People's 
Front,  decided  to  form  the  confederation  of  the  Far  Eastern  Association  of  Democratic 
Movements  in  September  1989.  As  the  name  suggested,  the  Association  was  rather 
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Considering  the  composition  of  member  organisations  of  these  coalition  bodies, 
however,  little  difference  were  found  between  regionalist/separatist  coalition  bodies 
and  other  People's  Fronts  which  did  not  advocate  sovereignty  of  Siberia  or  the  Far 
East.  Therefore,  the  sovereignty  of  Siberia  or  the  Far  East  did  not  seem  to  be  the 
prime  goal  of  these  organisations,  as  their  member  organisations  were  rather  close  to 
an  `anti-establishment'  type  and  more  faithful  to  their  own  goals.  Among  these  three 
organisations,  the  Union  of  Unification  of  Siberia  was  to  some  extent  more 
homogeneous  than  other  organisations  in  its  composition,  presenting  more  detailed 
proposals  to  achieve  the  sovereignty  of  Siberia.  n  However,  in  general,  their  activities 
to  mobilise  the  general  public  were  even  less  successful  than  other  organisations  such 
as  ecological  groups.  " 
VII.  3.  (2)  The  Grassroots  in  the  Presidential  Election  and  Referendums 
In  the  course  of  democratisation,  Gorbachev  and  Eltsin  often  employed  a 
populist  approach  in  order  to  overcome  opposition  from  conservative  blocs.  In 
particular,  key  questions  such  as  the  presidency,  confidence  in  the  president  and  his 
socio-economic  policies,  and  the  new  Constitution  had  been  settled  by  referendums  in 
Russia.  Those  occasions  provided  regional  leaders  with  opportunities  to  strengthen 
their  positions  in  bargains  with  the  centre,  if  they  could  influence  the  voting  patterns  of 
the  grassroots.  However,  as  recent  research  suggests,  most  regional  leaders  were  not 
able  to  mobilise  the  grassroots,  but  only  to  attend  to  existing  divisions  at  the  grassroots 
level  in  order  to  win  the  electoral  success.  74 
An  analysis  on  the  regional  voting  patterns  of  the  grassroots  showed  that  they 
had  rather  `consistent'  voting  patterns  in  a  series  of  elections  and  referendums  during 
1991-1993,  reflecting  their  socio-economic  conditions,  As  in  Table  7.3.3,  the  living 
standard  and  economic  performance  of  a  region  that  discussed  in  Chapter  2  were 
positively  correlated  to  the  level  of  support  for  Eltsin,  's  However,  the  regression 
analysis  showed  that  proportion  of  non-Russian  population  and  change  in  industrial 
productions  during  1989-1993  at  the  regional  level  (social  stress  indicator  in  this 
analysis)  did  not  seem  to  be  significant  at  the  0.05  level. «. ý 
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Despite  the  regression  result,  however,  it  does  not  exclude  any  possible 
influence  of  regional  leaderships  and  other  factors  over  voters  in  the  presidential 
election  and  referendums  in  question.  Although  the  level  of  voters'  support  for  Eltsin 
was  closely  related  to  socio-economic  indicators,  some  variations  could  be  found  as 
76  the  voting  patterns  of  the  grassroots  in  some  regions  changed  after  1992. 
Among  84  regions  included  in  this  part  of  analysis,  "  about  half  the  regions 
showed  rather  stable  voting  patterns,  while  the  other  half  revealed  shifting  voting 
patterns,  either  becoming  more  supportive  of  Eltsin  or  less.  However,  decreasing  or 
sharply  decreasing  support  for  Eltsin  throughout  1991-1993  at  the  regional  level  also 
appeared  to  reflect  poor  economic  performance  and  low  living  standards  in  the 
regions. 
<Figure  7.3>  Changing  Support  of  the  Grassroots  in  the  Presidential  Election  and 
Referendums  at  the  Regional  Level  (1991-1993) 
90 
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Figures  in  bracket  indicated  numbers  of  regions  included  in  the  category. 
For  detailed  description,  see  Appendix  8.2. 
--+-  Higher(7) 
-a-High(17) 
--+-Average(24) 
""  *-  --  Low(5) 
--  *-  -  -Decreasing(28) 
-  --o  --  "Sharp  fall(2) 
+  Increasing(1) 
In  combination  with  the  regional  clusters  based  on  socio-economic  conditions, 
we  can  locate  regions  that  showed  relatively  more  support  for  Eltsin  or  less,  compared 
to  their  economic  conditions.  As  in  Table  7.3.4,  voters  in  Tiumen,  Bashkortostan, 
Belgorod,  Lipetsk,  and  Ulianovsk  seemed  to  be  relatively  less  supportive  of  Eltsin, 
independent  of  their  socio-economic  conditions.  By  contrast,  voters  were  more 
supportive  of  Eltsin  in  Arkhangelsk,  Vladimir,  Tomsk,  Primorskii,  Khabarovsk, 
.................  _................ (Chapter  VII)  322 
Astrakhan,  and  the  Republic  of  Kalmykiia,  having  taking  account  of  their  economic 
conditions. 
Although  the  reasons  for  `higher'  or  'lower'  levels  of  support  for  Eltsin  in  this 
context  have  yet  to  be  analysed,  it  is  obvious  that  most  of  SIBFE  regional  leaders 
failed  to  mobilise  voters  in  their  regions  in  order  to  strengthen  their  bargaining  power 
with  the  centre.  For  instance,  despite  the  strained  relationship  between  the  centre  and 
Primorskii  leadership,  voters  in  the  krai  showed  a  relatively  high  level  of  support  for 
Eltsin  during  1991-1993.  The  situation  was  more  or  less  the  same  in  Krasnoiarsk, 
Irkutsk,  and  Kemerovo.  In  particular,  despite  his  ardent  regionalist  tendencies,  Tuleev 
did  not  seem  to  mobilise  the  grassroots,  as  the  grassroots  in  Kemerovo  showed  the 
national  average  level  of  support  for  Eltsin  in  the  referendums.  78 
By  contrast,  some  strong  linkages  between  regional  leaders  and  the  grassroots 
could  be  found  in  the  Republic  of  Sakha.  Voters  in  Sakha  were  less  supportive  of 
Eltsin  in  1991  than  other  voters  (59.8  per  cent  in  March  1991,  and  44.9  per  cent  in 
June  1991).  However,  after  the  concessions  of  the  centre  in  1992,  the  support 
increased  to  68.1  per  cent  in  April  1993.  Their  support  fell  to  below  the  national 
average  in  December  1993  (52.1  per  cent  compared  with  56.6  per  cent,  including 
invalid  votes),  possibly  because  the  new  Constitution  deprived  the  republics  of  the 
right  to  secede  from  the  Federation.  Another  strong  linkage  between  regional 
leaderships  and  the  grassroots  can  be  found  in  the  republics  of  Tatarstan  and  Tyva 
when  they  boycotted  the  referendum  on  the  RSFSR  question  in  March  1991.  In  these 
two  republics,  political  movements  on  the  basis  of  national  sentiments  were  at  their 
peak,  particularly  in  the  early  1990.  However,  in  these  cases,  it  is  not  clear  whether 
regional  leaders  were  mobilising  the  grassroots  or  they  were  merely  responding  to  anti- 
Moscow  tendencies  at  the  grassroots  level.  '  In  any  case,  this  radical  approach  also 
revealed  difficulties  for  regional  leaderships  to  infuse  the  grassroots  with  inter-regional 
goals  at  the  cost  of  peculiar  regional  demands. Ü  E.  z  : 
i°  a1 
ýý- 
CO 
C,  b  f 
y 
AL 
r.  - 
C4  u 
?" 
c 
1  F, 
ý  aw 
0 
y 
00 o  Y 
7 
ýý  Cy 
A 
' 
Sw  ý 
Q 
^  O? 
co  C/ý  o 
Vl  ýy  td 
_  a 
64  2  ">  :ýC.  1 
w  v°ý 
ö  b 
ee 
Q 
ýýý  2 
"  m 
ä  öb  b 
ý  2 
.ý 
C 
5  w 
C  y 
y 
"_ýtd] 
NvO  F+ 
4 
MNý  F. 
< 
>  z  ý 









;ý  ä  aC 
Ü4  °L 
...  cu 
5  5F 
C  z3  c 
00  - 
oo  o 
c3 
°' 




>  hI 
c  0  ö:  2 
W  ü  ü'  Ö 
a 
a 
i'  a 
ý 
"ý"  & 
-ý 
y  öý 
o  H  ;  >x  2a  04  za4  aw 
_  ...  ... 
..............  -_  .  .....  _...  _.  _  .....  _.  _.  .  .,...  - 
" 
°'ý-  y  $  3ý 
co 
"^y  ý  ro 
v 
ý  .3  ý 
u 
d  1 
z  xýäý  ýs 
°äý ý 
-  ,  3ü  ö 
r,  b 
c`ýn  ý9  im 







































ý_ (C7iapter  VII)  324 
VU.  4.  Regional  Policy  of  the  Centre 
The  Eltsin  administration  has  been  often  criticised  for  lack  of  clear  principles 
in  its  regional  policy  in  the  early  1990s.  80  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  the 
context  of  a  regional  policy  had  been  altered  by  the  demise  of  the  Soviet  Union, 
before  any  evaluation  of  regional  policies  in  the  early  1990s  can  be  made.  First  of 
all,  a  new  regional  policy  in  the  early  1990s  had  broader  dimensions,  including  the 
question  of  re-establishing  a  federal  system.  After  the  declaration  of  sovereignty  by 
the  RSFSR,  the  regional  self-accountancy  drive  and  declaration  of  sovereignty  by 
federal  subjects  threatened  to  establish  a  single  political  and  economic  unit.  In  this 
context,  a  regional  policy  was  no  longer  only  a  series  of  location  or  distribution 
policies,  but  a  part  of  a  state-building  process. 
Secondly,  there  was  a  major  shift  in  power  relations  between  centre  and 
regions,  in  a  direction  that  was  favourable  to  the  regions.  As  a  result,  the 
maximisation  of  national  efficiencies,  which  was  a  major  concern  of  the  centre,  was 
no  longer  able  to  prevail  over  regional  demands.  Such  a  development  limited  the 
ability  of  the  centre  to  take  initiatives  to  work  out  and  implement  an  integrated  and 
`consistent'  regional  policy. 
In  this  situation,  Eltsin's  'regional  policy'  seemed  to  concentrate  more  on 
political  than  economic  aspects.  First  of  all,  top  priority  was  given  to  the  question  of 
re-establishing  single  political  and  economic  units  in  the  form  of  a  federation,  " 
which  was  to  be  based  on  a  territorial  and  functional  principle,  minimising  the 
principle  of  nationality.  "  The  goal  was  supported  by  Eltsin's  drive  for  a  strong 
presidency  and  the  development  of  local  self-government,  which  squeezed  the 
regional  authorities  from  above  and  bellow.  Meanwhile,  Eltsin  accommodated 
regional  demands  which  were  based  on  regional  peculiarities  with  ad  hoc  bilateral 
negotiations,  although  their  effectiveness  is  still  open  to  question. 
Considering  these  features,  Eltsin's  strategy  towards  the  regions  had  a  certain 
degree  of  consistency,  though  tactics  had  been  altered  in  response  to  the  development 
of  the  situation.  In  the  process,  the  centre  managed  to  establish  a  'safety  net'  under 
these  changes  in  centre-periphery  relations,  placing  limits  on  the  political  and 
economic  drives  of  the  periphery. (Chapter  YlQ  3I3 
VII.  4  (1)  A  `Strong  Presidency' 
The  idea  of  creating  the  post  of  president  in  Russia  had  appeared  even  before 
the  Soviet  Union  had  collapsed.  As  did  Gorbachev,  "  Eltsin  also  sought  to  secure  his 
leadership,  which  was  vulnerable  to  opposition  in  the  Congress,  by  establishing  a 
republican  presidency.  After  the  referendum  of  March  1991,  Eltsin  was  elected  as 
the  president  of  the  RSFSR  in  June  1991.  His  presidential  power  was  expanded  at 
the  Fifth  Congress  in  October  1991. 
In  connection  with  centre-periphery  relations,  two  presidential  powers  are 
noteworthy.  Firstly,  the  president  was  endowed  with  emergency  powers  to  issue 
presidential  decrees  which  could  be  at  variance  with  laws  of  the  USSR  and  the 
RSFSR  in  practice.  84  This  emergency  power  provided  Eltsin  with  more  flexibility  to 
respond  to  the  regional  demands,  particularly  when  the  Congress  rejected  to  discuss 
the  question  of  a  federal  treaty  in  1991.  In  the  process  of  signing  the  Federal  Treaty, 
for  instance,  Eltsin  issued  presidential  decrees  in  return  for  the  support  of  the  regions. 
Furthermore,  a  concession  granted  to  a  region  by  a  presidential  decree  did  not  change 
the  legal  framework  of  the  federal  system  itself,  and  thus  could  be  overridden  by 
another  decree  or  a  law.  In  this  regard,  Eltsin  tended  to  respond  to  regional  demands 
on  a  temporary  basis  which  could  be  re-adjusted  when  the  centre  became  strong 
enough  to  force  its  will  upon  the  regions.  Despite  the  disadvantage  of  `temporary' 
concessions  such  as  regionalisation  of  reform  and  the  possibility  of  deepening 
regional  disparities,  this  strategy  seemed  to  be  successful  in  encouraging  regions  to 
reach  a  separate  bargain  with  the  president  rather  than  stick  to  inter-regional 
cooperation. 
Secondly,  the  president  was  endowed  with  executive  powers  that  increased  his 
influence  over  regional  political  leaders.  "  In  order  to  increase  his  influence  over 
regional  authorities,  Eltsin  intended  to  nominate  regional  leaders  and  have  his 
nominees  run  for  the  elections  which  were  scheduled  for  December  1991.86 
However,  regional  political  elites  tended  to  be  more  attentive  to  regional  goals  in 
order  to  win  local  elections.  Therefore,  Eltsin  withdrew  himself  and  imposed  a 
moratorium  on  local  elections  until  December  1992  and  called  for  the  subordination 
of  lower  executive  organs  to  those  of  higher  organs,  establishing  the  accountability 
of  executive  powers  to  the  president.  87 
The  expanded  presidential  right  to  appoint  and  dismiss  regional  leaders  such (Chapter  YIl)  326 
as  governors  became  an  obstacle  to  the  development  of  regionalism.  Although  the 
function  of  governorship  and  presidential  representatives  was  rather  unclear,  and 
different  from  region  to  region,  the  new  post  increased  `heterogeneity'  among 
regional  leaders  in  regard  to  their  accountability  and  attitude  towards  reform  as 
suggested  in  the  analysis  of  their  voting  patterns  in  the  Congress. 
In  general,  the  new  posts-governorship  and  presidential  representatives- 
provided  Eltsin  with  more  places  for  his  supporters,  and  thus  more  opportunities  to 
counterbalance  regional  leaders  of  anti-president  or  anti-reform  orientation.  By 
appointing  his  supporters  to  the  head  of  regional  executives,  Eltsin  had  amplified  the 
discord  of  regional  leaders.  "  Furthermore,  the  threat  of  removing  regional  leaders 
who  were  defiant  to  the  president  from  their  positions  turned  out  to  be  an  effective 
way  of  blocking  regional  interest  articulation.  Although  Slider  has  observed  that 
Eltsin  made  relatively  little  use  of  his  power  to  remove  governors,  "  his  power 
seemed  to  have  an  impact  on  the  development  of  regionalism.  For  instance,  Eltsin's 
threat  to  relieve  Mukha  of  his  position  as  governor  of  Novosibirsk  in  March  1992 
changed  his  voting  patterns  in  the  CPD  as  already  discussed.  "  He  was  finally 
removed  from  his  post  in  October  1993  after  the  dissolution  of  the  CPD,  which  put 
an  end  to  the  discussion  of  countermeasures  to  Eltsin's  move  among  leaders  of  the 
Siberian  Agreement. 
VII.  4  (2)  A  New  Constitution  on  a  Territorial-Functional  Principle 
As  already  discussed,  the  asymmetrical  structure  of  the  federal  system  became 
a  major  obstacle  to  re-establishing  a  new  one  in  its  place.  In  particular,  the  republics' 
inherited  right  of  secession  became  a  major  threat  to  the  stability  of  the  federation. 
Therefore,  Eltsin's  primary  attention  was  devoted  to  the  republics  in  order  to  bind 
them  to  a  new  federation  and  reduce  their  influence.  Eltsin  suggested  forming  a 
federation  with  two  categories  of  subjects-republics  and  zemli--of  equal  rights,  91 
though  his  idea  of  creating  zemli  had  failed  to  survive  the  opposition,  as  already 
discussed  in  Chapter  2. 
However,  despite  the  general  observation  that  disparities  of  rights  between 
republics  and  ordinary  federal  subjects  had  increased,  two  `equalisation'  measures 
were  approved  at  the  end  of  1993.  First  of  all,  the  Constitution  of  1993  deprived 
republics  of  their  rights  of  secession  which  the  Federal  Treaty  confirmed,  nonetheless (Chapter  VII)  327 
republics  still  maintained  favourable  terms  in  their  relations  with  the  centre. 
Secondly,  Eltsin  introduced  equal  representation  in  the  central  parliament,  replacing 
a  national-territorial  principle  with  a  territorial-functional  principle  for  the  new 
parliament  which  would  reduce  the  influence  of  republics,  nonetheless  an  analysis  in 
depth  is  still  required. 
Eltsin's  move  to  change  the  representation  system  appeared  to  be  a 
compromise  between  a  manageable  size  of  legislature  and  a  need  to  win  support 
from  regional  leaders.  For  the  1993  elections,  Eltsin  introduced  critical  changes  in 
the  parliamentary  system.  The  parliament  had  been  reduced  to  less  than  half  its  size 
as  compared  with  the  CPD  and  was  to  consist  of  two  chambers,  the  Duma  and  the 
Council  of  the  Federation.  As  for  the  Duma,  half  of  the  450  seats  were  allocated  to 
party  lists,  removing  national  electoral  districts  which  provided  republics  with  more 
representation  than  ordinary  administrative  units.  Furthermore,  as  no  regional  parties 
seemed  to  wage  a  successful  campaign  in  the  elections  during  1989-1993,  functional 
representation  based  on  the  party  system  tended  to  reduce  the  possibility  of  regional 
representation  in  the  parliament. 
In  particular,  the  idea  of  establishing  an  institution  of  regional  leaders  had 
appeared  in  April  1992  when  heads  of  regional  administrations  held  a  meeting  during 
the  Sixth  Congress  on  their  own  initiative.  In  August  1992,  the  Union  of  Leaders  of 
Executive  Powers  of  Territorial  Organs  had  been  established,  which  gained  a  legal 
status  in  November  1992  when  the  Russian  Union  of  Governors  (Soiuz  gubernatorov 
Rossii)  had  established.  92  At  the  same  time,  Eltsin  called  republic  leaders  to  form  the 
Council  of  Republics  (Sovet  glav  respublik)  in  October  1992  under  his  administration 
as  a  consultative  body.  In  March  1993,  the  Council  of  Heads  of  Administrations  was 
established,  which  developed  into  a  constitutionalised  body-the  Council  of  the 
Federation-in  December  1993,  despite  opposition  led  by  Khasbulatov93  The 
Council,  consisted  of  two  deputies  from  each  of  the  89  federal  subjects,  became  an 
institutional  arena  for  regional  interest  articulation. 
Although  Eltsin's  initiative  still  accommodated  regional  interest  articulation  in 
the  central  legislature,  it  achieved  equal  representation  between  republics  and 
ordinary  federal  subjects,  and  thus  reduced  the  influence  of  the  republics.  It  also 
prevented  an  eruption  of  regional  demands  in  a  more  chaotic  way  by  inviting 
regional  leaders  into  the  decision-making  process,  which  affected  the  question  of 
federation  or  federal  relations. (Chapter  YIA  328 
VII  4  (3)  Development  of  Local  Self-Government 
If  the  concept  of  zemli  was  designed  to  counterbalance  regional  authorities, 
particularly  the  republics'  sovereignisation,  from  the  upper  tier  of  administrative 
units,  the  development  of  local  self-government  eroded  regional  authorities  from 
below.  Although  both  the  centre  and  regions  supported  the  development  of  local 
self-government,  they  had  rather  conflicting  expectations.  As  for  the  regions,  local 
self-government  was  sought  to  increase  their  competence  to  implement  and 
determine  policies  that  affected  daily  lives.  However,  the  centre  supported  the 
development  of  local  self-government  to  increase  their  control  over  regional 
authorities  94 
In  the  process  of  legislation  on  local  self-government  and  economic  reform, 
some  powers  and  responsibilities  were  transferred  to  regional  authorities.  However, 
the  transfer  was  not  associated  with  the  necessary  financial  measures  and  a  clear 
demarcation  of  power  at  various  levels  of  regional  government  93  According  to  the 
law  "On  the  Basic  Principles  of  Taxation"  adopted  in  December  1991,  only  twenty- 
one  minor  taxes  were  assigned  to  raion  governments,  "  while  value-added  tax  was 
assigned  to  the  federal  government  and  personal  and  corporate  income  taxes  were 
assigned  to  sub-national  governments.  Furthermore,  tax  rate-setting,  tax  assignment 
and  collection  remained  a  federal  responsibility  which  undermined  the  financial 
independence  of  local  self-governments,  as  well  as  regional  authorities  97 
The  situation  became  even  worse  when  public  services  which  were  normally 
provided  by  enterprises  (sotskul'tbyt)  were  transferred  to  sub-national  governments 
in  the  process  of  marketisation  98  Under  the  Soviet  economic  system,  state 
enterprises  had  financed  expenditures  for  public  services  such  as  schools  and 
kindergartens,  hospitals,  holiday  camps,  roads,  and  sanitation  which  were  normally 
recognised  as  local  responsibilities.  However,  under  the  economic  reform,  neither 
the  local  self-governments  nor  enterprises  were  able  to  finance  such  services.  A  case 
study  in  Kemerovo  oblast  showed  that  responsibility  for  public  services  became  a  hot 
potato  for  enterprises  and  local  authorities: 
First,  local  services  which  are  part  of  the  sotskul'tbyt  (public  service  of 
enterprises'  responsibility)  complexes  of  the  local  enterprises-the 
kindergartens,  house  of  culture,  prophylactic  care  facility  and  holiday  camps- 
face  an  uncertain  future.  According  to  the  1994  Privatisation  Law,  sotskul'tbyt  is 
supposed  to  be  handed  over  to  the  local  authorities.  So  far  the  mine (Chapter  YIA  329 
management,  the  trade  union  and  local  authority  have  been  resisting  pressure  for 
its  transfer  and  only  one  kindergarten  has  been  handed  over. 
... 
in  the  past  a  variety  of  local  services,  such  as  street  lighting,  road 
building  and  maintenance  were  delegated  to  local  enterprises.  Now  that 
enterprises,  which  themselves  are  under  severe  financial  pressure,  claim  that  they 
are  no  longer  maintain  the  local  fabric.  Instead,  they  pay  a  local  tax,  but  the  head 
of  Vishnovka's  local  administration  claims  that  the  portion  of  this  that  they 
receive  is  not  enough  to  cover  the  cost  of  local  services  previously  provided  by 
the  enterprises.  " 
A  conflict  over  transferring  responsibilities  without  the  necessary  funding 
inevitably  spilled  over  into  a  conflict  over  financial  sources  such  as  central  subsidies 
between  regional  and  local  governments,  and  over  property  rights  among  central, 
regional  and  local  governments.  In  particular,  local  governments  that  were  more 
dependent  on  central  support  often  competed  with  upper  echelons  of  administrative 
units,  becoming  a  lever  for  the  central  government  to  erode  the  power  of  regional 
authorities.  100 
The  power  struggle  between  regional  authorities  and  local  governments  under 
their  jurisdiction  could  be  found  in  the  SIBFE  regions,  as  in  other  regions  of  the 
Russian  Federation.  For  instance,  a  'public  forum,  '  in  which  deputies  of  all  levels 
who  elected  in  Irkutsk  oblast,  and  representatives  of  public  organisations, 
movements,  and  political  parties  took  part,  adopted  a  resolution  asking  the  Supreme 
Soviet  to  recognise  the  equal  status  of  Irkutsk  oblast  to  republics.  However,  at  a 
session  of  the  oblsovet  in  November  1991,  deputies  from  Angarsk  city  in  Irkutsk 
expressed  their  worries  about  the  recognition  of  'Irkutsk  State'  as  it  would  be  another 
'centre'  for  okrugs  and  cities.  They  also  threatened  regional  authorities  by  declaring 
that  they  would  try  to  put  the  city  under  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Federation.  101 
Regional  authorities  were  still  further  undermined  when  they  found 
themselves  in  a  conflict  with  the  municipal  authorities  of  the  regional  centre.  In 
Omsk  oblast,  the  conflict  between  municipal  and  oblast  administrations  became 
acute  over  the  property  rights  in  the  process  of  privatisation  in  late  1991  and  1992.102 
The  conflict  between  two  administrations  showed  a  more  dramatic  development  in 
Primorskii  krai  when  Evgenii  Nazdratenko,  governor  of  the  krai,  resorted  to  violent 
measures  in  order  to  suspend  Viktor  Cherepkov,  mayor  of  Vladivostok  city.  103 (Chapter  VII)  330 
VII.  4  (4)  Eltsin's  Non-svstematised  Bilateral  Negotiations  with  Regions 
Eltsin's  tactics  to  encourage  regions  to  conclude  an  agreement  separately  with 
Moscow  constituted  a  basic  feature  of  his  regional  policy  of  'divide  and  rule.  "'  In 
general,  Eltsin's  bilateral  negotiations  with  the  regions  had  two  main  effects  on 
centre-periphery  relations.  First  of  all,  it  encouraged  regions  to  maintain  their 
contact  with  the  centre.  For  the  regions,  it  appeared  more  promising  to  have  an 
agreement  with  the  centre  rather  than  to  seek  a  'systematic'  guarantee  that  would 
take  more  time  to  satisfy  regions  of  different  expectations  or  to  wage  a  'total  war' 
with  the  centre  following  Chechnia.  In  particular,  it  would  be  acceptable  for 
politically  or  economically  'strong  regions,  '  as  the  process  would  provide  them  with 
opportunities  to  become  'more  equal'  than  other  regions.  In  this  regard,  Eltsin  made 
it  clear  that  any  concessions  to  a  region  would  not  lead  to  changes  in  the  system 
itself.  "'  Therefore,  despite  the  observation  that  any  preferential  terms  agreed  with  a 
region  might  become  a  standard  for  the  rest,  and  thus  reduce  the  influence  of  the 
centre  over  the  regions,  'non-systematic'  bilateral  negotiation  prevented  'maximum' 
concessions  to  'strong  regions'  from  being  applicable  to  'weak  regions'  as  well.  It 
rather  provided  the  centre  with  more  flexibility  in  its  response  to  the  demands  of 
`strong  regions.  "' 
Secondly,  bilateral  negotiations  diversified  the  sources  of  financial  support. 
Although  they  often  failed  to  be  fully  implemented  when  based  on  the  central  budget 
because  of  chronic  budget  deficits,  they  included  specific  terms  that  reflected 
regional  socio-economic  peculiarities  such  as  regional  needs  and  possible  fund 
generating  sources.  As  a  result,  the  measures  often  diverted  regional  lobbies  to 
different  directions  or  financial  sources  on  the  basis  of  their  peculiarities,  which 
undermined  regional  unity. 
In  the  reform  process,  various  financial  sources  emerged  in  addition  to 
traditional  centralised  sources  such  as  subsidies  and  investment  for  the  centre.  107  For 
instance,  the  role  of  federal  or  sub-federal  level  of  budget/off-budget  funds  was 
expanded.  A  region  was  also  endowed  with  rights  to  attract  direct  or  indirect  foreign 
investment  or  foreign  credits,  which  were  supposed  to  be  a  main  goal  of  the  FEZs. 
Furthermore,  a  region  also  financed  its  own  socio-economic  development  by  holding 
the  wealth  produced  on  its  own  territory  at  its  disposal  by  expanding  assigned  and (Chapter  YIA  331 
regulatory  budget  revenue  and  by  establishing  regional  credit  or  material- 
technological  funds. 
Distribution  of  or  access  to  such  financial  sources  was  made  to  four  types  of 
possible  beneficiaries:  a  group  of  regions,  an  individual  region,  economic  sectors, 
and  the  general  public.  For  instance,  a  programme  to  deal  with  the  Chernobyl' 
incident  affected  21  regions  and  a  support  programme  for  the  Far  North  included  19 
administrative  units.  In  addition,  bilateral  agreements  between  centre  and  inter- 
regional  associations  of  Central  Chernozem  regions,  "'  the  Ural  regions,  109  Great 
Volga,  "'  and  the  Siberian  Agreement.  "  included  a  group  of  regions.  Support  for  a 
particular  sector  also  became  a  source  of  finance  for  a  region  of  specialised  economic 
structure  such  as  agriculture/agro-industry,  fuel-energy  industry,  and  military- 
industrial  complex.  Social  funds  such  as  the  Fund  for  Pensioners,  the  Social 
Insurance  Fund,  and  the  Fund  of  the  Supreme  Soviet  on  Social  Support  for 
Population  (Fund  of  Development  of  Kino/TV  for  Children  and  Youth)  were  also 
available  for  regions  to  meet  their  particular  socio-economic  needs.  These  financial 
sources  were  often  open  to  negotiation  between  centre  and  regions. 
In  the  process  of  negotiations  between  Moscow  and  regions,  two  main  features 
are  noteworthy  in  relations  with  the  development  of  inter-regional  associations. 
Firstly,  concessions  were  made  when  power  struggles  were  acute  in  the  centre  as 
discussed  in  Chapter  3,  which  widened  the  gap  between  regional  political  leaders  on 
the  issues  in  question. 
Another  feature  that  are  closely  related  with  the  development  of  inter-regional 
unity  is  that  the  economic  structure  of  a  region  and  the  status  of  a  region  in  the 
federal  system  turned  out  to  be  a  critical  factor  in  the  process  of  bilateral 
negotiations.  In  general,  federal  republics  tended  to  attract  more  attention  from  the 
centre  than  ordinary  administrative  units.  However,  at  the  same  time,  administrative 
units  featured  as  natural  resource  bases  were  more  interested  in  expanding  their 
control  over  resources  in  their  territories,  while  others  with  poor  natural  resources 
were  more  concerned  to  secure  central  subsidies.  Therefore,  interregional 
associations  such  as  the  Siberian  Agreement  and  the  Great  Urals  tended  to  be 
endowed  with  economic  rights  over  their  natural  resources  which  were  greater  than 
those  of  other  inter-regional  associations  such  as  the  'Central  Chernozem'  regions 
and  other  republics  which  had  a  weaker  basis  of  natural  resources  (see  Table  7,4.1). t: 
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However,  considering  the  concessions  made  to  inter-regional  associations  with 
those  to  'strong  regions'  such  as  Sakha  and  Tiumen,  `strong  regions'  were  more 
successful  in  their  bilateral  negotiations  with  Moscow.  As  a  result,  inter-regional 
associations  seemed  to  be  a  secondary  way  to  extend  their  economic  rights  for 
'strong  regions'  which  were  rather  keen  to  find  their  own  way  of  development  rather 
than  remain  as  a  part  of  inter-regional  association.  Such  a  development  reduced  the 
coordinated  activities  of  inter-regional  associations  and  eroded  inter-regional  unity.  "= 
Furthermore,  the  Siberian  Agreement  seemed  to  fail  to  satisfy  the  peculiar  interests 
of  some  member  regions  in  its  negotiations  with  the  centre.  For  instance,  the 
negotiation  between  the  two  parties  did  not  include  any  specific  measures  to  assist 
the  agricultural  sector  in  Altai  krai,  coal  mines  in  Kemerovo  oblast,  military- 
industrial  complexes  in  Omsk,  Tomsk  and  other  regions,  environmental  problems  of 
Baikal  regions  and  so  on.  It  forced  those  regions  to  shift  from  collective  bargains  to 
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the  case  will  be  dropped.  In  the  analysis,  a  deputy  group  that  had  less  than  five  deputies  were  excluded. 
4'  )  First  of  all,  more  regional  leaders  were  elected  to  the  CPD  of  Russia  than  to  the  CPD  of  the 
USSR.  Accordingly,  difficulties  arose  in  choosing  the  right  leader  to  compare  his  or  her  voting  patterns 
with  those  of  other  deputies.  In  the  analysis,  deputies'  voting  patterns  are  compared  with  those  of (Chapter  VII)  341 
governors  and  the  regional  soviet  chairmen.  If  both  leaders  remained  out  of  the  Congress,  the  voting 
patterns  of  ispolkom  chairmen  or  first  secretaries  of  the  CPSU  are  used  for  comparison. 
")  Eltsin  tried  to  dismiss  Mukha  and  other  regional  leaders  in  March  1992,  a  month  before  the 
Sixth  Congress,  though  he  cancelled  his  decision  in  the  face  of  resistance  from  the  Siberian  Agreement. 
Hughes,  "Eltsin's  Siberian  Opposition,  "  p.  32.  However,  after  the  incident,  Mukha's  voting  patterns 
were  changed,  becoming  supportive  of  Eltsin's  position,  though  it  is  quite  difficult  to  find  a  clear 
relationship  between  the  incident  and  his  changing  voting  patterns.  Perhaps  considering  his  relationship 
with  Eltsin,  he  voted  in  abstention  in  the  vote  on  rather  subtle  questions  such  as  emergence  powers  of 
the  president  (Q3),  and  no  confidence  in  the  government  (TI).  Furthermore,  among  the  five  votes  that 
were  selected  for  the  analysis  of  the  voting  patterns  at  the  Seventh  Congress,  he  abstained  from  voting  in 
four  questions,  and  supported  Eltsin's  position  in  the  vote  on  Zor'kin's  compromises. 
47)  During  the  Second  and  Fifth  Congresses,  none  of  Siberian  deputies  followed  Tuleev's  voting 
patterns  in  more  than  seven  of  nine  votes.  However,  during  the  Sixth  and  Seventh  Congresses,  44 
deputies  showed  identical  voting  patterns  with  those  of  Tuleev  in  more  than  seven  of  ten  votes. 
41  )  For  a  general  overview  of  these  election  and  referendums,  see  A.  A.  Sobianin  and  V.  G. 
Sukhovol'skii,  Demokratiia,  organichennala  fal'sifikatsilaml:  vybory  I  referendumy  v  Rossii  v  1991- 
1993  gg.  (Moscow:  INTU,  1995);  and  Aleksandr  Sobianin  and  Vladisly  G.  Sukhvol'skii,  Kak 
organizovat'  kontrol'  na  vyborakh  (Moscow:  Izdatel'stvo  "Evraziia",  1995). 
49)  Gel'man  and  Golosov  argue  that  the  organisations  of  political  activists  failed  to  attract  new 
members,  while  old  activists  became  politically  inactive,  weakening  the  linkage  between  'parties'  and 
the  grassroots.  Vladimir  Gel'man  and  Grigorii  V.  Golosov,  "Regional  Party  System  Formation  in 
Russia:  The  Deviant  Case  of  Sverdlovsk  Oblast,  "  in  John  Löwenhardt  (ed.  ),  Party  Politics  in  Post- 
Communist  Russia  (London:  Frank  Cass,  1998),  pp.  33,43.  Golosov  also  mentioned  that  the 
performance  of  political  parties  was  rather  miserable  when  he  examined  708  candidates  who  had  run  for 
1994  local  elections  in  Novosibirsk,  Omsk  and  Tiumen  oblasts  and  Altai  kral.  Grigorii  V.  Golosov, 
"Russian  Political  Parties  and  the  'Bosses':  Evidence  from  the  1994  Provincial  Elections  in  Western 
Siberia,  "  Party  Politics,  vol.  3,  no.  1  (1997),  p.  9.  White  also  examined  degree  of  identification  of 
voters  with  the  party  that  they  voted  for.  His  argument  showed  that  the  party  did  not  play  a  great  role  in 
the  election  to  the  Federal  Council  in  1993.  As  a  consequence,  candidates  preferred  to  run  the  elections 
independently  rather  than  identify  themselves  with  Moscow-based  parties.  Stephen  White,  Richard 
Rose,  and  Ian  McAllister,  How  Russia  Votes  (Chatham,  New  Jersey:  Chatham  House  Publishers,  1997), 
p.  139.  Sakwa  also  observed  that  the  relationship  between  leadership  and  organisations  turned  out  to  be 
problematical.  Richard  Sakwa,  "Parties  and  the  Multiparty  System  in  Russia,  "  RFE/RL  Research 
Report,  vol.  2,  no.  31(30  July  1993),  p.  11. 
d0)  The  workers'  movements  in  Kemerovo  oblast  which  co-operated  with  the  coal  miners  of 
other  regions  and  ecological  movements  in  Zabaikalia  was  a  possible  exception.  In  particular,  the  idea 
of  establishing  a  Siberian  republic  failed  to  be  supported  by  the  grassroots.  For  instance,  a  survey  in 
Novosibirsk  in  September  1992  showed  that  only  35  per  cent  of  respondents  supported  the  idea,  while 
47  per  cent  rejected  even  the  idea  of  autonomy,  although  regionalist  tendencies  were  at  a  peak  at  that 
moment.  Grigorii  Golosov,  Political  Parties  in  Western  Siberia,  August  1991-October  1993:  A (Chapter  PLO  341 
Comparative  Analysis  (Occasional  Paper)  (Washington,  D.  C.:  Kennan  Institute  for  Advanced  Russian 
Studies,  1994),  p.  12. 
11  )  For  instance,  Clem  and  Craumer  has  argued  that  voter  turnout  was  linked  to  both 
institutional  and  socio-economic  factors.  Ralph  S.  Clem  and  Peter  R.  Craumer,  "Regional  Patterns  of 
Voter  Turnout  in  Russian  Elections,  1993-1996,  "  in  Matthew  Wyman,  Stephen  White,  and  Sarah  Oates 
(eds.  ),  Elections  and  Voters  in  Post-communist  Russia  (Cheltenham:  Edward  Elgar,  1998),  p.  67.  For 
detailed  analysis  on  the  regionalised  voting  patterns  of  the  grassroots,  see  Ralph  S.  Clem  and  Peter  R. 
Craumer.  "The  Geography  of  the  April  25  (1993)  Russian  Referendum,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol. 
34,  no.  8  (October  1993),  pp.  481496;  "The  Politics  of  Russia's  Regions:  A  Geographical  Analysis  of 
the  Russian  Election  and  Constitutional  Plebiscite  of  December  1993,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol.  36, 
no.  10  (December  1995),  pp.  67-86;  "The  Geography  of  the  Russian  1995  Parliamentary  Election: 
Continuity,  Change,  and  Correlates,  "  Post-Soviet  Geography,  vol.  36,  no.  10  (December  1995),  pp.  587- 
616;  "Roadmap  to  Victory:  Boris  Yeltsin  and  the  Russian  Presidential  elections  of  1996,  "  Post-Soviet 
Geography,  vol.  347,  no.  6  (June  1996),  pp.  335-354;  and  Sarah  Oates,  "Electoral  Cleavages  and 
Constituencies:  Mapping  Party  Success  and  Failure  Across  Russia,  "  unpublished  paper  presented  at  the 
BASEES  Annual  Conference  in  Cambridge  in  April  1998. 
S2)  For  instance,  Helsinki  watch  groups  had  already  been  set  up  in  numbers  of  republics  of  the 
USSR  after  the  Helsinki  Agreement  of  the  Conference  on  Security  and  Co-operation  in  Europe  in  1975. 
Geoffrey  A.  Hosking,  Jonathan  Aves,  and  Peter  J.  S.  Duncan,  The  Road  to  Post-Communism: 
Independent  Political  Movements  in  the  Soviet  Union  1985.1991  (London:  Pinter,  1992),  p.  2.  In 
addition,  Pamiat'  was  established  in  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s.  For  details  on  Pamiat',  see  Michael 
McFaul  and  Sergei  Markov,  The  Troubled  Birth  of  Russian  Democracy:  Parties,  Personalities,  and 
Programmes  (Stanford,  California:  Hoover  Institution  Press,  1993),  pp.  44-60. 
31  )  In  the  USSR  as  a  whole,  numbers  of  'informal'  groups  were  estimated  to  be  30,000  in 
February  1988  which  had  grown  to  by  60,000.  Pravda,  5  February  1988,  p.  3;  and  Izvestita,  11  June 
1992,  P.  2. 
")  Numbers  of  political  organisations  were  mainly  based  on  following  works:  V.  N. 
Berezovskii,  N.  I.  Krotov,  and  V.  V.  Cherviakov,  Rossaa:  partit,  assotslatsil.  soiuz,  kluby  (Moscow: 
Izdatel'stvo  Rau-Press,  1991);  Vladimir  Pribylovskii,  Slovar'  oppositsil:  novye  politicheskle  pants  I 
organisatsli  Rossit  (Moscow:  Postfactum,  1991);  and  Samodeiatel'nye  obshchestvennye  t  politicheskle 
organlsatsii  I  dvizheniia  v  SSSR:  spravochnik  serli  "Kto  est'  kto"  (Moscow:  VTI  Delta-Press,  1992). 
Despite  the  possible  omission  of  numbers  of  political  movements,  'independent'  political  organisations 
were  established  in  most  of  the  Western  Siberian  regions,  Krasnoiarsk  krai  and  Irkutsk  oblast  in  Eastern 
Siberia,  and  Republic  of  Sakha,  Primorskii  and  Khabarovsk  krais  In  the  Far  East.  In  particular, 
according  to  observation  of  a  regional  newspaper,  Sibiriskala  gazeta,  political  'parties'  were  particularly 
active  in  Novosibirsk  oblast.  "V  mire soiuz,  assotsiatsii  I  frontov,  "  Sibirskala  gazeta,  4  December  1989, 
p.  10. 
")  "Liki  sibirskoi  provintsii:  tri  partii  Altaia,  "  Sibirskata  gazeta,  no.  25  (July  1991),  p.  4. 
Another  sign  of  growing  influence  of  the  movement  was  showed  when  the  kraisovet  elected  V. 
Raifikesht,  sovkhoz  director  from  Novoaltaisk,  turning  down  Iu.  Zhil'tsov  and  A.  Nazrachuk.  Peter (Chapter  YlV  343 
Kirkow,  "Regional  Politics  and  Market  Reform  in  Russia:  the  Case  of  the  Altai,  "  Europe-Asia  Studies. 
vol.  46,  no.  7  (1994),  p.  1179;  and  Kirkow,  Russia's  Provinces,  pp.  101-103. 
56)  Pribylovskii,  Slovar'  oppositsil,  p.  47. 
17)  Samodeiatel'nye  obshchestvennye  i  politicheskie  organlsatsll  I  dvizhenlia  v  SSSR,  p.  532. 
s$)  The  Democratic  Movement  for  Perestroika  in  Sakhalin  oblast  claimed  4-5  thousand  members 
including  200  active  members  with  four  local  branches  in  Timovsk,  Noglinsk,  Severo-Kurilsk,  and 
Iuzno-Kurilsk.  Ibid.,  p.  526. 
59  )  The  People's  Front  advocated  a  platform  which  included  the  proposal  to  forbid  the 
incumbent  First  Secretary  of  the  CPSU  being  a  member  of  People's  Deputies  or  chairman  of  the  Soviet, 
to  increase  the  duration  of  Soviet  sessions,  to  establish  a  commission  to  control  the  activities  of  organs 
of  MVD,  KGB  and  Army  under  the  oblast  soviet,  and  to  introduce  alternative  election  procedures  of  the 
oblsovet  chairman  and  deputy  chairman,  and  editors  of  the  newspaper  Tiwnenskala  pravda. 
Furthermore,  the  Front  considered  claiming  up  to  ten  per  cent  of  income  from  the  delivery  of  petroleum 
and  gas  to  meet  the  need  of  producers.  "Rezoliutsiia  sobraniia  kandidatov  v  narodnye  deputaty 
organisovannogo  po  initsiative  koordinatsionnogo  soveta  Narodnogo  Fronts  Tiumeni,  "  Tiumenskala 
pravda,  7  February  1990,  p.  2. 
60)  Omsk People'  Front  was  quite  successful  when  they  supported  three  candidates  who  were 
elected  to  the  CPD  of  Russia-S.  Nosoverts,  B.  Lotkov,  and  S.  Baburin-and  gained  control  of  roughly 
50  per  cent  of  the  gorsovet  candidates.  However,  it  only  managed  to  control  over  10-15  per  cent  of  the 
oblsovet  deputies,  which  was  regarded  as  a  crisis  of  the  Front.  Samodeiatel'nye  obshchestvennye  t 
politicheskie  organisatsii  I  dvizhenila  v  SSSR,  p.  357. 
61  )  White  and  McAllister  categorised  political  parties  in  the  Russian  Federation  into  three- 
right,  centre,  and  left-categories.  On  the  right  included  business  parties  including  the  Conservative 
Party  (October  1990),  the  Party  of  Economic  Freedom  (Konstantin  Borovoi),  the  Order  of  Orthodox 
Monarchists,  the  Christian  Democratic  Parties,  the  Liberal  Democratic  Party,  a  variety  of  groupings  of  a 
radical  nationalist  character  including  Pamiat',  the  National  Republican  Parties  of  Russia,  the  Russian 
National  Sobor  (1992,  a  coalition  of  communists  and  nationalists),  the  Russian  People's  Union  (late 
1992,  Sergei  Baburin),  the  National  Salvation  front  (October  1992,  a  national-patriotic  coalition  of 
forces),  and  the  Liberal  Democratic  Party  (Summer  1989,  Vladimir  Zhirinovskii).  Five  political  parties 
such  as  the  Agrarian  Party,  the  Constitutional  Democratic  Party,  the  Democratic  Party  of  Russia,  the 
Democratic  Party  (May  1990,  Nikolai  Travkin),  and  the  Democratic  Russia  are  placed  in  the  centre. 
Finally,  the  Republican  Party  of  Russian  Federation  (former  'Democratic  Platform'  within  the  CPSU), 
the  Russian  Party  of  Communists  (the  former  Marxist  Platform  within  the  CPSU),  the  Socialist 
Workers'  Party  (Roy  Medvedev),  the  Communist  Party  of  Bolsheviks,  a  re-established  Menshevik  Party, 
and  the  Communist  Party  of  the  Russian  Federation  (February  1993)  were  categorised  as  left  wing,  Ian 
McAllister  and  Stephen  White,  "Democracy,  Political  Parties  and  Party  Formation  in  Postcommunist 
Russia,  "  Party  Politics,  vol.  1,  no.  1(January  1995),  pp.  52-53. 
62)  Moses  used  the  term  'anti-establishment'  to  depict  the  movement  led  by  new-leadership  that 
consisted  of  non-communist  intellectuals,  former  political  dissidents,  nationalist,  and  reformist (Chapter  VII)  344 
communists  who  defied  the  'party-state  establishment.  '  Moses,  "Soviet  Provincial  Politics  in  an  Era  of 
Transition  and  Revolution,  "  pp.  479-480.  In  the  same  context,  Gelman  and  Golosov  described 
activities  of  these  newly  emerged  political  parties  as  'anti-regime'  political  mobilisation.  Gel'man  and 
Golosov,  "Regional  Party  System  Formation  in  Russia,  "  p.  33. 
67  )  Possibly,  the  People's  Front  of  Tuva  ASSR  (Narodnyi  front  Tuvinskoi  ASSR,  former  Tuvan 
Democratic  International  Movement)  and  the  Tun  of  Khakasiia  tended  to  be  strong  basis  of  its  own 
nation.  However,  even  in  Tyva  where  nationalist  movements  were  quite  strong,  the  organisation  had 
changed  into  inter-national  movements,  opening  its  membership  to  Russian-speaking  population,  when 
the  Tuvan  Democratic  International  Movement  was  changed  to  Tuvan  People's  Front  in  March  1990. 
Samodetatel'nye  obshchestvennye  I  politicheskie  organisatsii  I  dvizheniia  v  SSSR,  p.  423. 
")  According  to  Golosov's  observation,  local  party  organisations  in  the  Western  Siberia  lost 
their  ground  of  existence  in  the  local  elections  of  1994.  For  instance,  the  Democratic  Russia  in 
Novosibirsk  lost  most  of  their  members,  only  retaining  its  executive  committee.  Small  Moscow-based 
parties  such  as  the  Republican  Party  of  the  Russian  Federation  also  had  lost  almost  90  per  cent  of  its 
members  in  Novosibirsk.  Vechernil  Novosibirsk,  31  March  1995,  p.  2,  in  Golosov,  "Russian  Political 
Parties  and  the  'Bosses',  "  p.  14. 
6'  )A  survey  conducted  by  Krasnoiarsk  and  Altai  Universities  in  the  late  of  1992  also  supported 
the  observation  that  the  separatist  movement  was  supported  among  a  majority  of  officials  and  managers 
of  enterprises.  Rossiiskaia  gazeta,  17  November  1992,  p.  2. 
66  )  The  Association  of  Siberian  Cities  was  formed  at  the  beginning  of  1989,  aimed  at  promoting 
active  barter  relations  between  Siberian  cities,  establishing  a  modem  infrastructure  in  the  Siberian 
regions,  organising  production  of  natural  resources,  and  promoting  foreign  economic  relations. 
Samodeiatel'nye  obshchestvennye  i  politicheskie  organisatsii  i  dvizhenila  v  SSSR,  p.  27. 
67  )  Boris  Perov,  "Sibirskaia  ekonomika  golosuet  za  sibirskuiu  nezavisimost',  "  SJbtrskata  ga:  eta, 
no.  1(January  1993),  p.  4. 
ea  )  Ibid. 
69  )  Samodetatel'nye  obshchestvennye  1  pollticheskle  organtsatsil  l  dvirhenila  v  SSSR.  p.  456. 
70  )  ]3erezovskii.  Krotov,  and  Cherviakov.  Rossila,  p.  124. 
")  Though  the  Association  advocated  the  full  political  and  economic  autonomy  of  the  Far  East 
and  the  restoration  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  it  also  declared  to  concentrate  their  efforts  to  put  to  an 
end  to  the  monopoly  of  the  CPSU  and  ecological  disasters.  As  a  confederation,  any  decision  was  to 
decided  by  the  two-thirds  of  majority  which  had  no  binding  force  upon  those  who  disagree. 
Samodeiatel'nye  obshchestvennye  i  politicheskie  organisatsii  t  dvirheniia  v  SSSR,  pp.  523-524. 
n)  For  instance,  Viktor  Shmurygin,  the  Deputy  Chairman  of  the  Duma  of  the  Union,  proposed 
more  detailed  programme  for  the  independent  of  Siberia  in  October  1992,  aiming  at  the  establishment  of 
a  Siberian  Confederation.  He  proposed  that  republics,  krais,  and  oblasts  in  Siberia  constituted  a  Siberian 
Confederation  with  no  central  structure,  which  would  joined  a  Commonwealth  of  Republics  and 
Regions  in  Russia  that  would  be  established  by  1995,  abolishing  the  central  administrative  structures  in (Chapter  V71)  345 
Moscow.  Sibirskaia  gazeta,  no.  41  (24  October  1992),  in  Vera  This,  "Regionalism  in  Russia:  The  Case 
of  Siberia,  "  RFE/RL  Research  Report,  vol.  2,  no.  9  (26  February  1993),  p.  6;  and  "Nuzhna  li  Sibirskaia 
respublika?  "  Tiumenskaia  pravda,  6  December  1991,  p.  1. 
")  The  Siberian  Democratic  Union,  for  example,  organised  a  rally  in  May  1990  in  which  about 
3  thousand  people  took  part.  By  contrast,  a  couple  of  ecology  movements  in  the  SIBFE  regions 
demonstrated  more  successful  activities.  For  instance,  the  Committee  for  the  Support  of  Perestroika  in 
Komsomolsk-na-Amure  collected  about  18  thousand  signatures  on  the  question  of  the  Far  Eastern  AES 
construction.  Samodeiatel'nye  obshchestvennye  I  politicheskie  organisatsit  I  dvizheniia  v  SSSR,  p.  364. 
The  Movement  for  the  Preservation  of  Baikal  also  organised  a  rally  against  the  construction  of  the 
pipeline  in  June  1988,  and  collected  107  thousand  signatures  which  seemed  to  be  quite  a  success. 
Berezovskii,  Krotov,  and  Cherviakov,  Rossia,  pp.  129-130. 
74)  Stephen  Whitefield  and  Geoffrey  Evans,  "The  Emerging  Structure  of  Partisan  Divisions  in 
Russian  Politics,  "  in  Wyman,  White,  and  Oates  (eds.  ),  Elections  and  Voters  In  Post-communist  Russia, 
p.  91.  Mau  and  Stupin  have  also  argued  that  regional  authorities  could  not  but  attentive  to  the  needs  of 
the  population  in  order  to  preserve  the  stability  in  the  region,  although  voters  still  had  a  relatively  weak 
influence  over  the  regional  authorities.  Vladimir  Mau  and  Vadim  Stupin,  "The  Political  Economy  of 
Russian  Regionalism,  "  Communist  Economies  and  Economic  Transformation,  vol.  9,  no.  1(1997),  p.  8. 
75  )  In  fact,  voter  turnout  at  the  regional  level  was  also  strongly  correlated  with  these  indicators, 
although  correlation  between  living  standard  indicator  and  voter  turnout  decreased  in  1993.  For 
instance,  the  level  of  economic  performance  had  a  negative  association  with  voter  turnout  (rm-0.5  I  and  - 
0.47  in  March  1991  referendum  on  the  USSR  and  Russian  questions  respectively,  r.  '-0.42  in  June  1991 
presidential  election,  r--0.34  in  April  1993  referendum,  and  r--0.47  in  December  1993  referendum).  In 
connection  with  the  level  of  voter  turnout,  Clem  and  Craumer  have  observed  that  "very  little" 
correlation  was  found  between  macro-economic  conditions  at  the  regional  level  and  voter  turnout. 
However,  in  this  case,  macro-economic  conditions  referred  to  "change  in  industrial  and  agricultural 
productions,  change  in  the  volume  of  retail  sales,  change  in  the  consumer  price  index  and  the  extent  of 
housing  privatisation.  "  Clem  and  Craumer,  "Regional  Patterns  of  Voter  Turnout  in  Russian  Elections, 
1993.1996,  "  in  ibid.,  p.  66. 
76  )  Although  it  is  rather  complicated  to  figure  out  the  reasons,  one  possible  reason  can  be  found 
in  the  economic  shock  therapy  that  launched  in  1992.  Its  impact  could  have  resulted  in  changes  in  the 
voting  patterns  of  the  grassroots. 
77)  In  this  analysis,  four  regions-Republics  of  Tatarstan,  North  Ossetiia,  Tuva,  and  Chechnia- 
that  boycotted  the  referendum  of  March  1991  on  the  RSFSR  question  were  excluded. 
71)  When  he  ran  for  the  presidential  election  in  June  1991,  the  regions  showed  a  quite  low  level 
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programme  to  support  agriculture  and  agro-industrial  complex.  As  for  Kemerovo  oblast,  the  financial 
support  for  unpromising  mines  seemed  to  be  a  more  imminent  and  promising  financial  sources.  The 
federal  budget  of  1994  planned  to  allocate  11  trillion  rubles  for  the  agricultural  sector,  775  billion  rubles 
for  the  conversion  funds,  and  300  billion  rubles  for  unpromising  mines.  Leksin  and  Shvetsov, 
"Regional'naia  politika  Rossii  (stat'ia  chetvertaia),  "  Rossiiskii  ekonomicheskil  zhurnal,  no.  8  (August 
1994),  p.  44. CHAPTER  VIII 
Conclusion:  The  Regions  and  the  Future  of  Russia 
The  main  purpose  of  this  study  has  been  to  find  answers  to  the  following  three 
questions:  whether  the  regions  had  an  influence  upon  the  central  legislative  institutions 
in  the  USSR  and  Russia  during  1989-1993;  if  they  had,  then  how  strong  their  influence 
was;  and  finally  what  could  be  the  implications  of  the  regions  for  the  future  course  of 
reform  in  Russia. 
In  the  process  of  democratisation  and  economic  reform,  long  suppressed 
regional  demands  erupted  in  Russia  and  the  Soviet  style  of  centre-periphery  relations 
was  put  to  a  trial.  Such  a  tendency  has  been  a  worldwide  phenomenon.  Similar 
tendencies  appeared  in  Spain  after  the  Franco  dictatorship  in  1975.  In  Spain,  the 
regions  gained  a  momentum  to  increase  their  influence  on  central  decision-making  and 
federal  principles  were  applied  to  its  unitary  structure  after  the  adoption  of  the  1978 
Constitution.  The  Spanish  case  of  course  is  not  a  perfect  transition  model  of 
incorporating  regional  demands  into  the  political  system  as  separatist  bombing 
campaigns  are  still  taking  place.  However,  the  transition  in  Spain  appears  to  be  more 
stable  and  progressive  than  in  Russia.  In  this  regard,  we  may  briefly  conclude  that 
cultural  background,  general  socio-economic  conditions,  or  the  experience  of 
democracy  of  either  side  make  a  difference.  However,  it  appears  to  be  more 
complicated  when  such  a  transition  is  also  a  painstaking  task  in  more  democratised  and 
economically  stable  countries.  For  instance,  the  transition  process  in  Belgium  took 
nearly  twenty  years-if  we  take  the  adoption  of  the  1970  Constitution  as  a  starting 
point-before  the  throne  officially  recognised  Belgium  as  a  federal  state  in  1988,  and 
during  the  transition  period  a  couple  of  coalition  governments  had  collapsed. 
In  Russia,  however,  the  situation  was  rather  more  complicaetd.  The  analysis 
shows  that  regional  socio-economic  disparities  were  reflected  in  the  composition  and 
conduct  of  the  Congresses  of  People's  Deputies  (CPDs)  of  the  USSR  and  RSFSR, 
which  was  the  same  in  Spain  and  Belgium.  However,  regional  factors  in  the  CPDs  of (Chapter  VIII)  352 
the  USSR  and  Russia,  together  with  some  other  factors  (e.  g.  political  bloc  membership 
and  age),  placed  obstacles  in  front  of  efforts  to  adopt  reform  policies,  and  thus  affected 
the  course  and  speed  of  reform  by  delaying  or  distorting  reform  measures. 
Secondly,  the  case  study  of  SIBFE  regionalism  showed  that  the  influence  of 
inter-regional  coordination  bodies  such  as  the  Siberian  Agreement  had  declined  in  the 
CPD,  although  their  influence  varied  with  the  question  at  issue.  In  accordance  with  the 
acceleration  of  reform,  regional  interests  were  also  diversified,  hampering  inter- 
regional  coordination  efforts.  In  this  context,  the  analysis  suggested  that  deputies  were 
more  attentive  to  the  socio-economic  conditions  and  goals  of  their  own  region  rather 
than  those  of  inter-regional  associations. 
Thirdly,  the  analysis  also  suggested  the  possibility  that  the  regions  have 
continued  to  influence  the  decision-making  process  in  the  Russian  Duma  since  1993. 
Further  research  could  look  into  the  scope  and  character  of  this  influence.  Despite  the 
decreasing  influence  of  inter-regional  associations  and  the  emergence  of  a  party 
system  as  a  basis  for  Duma  elections,  this  did  not  necessarily  imply  that  the  influence 
of  the  regions  on  the  decision-making  process  had  decreased.  First  of  all,  deputies  in 
the  CPD  were  rather  independent  of  their  regional  or  factional  leaders.  Therefore,  we 
must  consider  the  fate  of  regionalism  operating  outside  (i.  e.  inter-regional  associations 
as  coordinating  bodies  of  regional  leaderships)  and  inside  (i.  e.  regional  deputy  blocs) 
the  CPD  separately.  Furthermore,  'class'  background  and  political  faction 
membership  of  a  deputy  did  not  always  have  a  cross-regional  impact  in  the  CPD. 
Regional  cleavages  were  also  found  among  deputies  belonging  to  the  same  'class' 
group  or  political  bloc.  Accordingly,  the  current  party-based  representation  to  the 
State  Duma  may  still  allow  for  regional  interest  articulation,  in  addition  to  the 
influence  of  the  regions  in  the  Council  of  the  Federation.  In  particular,  regional 
support  for  political  parties  in  the  elections  also  suggests  that  the  development  of  party 
politics  in  the  Russian  context  can  accommodate  regional  interest  articulation. 
Finally,  in  conjunction  with  current  regional  reform  under  Vladimir  Putin's 
leadership,  the  level  of  coordination  among  the  regions  or  regional  political  actors  may 
need  to  be  enhanced  in  order  to  establish  a  `genuine'  federal  structure.  This  study 
suggests  that  chaotic  regional  interest  articulation  in  the  CPD  hampered  efforts  to 
establish  a  legal  framework  for  a  'genuine'  federal  structure.  In  the  early  1990s, 
deputies  in  the  Congress  failed  to  reach  an  agreement  on  a  future  federal  structure.  As 
a  result,  two  major  legal  frameworks  of  current  federal  relations-i.  e.  the  Federal 
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relations  developed  mainly  based  on  bilateral  negotiations  between  Moscow  and 
regional  authorities.  Devolution  based  on  bilateral  negotiations  in  circumstances  of 
wide  regional  socio-economic  disparities  facilitated  the  regionalisation  of  reform,  and 
in  turn  could  erode  the  legacy  of  regional  autonomy.  Regionalisation  of  reform  could 
also  be  a  seedbed  for  a  `strong  centre'  or  for  even  an  authoritarian  regime,  which 
would  affect  not  only  the  future  structure  of  the  federation  but  also  economic  and 
political  reform  in  general. 
Although  regions  failed  to  coordinate  their  activities  in  the  1990s,  regions 
appear  to  face  another  round  of  test  as  Putin  launched  his  regional  reform  in  May 
2000.  Although  the  competence  of  newly  established  federal  okrugs  and  their  status  in 
the  federal  structure  have  still  to  be  settled,  the  importance  of  regional  coordination 
appear  to  be  growing.  In  this  regard,  the  Belgian  and  Spanish  experience  suggests  a 
couple  of  alternative  paths  to  a  federal  state  or  a  way  of  approach  the  question  of 
building  federal  relations.  However,  in  any  case  coordination  between  the  regions  in 
the  process  of  negotiation  with  the  centre  remains  unchanged. 
Regionalism  in  the  Congresses  of  the  USSR  and  RSFSR 
According  to  the  experience  of  the  Western  countries,  the  existence  of  regional 
socio-economic  disparities,  'isolated'  ethnic  groups,  and  direct  election  of  deputies  to 
the  central  parliament  and  of  regional  leaderships  should  encourage  the  development 
of  regionalism.  However,  cross-regional  factors  such  as  'class'  cleavages  and  the 
development  of  a  nationwide  political  party  system  tended  to  held  back  the 
development  of  regionalism.  All  these  factors  were  activated  or  reactivated  after 
perestroika,  and  thus  are  considered  in  this  analysis. 
During  the  period  between  1989  and  1993,  inter-regional  coordination  bodies 
were  established  and  reached  their  peak  of  activity,  In  the  course  of  reform,  the 
policies  of  the  centre  had  different  impacts  due  to  different  circumstances  at  the 
regional  level,  intensifying  regional  socio-economic  disparities.  Glasnost'  brought  the 
legacy  of  existing  federal  relations  into  question,  and  led  to  open  discussion  of  regional 
problems.  Changing  electoral  procedures  turned  regional  leaders  and  deputies  into  the 
agents  of  regional  interests.  In  particular,  the  demise  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the 
declaration  of  sovereignty  of  the  RSFSR  provided  regions  with  timely  opportunities  to 
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Democratisation  also  altered  political  circumstances  in  the  central  political 
arena.  Along  with  the  changes  in  the  electoral  procedures  and  working  patterns  of  the 
parliament,  incessant  power  struggles  also  helped  to  erode  a  Soviet  style  of  authority  at 
the  centre.  As  already  discussed  in  Chapter  3,  the  political  and  economic  resources  of 
the  centre  were  severely  depleted  in  this  transition  period  between  1989  and  1993. 
Under  these  circumstances,  inter-regional  coordination  bodies  were  formed  among 
regional  political  actors  including  regional  leaderships,  deputy  groups,  and  political 
parties  and  movements. 
This  analysis  showed  that  regional  interests  became  a  factor  that  helped  to 
determine  deputies'  behaviour  in  the  CPDs  of  the  USSR  and  Russia  during  1989-1993. 
Content  analysis  showed  that  increasing  numbers  of  deputies  in  the  USSR  CPD  in 
1989  articulated  the  interests  of  their  own  region  in  a  more  direct  way,  using  stronger 
terms  than  during  the  Soviet  period.  The  Baltic  deputy  group  is  perhaps  the  best 
example  of  such  a  case. 
Deputies'  voting  patterns  in  the  Congresses  also  showed  that  regional  factors, 
political  faction  membership,  'class,  '  and  age  were  the  variables  most  closely 
associated  with  deputies'  voting  behaviour.  As  for  the  regional  factors,  inter-regional 
groups-the  union  republic  groups  in  the  USSR  CPD  and  inter-regional  association 
groups  in  the  Russian  CPD-showed  different  voting  patterns,  suggesting  the 
influence  of  the  general  political  and  economic  conditions  of  each  regional  bloc. 
However,  most  inter-regional  deputy  groups,  excluding  the  Baltic  deputy  group,  were 
not  strongly  united,  as  the  interests  of  member  regions  were  increasingly  diversified 
with  the  intensification  of  reform.  In  particular,  the  conflicts  in  the  Russian  Congress 
mainly  revolved  around  political  factions-for  instance,  Eltsin's  and  Khasbulatov's 
blocs-rather  than  between  centre  and  regions.  Partly  because  of  these  power 
struggles  at  the  centre  and  divisions  within  regional  groups,  the  regions  seldom 
appeared  to  be  strong  enough  to  initiate  changes  in  the  federal  structure  itself. 
The  impact  of  regional  factors  over  deputies'  voting  patterns,  and  thus  upon  the 
decision-making  process,  was  more  clearly  apparent  when  deputies  were  regrouped  on 
the  basis  of  the  socio-economic  conditions  of  the  regions  where  they  had  been  elected. 
Although  `class'  and  generation  factors  appeared  to  be  of  some  importance  in  the  vote, 
their  influence  over  deputies'  voting  patterns  decreased  as  power  struggles  in  the  CPD 
intensified.  In  particular,  regional  cleavages  were  also  found  among  deputies  who 
belonged  to  the  same  'class'  group  or  to  the  same  political  bloc,  suggesting  that  these 
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regional  influences  appeared  to  be  operating  in  the  State  Duma  that  formed  after  1993, 
although  deputies  had  partly  been  elected  on  the  basis  of  a  party  list  system.  '  Further 
work  would  be  required  in  order  to  establish  their  importance  in  this  context. 
SIBFE  Regionalism  in  the  CPD 
During  the  period  1989-1993,  regionalist  demands  including  separatist  ones  and 
inter-regional  coordination  efforts  were  developing  in  the  SIBFE  regions,  and  these 
constituted  a  prime  concern  of  this  thesis.  In  the  SIBFE  regions,  the  sentiment  of 
being  exploited  by  the  centre  was  widespread,  and  thus  efforts  were  made  to  keep 
wealth  within  their  territory.  Furthermore,  difficulties  in  procuring  necessary  goods 
during  the  marketisation  process  encouraged  the  SIBFE  regions  to  form  a  self- 
supporting  mechanism  on  the  basis  of  complementary  economic  structure  or  economic 
capacity  as  discussed  in  Chapter  3.  As  a  result,  inter-regional  co-operation  bodies 
emerged  among  the  regional  leaderships,  deputies,  and  political  movements  in  the 
SIBFE  regions  at  the  end  of  the  1980s  and  in  the  early  1990s.  Their  major  demands 
could  be  summarised  as  the  decentralisation  of  economic  management,  including  the 
exploitation  of  natural  resources  and  foreign  economic  activities.  Although  political 
demands  such  as  establishing  a  Siberian  or  Far  Eastern  republic  were  made 
sporadically,  they  won  support  neither  from  the  grassroots  nor  from  regional  leaders. 
In  the  Congresses,  SIBFE  deputies  were  given  fair  opportunities  to  express  their 
views,  despite  the  complaints  that  they  were  simply  `observers.  '  SIBFE  speakers  at 
the  sessions  often  advocated  regional  interests  together  with  other  reform-related 
questions.  SIBFE  deputies  also  showed  distinctive  voting  patterns  in  the  Congress. 
Despite  difficulties,  a  relatively  clear  linkage  can  be  found  between  voting  and  the 
interests  of  the  SIBFE  regions.  For  instance,  questions  that  were  included  in  the 
resolution  of  the  Sixth  Congress  ("On  the  Course  of  Economic  Reform  in  the  Russian 
Federation")  had  been  discussed  at  the  First  Congress  of  People's  Deputies  from 
Siberia  in  Krasnoiarsk  in  March  1992.  In  the  vote  on  the  resolution,  SIBFE  deputies  as 
a  group  tended  to  respond  to  regional  interests. 
However,  SIBFE  deputies  failed  to  maintain  a  high  level  of  unity  in  their 
Congress  votes.  We  may  suggest  a  couple  of  reasons  for  the  weak  unity  of  the  SIBFE 
regions:  socio-economic  disparities  within  the  region,  the  lack  of  an  institutionalised 
mechanism  for  horizontal  and  vertical  coordination  between  regional  political  actors, 
and  the  centre's  policy  of  'divide  and  rule.  '  First  of  all,  socio-economic  disparities (Chapter  VIII)  356 
among  the  SIBFE  regions  appeared  to  play  a  major  role  in  their  divisions.  These 
disparities  resulted  in  a  diversification  of  goals  among  regional  leaderships  and 
deputies,  particularly  when  the  centre  invited  them  to  a  series  of  bilateral  negotiations. 
Accordingly,  it  became  more  difficult  for  the  regions  to  coordinate  their  activities 
inside  and  outside  the  CPD.  Although  regional  leaders  established  mechanisms-for 
instance,  the  Council  of  the  Siberian  Agreement-to  coordinate  their  activities,  they 
failed  to  reach  an  agreement  on  the  future  development  of  the  association  and  to 
mobilise  their  deputies  and  the  grassroots. 
Despite  the  limits  of  SIBFE  regionalism  in  the  Congress,  the  analysis  suggested 
a  couple  of  findings  which  may  be  meaningful  for  the  future  development  of  economic 
and  political  changes  in  Russia.  First  of  all,  SIBFE  deputies  in  the  Congress  were 
more  attentive  to  the  interests  of  their  own  regions  rather  than  to  those  of  inter-regional 
associations,  although  dependent  on  the  question  at  issue.  The  analysis  showed  that 
SIBFE  deputies-or  Siberian  and  Far  Eastern  deputies  separately-were  divided  not 
only  by  functional  factors  such  as  faction  membership  or  'class,  '  but  also  by  the  socio- 
economic  conditions  of  the  regions  where  they  had  been  elected.  This  may  lead  us  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  influence  of  the  regions  on  the  decision-making  process  mainly 
or  more  frequently  came  from  regional  groups  based  on  similar  socio-economic 
features  than  from  inter-regional  associations. 
Secondly,  despite  the  general  observation  that  regionalism  was  mainly 
advocated  by  `old'  elites  in  their  adaptation  to  changing  circumstances,  2  the  analysis 
suggested  that  this  observation  reveals  only  half  the  picture.  According  to  the  analysis, 
despite  the  regionalised  voting  patterns  of  deputies  in  the  CPD,  SIBFE  deputies  often 
showed  rather  independent  voting  patterns  from  those  of  their  regional  leaders  who 
had  also  been  elected  to  the  CPD.  In  particular,  those  regional  leaders  who  were 
members  of  the  leadership  bodies  of  inter-regional  associations  such  as  the  Council  of 
the  Siberian  Agreement  had  only  a  limited  influence  over  deputies'  voting  patterns. 
Considering  these  two  findings,  we  may  conclude  that  regional  interest 
articulation  of  SIBFE  deputies  in  the  Congress  was  mainly  carried  out  by  the  deputy 
groups  of  smaller  regions  with  similar  socio-economic  conditions  who  were  rather 
independent  of  their  regional  leaders.  In  this  regard,  the  decreasing  influence  of  inter- 
regional  associations  outside  and  inside  the  Congress  may  not  necessarily  mean  that 
the  influence  of  regions  itself  was  also  fading  in  the  Congress.  This  is  an  issue  that 
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Regions  and  üture  'hanQes  in-Lhe-  onomi  e 
As  the  logistic  regression  analysis  showed,  various  factors  were  involved  in 
determining  deputies'  attitudes  towards  reform,  although  their  influence  upon 
deputies'  voting  patterns  was  overridden  by  that  of  other  factors  from  time  to  time. 
Furthermore,  deputies'  shifting  positions  in  votes  made  the  situation  worse,  as 
discussed  in  Chapter  6.  Such  tendencies  made  it  difficult  for  any  blocs  to  control  the 
Congress,  which  affected  the  economic  and  political  changes  in  the  early  1990s. 
Firstly,  as  a  result  of  the  confrontation  of  conflicting  interests,  decisions  on  key 
reform  measures  were  delayed  or  ended  up  with  vague  and  self-contradictory 
agreements  in  order  to  win  the  necessary  support  for  their  adoption.  Such  tendencies 
clearly  emerged  when  decisions  on  major  issues  such  as  land  ownership,  privatisation, 
and  centre-periphery  relations  were  made.  Delayed  and  self-contradictory  decisions  in 
the  CPD  added  confusion  and  facilitated  the  regionalisation  of  reform  in  the  policy- 
implementation  process. 
Secondly,  difficulties  in  negotiating  among  the  numerous  factions  in  the 
Congress  in  order  to  work  out  an  agreement  encouraged  Eltsin  to  introduce  changes  in 
the  structure  of  the  parliament.  '  First  of  all,  in  December  1993,  the  size  of  the  supreme 
decision-making  body  was  reduced  from  1,068  seats  in  the  Russian  CPD  to  628 
seats-450  in  the  State  Duma  and  178  in  the  Council  of  the  Federation-in  a 
bicameral  parliament.  The  changes  revealed  Eltsin's  intention  to  reduce  the  influence 
of  regional  forces  in  the  parliament.  The  new  electoral  system  abolished  national- 
territorial  districts,  and  allocated  half  the  seats  to  political  parties  or  movements.  In 
return,  administrative  units  were  allocated  seats  in  the  newly  established  Council  of  the 
Federation  on  the  basis  of  two  deputies  from  each  of  the  89  administrative  units,  with 
equal  representation  from  the  regions  and  republics. 
Despite  these  changes,  the  regions  still  have  considerable  importance  for  future 
changes  in  the  Russian  economic  and  political  system,  including  centre-periphery 
relations.  As  Stoner-Weiss  has  pointed  out,  institutional  settings-such  as  the  party 
system,  State  Duma,  Federal  Council,  and  Constitutional  Court-have  yet  to  be 
developed.  4  Governors  elected  by  the  grassroots  appear  to  be  more  attentive  to  local 
interests  and  the  influence  of  presidential  representatives  upon  regional  politics 
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However,  the  situation  appears  currently  to  have  reached  a  stalemate  in  which 
neither  the  centre  nor  the  regions  can  prevail,  as  pressures  from  the  regions  to  change 
federal  relations  also  do  not  seem  to  grow  stronger  either.  6  Although  further 
investigation  is  required,  there  is  little  sign  that  indicates  regional  disparities  have 
decreased,  partly  as  a  result  of  the  failure  of  macro-economic  stabilisation  measures. 
As  suggested  in  this  analysis,  such  disparities  between  regions  make  it  difficult  for 
them  to  form  a  coalition  against  the  centre? 
Therefore,  despite  incessant  demands  for  changes  in  the  federal  structure  not 
only  from  the  centre  but  also  from  the  regions,  only  de  facto  changes-somewhere 
between  the  `minimum'  and  `maximum'  concessions  made  by  the  centre-are  taking 
place  in  centre-periphery  relations  on  the  basis  of  bilateral  negotiations!  In  this 
situation,  a  shift  in  the  balance  of  power  between  Moscow  and  regions  may  ignite 
changes  in  the  framework  of  centre-periphery  relations.  Such  changes  will  be  mainly 
dependent  on  the  development  of  power  struggles  at  the  centre,  pressures  from  the 
regions,  the  attitudes  of  the  grassroots,  and  general  socio-economic  conditions  that 
may  affect  the  attitudes  of  political  actors  at  various  levels. 
Considering  these  factors,  we  may  suggest  four  scenarios  for  the  future 
development  of  centre-periphery  relations  in  Russia:  the  status  quo,  the  advent  of  a 
`strong  centre'  or  `strong  regions,  '  or  a  'fourth  way.  ' 
First,  we  may  consider  the  possibility  of  the  status  quo.  Despite  de  facto 
changes  in  federal  relations,  the  balance  of  power  between  Moscow  and  the  peripheries 
may  continue  without  fundamental  changes  in  their  relations.  However,  the  current 
situation  is  more  likely  to  be  a  result  of  divisions  on  both  sides,  and  thus  not  the  result 
of  an  agreement  but  of  discord,  without  institutionalised  support.  Therefore,  the  status 
quo  at  this  moment  does  not  appear  to  be  stable  enough  to  survive  in  the  long  term.  ' 
Should  a  shift  in  the  balance  of  power  take  place  either  at  the  centre  or  in  the 
peripheries,  it  may  change  the  framework  of  relations  between  the  two.  In  this 
context,  we  may  suggest  two  extreme  scenarios:  a  'strong  centre'  or  'strong  regions.  ' 
'Strong'  regions  may  emerge  when  successful  coordination  between  regions  is 
achieved,  and  the  centre  remains  weak.  In  its  extreme  case,  a  sort  of  confederation 
might  emerge  as  a  result  of  the  initiatives  of  the  regions.  However,  considering  that  a 
consensus  for  future  development  has  yet  to  be  established  at  the  regional  level,  such  a 
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leaderships  discussed  in  this  analysis  suggests  that  regional  disparities  will  hamper 
such  an  effort. 
However,  despite  the  discord  among  regions,  they  may  become  stronger  than  the 
centre  when  it  becomes  weaker.  For  instance,  a  further  intensification  of  power 
struggles  at  the  centre,  decreasing  support  of  the  grassroots  for  the  central  government 
and  its  policies,  and  weakening  control  of  the  centre  over  the  law-enforcing  institutions 
such  as  military  forces  will  weaken  the  centre.  10  If  the  centre  becomes  weaker,  at  least 
some  `strong'  or  `winner'  regions  may  initiate  changes  in  federal  relations  which  may 
lead  to  more  devolution  of  powers  to  them. 
This  sort  of  go-it-alone  approach  pursued  by  'strong'  regions  may  face  two  main 
obstacles.  Firstly,  such  a  development  is  primarily  caused  by  the  weakness  of  the 
centre  rather  than  the  strength  of  regions.  Therefore,  once  the  centre  regains  its 
strength,  its  further  march  could  be  halted.  "  Secondly,  a  go-it-alone  approach  on  the 
point  of  `strong'  regions  may  widen  the  gap  between  'winner'  and  'loser'  regions.  The 
wider  the  gap  among  the  regions,  the  more  difficult  for  the  regions  to  coordinate  their 
activities.  In  this  regard,  the  success  of  'winner'  regions  will  of  itself  constrain  further 
success. 
12 
Taking  such  factors  into  account,  another  scenario,  the  advent  of  a  "strong 
centre,  '  appears  more  likely.  De  facto  changes  in  federal  relations  and  regional 
politics  have  produced  negative  effects  not  only  in  centre-periphery  relations,  but  also 
in  the  broader  programme  of  reform,  bolstering  the  demands  for  a  'strong  centre.  ' 
First  of  all,  the  legacy  of  regional  autonomy  has  been  eroded.  In  the  course  of 
devolution  and  marketisation,  public  services  have  deteriorated  and  regional  barriers 
have  been  established,  increasing  the  importance  of  barter  systems,  as  mentioned  in 
Chapter  1.  In  combination  with  democratisation  and  increasing  public  participation, 
regional  autonomy  and  devolution  have  also  led  to  the  corruption  of  political  leaders  at 
the  regional  level,  13  'unconstitutional'  or  'illegal'  regional  decisions,  "  and  even 
territorial  disputes  between  regions.  " 
In  this  context,  Evgenii  Primakov's  speech  at  the  All-Russian  Conference  on 
Federal  Relations  on  26  January  1999  is  noteworthy.  In  his  address,  he  briefly 
mentioned  seven  principles  of  federal  relations  including  equality  between  federal 
subjects,  "vertical"  executive  power,  improvement  of  treaty-based  centre-periphery 
relations  by  toughening  their  legitimacy,  and  the  merger  of  federal  subjects.  16 (Chapter  YIII)  360 
In  fact,  Primakov's  speech  seems  to  be  a  revival  of  Eltsin's  zemli  proposal, 
considering  its  emphasis  on  equal  rights  between  federal  subjects  and  the  merger  of 
federal  subjects.  In  particular,  some  of  these  centrist  initiatives  were  already  in 
practice,  though  they  may  need  more  solid  support.  First  of  all,  the  privileges  of 
regions  benefited  from  bilateral  negotiations  with  the  centre  are  being  eroded  in  the 
process  of  institutionalisation  of  bilateral  agreements.  "  Secondly,  regarding  the 
question  of  establishing  a  stronger  executive  "verticals,  "  decrees  were  issued  to 
strengthen  the  power  of  presidential  representatives.  Primakov  went  even  further, 
proposing  that  gubernatorial  elections  should  be  abolished.  "  Putin,  acting  president 
then,  also  emphasised  the  need  to  strengthen  "vertical  management,  "  although  he 
rejected  the  proposal  that  governors  should  be  appointed  by  Moscow  in  February 
2000.19  Thirdly,  the  question  of  reducing  the  number  of  federal  subjects  has  been 
raised  incessantly  not  only  by  the  centre  but  also  by  regions.  26  As  in  the  zemli  case, 
strong  resistance  may  come  from  the  republics.  "  However,  the  republics' 
decentralisation  or  defederation  efforts  appear  weaker  than  in  the  early  1990s  with 
some  exceptions  such  as  republics  of  Chechnia  and  Tatarstan,  22  and  further  changes 
have  been  introduced  since  the  creation  of  the  federal  okrugs  in  May  2000. 
Of  course,  neither  a  'strong'  centre  nor  `anti-centre'  tendencies  in  the  regions 
will  necessarily  mean  'anti-reform'  tendencies  . 
23  In  fact,  Western  experience  has 
shown  that  the  path  to  a  welfare  state  has  demanded  a  strong  government,  at  least  in 
the  past.  However,  at  the  same  time,  it  does  not  always  deny  the  possibility  that  a 
'strong'  centre  in  the  context  of  centre-periphery  relations  may  have  a  passive  attitude 
towards  reforms.  Even  if  a  'strong'  centre  may  be  regarded  as  "one  step  back  for  two 
steps  forward,  "  once  it  is  enshrined  in  the  Constitution  it  would  not  be  easy  to  revise  it 
for  "two  steps  forward,  "  considering  the  post-Soviet  Russian  experience. 
If  either  the  centre  or  the  regions  fails  to  prevail,  a  compromise  on  changes  may 
be  conceivable  as  a  fourth  way.  In  a  compromise  between  centre  and  peripheries,  the 
following  points  bear  significance  in  the  future  development  of  federal  relations:  a 
clear  demarcation  of  power  in  more  'genuine'  federal  relations,  and  a  balance  of  power 
between  Moscow  and  provinces  creating  'checks  and  balances'  until  federal  relations 
are  stabilised  and  institutionalised. 
As  many  have  argued,  legal  and  constitutional  regulation  must  be  one  of  the 
most  important  factors  in  the  stabilisation  of  federal  relations.  In  this  connection,  the 
centre  has  often  been  blamed  for  its  negligence.  However,  as  already  discussed,  a  lack 
of  consensus  at  the  regional  level  and  rather  chaotic  regional  interest  articulation  in (Chapter  Y11Q  361 
central  decision-making  bodies  must  have  hampered  stabilisation  efforts.  In  this 
context,  regions  should  share  the  blame  for  the  current  situation. 
In  connection  with  this  criticism,  Putin's  regional  reform  is  another  challenge 
for  the  regions  as  well  as  for  the  centre.  Despite  the  establishment  of  new 
administrative  units  or  federal  okrugs,  almost  nothing  has  been  decided  regarding  their 
status  or  competence.  The  functions  of  the  governors  of  new  units  are  still  in 
confusion.  Although  many,  including  Putin  himself,  denied  the  need  for  a 
constitutional  revision  at  least  in  the  short  term,  it  depends  on  what  kind  of  the 
function  the  units  may  acquire  and  when  the  question  will  be  settled. 
The  federalisation  processes  in  India,  Spain,  and  Belgium  that  we  discussed  in 
Chapter  2.3  suggest  a  couple  of  valuable  main  factors  for  the  evolution  of  federal 
relations  either  in  a  centralised  federation  or  in  a  unitary  system. 
First,  coordination  among  regional  political  actors  is  very  important.  A  low 
level  of  coordination  among  regional  political  actors  not  only  makes  the  negotiation 
process  more  complicated,  but  also  weakens  regional  pressure  on  the  centre.  If  the 
newly  established  federal  okrugs  are  to  develop  into  federal  subjects,  members  of  each 
okrug  should  reach  an  agreement  before  they  put  forward  their  demands  towards  the 
centre.  The  federal  okrugs  have  been  established  on  the  basis  of  the  existing  military 
districts  (or  planning  regions),  but  the  socio-economic  conditions  and  federal  status  of 
member  regions  are  different.  Accordingly,  the  coordination  between  member  regions 
in  an  okrug  is  likely  to  be  a  challenging  task,  but  at  the  same  time,  it  could  be  a 
valuable  learning  process  in  the  construction  of  more  genuine  federal  relations. 
Second,  interim  measures  may  also  facilitate  the  process  of  building  consensus 
or  agreements  among  political  actors.  In  order  to  reach  an  agreement,  a  compromise 
between  the  need  to  meet  the  demands  for  'separate  treatment'  and  the  need  to  avoid 
asymmetric  federal  status  should  be  made.  In  Belgium,  the  asymmetry  in  federal 
relations  that  resulted  from  bilateral  negotiations  has  been  compensated  by  a  series  of 
multiparty  pacts. 
Finally,  legal  or  constitutional  guarantees  for  already-achieved  agreements  may 
protect  the  transition  process  from  retreating.  A  number  of  bilateral  and  multiparty 
pacts  had  been  signed  between  Moscow  and  various  regions  in  the  1990s.  However, 
those  agreements  appeared  to  be  solely  depending  on  the  goodwill  of  Moscow.  A 
series  of  legal  or  constitutional  revisions  that  reflect  agreements  between  centre  and (Chapter  YIIQ  362 
"  regions  will  bind  both  sides.  It  could  be  difficult  to  reach  an  agreement,  but  it  is  more 
difficult  to  keep  the  agreement.  In  this  respect,  Russian  regions  appeared  to  have 
failed  to  reach  an  agreement  and  retain  what  they  had  gained. 
We  may  wait  long  to  see  the  advent  of  a  'genuine'  and  more  stable  federal 
system  in  Russia.  However,  it  may  not  take  long  to  establish  at  least  a  minimum  level 
of  legal  guarantees-for  instance,  common  concessions  in  existing  bilateral 
negotiations  between  centre  and  regions-as  a  stepping  stone  to  more  'genuine' 
federal  relations  on  the  basis  of  the  current  balance  of  power,  of  compromises  between 
centre  and  regions  and  between  the  regions.  A  balance  between  centre  and  regions 
may  prevent  abrupt  changes  in  their  relations,  and  compromises  will  contain  possible 
crises  in  governing  the  state.  Although  a  minimum  level  of  legal  guarantees  may  not 
be  satisfactory  to  both  the  centre  and  the  regions,  it  would  be  a  good  starting  point  for 
the  future  evolution  of  federal  relations. 
I)  Haspel  has  also  observed  that  most  of  the  electoral  organisations  were  "temporary  alliances" 
that  served  deputies'  policy  needs.  Moshe  Haspel,  "Should  Party  in  the  Parliament  Be  Weak  or  Strong?: 
The  Rules  Debate  in  the  Russian  State  Duma,  "  in  John  Löwenhardt  (ed.  ),  Parry  Politics  in  Post- 
Communist  Russia  (London:  Frank  Cass,  1998),  p.  197.  Considering  this  observation  and  regional 
supporting  patterns  of  political  parties  in  the  elections,  deputies'  policy  needs  may  include  the  interests  of 
regions. 
_)  For  instance,  Stoner-Weiss  has  argued  that  'old'  communist  bosses  moved  to  enrich  themselves 
and  to  protect  their  own  status  amplified  regional  demands.  Kathryn  Stoner-Weiss,  "Federalism  and 
Regionalism,  "  in  Stephen  White,  Alex  Pravda,  and  Zvi  Gitelman  (eds.  ),  Developments  in  Russian  Politics 
4  (London:  Macmillan,  1997),  p.  233. 
3)  Eltsin's  frustration  in  his  dealing  with  the  CPD  during  1990-1993  was  clearly  revealed  in  his 
autobiography.  See  Boris  Eltsin,  The  View  from  the  Kremlin  (London:  Harper  Collins,  1994),  Chapter  7. 
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Devolution  Process  in  Russia,  "  Post-Soviet  Affairs,  vol.  15,  no,  1(January-March  1999),  pp.  97.103. 
3)  Marc  Zlotnik,  "Russia's  Governors:  All  the  President's  Men?  "  Problems  of  Post-Communism, 
vol.  43,  no.  6  (November-December  1996),  p.  30.  Eltsin  issued  a  decree  on  9  July  1997  to  expand  the 
responsibilities  of  the  presidential  representatives  in  the  regions  in  order  to  "relieve  a  part  of  the  burden" 
of  governors.  Ukaz  Prezidenta  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  polnomochnom  predstavitele  Prezidenta 
Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  v  regions  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  (9  July  1997),  "  Sobranle  zakonodatel'stm  Rossliskol 
Federatsil,  no.  28  (14  July  1997),  pp.  5549-5556.  However,  the  Council  of  the  Federation  opposed  the 
decree. 
6)S.  Pavlenko,  "Regiony  i  regional'naia  politika,  "  Yoprosy  ekonomiki,  no.  9  (September  1994),  p. 
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I)  For  a  brief  discussion  of  de  facto  changes  in  centre-periphery  relations,  see  Stoner-Weiss. 
"Central  Weakness  and  Provincial  Autonomy,  "  pp.  94-96. 
9)  Solnick  has  also  argued  de  facto  changes  in  federal  relations  mainly  based  on  bilateral 
negotiations  between  the  centre  and  regions,  but  "the  post-Eltsin  succession  will  test  the  robustness  of 
these  treaties.  "  Stephen  L.  Solnick,  "The  Political  Economy  of  Russian  Federalism:  A  Framework  for 
Analysis,  "  Problems  of  Post-Communism,  vol.  43,  no.  6  (November-December  1996),  p.  23. 
10)  In  July  1997,  Eltsin  and  Chernomyrdin,  former  Prime  Minister,  signed  decrees  on  restructuring 
military  branches.  One  of  the  decrees  instructed  the  General  Staff  to  reduce  the  number  of  military 
personnel  by  1.5  million  by  the  end  of  1999.  Ukaz  Prezidenta  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "0  pervoocherednykh 
merakh  po  reformirovaniiu  Vooruzhennykh  Sil  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  i  sovcrshenstvovaniiu  ikh  struktury,  " 
Sobranie  zakonodatel'stva  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  no.  29  (21  July  1997),  pp.  5724-5725  (Article  1).  In 
August  1997,  Andrei  Kokoshin.  former  Deputy  Defence  Minister,  unveiled  a  new  national  security 
concept,  emphasising  the  need  to  deal  with  potential  localised  conflicts  and  sliming  military  units.  For  the 
new  security  concept,  see  Ukaz  Prezidenta  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii  "Ob  utverzhdenii  kontseptsil  natsional'nol 
bezopasnosti  Rossiiskoi  Federatsii,  "  Sobranle  zokonodatel'stva  Rossllskol  Federatsil,  no.  52  (29 
December  1997),  pp.  10418-10439.  However,  a  series  of  current  incidents  suggests  that  relations  between 
the  central  government  and  military  forces  appear  to  be  ameliorating:  an  increase  in  the  defence  budget  for 
the  year  2000  despite  financial  difficulties  and  the  warnings  of  the  IMF,  deployment  of  new  nuclear 
warheads  (Topol-M)  in  December  1998  and  10  more  in  December  1999,  and  hard-line  policies  on  ethnic 
disputes  in  the  republics  of  Dagestan  and  Chechnia.  For  the  defence  budget  and  deployment  of  new 
nuclear  warheads,  see  ITAR-TASS,  1  October  1999,  in  RFE/RL  Newsline,  vol.  3,  no.  193,  part  I  (4 
October  1999).  A  draft  military  doctrine,  unveiled  on  5  October  1999,  maintained  the  possibility  of 
winning  a  nuclear  war,  suggesting  a  shift  in  the  strategic  concept.  Krasnala  zvezda,  9  October  1999,  pp. 
3-4. 
11  )A  go-it-alone  approach  has  been  and  will  lead  the  regions  to  an  "anarchic  scramble  for 
benefits,  "  and  as  Solnick  has  observed,  Moscow  "must  be  seeking  means  to  regularise  centre-periphery 
relations.  "  Steven  Solnick,  "Will  Russia  Survive?:  Centre  and  Periphery  in  the  Russian  Federation,  "  in 
Barnett  R.  Rubin  and  Jack  Snyder  (eds.  ),  Post-Soviet  Political  Order;  Conflict  and  State  Building 
(London:  Routledge,  1998),  p.  76. 
1_)  For  instance,  the  authorities  of  Krasnoiarsk  krai  and  Irkutsk  oblast  have  made  it  clear  that  they 
are  against  any  form  of  special  treatment  for  resource-rich  regions  and  republics. 
")  Aslund  has  observed  that  the  enterprise  subsidies  are  "tantamount  to  corruption.  "  Anders 
Aslund,  "Russia's  Current  Economic  Dilemma:  A  Comment,  "  Post-Soviet  Affairs,  vol.  1S.  no,  1(January- 
March  1999),  p.  84.  He  has  also  argued  that  the  regions  collected  too  large  a  proportion  of  the  revenues (Chapter  Ylln  364 
(about  15  per  cent  of  GDP)  compared  to  the  share  of  the  centre  (about  10  per  cent),  which  caused  a 
deterioration  of  fiscal  problems  of  the  centre.  Ibid. 
1'  )  At  the  All-Russian  Conference  on  Federal  Relations  on  26  January  1999,  Iurii  Skuratov, 
Prosecutor-General,  mentioned  that  70  per  cent  of  regional  legislation  was  not  in  accordance  with  federal 
laws.  Interfax  in  RFE/RL  Newsline,  vol.  3,  no.  18,  part  I  (27  January  1999). 
13)  Nezavisimaia  gazeta,  29  January  1999,  p.  3.  According  to  Primakov,  more  than  30  regions  are 
involved  in  territorial  claims.  The  newspaper  warned  that  border  conflicts  between  regions,  particularly 
between  oblasts  and  autonomous  okrugs,  could  develop  into  a  more  open  form  by  the  year  2000  if  the 
centre  continues  to  lose  its  influence. 
16  )  According  to  him,  the  core  aspect  of  federal  relations  is  not  decentralisation  but  integration. 
He  also  emphasised  the  optimal  division  of  public  properties  at  the  various  levels,  and  the  establishment  of 
"uniform  rules"  for  fiscal  federal  relations.  Rossilskala  gazeta,  27  January  1999,  p.  3. 
11)  Solnick,  "The  Political  Economy  of  Russian  Federalism,  "  p.  23.  For  instance,  President  Eltsin 
signed  a  decree  which  withdrew  from  Sakha  the  tax  privileges  it  had  been  granted  during  the  period 
between  1992  and  1993.  In  particular,  the  decree  denied  monopoly  of  diamond  sales  that  Almazy  Rossii- 
Sakha,  a  joint  venture  established  by  the  central  and  Sakha  government,  had  sought  for,  and  placed  all 
diamond  industry  under  the  control  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  The  decree  also  demanded  that  Sakha  pay 
for  its  diamond  share  at  world  market  prices,  banning  the  transfer  of  diamonds  at  a  discount.  The  St 
Petersburg  Times,  25-32  August  1997  (internet  service  version).  Colton  and  his  colleagues  also  doubt  that' 
the  privileges  of  republics  will  last  in  the  long  run.  Timothy  Colton,  Robert  Legvold,  George  Breslauer, 
Jack  Matlock,  Herber  Levine  and  Victor  Winston,  "  Five  Years  After  the  Collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union,  " 
Post-Soviet  Affairs,  vol.  13,  no.  1  (January-March  1997),  p.  13. 
IS  )  For  a  brief  discussion  of  a  series  of  efforts  of  the  centre  to  control  governors,  see  Tolz  and 
Busygina,  "Regional  Governors  and  the  Kremlin,  "  pp.  421-424.  An  opinion  poll  in  1997  showed  that  64 
per  cent  of  elites  had  sceptical  view  on  mass  participation,  while  only  29  per  cent-including  S  per  cent  of 
strong  supporters-replied  that  participation  of  the  general  public  would  be  necessary.  Arthur  H.  Miller, 
Vicki  L.  Hesli,  and  William  M.  Reisinger,  "Conceptions  of  Democracy  Among  Mass  and  Elites  in  Post. 
Soviet  Societies,  "  British  Journal  of  Political  Science,  vol.  27,  part  2  (April  1997),  p.  177.  Slider  has  also 
pointed  out  that  executive  branches  will  easily  manipulate  and  control  the  regional  government  structure 
including  regional  assemblies  with  minimal  democratic  supervision.  He  also  warned  that  such  a 
development  would  make  "genuine"  political  and  economic  reforms  less  likely.  Darrell  Slider,  "Elections 
to  Russia's  Regional  Assemblies,  "  Post-Soviet  4  airs,  vol.  12,  no.  3  (July-September  1996),  pp.  243-264. 
19)  Rejecting  the  proposal  that  regional  governors  should  be  appointed  by  Moscow,  he  remarked 
on  18  February  2000  that  it  was  not  "the  only  way  to  strengthen  vertical  management.  "  RFE/RL  Newsilne, 
vol.  4,  no.  8  (23  February  2000). 
20  )  For  instance,  Eltsin's  concept  of  zemll,  Mukha's  idea  of  establishing  a  single  budget  among  the 
member  regions  of  the  Siberian  Agreement,  and  SIBFE  regions'  initiatives  for  establishing  a  Siberian  or  a 
Far  Eastern  republic  would  reduce  the  numbers  of  federal  subjects.  At  the  All-Russian  Conference  on 
Federal  Relations  in  January  1999,  Viktor  Kress,  Governor  of  Tomsk  oblast,  also  proposed  to  reorganise 
the  territorial-administrative  system  of  Russia. (Givpter  VIII)  363 
_1)  For  instance,  Farit  Mukhametshin,  the  Chairman  of  the  State  Council  of  Tatarstan,  rejected 
Primakov's  proposal  to  reduce  the  numbers  of  federal  subjects.  "Tatarstan  Rejects  Consolidation  within 
Russian  Federation,  "  RFE/RL  Newsline,  vol.  3,  no.  18,  part  1(3  March  1999). 
u)  Smith  has  argued  that  the  republics'  ability  to  follow  their  own  paths  to  development  is 
constrained  by  "fiscal  budgetary  policies,  the  lack  of  a  shared  conception  of  national  self-determination, 
the  economic  cost  of  defederation,  inter-dependent  economic  structure,  and  the  centuries-long  identities  of 
being  part  of  Russia.  "  Considering  these  difficulties,  he  has  showed  his  doubt  that  even  resource-rich 
republics  such  as  the  republics  of  Sakha,  Tatarstan,  and  l3ashkortostan  are  likely  to  become  'Kuwaits  of 
Northern  Eurasia.  '  Graham  Smith,  "Federation,  Defederation  and  Refederation:  From  the  Soviet  Union  to 
Russian  Statehood,  "  in  Graham  Smith  (ed.  ),  Federalism:  the  Multiethnic  Challenge  (London:  Longman, 
1995),  pp.  173-175. 
v)  Josephine  Andrews  and  Kathryn  Stoner-Weiss,  "Regionalism  and  Reform  in  Provincial 
Russia,  "  Post-Soviet  Affairs,  vol.  11,  no.  4  (October-December  1995),  pp.  385,404. (Appendix)  366 
Appendix  1.1  Economic  Performance  and  Living  Conditions  in  Russia  (1990-1993) 
Economic  Living  Socio-  Cluster  Cluster  Cluster 
Per-  Standards  economic  11)  22)  33) 
formance  Stress 
North 
Rep  Kareliia  23  45  42  332 
Rep  Komi  42  39  60  532 
Arkhangelsk  24  28  9343 
Vologoda  38  37  0334 
Murmansk  39  65  22  213 
Northwest 
St  Petersburg  32  69  26  213 
Leningrad  31  31  14  342 
Novgorod  17  31  5343 
Pskov  14  33  23  344 
Central 
Briansk  22  26  21  344 
Vladimir  29  30  16  344 
Ivanovo  30  28  22  344 
Kaluga  15  29  19  343 
Kostroma  18  29  17  344 
Moscow  city  84  100  21  113 
Moscow  ob  60  40  21  223 
Orel  24  36  17  344 
Riazan  27  26  14  344 
Smolensk  23  34  7344 
Tver  24  28  18  343 
Tula  41  41  10  334 
Iaroslavl  34  35  13  334 
Volga-Viatka 
Rep  Mari-El  15  23  88  454 
Rep  Mordovia  17  20  70  454 
Chuvash  Rep  19  21  61  454 
Kirov  22  25  23  344 
Nizhgorod  59  31  5324 
Central  Chernozem 
Belgorod  36  37  0334 
Voronezh  22  31  20  343 
Kursk  24  27  6344 
Lipetsk  33  35  5334 
Tambov  18  21  3354 
Volga 
Rep  Kalmykiia  8  17  80  454 
Rep  Tatarstan  63  32  72  524 
Astrakhan  14  15  30  354 
Volgogra  33  31  27  344 
Penza  16  20  30  354 
Samara  64  41  24  223 
Saratov  31  28  27  344 
Ulianovsk  30  47  20  334 
North  Caucasus 
Rep  Adygeiia  9  12  57  451 
Rep  Dagestan  20  47  451 
Kabardio-Bakar  Rep  5  10  83  454 (AppendL%)  367 
(cont.  ) 
Economic  Living  Socio-  Cluster  Cluster  Cluster 
Per-  Standards  eocnomie  11)  22)  3') 
formance  Stress 
Karachaevo-Cherk  Rep  7  13  100  451 
Rep  North  Ossetiia  5  22  86  454 
Krasnodar  36  14  21  341 
Stavropol  25  17  43  341 
Rostov  36  24  27  343 
Urals 
Rep  Bashkortostan  65  28  87  524 
Udmurt  Rep  41  25  65  544 
Kurgan  17  13  25  351 
Orenburg  37  20  37  344 
Perm  68  24  24  224 
Sverdlovsk  68  38  26  223 
Cheliabinsk  53  31  35  324 
West  Siberia 
Rep  Altai  30  60  451 
Altai  Kr  19  13  32  351 
Kemerovo  62  33  27  224 
Novosibirsk  25  23  18  343 
Omsk  30  28.33  344 
Tomsk  33  30  6344 
Tiumen  100  58  36  212 
East  Siberia 
Rep  Buriatiia  14  18  47  354 
Rep  Tyva  03  54  451 
Rep  Khakasiia  25  31  13  344 
Krasnoiarsk  64  37  20  222 
Irkutsk  53  45  14  222 
Chita  14  10  29  354 
Far  East 
Rep  Sakha  69  30  60  522 
Primorskii  31  23  22  343 
Khabarovsk  32  28  34  343 
Amur  19  21  31  354 
Kamchatka  42  36  40  332 
Magadan  51  50  32  222 
Sakhalin  30  26  32  344 
Kaliningrad 
Kaliningrad  15  29  46  343 
`  Cluster  using  three  indicators:  highly  adapted  (1),  adapted  (2),  stagnated  (3)  regions,  stagnated  republics 
(4),  adapted  republics  (5) 
1)  Cluster  excluding  socio-economic  stress  indicator:  highly  developed  (1).  well-developed  (2),  moderately 
developed  (3),  under-developed  (4),  poorly  developed  (5) 
3)  Cluster  based  on  economic  structure  of  regions:  rural  (1),  resource  (2),  hub/gate  (3),  residual  (4); 
Source:  Philip  Hanson,  "Russia's  Region,  or  the  Mysteries  of  the  89  Organisations,  "  unpublished  paper 
presented  at  the  BASEES  annual  conference,  Cambridge,  30  March-1  April  1996  (overlapping  regions  re- 
categorised). (Appendix)  368 
Appendix  1.2.  Scale  of  Indicators  of  Socio-economic  Situations  in  Russia  (1989-1993) 
In  the  selection  of  data,  two  main  points  are  considered:  regional  differentiation 
in  terms  of  socio-economic  situation  and  its  impact  on  regionalism.  In  the  context, 
variables  are  collected  based  on  Dmitrieva's  indicators.  However,  because  of 
technical  difficulties  in  merging  variables,  irrelevance  to  the  voting  patterns,  and 
multicollinearity,  some  data  sets  which  reflected  living  conditions  such  as 
unemployment  and  environmental  data  are  dropped.  Final  cluster  results  have  been 
cross-examined  with  existing  works.  In  order  to  avoid  potential  inaccuracy  and 
peculiar  phenomena  of  a  particular  year  that  may  distort  general  picture,  mean  value  of 
a  variable  during  1989-1994  was  used,  though  it  depended  on  availability. 
In  order  to  work  out  indicators,  each  variable  was  converted  into  a  standard 
score  (z  score  =  (old  value-mean  value)/standard  deviation).  In  each  merging  step, 
reliability  coefficient  was  tested,  and  variables  were  merged  when  Alpha  score  was 
higher  than  0.7  point.  However,  variables  employed  to  create  socio-economic  stress 
indicator  were  merged  after  converted  into  the  same  type  of  value,  %  to  the  RF 
average. 
Economic  Performance  .  [(%  of  total  industrial  production  (1991.93)+%  of  per 
capita  industrial  production  (1991.93))/6  +  (%  of  total  foreign  trade  (1992-93)  + 
%  of  per  capita  foreign  trade  (1992-93))/2  +  (%  of  total  capital  investment  (1990. 
93)  +%  of  per  capita  capital  investment  (1990-93))/2  +  (%  of  total  basic  fund 
share  (1991.93)  +%  of  per  capita  Basic  fund  share  (1991.1993)16)/4  (Alpha 
scores:  industrial  production  (a=0.90),  foreign  trade  (a=0.92),  capital  investment 
(a=0.90),  basic  fund  share  (a=0.82),  and  Economic  Performance  Total  (a=0.78)] 
Living  Standards  -  [real  income  (1993,  %  to  the  RF  average)  +  'real' 
expenditure  (1993,  %  to  the  RF  average)  +%  of  housing  space  (1990-93,  %  to  the 
RF  average  +%  homes  with  telephone  in  urban  area  (1990.93,  %  to  the  RF 
average)  +  per  capita  electricity  consumption  (1994,  %  to  the  RF  average)  +%  of 
population  of  higher  education  (1989,  %  to  the  RF  average)]/7  [Alpha  scores- 
hosing  space  (a=0.99),  telephone  (a=0.9964)  Living  Standards  total  (a=0.72)] 
Socio-economic  Stress  -  [°to  decline  of  physical  industrial  production  (1993, 
1989=100,  %  to  the  RF  average)  +%  of  non-Russian  population  (1989,  %  to  the 
RF  average)] 
Since  it  is  difficult  to  interpret  the  final  results  in  standard  values  (Z  score),  they 
were  converted  into  more  operable  values  on  a  0-100  scale,  so  that  100  points  were 
given  to  the  highest  scale  and  0  to  the  lowest.  The  score  was  calculated  as  follows: 
new  value  =  (old  value-lowest  score)/range. (4ppsnJtx)  J69 
Appendix  1.3.  Regional  Differentiation:  Anova  Analysis  Descriptives 
Regional 
95%  Confidence 
Std.  Std.  Interval  for  Mean  MIn  Max  sum  of  Mean 
Group  N  Mean  Deviedon  Error  Lower  Upper  square  df  Square  P 
Bound  Bound 
A.  Cluster  1(3  Indicators  used) 
Economic  Performance 
highly  adapted  region  1  84.0.54  84  Between  Groups  21614.2  4  5403.8  43.5  0.000 
adapted  regions  11  80.1  17.7  5.3  48.2  72.0  32  100  Within  Groups  8817.9  71  124.2 
stagnated  regions  48  27.2  9.9  1.4  24.3  30.1  14  50  Total  30432.1  75 
stagnated  repbulics  11  8.2  6.3  1.9  4.0  12.4  0  19 
adapted  republics  5  58.0  13.4  6.0  39.3  72.7  41  89 
total  78  31.8  20.1  2.3  272  36.4  0  100 
Lbdna  Standards 
highly  adapted  region  1  100.0.100  100  Between  Groups  10900.1  4  2747.5  33.7  0.000 
adapted  regions  11  45.5  13.8  4.2  36.2  54.7  24  69  Within  Groups  5787.1  71  81.5 
stagnated  regions  48  27.7  8.0  1.2  25.4  30.0  10  47  Total  18777.2  76 
stagnated  repbulica  11  12.8  8.7  2.6  7.0  18.7  0  23 
adapted  republics  5  30.6  6,3  2.4  24.3  37,3  25  39 
total  78  29.3  15  0  1.7  25.9  32.7  0  100 
Soclaeconnimc  Stress 
highly  adapted  region  1  21.0  . 
21  21  Behwen  Groups  29839.2  4  7458,8  48.4  0.000 
adapted  regions  11  24.7  6.9  1.8  20.8  28.7  14  38  Within  Groups  10951.6  71  154.2 
stagnated  regions  48  21.5  12.4  1.8  17.9  25.1  0  47  Total  40790.8  7S 
stagnated  repbulics  11  71.5  16.9  5.1  80.1  82.8  47  100 
adapted  republics  5  68.8  11.3  5.1  54.8  82  8  60  67 
total  76  32.3  23.3  2.7  27.0  37,7  0  100 
S.  Cluster  2  (Soclo-economic  Stress  Indicator  Ignored) 
Economic  Performance 
hiply  developed  4 
wall  developed  13 
moderately  developed  9 
under-developed  31 
poorly  developed  19 
total  76 
I  Mho  Standania 
hlply  developed  4 
well  developed  13 
moderately  developed  9 
under-developed  31 
poorly  developed  19 
total  76 
63.8  33.4  16.7  10.6  118.2  32  100  Bsewaan  Groups  24192.4  4  6048.1  68.8  0,000 
81.5  6.0  1.7  57.9  66.1  51  69  Within  Groups  6239.7  Ti  87.9 
35.4  6.3  2.1  30.6  40.3  23  42  Total  30432.1  78 
26.8  6.8  1.2  24.1  29.2  14  41 
11.8  8.4  1.5  8.3  147  0  19 
31.8  20.1  2.3  27.2  36.4  0  100 
73.0  18.8  9.3  43.8  102.5  58  100  BeNwen  Oroupt  13365.8  4  3341.4  89.6  0.000 
35.4  7.3  2.0  31.0  39.8  24  50  WUMn  Oroupe  3411.4  71  48 
39.1  4.4  1.6  35.8  42.5  35  47  Totrl  187772.2  75 
27.4  4.8  0.8  25.7  29,1  14  36 
143  7.2  1.7  108  17.8  0  23 
29.3  15.0  1.7  25.9  32.7  0  100 
Socto"econotmc  Stress 
hlgy  developed  4  26.3  6.8  3.4  16.4  37.1  21  35  Between  Groups  12610.4  4  3152.7  7.0  0.000 
well  developed  13  34.4  23.9  6.6  19.9  48.8  5  87  Within  Groups  28170.0  71  306.0 
moderately  developed  9  21.1  21.4  7.1  4.7  37.5  0  60  Total  40790.8  76 
under-developed  31  22.6  13.0  2.3  17.0  27,4  5  65 
poorly  developed  19  63.3  26.3  8.0  40.6  880  3  100 
total  76  32.3  23.3  2.7  27.0  37.7  0  10o 
C.  Cluster  3  (Econoima  Structure) 
Economic  Panbrmanca 
rural  regions  9  13.1  12.  t  4.0  3.8  22.4  0  38  8.  hwee  Croups  7718.2  3  2672.7  8.2  0.000 
resource  regions  9  52.8  23.0  7.7  35.1  70.4  23  100  Within  Croups  22713,9  72  315,8 
hub/gate  regions  16  36.8  21.0  5.2  25.6  47.9  18  64  Total  30432.1  75 
residual  regions  42  29  5  16.2  2.5  24.5  34  65  68 
total  76  31.6  20.1  2.3  27.2  3  9,4  0  100 
LMna  Standards 
rural  region.  9  9.4  0.5  2.2  4.4  14.5  0  17  Between  Groups  6076.6  3  2192.6  16.5  0.000 
resource  regions  9  41.2  9.1  3.0  34.2  46.2  30  58  Within  Groups  10196,7  72  141.6 
hubtgets  regions  15  39.2  21.2  5.3  27.9  50,0  23  100  Total  16777.2  75 
residual  regions  42  27.2  7.7  1.2  24.5  29,6  10  47 
total  76  29.3  10.0  1.7  25.9  32.7  0  100 
SOCIO-ammime  Stream 
rural  regions  9  48.5  23.7  7.9  30.5  67,0  21  100  B+IWwen  Groups  410T,  6  3  1369.2  2.7  0.050 
resource  regions  9  35.3  11.5  6.8  21.9  48.0  14  60  Within  Groups  36683.2  72  609.5 
hub/gete  regions  16  22.4  9.3  2.3  17,4  27.3  5  46  ToW  40790.6  75 
residual  regions  42  32.0  26.3  4.1  23.7  40  2  66 
total  76  32.3  23.3  2.7  27.0  31.7  0  100 W 
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Appendix  2.2.  Frequency  of  Speeches  (Category  A)  in  the  First  CPD  of  the  USSR 
05%  oonMence 
N  Man  Std.  Sid.  Inlervel  for  man  Min.  Max. 
Dev.  Err.  Lower  Upper 
Bound  Bound 
A  Level  of  Speeches  (CPD  total) 
ß  dr 
male  1604  0.3  0.0  0.0 
famale  361  0.1  0.4  0.0 
TOW  2245  0.3  0.6  0.0 
aummum 
wnlor  ar  667  0.1  0.4  0.0 
. Inla  1388  0.3  0.6  0.0 
TOW  2246  0.3  0.6  0.0 
Sum  of  dt  Man  P  818, 
Sq.  Sg. 
0.2  0.3  0  14  s1  w«n  Oram  1.0  1  1.1  13.1  0100 
0.1  0.2  02  W3  f1M  Oragp  1215.1  2243  0.0 
0.2  0.3  0  14  1oW  195.3.1  2244 
0.1  0.2  a2  IMwwn  GIOUM  21.0  1  21.0  446  0.000 
0.3  0.4  0  11  VYMMn  dmps  1201.1  2243  0.1 
0.2  0.3  0  14  Wei  11e1.1  2244 
Edueidenf6vd 
dootony  /96  0.7  1.3  0.1  0.6  0.0 
cwidWM  167  0.6  0.6  0.1  0.3  0.6 
high  1276  0.2  0.7  0.0  0.2  0.3 
middb  622  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Total  2190  0.3  0.6  0.0  0.2  0.3 
mm 
nomwkb4jm  306  0.6  1.4  0.1 
eadra  169  0.2  0.6  0.0 
m99uy  91  0.2  0.4  0.0 
mw9w  396  0.2  0.6  0.0 
htM191mtNe  394  0.4  0.9  0.0 
14ohnM9m  361  0.2  0.5  0.0 
wokon  502  0.1  0.2  0.0 
Td.  l  2211  0.3  0.8  0.0 
11  BM~  um  Mo  2  27.7  42.2  0.000 
1  wownOiw"  12071  21M  0,4 
14  btM  1277.1  210Y 
2 
14 
0.5  0.5  0  14B  -n  0iam  56.1  1  112  ý5  0,000 
0.1  0.2  02  WkNnOiam  1155.1  2201  0.0 
0.1  0.3  0  2lohl  I2no  2210 
0.1  0.2  04 
0.3  0.5  05 
0.1  0.2  04 
0.0  0.1  02 
0.2  0.3  0  14 
iir4a0  runt 
iuip  city  92e  0.4  1.0  0.0  0.4  0.  e  0  14  941wo4n  Ora+p4  60.1  6  10.?  *2  0.000 
modtun-Wed  city  492  0.2  0.6  0.0  0.2  0.2  04  WIOgn  pinups  1200.9  2200  0.6 
ma  qty  364  0.1  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.2  04  lout  1260.0  2209 
runt  464  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  02 
Tauf  2210  0.3  0.6  0.0  0.2  0.2  0  14 
CPSU  Mambanhln 
mambN  1993  0.3  0.4  0.0  0.2  0.3  0  14  9anwan  cm« 
rwn.  m«nbw  161  0.2  0.6  0.0  0.1  0.3  04  WAMn  oroupta 
Taal  2244  03  08  00  02  0.3  0  14  he 
1<thnlelRuaalan  va  Nnn"Ruaa/in1 
Funon  1020  0.3  0.6  0.0 
other  1226  0.2  0.7  0.0 
Toth  2246  0.3  0.6  0.0 
A  Level  Speeches  among  the  SIBFE  deputies 
Bsndae 
male  186  0.3  0.7  0.1 
female  32  0.6  0.5  0.1 
Total  217  0.3  0.7  0.0 
am,  oNan 
oar  103  0.2  0.4  0.0 
Hnlor  114  0.4  0.0  0.1 
Totd  217  0.3  0.7  0.0 
0.2  0.7  0  14  OMw~  Ora" 
0,2  0.2  01  WNW  Groups 
0.2  0.2  0  14  wd 
0.2  Q{  0a  O«wn  tüoua 
0.1  0.0  02  NfMMn  G+aupe 
0.2  0.4  06  IoW 
2.1  1  14  4.2  0.041 
1400.1  2242  0.4 
Coa  1  2243 
2.1  1  2.1  7.  a  0.00.1 
1281.0  2243  0.0 
1207.1  2244 
0.0  1  0.0  0.0  O  NI 
110.0  i16  OA 
110.0  t10 
0.1  0.2  02  iK.  Omm  I.  i  1  1.0  l1  0.051 
0.2  0.  a  0I  WMMn  Owm  101.2  211  0.1 
0.2  0.4  0a  1011  110.0  2u 
ý"0.0 
0.8  0,3  41  1.1 
tarWldM  13  1,0  2.2  0.0  43  2.3 
hklh  142  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.3 
middle  45  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.2 
TatM  208  0.3  0.7  0.1  0.2  0.4 
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Appendix  3.1.  List  of  the  Votes  Analysed  (the  USSR  CPD) 
Votes 
Score  Re. 
Pro  Con  Abs  (Pro  suit 
vote) 
s>  <Federal  Issue 
X2  Including  the  question  of  the  draft  law  on  the  1601  348  42  -10  A 
Constitutional  Supervision  of  the  USSR  on  the  agenda 
X7  Law  on  the  Constitutional  Supervision  must  be  discussed  308  1521  70  +10  R 
in  the  Supreme  Soviet  first 
Z2  Retention  of  the  name  of  the  USSR  1372  188  170  -10  A 
Z5  E.  G.  Kozin's  proposal  to  recognise  the  declarations  of  419  993  266  +10  R 
sovereignty  and  independence  adopted  by  the  union 
republics'  parliaments  as  a  result  of  an  expression  of  the 
people's  will.  " 
<Presidential  Issues> 
Y2  V.  I.  Prokushev's  amendment  to  Art.  127  (1):  "The  1303  607  64  +10  R 
president  of  the  USSR  may  not  be  a  People's  Deputy  or 
member  of  a  leadership  body  of  any  political  parties  or 
any  public  organisations.  " 
Y3  Merging  the  Federal  Council  and  the  Presidential  871  930  160  +10  R 
Council  (Art.  172  (4)) 
Y4  A.  A.  Zakharenko's  amendment  to  Art.  127  (17):  "The  652  1153  117  +10  R 
CPD  appraise  the  activity  of  the  president  annually, 
proceeding  from  the  criteria  of  the  duration  of  life  and 
condition  of  people's  welfare,  qualitative  and 
quantitative  parameters  of  national  poverty,  preserving 
the  society  for  offspring,  and  contribution  in  the 
preservation  of  peace  and  world  civilisation.  " 
Y5  Adoption  of  the  section  III  of  the  Law  of  Establishing  a  1542  368  76  -10  A 
USSR  Presidency 
<Economic  Issues> 
X5  Congress  agree  with  the  proposed  measures  in  the  1532  419  44  -10  A 
programme  of  the  USSR  government  (Ryzhkov's  plan) 
Z3  G.  N.  Podberezskii's  proposal  on  the  resolution  of  the  384  1120  261  -10  R 
CPD  on  the  situation  of  the  country  and  immediate 
measures  to  overcome  the  crisis  to  introduce  legal 
measures  to  guarantee  the  fulfilment  of  delivery 
agreement 
Z4  Proposal  to  declare  a  moratorium  on  strikes  716  833  21S  -10  R 
<Other  Issues 
X1  Including  the  question  of  Art.  6  of  the  USSR  $68  1194  57  +10  R 
Constitution  on  the  agenda  of  the  Second  Congress 
Y1  P.  A.  Akhunov's  proposal  to  Art.  6  to  rephrase  "the  1067  906  39  +10  R 
CPSU  and  other  political  parties"  with  "all  political 
parties" 
X3  Excluding  the  article  that  allows  to  elect  deputies  from  1354  510  42  +10  R 
social  organisations 
X4  Maintaining  the  article  that  allows  to  elect  deputies  from  773  1051  64  -10  R 
social  organisations 
X6  Adding  the  following  words  to  the  Art.  96  (those  who  are  $20  1263  138  -10  R 
not  allowed  to  vote):  "A  person  to  whom  applied  forced 
medical  treatment  according  to  the  law  and  also  a  person 
who  is  recognised  as  incapability  by  the  court" 
ZI  Including  the  question  of  vote  of  no  confidence  in  the  423  1292  183  -10  R 
USSR  president  on  the  agenda 
X:  Votes  that  put  to  the  vote  in  the  Second  Congress  of  the  USSR;  Y;  in  the  Third  Congress;  Z.,  in  the 
Fourth  Congress;  A:  adopted;  R.  rejected. (Appendix)  37J 
Appendix  3.2.  Coding  of  Variables 
Variables  Data  Coding  1 
(Anova  &  T-test) 
Dependent  Variables 
17  votes  N  +10-  pro-reform 
22  votes 
0-  abstention,  not  vote 
-10=  anti-reform 
N  +10-  pro-Eltsin 
0-  abstention,  not  vote 
-10-  anti-Eltsin 
Independent  Variables 
Personal  Factors 
Gender  B  1=  male 
2=  female 
Age  Nuni  1-  under  45  years 
1-  autonomous 
2-  others 
1-  rural  regions 
2-  resource  regions 
3-  hub/gate  regions 
4s  residual  regions 
(Generation)  2=  over  45  years 
Ethnic  Origin  N  1=  Russians  1-  Russians  all 
2=  others  0=  others 
Education  level  0  1-  PhD  excluded  USSR 
2=  candidate  CPD 
3=  high 
4=  middle 
Functional  Factors 
CPSU  B  1=  member 
membership  2-  non-member 
'Class' 
N  I=  nomenklaturists 
2=  cadres 
3=  military 
4=  managers 
5=  intelligentsia 
6=  technicians 
7=  workers 
8=  others 
N  1=CR,  2-DC, 
Political  blocs  3-  CS,  4=  RU 
5=  others 
Regional  Factors 
0  1=  large  cities 
Urbanisation  (p>_50,000) 
level  2=  medium  sized  cities 
(10,000:  5p<50,000) 
3=  small  cities 
(p<10,000) 
4=  rural  areas 
Federal  Status  N 






Coding  2  CPD 
(Logistic  Regression) 
1"  pro-reform  vote  all 
0'-  others 
1-  pro-reform  vote  all 
0-  others 
I-  male 
0-  female 
I-  member 




1-  nomenklaturist  +  all 
military 
2-  cadres 
3"  managers 
4-  intelligentsia  + 
technicians 
5  workers 
6a.  others 
1-  CR  RF 
2-  RU  CPD 
, 
3-  others 
I-  rural  areas 
2- 
small  cities 
3=  medium-sized  cities 
4-  large  cities 
All 
I-  autonomous 
0-  others 
all 
I-  rural  regions  RF 
2-  resource  regions  CPD 
3-  hub/gate  regions  & 
4-  residual  regions  SIDFE 
1-  highly  developed  1-  poorly  developed  RF 
2-  well-developed  2-  under-developed  CPD 
3-  moderately-developed  3-  moderately  developed  & 
4-  under-developed  (av)  4-  well-developed  SII3FE 
S=  poorly  developed  S+  highly  developed 
_,,,,  ý (APP  dlz)  374 
(cont.  ) 
Variables  Data  Coding  1 
(Anova  &  T-test) 
N  1=  highly  adapted  region 
Living  2=  adapted  regions 
Standards  +  3=  stagnated  regions 
Federal  Status's  4'  stagnated  republics 
5=  adapted  republics 
N  I-  Slavic 
Union  Republic  2-  Baltic 
Groups  3=  Caucasus 
4-  Central  Asian 
N  1=  Northwest 
2'  Central 
Regional  3'  Volga 
Associations  4=  Chemozem 
5=  North  Caucasus 
6'  the  Urals 
7=  Siberia 
8=  Far  East 
9'  others 
SIBFE  vs.  N  1=  SIBFE 
Others  2'  European  Russia 
Siberian  vs.  FE  N  1=  Siberian 
2'  Far  Eastern 
Coding  2  CPD 
(Logistic  Regression) 
1-  highly  adapted  region  RF 
2-  adapted  regions  CPD 
3-  stagnated  regions  & 
4-  stagnated  republics  SIDFE 
5  adapted  republics 
1-  Slavic  USSR 
2-  Baltic  CPD 
3-  Caucasus 
4-  Central  Asian 
1-  Northwest  RF 
2-  Central  CPD 
3-  Volga 
4-  Chernozem 
5-  North  Caucasus 
6-  the  Urals 
7-  Siberia 
8-  Far  East 
9-  others 
1-  SIBFE  USSR 
0-  Others  CPD 
1-  Siberian  SIBFE 
0-  Far  Eastern  only 
Original  data  type:  Num  (numeric),  0  (ordinal),  B  (binary),  and  N  (nominal) 
I)  In  the  analysis  of  the  voting  patterns  in  the  CPD  of  the  USSR,  these  variables  are  considered  only  when 
the  voting  patterns  of  SIBFE  deputies  are  discussed. (Appendix)  315 
Appendix  4.1.  The  Voting  Patterns  of  Deputies  in  the  USSR  CPD 
Federal  9  tam  Pre+tdaneal  h  E  u+  ak  Ie 
N  X2  %  2 
value  of  Pro  vote  "  "  "  "  "  "  "  "  " 
<Raglonal  Factor,  '' 
Renubtle  Gmuna 
SIavia  1508  -0.0  -0.2  -5.0  .  2.9  3.1  "1.3  -3.1  -4.4  -5,1  .  4.1  1.4  "1.3  1.7  4.3  1.9  3.1  4.0 
Baltic  165  7.1  0.3  -0.8  0.0  2.3  1.8  -0.5  -2.4  4.0  -0.6  0.4  71  $.  0  4,1  0.1  2.5  2.5 
Caucasus  210  -3.2  0.3  "2.0  0.3  -0.1  3.3  0.8  .  7.2  -5.8  .  2.2  -0.4  0.2  -0,1  3.6  1.7  4.1  1.6 
Central  Asian  381  -8.4  -8.0  "7.9  "2.0  1A  1.1  "1.1  -8.4  .  4.1  .  1.8  .  2.2  "72  3.7  1.3  .  1.0  1.4  5.6 
total  2241  -5.2  -5.4  -5.3  -2.3  3.1  -0.3  "22  -52  -6.0  3.3  0.0  "1.5  0.7  3.8  1.2  3.3  3.0 
F  valu  e  192.3  112.6  70.2  17.9  17.6  25.3  17.0  40.8  99.0  17.3  20.3  103.7  36.9  13.6  17.3  9.6  13.4 
p  value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0  , 000  0.000 
Urban-Rural 
large  dues  928  -3.9  -4.4  -4.3  -2.2  1.8  -0.5  -2.8  -0.4  -4.2  3.6  1.2  -1.0  0.6  2.5  0.2  3.0  4.7 
medium-sized  dues  461  -4.0  -5.5  -5.4  -2.2  3.1  -0.0  -2.4  "42  -4.1  45  0.7  .  1.0  0.8  4.7  2.1  2.6  3.7 
sma6  dues  386  -5.7  -5.7  "5.2  .  2.0  0.0  0.9  -1.0  3.8  -4.5  -3.0  1.5  -0.1  2.9  5.3  3.3  3.2  2,  a 
rural  areas  452  -7.3  "7.3  "7.3  "2.8  3.4  -0.6  "1.9  "7.3  4.7  .  2.8  .  1.5  42  -0,9  4.0  0.6  2.9  3.3 
total  2207  -62  -8.4  -5.3  "2.3  3.1  4.3  -2.2  -5.3  4.0  .  1.3  0.6  "1.  $  0.7  3.7  1.2  3.3  3.9 
F  value  25.3  16.7  21.6  1.1  21.8  2.7  3.9  19.3  24.3  1.3  12.5  16.6  11.5  14.2  12.6  3.4  7.2 
value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.380  0.000  0.045  9  0.000  0.000  0250  0,000  0000  0,0W  0,000 
- 





nomanklstur,  304  "7.7  "7.1  "7.3  -4.7  "4.3  .  1.4  "4.6  .  4.4  "7.7  3.0  "2.5  "7,8  X8.0  0.4  .  3.0  2.6  0.0 
cadres  159  -5.1  "5.3  -5.9  3.1  2.8  "1,3  3.3  -0.7  -4.1  -32  2.3  -2.8  -0.3  1,6  0.0  3.7  3.8 
military  91  .  7.0  "7.9  "7.4  .  42  0.7  3.6  3.7  .  4.6  4.7  .  3.2  -0.9  .  4.1  .  3.1  3.1  -0.4  4.0  0.7 
managers  393  4.0  -0.4  -5.0  "2.4  5.6  -0.3  "2.2  -5.0  -5.8  4.1  -0.7  "11  1.0  5.2  2.0  3.9  2.9 
Intelligentsia  388  0.7  "1.3  -1.1  0.6  3.2  1,5  .  1,0  3.5  43  3.6  1.9  3.0  4.0  4.5  2.4  3.9  4.0 
technicians  301  -4.4  4.0  -4.5  -1.5  0.1  1.1  -1.1  -2.7  3.3  3.6  2.5  1.2  3.4  5.9  3.7  2.5  2.0 
workers  498  -7.2  -0.5  -6,0  -2.5  4.2  0.4  -1.3  -6.9  -4.0  "2.1  1.2  .  2.6  1.2  4.1  1.7  3.3  3,1 
total  2194  -6.1  -6.4  "5.2  -22  3.2  -0.2  -2.2  45,1  -4.0  3.3  0.7  "1.4  0,8  3.9  1.3  3.3  3.9 
F  value  55.1  30.1  42.7  17.7  61.0  13.8  0.7  21.0  40.1  3,2  15.1  60.8  47.5  17.6  19.4  1.6  12.0 
p  value 
'  C  h 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0,000  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.096  0.000 
p_  IJ  membera  lo 
member  1990  4.6  -5.7  -5.5  -2.5  2.8  -0.5  "2.3  4.6  -5.3  .  14  0.5  -2.0  0.2  3.6  0,9  3.3  4.1 
non-member  251  "2.5  -3.3  -2.0  -02  5.1  1.7  "1.3  -2.4  -2.3  ßl  1.6  2.8  4,0  5.3  3.6  3.6  2.4 
T  value  .  5.7  -5.0  40  -4.7  -3.0  -3.8  -1.8  4.3  .  5.7  .  2.5  .  10  .  7.8  .  7.4  -3.2  -4.4  .  1.0  3.2 
value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0,000  0-000  7  0014  1  0,000  0000  0002  0.000  0331  0002 
<Per,  onal  Factor,  ' 
fender 
male  1891  4.9  4.2  4.1  -22  3.1  -0.3  "2,1  -4.0  -4.5  32  0.8  -1.0  1.0  4.1  1.5  3.4  3.8 
female  351  49  -0.4  4.6  "2.5  2.9  -0.1  -32  -4.1  .  7.3  3.4  -0.4  -4.1  -0.7  1.6  -0.1  2.1  4.5 
Tvalue  4.5  2.8  3.7  0.5  0.5  -0.4  2.2  4.6  0.1  0.8  2.5  5.7  3.0  4.8  3.1  1.3  "1.5 
p  value  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.923  0.639  0.850  0.023  0.000  0.000  0.397  0.014  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.002  0.195  0,104 
r1anerauoa 
under  45  668  -6.4 
4.1  -4.7  -1.5  0.4  1.1  -1.6  3.5  -4.0  -1.4  1.6  0.3  2.8  5.0  3.6  3.3  2.6 
over  45  1380  -5r,  -5.0  .  5.5  -2.6  1.7  "12  "2.6  4.3  -6.6  3.3  42  46  415  2.7  -0.3  3.3  4.7 
T  value  -0.8  1.4  3.3  4.0  10.1  6.0  2.6  6.5  4.8  -0.3  8.6  7.1  6.2  8.1  10.3  -0.1  -4.0 
p  value  0.436  0.161  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.009  0.000  0,000  0.730  0.000  0,000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0,956  0.000 
Fdueatlöa 
doctoral  190  .  1.7  .  1.1  "2.8  -0.5  1.8  -0.8  -3.2  4.5  -2.8  .  6.0  2.6  1.5  2.1  3.1  1.3  2.7  6.2 
eadldate  197  3.1  .  4.2  -4.2  "2.6  0.7  -0.7  .  2.4  "4.3  . 3.5  34  0.4  -0.6  42  3.5  0.6  3.7  4.9 
high  1275  -6.1  -5.5  -5.2  "2.3  3.2  -0.3  -2.4  -5.0  -4.9  -3.4  02  -L7  0.5  3.6  12  3.4  4.0 
middle  520  .  7.4  -6.6  -0.6  -2.0  4.3  0.1  -1.3  -6.0  -6.5  .  2.5  1.0  .  2.5  1.3  3.6  1.3  3.3  3.0 
total  2186  -6.1  -6.4  -5.3  4.3  3.1  -0.3  42  -52  .  0.0  3.4  0.6  -1.5  0.7  3.7  1.2  3.3  3.0 
F  value  30.9  13.1  19.5  4.2  9.8  0.7  2.6  3,7  14.4  5.6  5.2  1.7  2.8  0.4  0.4  0.5  6.4 
p  value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0,008  0,000  0.554  0.038  0.011  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.031  0.735  0.721  0.093  01001 
FthnlGrrioln 
Russian  1019  -6.0  -6.1  -6.6  3.1  3.8  "1.0  3.0  -3.0  -4.6  3,1  2.2  .  1.1  1.3  3.1  1,8  3.6  3.8 
Others  1223  -4.6  -4.1  "4.0  "1.6  2.5  0.8  "1.0  -0.3  -6.3  -2.5  -0.7  -1.6  0.2  3.7  0.7  31  4.1 
T  value  -3.9  -3.5  .  3.2  3.6  -0.4  -4.0  73  2.3  4.8  0.3  1.8  2.9  0.7  2.0  1.0  "1.4 
value  00  . 
00  002  00  O  0,00 
. 
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Appendix  4.2.  The  Voting  Patterns  of  RSFSR  Deputies  (the  USSR  CPD) 
FadereI  system  sidentlal  Issus  I  u 
N  X2  V  Z2 
-- 
z3-  Y2  Y3  Y4 
value  of  Pro  vole  +  "  "  "  "  "  "  "  " 
<R.  glonal  Factorox 
3IBFE  O  h  &  t  er 
European  Russia  879  .  6.8  a.  1  -0.6  . 2.4  3.  e  .  21  4.4  -4.5  -0,1  -42  2.0  -1.4  1.2  3.9  1.6  3.1  3.1 
SlOFE  217  -6.3  -6.2  4.7  4.4  5.7  0.7  44  -0.6  4.5  4.7  0.5  -0.3  3.4  e.  0  3.  e  3.5  2.5 
Tvalue  0.8  0.2  0.2  2.8  4.3  "4.2  .  1.4  4.5  .  2.6  1.0  2.2  "1.8  4.0  14  4.1  0.0  2.1 
p  value  0.405  0.850  0.853  0.005  0.001  0.000  0.160  0.000  0.010  0.300  0.027  0.135  0.003  0.001  0.002  0.082  0.036 
Urban-Rural 
large  Cites  459  .  4.8  -5.4  4.7  4.1  2.1  -2.4  4.8  4.6  -4.2  .  1.5  2.4  4,3  0.9  2.8  0.3  44  5.4 
medium-sized  dllae  229  -0.1  4.1  .  5.8  4.2  4.6  -1.7  4,1  44  45  .  4.9  2.1  .  1.2  1.4  5.8  3.0  2.1  3.5 
smog  Cites  191  .  5.0  .  8.1  .  6.2  -2.0  7.0  1.2  -1.9  -0.6  4.2  4.5  2.1  1.6  0.0  0.2  4.6  4.0  1.8 
nrral  are"  192  -0.8  -7.8  .  8.8  -4.0  4.5  4.6  -2.9  4.8  -7.9  4.9  -0.9  4.7  -0.1  4,7  1.4  2.8  1.4 
total  1074  .  6.0  -0.1  .  6.7  4.2  4.0  -1.8  4.2  4.6  .  44  -4.3  1.7  .  1.2  1.8  4.3  1.8  3.8  3.6 
P  value  11.9  5.5  14.0  11  16.5  8.4  2.3  14.2  13,0  1.4  71  9.1  11.9  12.5  11.7  4.1  15.5 
p  value 
Q 
0.000  0.001  0.000  0.320  0.000  0.000  0.080  0.000  0.000  0.236  0.000  0.000  01000  0.000  0.000  0.007  0.000 
attic  Federal 
autonomous  304  -0.3  .  8.4  -0.7  .  4.2  5.3  0.2  .  3.8  -41  4.1  -4.0  -0.3  -1.4  1.0  7.0  3.1  4.6  2.0 
non-autonomous  789  -0.8  -0.0  -5.2  -2.7  3.6  4.2  -2.9  4.5  -42  -4.4  2.4  .  1.1  1.9  3.3  12  3.5  4.2 
T  value  -1.0  4.8  4.3  4.0  3.1  4.1  -1.8  -11  4.4  0.8  .  4.6  -0.5  .  1.5  6.0  4.3  1.7  .  1.9 
value  0.330  0.428  0.001  0,003  0.002 
.  10  0,248  0,001  0,452  0000  0.130  0000  0,000  0  169  0000 
'Functional  Facter> 
sitael 
nomenklatun  111  -9.0  4.7  4.3  4.3  4.0  -7.0  4.3  4.0  -0.1 
-4.6  -1.0  4.5  4.9  0.6  4.4  4.6  7.9 
cadres  61  4.0  .  6.0  -0.  e  -4.0  3.2  -2.5  4.2  4.7  4.5  -0,0  2.5  -3.5  .  0.9  2.0  1.0  3.8  4.1 
m4ifery  48  -7.1  -0.7  -0.5  4.4  0.2  .  4.8  -0A  4.3  .  8.4  45  "1.7  4.5  -3.6  3.8  -1.0  5.4  8.0 
managers  227  -7.0  -0.8  -6.2  -3.3  0.7  -1.1  .  2.4  4.5  -8,5  4.0  0.3  -0,5  1.9  5.3  2.0  3.0  1,8 
Intelligentsia  168  -0.3  4.8  -1.0  -0.4  3.2  0.4  .  11  4.0  -0.1  -0.0  2.7  2.1  4.6  4.6  2.1  4.5  4.9 
technician  194  4.6  -6.8  -6.1  .  2.3  6.4  0.3  -1.8  -0.7  -3.2  -4.9  3.5  1.5  39  6.6  4.2  2.1  2.6 
workers  216  -7.3  -7.1  .  72  4.4  8.3  -1.3  .  2.2  -3.9  .  5.5  .  2.5  3.0  .  1.4  3.2  6.3  2.1  4.1  2.0 
total  1083  -6.8  -0.0  -5.0  4.0  4.1  -1.5  4,1  4.6  -4.0  .  4,4  1.1  "1,0  1.7  4.0  2.1  3.8  3.5 
F  value  25.4  10.4  21.4  8.4  43.7  11.4  5.0  9.5  13.5  3.1  6.8  24.3  26.4  9.0  11.2  1.3  10.0 
p  value 
C  hl  h 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.000  01000  0.000  0.252  0.000 
o  psu  mem  ers 
member  979  -0.3  -0.4  -6.0  4.5  3.8  -1.9  42  .  4.0  -0.0  -4.3  1.1  4.7  1.1  4.1  1.6  3.6  3.7 
non-member  115  -2.5  4.2  -2.1  -02  5.9  1.3  4.5  -1.1  44  4.4  2.3  3.1  5.1  0.1  4.5  3.7  2.1 
T  value  -5.2  -4.6  -0.8  -4.5  -2.4  -3.8  -0.0  4.4  43  0.1  .  0.1  .  6.2  43  4.4  4.2  0.2  1.0 
value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.00  0.013 
. 00  0,361  0.001  0.001  0.887  40  01?  0.001  0,0?  7  0,055 
aPareonal  factoraa 
d  G.  n  ar 
male  944  4.7  -5.8  -5.3  4.0  3.9  .  1.4  4.9  .  3.3  4.3  .  4.2  1.9  -0.7  2.0  4.5  22  3.6  3.4 
female  151  -7.6  -7.9  -8.0  4.6  4.6  "2.  e  -4.4  -e,  2  -7.5  .  4.1  0.3  .  4,5  .  0.9  2.5  0.2  3.4  4.6 
Tvalue  3.0  3.3  4.5  1.3  -0.9  1.6  1.9  3.7  4.5  1.0  2.0  4.  e  3.5  3.0  2.5  0.6  -1.1 
p  value 
G 
0.003  0.001  0.000  0.208  0.397  0.137  0.052  0.000  0,000  0.339  0.046  0.000  0.001  0.003  0.014  0.572  0.112 
eneration 
undor45  427  -6.5  -4,0  -4.6  .  2.0  6.7  0.4  -2.5  -0.9  4.9  .  4.6  3.1  1.7  4.3  6.7  4.9  3.5  1.5 
over  45  858  -6.2  -5.8  -0.3  4.9  2.3  -2.8  4.1  -0.5  -0.9  . 4.1  0.8  .  3.0  41.1  2.1  0.0  4.0  4.9 
Tvalue  1.5  4.3  3.9  3.8  8.3  5.9  2.0  8.9  e.  1  4.0  4.2  6.2  7.7  7.1  1.1  .  1,0  -0.5 
p  value  0.130  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.050  0,000  0.000  0.308  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.320  0.000 
Educatlgn 
doctoral  110  -3.3  4.0  4.0  .  1.5  1.5  -2,7  -4.1  4.0  4.3  4,0  3.8  0.1  2.2  1.4  0.4  3.4  4.2 
adkate  55  -4.0  -4.5  -4.5  -3.3  0.6  -0.6  4.9  -2.9  . 3.4  -4.0  2.2  .  0.7  0.4  3.3  0,5  3.1  4.9 
high  032  -0.9  -0.0  -0.4  -3.1  3.9  -1.4  4.2  4.3  4.7  4.7  1.0  "1.3  1.2  4.5  2.1  3.1  3.6 
middle  241  -8.0  -7.8  -7.7  4.8  62  -1.8  -2.1  -41  -0.  e  4.1  2.4  -1.8  3.7  48  22  3.8  Co 
total  1088  -0A  -0.1  -6A  42  4.0  "1.0  4.2  4.7  4.7  -4.4  1,7  "12  1.1  4.3  1.5  3.5  3.6 
F  value  12.8  5.0  13.8  1.9  12.3  1.0  2.5  3,4  3.3  4.6  3.5  1.5  2.0  4.3  1.1  0.2  7.8 
p  value 
h  i  O  l  i 
0.000  0,001  0.000  0.127  0.000  0.410  0.057  0.017  0.020  0.003  0,011  0.184  0.110  0.006  0.101  0.928  0.000 
Et  n  c  r  e  n 
Russian  119  -5.8  4.0  -6.5  -3.0  3.9  -1.8  "3.1  4.4  4,5  -4.6  2.8  -0.8  1.5  4.0  L7  3.7  3.5 
Others  276  -0.4  -0.5  -6.1  4.5  4,5  419  44  -4.8  &a  4.6  -0.9  4.1  1.1  5.2  14  1.1  31 
Tvalue  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.3  -1.0  -1.3  0.0  2.0 
1 
2.0  .  2.1  5.7  2.5  1,1  -2.1  -1.0  40  -0.5 
value  0.263  0-243  0,310  0.192  1  0,047  4  1  0410  61 (Appendix)  J77 
Appendix  4.3.  The  Voting  Patterns  of  SIBFE  Deputies  (the  USSR  CPD) 
Fade  ral3  lens  Presidenti  4  ee  issues  ý  =  le 
N  x2  x7  I  Y2 
_ 
Y3__  Y4  Y5  X5  L3  Z4  X  Y,  94  go  11 
value  ro  vote  +  "  +  "  "  f  "  "  " 
sReglonal  Factors 
Siberia  A  Far  East 
Siberian  168  4.3  4.4  -6.  e  4.8  5.1  AT  -2.5  -1.3  45  4.4  0.5  4.1  2.3  5,1  3.1  4.3  2.4 
For  Eastern  se  4.4  4.  e  4.1  4.0  7.3  4.8 
"2.2  0.3  -0.2  4.1  0.5  0.3  0.1  4.4  2.7  2.4  2.6 
T  vakle  0.2  -0.7  0.5  .  0.0  .  1.8  4.8  .  02  .  1.1  -0.2  -2.0  0.0  4.8  -2.7  -1.0  0.1  1.5  41 
p  value 
C 
0.870  0.467  0.014  0.823  0.009  0.000  0.851  0.254  0.813  0.044  0.906  0.542  0.001  0.330  0.354 
0.143  0.938 
irri  ire  Fcnndm 
- 
rural  region  31  .  10.0  .  0.7  "0.0  4.0  0.0  1.3  d.  4  . 4.2  .  1.4  "e2 
d.  6  . 2.1  -1.3  4.5  . 
1.0  8.1  1.  e 
resource  regions  72  41  .  4.7  -2.8  -1.4  0.9  2.2  .  1.9  0.1  -0.7  4.1  1.7  1.0  4.8  4.1  4.2  5.0  3.4 
hub/gals  regions  34  -9.1  4.2  -7.0  -5.3  0.8  -0.5  4.2  1.8  d.  6  d.  8  1.8  -1.8  8.3  5.1  3.6  12  3.2 
residual  regions  80  -0,1  4.3  -0.2  .  4.9  0.4  43  .  1.1  -1.5  -0.3  -4.7  0,5  0.0  3.3  0.9  4.1  2.9  1.8 
total  217  -0.3  4.2  -5.7  -4.4  6.7  0.1  -2.4  -0.8  -3.6  -4.7  0.5  -0.3  3.4  1.0  3.6  3.1  2.5 
F  value  6.5  6.1  8.7  9.4  7.1  12  2.1  2.0  6.2  0.2  2.0  1.3  3.1  0.6  3.?  2.8  0.1 
p  value  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.327  0.101  0.050  0.002  0.868  0.052  0.201  0.012  0.016  0.013  0.001  0.680 
Living  Conditions 
highly  developed  12  -2.5  "4.2  0.8  0.0  10.0  7.6  4.2  5.1  6.2  0.0  4.2  8.3  10.0  8.3  1.3  9.2  2.5 
well  developed  68  -0.0  -4.7  -4.2  "1.5  7.1  -0.4  -22  -0.3  -3.1  4.7  1.6  -0.3  3.2  8.3  4.1  3.4  2.8 
underdeveloped  e1  -6.1  4.2  4.0  -4.8  6.7  0.0  -2.3  1.3  -4.4  4.0  1.8  "1.0  4.4  e.  4  5.1  3.0  3.4 
poorly  developed  59  4.8  -9.0  -8.8  4.6  1.5  1.0  4.4  -4.0  -6.9  4.3  4.4  .  3.1  -0,5  4.1  -0.3  6.4  0.3 
total  200  -0.7  -0.4  -6.0  .  4.4  5.5  0.6  -3.1  -0.8  -0.0  -4.9  0.4  -0.1  2.1  5.1  3.4  4.3  2.3 
F  value  3.0  4.6  10.0  14.3  8.3  2.0  6.1  7.9  13.5  3.8  5.2  4.6  5.9  1.8  0.3  2.5  1.3 
p  value 
i  aF  d  l  t 
0.014 
t 
0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.054  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.011  0.002  0.003  0.001  0.152  0,000  0.052  0.270 
er  t  Nine  cond  tinns  e 
adapted  regions 
a  s  a 
84 
us 
-0.3  4.8  a.  3  "1.1  7.7  -0.9  4.8  0.8  -0.9 
4.4  2.9  0.9  4.2  at  5.3  3.9  3.3 
stagnated  regions  107  a.  0  -7.0  17.3  4.9  5.1  -0.1  45  -1.5  -e.  0  4.7  -0.1  -1.7  3.1  6.0  2.1  3.  e  2.4 
stagnated  republics  11  .  10.0  "10.0  -0.5  4.4  -1.8  7.1  -7.1  -2.9  4.8  -2.4  4.5  a.  9  -3.5  7.1  0.  e  6.9  0.0 
adopted  republics  10  -2.5  -3.8  -3.8  -1.3  6.9  7.5  .  3.1  0.8  .  2.5  "6.9  -0,1  1.3  4.4  8.8  2.6  6.1  0.6 
total  204  4.7  4.3  4.9  -4.4  5.6  0.5  -2.9  -0.7  4,7  4.9  0.5  -0.7  3.0  6.1  3,3  4.1  2.3 
F  value  3.4  3.0  6.3  10.6  7.1  7.3  2.5  1.2  42  1.1  2.7  1.5  3.4  1.4  2.0  0.5  0.6 
p  value 
l 
0.019  0.014  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.055  0.318  0.007  0.332  0.040  0217  0.019  0.239  0.118  0.654  0.476 
Urban-Rura 
large  dues  87  -0.0  .  5.8  4.9  -3.9  4.0  44  .  2.8  47  . 3.4  .  7,0  0.5  .  1.0  1.8  4.5  3.4  3.1  4.6 
medlumalzed  does  47  ..  0  4.1  4.7  "3.4  5.3  1.7  -1.3  -0.2  .  1.6  4.5  0.9  0,4  3.6  4.4  3.4  3.0  2.8 
sma9  awes  57  "4.5  "7.0  -4.9  "42  7.5  3.3  -/.  e  -0.5  -2.1  4.0  2.3  1.9  5.6  e.  1  4.9  4.6  1.4 
rural  areas  '  41  -0.3  -0.8  d.  0  "7.0  5.4  1.0  a.  7  -2.0 
d.  8  -3.5  "1.1  -2.4  1.7  6.1  22  3.  )  0.5 
total  212  -0.2  4.2  .  5.8  .  4.5  6.1  0.7  -2.4  -0.8  4.3  .  4,7  0.8  4.2  3.2  8.0  3.8  3.7  2.6 
F  value  2.1  0.8  2.2  2.1  1.8  4.3  0.5  0.3  3.2  3.3  1.5  1.9  2.3  1.9  0.4  0.3  2.2 
p  value 
lS  t  0.098  0.615  0.087  0.102  0.199  0.006  0.601  0.839  0.025  0.020  0.215  0.132  0.062  0.223  0.460  0.538  0.069 
ta  us  Federa 
autonomous  07  .  5.2  .  7.0  4.1  4.3  4.8  4.2  .  4.3  "1.8 
4.0  4.7  -2.1  0.0  2.4  7.5  3.1  4.4  0.7 
non-autonomous  160  4.0  -5.8  -5.5  a.  0  8.3  -0.6  -1.5  -0.4  a2  4.2  1.7  -0.9  3.5  5.3  3.5  3.4  3.2 
Tvalue  1.6  4.2  -0.0  .  2.5  .  1.6  3.7  .  2.1  "1.0  . 0.8  1.3  .  2.5  0.3  "1.1  2.0  0.2  1.0  -1.9 
value  0.145  0.50  0.584  0.012  0,115  0.529  1  0.743  0.294  1  1 
<FuncuonalFactora 
Cut 
nomanklalure  15  .  10.0  d.  3  40.0  4.7  4.7  "2.0  -0.7  J.  1  del  4.7  AT  d.  1  d.  0  4.7  -0.1  7.3  1.3 
cadres  23  4.1  -3.9  4.1  -0.5  6.7  0.9  .  0.9  -2.2  -4,3  -4,3  0.0  ale  1.3  41  3.9  4.3  -2.2 
military  it  4.2  -7.3  -7.3  d.  5  0.0  .  3.6  4.5  .  4.5  .  10.0  4.4  44  .  4.6  .  1.6  2.1  1.1  52  4.5 
managers  54  .  7.8  4.9  .  7.0  .  5.4  7.2  0.9  -2.8  -1.3  -4.0  4.4  .  0.2  0.4  3.5  5.0  3.1  3.3  1,3 
Intelligentsia  30  -2.3  .  4.0  -0.7  -1.4  6.3  0.7  1.0  1.0  1.0  4,0  2/  4.3  6.0  6.0  4.0  2.3  1.2 
tachnlclana  30  4.9  -5.3  4.3  4.0  0.9  2.5  0.0  3.1  4.5  -5.8  4.7  3.1  1.1  7.4  5.0  1.1  0.4 
workers  43  .  4.7  -7.0  4.2  -4.0  1.1  1.9  -4.4  -0.7  -1.9  -1.4  1.0  4.6  5.3  7.2  4.8  5.3  2.8 
total  212  -02  -0.1  4.6  -4.3  5.7  0.9  4.3  -0.6  4.3  -4.8  0.1  .  0.1  3.5  8.4  3.5  3.9  2.4 
F  value  3.1  1.5  4.5  2.0  10,9  0.1  2.4  2.1  3.9  2.1  3.6  5.0  113  1.3  1.3  2.0  IT 
p  value  0.000  0.141  0.000  0.062  0.000  0.481  0.031  0.059  0.001  0.081  0.002  0.000  0.000  0266  0253  0.074  0.002 
r-PStl  membershlo 
member  192  4,8  -6.5  4.1  -1.6  5.6  0.3  -2.2  -1.2  4.6  . 4.8  0.4  -0,1  2.9  5.1  3.3  3.1  2.5 
non-member  25  -4.4  .  4.0  .  2.0  -2.9  5.5  4.4  a.  0  2.0  . 3.2  4.6  1.7  1.1  7.2  1.6  8.0  5.2  2.1 
T  value  4.4  -1.8  -2.2  4.1  4.7  .  2.1  0.9  -1.6  -0.2  -0.1  -0.6  .  1.0  -2.3  -2.1  -1.6  41111  0.2 
value  0.147  0,107  A  88  460  0,030  I  i  1 
ePeraonal  Pactore> 
fi80d0[ 
male  185  .  6.9  d.  9  4.4  .  1.2  5.0  0.9  -2.3  -0.5  4.9  .  4.4  0.6  0.3  3.4  8.2  3.1  3.9  3.2 
female  32  4.4  -7.5  -7.7  -5.7  8.6  -0.3  d.  1  .  2.5  d.  9  -1.0  0.7  4.1  3.1  4.7  2.2  3.8  4.3 
Tvalua  1.6  1.1  1.7  1.0  4.7  0.7  0.8  1,1  2.4  1.5  Al  2.4  0.2  t.  i  t.  0  0.0  -1.2 
p  value  0.070  0.259  0.091  0.318  0.506  0.495  0.029  0277  0.016  0.080  0.622  0.018  0.473  0273  0.316  0.964  0214 
under45  103  -5.4  -4.9  -4.2  -3.1  7.2  2.5  -2.4  2.0  -1.7  -4.4  2.5  2.2  6.4  7.8  5.9  4.0  2.0 
over  46  114  -7.1  "1.4  -7.1  4.1  4.4  -0.0  -2.4  4.4  4.0  -6.1  .  1.2  -2.1  1.5  4.8  1.5  3.1  2.9 
T  value  1.7  2.6  3.2  1.0  IT  2.7  0.0  4.5  2.7  0,7  3.0  3.1  3.2  2.9  3.1  0.3  -0.4 
p  value 
Ed  ti 
0.095  0.010  0.001  0.295  0.008  0.007  0,963  0.000  0.007  0.453  0.003  0,000  0,001  0.004  0.000  0.144  0.461 
uca  on 
doctoral  6  4.3  4.3  4.3  -2.5  "1.3  4.8  -7.6  4.0  .  2.6  4.1  0.0  "1.3  0.0  2.6  0.0  -1.3  3.8 
cadldale  13  . 2.3  -08  -2.3  4.3  6.4  2.3  .  1.6  2.3  1.6  4.4  2.3  2.3  2.3  3,1  1.6  4.1  3,6 
high  142  4.9  -0.5  AT  -4.5  5.6  1.3  d.  3  .  0.0  .  4.1  4.3  0.0  Al  3.2  1.0  3.8  3.6  2.3 
middle  45  .  5.0  -0.4  -0.8  4.7  7.0  0.7  -22  -1.6  4.4  -2.1  1,6  -1.4  4.4  7.1  4.9  4.1  1.1 
total  208  -0.3  -6.2 
d.  7  . 4.8  5.7  0.6  -2.4  -0.8  -14  .  4.1  0.6  -0.3 
3.3  6.5  3.1  3.5  3.4 
P  value  1.8  2.7  1.3  1.0  3.1  3.1  0.9  1.1  1.7  2.4  0.5  0.4  0.4  1.1  1,1  12  0.3 
p  value 
f  i  h  F  I  0.150  0,050  0.265  0,407  0.029  0.021  0.454  0.335  0.173  01072  0.115  0.609  0.698  0.174  0.300  0.314  0.671 
c  r  t  thn 
Russian  152  -0.8  -02  -5.  e  . 4.0  5.9  -0.3  -2.7  4.9  .  3.7  4.4  1.1  -0.3  3.2  5.7  3.4  4.3  2.7 
Others  66  4.2  42  4.5  4.4  52  3.1  .  1.7  -0.  e  -2,9  a.  2  -0.6  4.3  3.7  1.4  42  2.8  2.0 
T  value  .  1.4  0.0  -0.3  1.3  0.6  . 2.4  .  0.7  All  -0.  e  1.5  0.0  43  .  0.8  4.6  1.3  0.1 
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Appendix  4.4.  The  Voting  Patterns  of  Siberian  Deputies  (the  USSR  CPD) 
ederal8  tern  Presdendallesu  Economic  I. 
N  X7 
value  of  pro  vote  "  "  "  "  "  "  "  "  " 
<Reglonal  Fectons 
P  S  connatic  tructure 
regions  31  .  10.0  -9.7  "9.0  -9.0  0.0  1.3  -5.8  .  4.2  "7.4  42  4.6  -2.1  .  1.3  4.8  .  1,0  6,1  1.6 
resource  regions  49  -4.9  .  4.9  -2.1  -1.0  8.9  1.2  .  1.8  0.2  .  0.6  "4.4  1.9  1,0  4.5  1.3  8.1  5.3  3.6 
hub/gate  region.  15  "8.0  -7.3  .  4.0  -4.7  4.0  -7.3  -1.3  .  0.7  3.3  -6.0  3.3  4.7  0.7  3.3  2.7  1.3  7.3 
residual  regions  63  -6.1  3.7  -8.5  -6.2  6.6  "1.6  -1.0  -1.1  3.3  -5.6  0.6  .  0.2  2.9  62  6.7  3.3  0.0 
total  158  -0.3  -0.4  -6.0  4.0  5,1  -0.7  -2.5  .  1.3  3.5  -6.4  0.6  -0.6  2.3  6.7  3.9  4.3  2.4 
F  value  4.4  3.5  7.9  8.9  6.1  4,1  1.7  1.5  3.0  1.0  3.0  1.3  2.7  0.1  5,1  1.4  2.0 
p  value 
itl 
0.005  0.017  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.008  0.165  0.230  0.010  0.392  0.034  0,287  0.050  0,457  0.002  0.161  0.038 
t.  Mne  Gond  one 
highly  developed  12  -2.3  .  42  0.8  0.8  10.0  7.5  4.2  8.7  02  0.0  4.2  1.3  10.0  1.3  6.3  92  2A 
well  developed  49  "0.9  -4.7  4.0  -1.0  6.0  .  29  .  1.4  -0.4  3.7  .  4.5  2.3  .  0.6  2.9  5.7  4.7  2.2  3.1 
underdeveloped  38  -4.7  -0.1  -0.3  -5.3  5.3  -2.9  -1.9  -0,3  -42  -02  1.6  -1.6  2.1  6.1  5.3  5.3  4.5 
poorly  developed  53  -8.7  -9.1  -4.7  -4.5  1.7  0.8  -6.0  f.  3  -0.0  -4.6  3.1  -2.3  -0.0  4.5  0.6  6.1  0.2 
total  152  -6.5  -0.5  -6.8  -4.5  4.9  -0.8  -2.7  -1.2  4.8  -5.3  0.4  45  2.0  6.6  3.4  4,5  2.4 
F  value  4.1  4.3  8.9  13.4  5.6  5.5  6.6  5.4  12.0  2.9  4.2  4.4  4.5  1.0  4.1  2.8  1.9 
pvalue 
ltl  i  l  F  d  l  t 
0.008 
t 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.035  0.007  0.005  0.004  0,415  0.000  0.044  0,137 
v  ons  8  e  L  ne  ennd 
adopted  regions 
a  era  s 
51 
us 
-6,1  -4.6  3.0  -0.7  7.5  4.8  -0.3  1.0  -1.1  4.2  2.7  1.1  4.3  62  5.4  3.6  3.0 
stagnated  regions  74  -0.4  -7.3  -7.4  -6.0  4.3  -2.0  3.4  -2.8  -6.1  .  4.2  -0.5  "1.9  1,5  4,7  3.1  5.0  2.6 
stagnated  republics  17  -10.0  -10.0  -4.8  -1.8  7.1  -7.1  -2.9  -1.6  -2.4  3.5  3.9  3.5  7.1  0.6  5.0  0.0 
total  152  -0.6  4.5  -5.8  "4,5  4.9  -0,8  -2.7  "12  3.8  -6.3  0.4  -0.6  2.0  5.0  3.8  4.5  2.4 
F  value  2.3  5.3  9.3  16.1  9.6  7.8  4.0  2.8  5.5  1.9  3.9  2.2  4.0  1.1  2.8  0.7  0.7 
p  value  0.107  0.006  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.011  0.066  0.005  0.149  0.023  0.119  0.006  0.351  0.042  0.458  0.474 
arge 
dues  51  -0.0  -6,3  -5.4  3.6  3.9  4,7  .  2.6  -1.4  4.3  -7.3  0.5  .  1.6  12  4.4  3.3  4.0  5,2 
medium-slzed  cities  29  -6.0  41,8  -5.2 
3.5  4.4  1.4  -2.1  0.0  -1.4  -4.5  -0.3  1.0  3.0  0.1  4.8  4.6  1.4 
small  cities  38  -4.5  .  7.4  .  5.0  -4.7  7.4  2.4  -11A  -0.8  .  2.1  3.7  2.4  1.6  4.6  6.0  8.3  5.3  0.1 
rural  areas  32  -0.4  .  7.2  -7.7  "7.4  4.1  -0.3  -3.6  -22  -72  -4.8  -1,3  "2A  0.0  5.5  2.2  3.8  0,3 
total  168  -6.2  -0.4  -6.7  -4.7  6.1  -0.8  .  2.5  -1.2  3.5  -5,4  0.5  -0.6  2.2  5.1  3.5  4.4  2.4 
F  value  1.8  0.9  1.2  2.0  1.4  4.0  0.3  0.3  2.8  2.3  1.0  1.7  1.8  0.9  0.9  0.2  3.1 
pvalue  0.154  0,452  0.327  0.122  0.233  0.009  0.793  0.822  0.043  0.080  0.402  0,169  0.149  0,434  0.419  0.874  0.030 
Federal  Statue 
autonomous  44  -0.4  .  8.8  4.0  -0.4  3.0  2.7  -0.6  -2.7  4.0  3.4  -2,7  .  1.5  0.1  6.6  3.4  5.0  0.0 
non-autonomous  114  -6.2  -6.5  -5.0  3.1  0.0  -2.0  -0.9  -0.7  4.0  42  1.6  -02  3,0  8.3  4.1  4.0  3.4 
TvaN»  -0.1  .  2.5  -1.1  -4.3  .  2.1  2.9  3.6  -1.2  .  1.3  2.2  49  -0.6  .  1.4  1.2  4.5  0.6  "2.2 
value  0.917  0.012  0.097  0,000  0.38  0.004  0,000  4  0202  0032  000  40.4`111  5.1711  4  0.038  1 
<Funcdonel  Factors 
CIaOt 
nomenklature  12  -10.0  -10.0  -10.0  -6.3  -6.7  -4.2  -6.7  -4.2  43  45  -13  -1.3  -5.6  13  -0.6  6.3  11.2 
cadres  15  .  6.7  .  4.0  -0.0  -2.7  4.7  0.7  -1.3  -1.3  3.3  4.7  .  2.0  .  2.7  3.3  /.  1  8.3  4.0  -4.7 
military  7  40.0  -10.0  -7.1  -5.7  -0.4  -10.0  -6.7  -4.6  -10.0  -4.3  .  7,1  -4.3  -7.1  4.3  4.3  7,1  7.1 
managers  40  .  7.0  .  0.3  -7.0  -0.0  0.6  0.0  -2.3  -1.0  -4.0  "7,0  0.3  1.0  2.3  6.6  2.6  3.8  0.1 
Intelligentsia  23  3.5  -4.8  -0.9  -1.4  5.2  -1.3  0.0  -0.9  0.0  -4.4  1.8  2.4  4.6  5.2  4.3  3.0  9.9 
technicians  24  -0.7  3.0  -6.0  3.6  6.3  0.6  -0.4  2.5  -3.8  -4.7  4.8  1.7  4.6  7.1  4.2  1.7  0.1 
workers  34  -4.4  -7.4  .  4.8  -4.5  82  0.0  -4.1  -12  -2.1  -1.8  1.4  -0.9  4.7  7.1  3.8  8.2  2.7 
total  155  -0.2  -0.3  -6.5  -4.5  5.2  -0.6  -2.5  "1.1  4.5  4.5  0.6  -0.4  2.8  6.0  4.1  4.4  2.4 
F  value  1.9  1.6  3.1  1.8  7.7  1.8  1.3  1.6  2.0  3.1  2.4  2.6  4.0  0.6  1.6  1.4  4.6 
p  value 
hln  CPSt1  b 
0.086  0.143  0.007  0.108  0.000  0.104  0.274  0.154  0.064  0.057  0.031  0.023  0.001  0.006  0.155  0.213  0.000 
mem  era 
member  137  -0.4  4.6  4.0  .  4.8  5.0  -1.3  -2.0  -1.7  -3.5  4.6  0.4  -0.1  1.7  5.3  3.4  4.2  2.3 
non-member  21  4.2  -4.8  3.0  -3.5  02  3.3  -5.2  1.4  3.5  .  4.0  1.0  1.0  1.7  4.6  7.6  02  3.6 
Tvalue  -0.7  -12  -1.8  -0.7  -0.0  -2.1  1.5  -1,4  0.1  -0.9  43  -0.9  3.3  -1.9  -2.2  45  -0.6 
value  .  48  0.251 
. 
07  0  467  2  0,034  0.140  0,18?  04  01  440  04  a  05  3  504  elms 
<Personal  Factors 
ßa0daf 
male  134  .  6.0  4.1  -52  . 4.5  4.7  41.7  42  -1.1  -2.7  -6.0  0.4  0.1  2.3  1.0  4.1  4.3  3.2 
female  24  -7.9  -7.9  -7.7  4.5  7.5  -0.4  3.8  -2.1  44.3  -7,7  0.0  .  48  3A  4.2  2.0  42  4.1 
T  value  12  1.2  1.8  0.6  -1.5  -0.2  0.7  0.6  2.9  1.7  4.2  2,2  -0.1  1.1  04  0,1  4.9 
p  valve  0228  0.245  0.117  0.653  0.124  0.615  0.461  0.644  0.004  0.101  0.829  0.027  0.929  0,250  0.631  0.931  0.344 
flene,  all0G 
under  45  75  .  0.0  4.6  -4.0  44.5  4.8  1.1  -2.6  1.3  .  2.0  .  4.9  2.6  1.3  4.3  7.1  6.6  4,7  1.6 
over  45  83  4.3  "7.1  -7.0  -4.7  3.0  3.3  -2.2  -3.0  "4,9  4.6  -1.3  4.3  0.1  4.0  1.9  4.0  3.1 
T  value  0.4  1.4  2.8  0.2  2.5  2.3  .  0.4  3.4  2.1  0.7  2.7  2.4  3.5  3.2  3.6  0.6  -1.1 
p  value  0.664  0.170  0.000  01580  0.014  0.024  0.509  0.001  0.036  0.404  0.007  0.016  0.018  0.002  0.000  0.607  0.295 
EducatIon 
doctoral  5  .  0.3  -0.3  -0.3  -2.5  -1.3  -8.8  -7.5  46.0  .  3.5  ,  4.5  0.0  -1.3  0.0  3A  0.0  .  1.3  3.4 
cadldete  11  -0.9  0.0  -1.8  -1.8  6.4  0.9  -1.6  3.7  1.8  .  5.5  3.6  2.7  2.7  2.7  1.1  4.5  4.6 
high  101  -72  -7.1  41.8  .  6.0  4.4  0.0  -22  "1.3  .  4.6  .  6.9  -0.8  -0.1  1.0  6.6  3.6  4,4  2.1 
middle  34  -5.0  -02  -0.1  -4.6  6.2  -0.6  -2.4  -1.5  -2.1  -3.3  3.0  -0.1  4.1  7A  1.5  5.0  3.1 
total  154  -6.2  -4.4  -5.0  -4.6  5,1  -0.5  -2.5  -12  3.5  .  6,6  0.6  -0.6  2.3  6.1  4.0  4.2  3.4 
F  value  3.0  3.6  12  0.8  3.8  2.3  0.1  1.1  1.9  1.1  1.1  0.4  0.1  2.0  1.1  12  0.3 
p  value 
in  Fth  Od  I 
0.033  0.015  0.319  0.469  0.012  0.062  0.473  0.354  0.137  0.175  0.156  0.724  0,690  0.122  0,131  0.301  0.106 
c  n  c 
Russian  119  4.5  -4.0  .  6.6  3.8  6.8  4.4  .  2.1  .  1.1  3.5  -8.1  1.1  43  2.6  5.6  3.1  4.3  2.7 
Others  39  .  5.6  4,7  -5.8  4.9  3.1  1.5  4,6  .  1.6  4.6  3.1  4.3  -1.6  1,5  5.4  48  4.4  1.1 
T  value  -0.5  1.3  0.1  2.3  1.8  .  1.7  0.9  0.4  0.0  .  1.5  1.4  0.7  0.1  -0.7  -0.4  0.0  0.1 
value  0.134-  4,181  0.947  0.022  0.0?  2  0.04?  0303  0,069 
-tiri 
0,125  f 
,- 
IY472  0,543  0160  0962  PASO (.  4ppendix)  379 
Appendix  4.5.  The  Voting  Patterns  of  Far  Eastern  Deputies  (the  USSR  CPD) 
value  of  pro  vote 
nomenklature  ý  -10.0 
cadres  5  -5.0 
military  4  -6.0 
managers  14  -10.0 
Intelligentsia  7  1.4 
tachnblans  12  -7.5 
workers  i  d.  0 
total  57  4.3 
F  value  2.2 
p  value  0.059 
<ReglonatFactors> 
Fcnnomlc  Structure' 
resource  regions  23  -4.3 
hub/gate  regions  19  -10.0 
residual  regions  17  -8.3 
total  59  4.4 
F  value  3.4 
p  value  0.040 
1  ivlna  Conditions  n1 
well  developed  19  .  3.7 
moderately  d.  velooed  4  -7.8 
underdeveloped  23  -8.3 
poorly  developed  8  -10.0 
total  52  -a.  7 
F  value  1.9 
p  value  0.138 
1  Nina  Condltlnns  (III 
well  developed  19  -3.7 
under-developed  23  -8.3 
poorly  developed  8  -10.0 
total  48  -0.7 
F  value  2.8 
p  value  0.072 
1  Nine  Cnndltiona  (fill- 
well  developed  19  .  3.7 
under-developed  23  .  8.3 
T  value  1.9 
p  value  0.062 
I  tvlna  conditions  &  Federal  status 
adopted  regions  3  .  10.0 
stagnated  reglons  33  .  8.5 
adapted  republics  18  -2.5 
total  52  -8.7 
F  value  4.4 
p  value  0.017 
Urban-Rural 
large  clues  10  -10.0 
medium-sized  dues  18  -8.0 
small  clues  19  -4.7 
rural  areas  9  -7.8 
total  56  -8.3 
F  value  1.3 
p  value  0.260 
Federal  Status 
autonomous  23  -3.0 
non-autonomous  30  -8.8 
T  value  2.9 
p  value  0.005 
<Funadonalrestore 
te  Cu 
CpaL  memhershle 
momber  66  d.  0 
non-mombx  f  010 
Tvawe  "1A 
value  0,070 
sP*nand  factornm, 
flanduit 
t.  nemuon 
mds  61  -6.6 
fomNo  6  "10.0 
Tvalue  1.4 
p  value  0.166 
under  45  26  a,  1 
over46  31  -0,1 
T  value  2.6 
p  value  0.016 
FdneatInn- 
high  41  -A.  1 
middle  11  "7.7 
Tvalue  0.4 
p  value  0.657 
E1hni  -  Orkin 
Russian 
Others 
t  value 
Federal  Syslar" 
X2  x7  u  z0 
,0 
N 
33  d.  o 
se  -4.  e 
"t.  l 
wluq  0 
j.  3  .  1.3  -22 
-6.9  4.9  -6.6 
.  4.6  -6.  i  d.  1 
-6.6  4.1  3.9 
2.9  3.0  1.3 
0.066  0.056  0.294 
4.7  "4.7  -2.6 
-2.6  -2.5  0.0 
-0.5  .  7.0  -9.  i 
4.9  -10.0  -10.0 
-6.5  4.2  J.  5 
0.7  1.5  2.2 
0.574  0.216  0.103 
-4.7  d.  1  4.0 
a.  b  "7.0  4.9 
a.  ý  "10.0  "10.0 
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Appendix  6.1.  List  of  the  Votes  Analysed  (the  CPD  of  Russia) 
Votes 
Score  Re- 
Pro  Con  Abi  (Pro  sulz 
vote) 
<Economic  Issue  I:  Land  Reform> 
P1  Shakhrai's  amendment  on  Land  Reform  602  369  40  +10  A 
T4  Excluding  a  moratorium  on  the  sale  of  land  (Art.  12)  377  428  43  +10  R 
U3  Muravev's  amendment  to  Art.  12  (land  sale  right) 
__413___ 
342  46  -10  R 
<Economic  Issues  II: 
-Resolutions 
on  Economic  Situation 
Q2  Zakharov  &  Kalashnikov's  proposal  to  insert  the  320  527  79  -10  R 
phrase  that  "the  Russian  leadership's  performance  be 
assessed  as  unsatisfactory"  in  the  resolution  on 
political  and  economic  condition  and  for  a  way  out  of 
the  crisis 
T2  A  draft  resolution  "On  the  Progress  of  Economic  536  217  82  +10  A 
Reform  in  the  Russian  Federation"  as  a  basis  of 
further  discussion 
U2  A  resolution  "On  the  Course  of  Economic  Reform  in  588  238  23  -10  A 
the  Russian  Federation  (Editorial  Commission 
version 
<Issues  on  the  President  and  Government  I:  the  law  on  the  Pres_idency> 
Q1  The  question  on  the  presidency  and  reforms  of  541  411  38  -10  A 
government 
power  and  administrative  system  to  be  reviewed  in 
the  following  Congress 
RI  Adoption  of  the  law  on  the  Presidency  as  a  basis  of  615  235  66  +10  A 
further  discussion 
R2  Belonogov's  proposal  against  the  President's  party  421  486  40  -10  R 
membership  (Art.  121  point  3) 
<rssues  on  the  President  and  Government  II:  no-confidence  vote, 
TI  Isakov's  proposal  to  discuss  the  question  of  a  no.  412  447  70  -10  R 
confidence  vote  in  the  government 
U1  Saenko's  proposal  to  include  the  question  of  no.  423  357  54  -10  R 
confidence  in  the  president  on  the  agenda 
<Balance  of  Power  between  the  Legislative  and  Executive  Branches 
Q3  Adoption  of  a  resolution  "On  the  Redistribution  of  511  316  72  +10  R 
Authority  among  Higher  Government  Organs  of  the 
RF  for  Realisation  of  Anti-crisis  Measures"  as  a  basis 
of  further  discussion 
S2  Adoption  of  a  resolution  "On  the  Organisation  of  618  127  100  +10  A 
Executive  Power  in  the  Period  of  Radical  Economic 
Reforms"  (a  moratorium  on  local  elections) 
S3  Adoption  of  a  draft  resolution  "On  the  Legal  529  206  53  +10  A 
Guarantee  for  Economic  Reform"  (Editorial 
Commission  version) 
T3  Eltsin's  amendment  to  a  draft  resolution  "On  the  429  313  64  +10  R 
Progress  of  Economic  Reform":  to  be  allowed  to 
head  and  form  government  until  1  December  1992 
T5  Sheboldaev's  Constitutional  amendment  to  Art.  109  510  333  40  .  10  R 
point  3:  "The  Supreme  Soviet  endorses  the 
appointment  of  the  chairman  of  the  Council  of 
Ministers.  " (Appendix)  384 
(cont.  ) 
Votes 
Score  Rc" 
Pro  Con  Abs  (Pro  suit 
vote) 
U4  Eltsin's  Constitutional  amendment  to  Art.  122:  "The  309  522  36  +10  R 
Council  of  Ministers  is  a  body  of  executive  power 
that  is  accountable  to  the  Congress  and  the  President 
of  the  RF.  "  (excluding  the  Supreme  Soviet) 
U5  Zor'kin's  proposal  on  the  resolution  "On  the  541  98  67  +10  A 
Stabilisation  of  the  Structure  of  the  RF" 
<Other  Issues> 
P2  Babaev  &  Tikhomirov's  proposal  on  the  measures  498  369  23  -10  R 
for  stabilisation  of  economy  and  transition  to  the 
market  relations  in  the  RSFSR:  "the  measures  be  in 
accordance  with  those  measures  adopted  in  other 
republics.  " 
P3  A  proposal  to  include  a  social  development  556  220  27  +10  A 
programme  for  the  North  in  the  measures  for  the 
stabilisation  and  the  transition  to  the  market  relations 
R3  Shakhrai's  proposal  to  adopt  the  law  on  the  Constitutional  498  343  59  +10  R 
Court  without  discussion 
Si  Isaev's  proposal  on  the  election  of  the  Chairman  of  the  462  422  38  +10  R 
Supreme  Soviet:  "to  ask  Khasbulatov  to  stay  in  office  and 
to  postpone  the  election  until  the  following  CPD" 
P:  Votes  in  the  First  CPD  of  the  RF;  Q:  the  Second  CPD;  R:  the  Fourth  CPD;  S:  the  Fifth  CPD;  T:  the 
Sixth  CPD;  U:  the  Seventh  CPD;  A:  adopted;  R.  rejected (Appendix)  38S 
Appendix  6.2.  The  Voting  Patterns  of  Deputies  in  the  Russian  CPD 
Land  Reform  Eco  Situation  Confidence  Preeiden  ctr  Belenc.  Power  Iher  Iuu. 
N  P1  T4  U3  2  T2  U2  TI  1  1  R1  R  2  R 
<Rsatonal  Feetorsa 
Northw.  et  89  2.0  -1.1  0.4  2.2  2.7  "1.3  1.3  -0.4  .  2.1  2.7 
4.1  1.2  4.8  3.2  0.9  .  1.1  3.1  3.5  -2.4  0.9  -0.7  -0.2  Centel  53  3.0  -0.2  -20  1.7  2.5  "1.0  -0.0  -1.3  -1.3  3.9  0.5  1.8  5.5  1.2  2.8 
-0.2  .  1.7  4.1  . 0.3  1.0  1.6  0.9  Chernozem  43  "3.3  3.1  .  .  0.7  3.4  "1.9  .  1.1  4.2  3.3  -2.6  1.7 
Volga  300  4.1  0.7  -1.6  1.0  2.5  -to  -0.5  -2.4  -2.1  3.3  0.0  1.3  5.9  1.2  1.6  0.7  46  3.2  -2.1  2.0  0.5  0.  e 
Northam  tau  120  0.3  -2.4  -0.6  2.2  3.8  40  0.0  -0.4  -10  2.6  .  0.8  1.0  3.7  2.4  1.6  3.4  .  4.3  49  .  2.4  3.1  34  . 2.5 
Urals  111  31  .  1.4  1.3  2.2  2.1  3.7  41  -0.4  .  1.7  6.0  0.2  2.4  5.2  4.6  0,7  .  1.4  .  4.2  3.8  0.4  1.2  1.4  0.6  Sib.  ri.  171  2.2  -2.1  -0.8  1.2  3.8  -4.7  -0.2  0.1  -1.9  21  -0.9  0.6  3.5  4.7  0.9  -2.1  &1  3.6  -2.3  3.2  03  .  0.6 
Far  East  63  4.0  0.3  "2.1  1.0  4.0  -1.5  1.9  0.5  44  2.9  1.9  0.5  3.6  4.0  14  0.3  -1.0  5.4  -0.6  4.8  12  0.3 
Others  125  -to  0.3  -2.1  5.3  4.0  -1.5  1.9  0.5  4.3  5.7  4.1  6.4  3.6  4.3  2.4  -3.0  -1.6 
5.4  2.2  3.4  4.9  4.3  total  1062  2.2  4.0  .  0.9  1.9  5.4  3.1  3.5  -0.3  "1.2  3.5  0.6  1.9  4.7  3.1  48  1.0  .  0.8  3.6  -1.2  3.2  1.6  0.4 
F  value  8.00  6.59  2.79  3.51  3.40  4.58  3.33  1.22  7.46  4.01  3.97  6.33  3.03  5.64  3.23  246  2.56  3.33  4.53  6.01  5.59  5.92 
p  value 
l  R  lA  i  ti  II  /  nd 
0.000  0.000  0.005 
Otha  al 
0.001  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.284  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.004  0.000  0.001  0.012  0.009  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 





2.8  -1.0  -0.6  1.5  2.6  3.5  -0.1  -0.8  -2.0  3.3  0.1  1.3  48  2.9  15  .  1.0  3.0  3.8  .  1.7  3.1  1.0  -0.1 
Fvalue  2.0  2.5  3.1  0.6  2.1  5.2  11  1.3  0.1  2.9  1.2  0.6  3.0  6.1  2.5  1.1  1.1  1.4  1,9  5.5  21  2.4 
p  value 
g  i  St  tu  e 
0.008  0.018  0.003  0.756  0.037  0.000  0.037  0.238  0.003  0.008  0.315  0.704  0.006  0.000  0.016  0.340  0.308  0.193  0.086  0.000  0.013  0.024 
mnnm  c  ruc  r 
rural  regions  109  1.8  -0.9  0.3  1.1  4.4  3.0  0.5  -1.4  3.0  2.5  -1.1  0.3  4.5  2.1  2.6  -1.2  -2.6  4.9  45  2.0  2.6  "2.5  resource  regions  91  3.6  -2.2  .  1.7  2.0  6.4  -4.2  -0.2  -1.5  -2.2  2.5  -0.5  1.0  5.3  5.2  0.2  .  1.4  -3.3  4.7  3.0  6.9  0.2  1.6 
hublgateregions  359  1.0  1.3  -0.8  3.7  2.9  -2.0  1.4  0.3  1.1  4.8  to  4.0  3.7  3.1  2.6  -0.9  -0.5  4.9  0.0  3.0  2.5  1,1 
residual  mgions  503  2.9  -1.3  -0.7  0.7  24  3.9  .  0.4  -1.0  "2.3  3.1  -0.2  0.8  5.3  2.9  1.2  -2.4  .  3.5  3.5  .  1.9  2.9  0.1  0.3  Fvalue  3.5  7.7  0.9  9.4  4.6  5.6  2.7  2.4  12.0  4.0  8.6  11.9  3.7  19  39  2.0  0.3  3.5  11.2  4.2  4.3  4.9 
P  value 
I.  l  tt  di  s  C 
0.014  0.000  0.449  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.042  0.065  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.012  0.030  0.009  0.100  0.000  0.015  0.000  0.008  0.006  0.002 
u  an  s  an  na 
htghty  developed  113  3.9  3.9  0.7  6.8  5.1  .  2.1  2.9  2.1  5.6  6.7  4.7  6.9  3.6  4.6  4.5  0.8  3.4  5.6  3.7  4.2  4.6  3.9 
wed  developed  295  4.1  -0.2  -1.3  2.2  2.3  3.3  0.2  -0.0  -0.9  4.4  1.4  2.8  4.6  3.2  1.4  "22  -2.7  4.0  -0.4  2.4  1.6  1.9 
moderately  developed  85  3.2  -0.1  0.2  0.0  2.2  44  .  1.0  -2.3  "2.5  1.2  42  1.1  4.7  1.6  0.5  .  1.8  3.0  2.0  .  2.7  4.6  0.11  1.6 
under-developed  373  2.2  -1.2  -1.0  1.3  2.8  -3.3  0.0  -1.0  -2.0  2.6  0.1  0.0  6.1  3.0  2.0  "1.7  -2.6  4.0  -21  3.0  0.6  "1.2 
poorlydaveloped  157  21  -1.8  0.0  0.8  3.2  -4.4  0.5  -0.5  -4.8  2.7  .  1.7  -0.4  4.1  3.2  1.4  45  -3.7  3.9  3.7  2.7  1.2  -1.3  total  1023  2.1  .  0.4  -0.7  2.0  2,0  3.3  0.3  -0.7  -1.3  3.6  0.5  1.0  4.7  3.2  1,0  -1.1  -2.3  4.2  -1.3  3.0  1.5  0.6 
F  value  16.4  8.7  1.8  11.8  2.5  1.6  3.7  4.2  23.4  6.1  9.9  16.4  1.0  1.7  3.8  2.6  0.5  4.8  14.3  1.6  4.6  10.0 
p  value 
ti  dl  &F  d  l 
0.000 
tat  s 
0.000  0.119  0.000  0.023  0.201  0.005  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.389  0.152  0.008  0.024  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.119  0.001  0.000 
ons  e  e  Vylna  can 
highly  adapted  region 
u  era  s 
64  -7.2  4.3  0.3  6.3  6.2  -2.0  3.0  21  6.7  7.0  6.2  0.4  2.5  4.1  4.1  0.5  11  1.5  0.3  3.6  6.0  5.2 
adapted  regions  214  3.0  0.2  0.4  3.4  2.4  -2.5  1.1  0.4  0.2  4.6  12  3.3  5.0  34  2.7  -1.2  -0.8  4.0  -0.2  3.1  1.7  1.5 
stagnated  regions  579  2.3  -0.8  -1.0  0.8  2.9  3.2  -0.3  -1.1  .  2.2  2.4  -0.2  00  44  28  1.6  .  1.6  -29  4.1  -12  2.0  0.6  -0.2 
stagnated  republics  82  2.0  -23  0.1  2.4  3.5  43  1.6  43  -5.2  3.6  -1.5  0.7  4.8  3.3  1.9  "1.8  .  4.0  3.3  3.0  3.5  1,1  -2.1 
adapted  republics  84  4.9  -1.3  -2.9  1.2  1.1  45  -1.0  -1.3  .  1.2  5.1  0.7  1.3  7.3  3.6  0.6  3.0  .  40  35  .  1.3  37  2.5  1,6 
total  1023  2.1  .  0.4  -0.7  2.0  2.9  3.3  0.3  -0.7  -1.3  36  0.5  1.9  4.7  32  1.0  -1.7  -13  4.2  -1.3  3.0  1.5  0.5 
F  value  20.8  0.0  2.8  13.4  3.5  3.4  3.1  3.3  19.3  0.2  8.0  14.1  4.7  0.7  2.3  25  9.3  4.5  15.3  0.4  6.2  30 
p  value  0.000  0.000  0.024  0.000  0.007  0.008  0.014  0.008  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.569  0.059  0.043  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.801  0.000  0.000 
largeelue$  603  24  1.3  -0.5  3.7  3.7  4.8  1.0  0.4  1.0  4.5  26  3.4  4.2  33  to  -1.0  -1.4  4.8  06  2.0  26  1.7 
midium-alnd  cities  167  2.2  -3.0  .  0.9  .  1.1  2.3  .  4.1  -0.8  .  1.8  .  8.2  2.5  4.5  -0.7  6.3  34  0.5  -3.0  .  31  4.1  -4.1  4.5  .  0.6  .  1.9 
small  cities  192  2.0  .  1.1  0.0  1.6  3.5  -4.0  -0.2  .  1.8  43  33  -0.1  1.6  to  10  2.2  .  1.0  "2.0  3.0  -2.5  33  0.2  -0.5 
rural  areas  77  -0.1  -0.7  -3.4  -3.0  -1.3  .  5.7  45  -4.5  -6.0  -0.6  49  .  10  4.8  31  -2.0  -4.7  -6.2  1.3  .  4.0  3.5  -0.5  .  2.1 
total  1050  2.2  -0.5  -0.7  20  3.0  3.4  0.3  -0.7  -1.2  3.8  0.6  1.9  4.7  31  1.6  .  1.7  43  4.3  .  1.2  3.2  1.5  0.4 
F  value  1.8  28.5  3.2  25.9  9.9  4.3  15.7  9.6  32.7  10.4  25.5  20.7  3.7  1.4  11.1  6.7  I.  1  0.9  21.9  2.9  11.5  11.1 
p  value 
d-r-1  St  t  F 
0.139  0.000  0.021  0.000  0.000  0.005  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.047  0.242  0.000  0.001  0,000  0.000  0.000  0.034  0.000  0.000 
a  es  e 
autonomous  226  3.2  "1.3  -0.5 
1.9  3.7  -6.4  0.5  41  -23  4.2  -0.5  1.0  4.9  3.8  1.1  3.9  4.2  4.2  . 
1.5  4.6  1.6  4.4  non-autonomous  636  1.9  -0.3  .  0.6  2.0  2.6 
-2.8  0.3  -0.6  -0.9  3.4  0.0  2.1  4.6  3.0  to  -1.3  .  1.6  4,3  -1.1  2.5  1.4  0.6  T  value  1.8  -1.5  -0.3  .  0.1  1.3  .  4.1  0.4  .  0.1  . 20  1.3  -2.0  -1.7  0.5  0.9  -1.4  3.4  3.1  -0.1  -0.6  to  0.3  -1.4  value  0.074  0  141  0.759  0  931  0.195  0.000  681  891  0  052  0  208  0  044  0482  038  0  354  0,173  1  0,424  0  004  0,751  1 
Functional  Fsetnna 
Political  Blass 
Coalition  for  Reform  105  1.6  5.3  4.6  9.1  6.7  4.4  72  7.2  6.6  9.0  06  9.7  4.7  30  7.5  5.1  7.3  6.7  6.0  1.0  6.1  1.2 
Democratic  Centre  150  6.4  2.0  0.0  5.3  5.7  3.1  4.8  2.3  1.7  7.1  39  5.6  8.0  2.6  4.2  41  -1.8  1.0  -0.1  3.0  4.3  1.5 
Creative  Strength  143  5.7  0.3  -1.4  3.5  4.3  -4.1  0.6  "1.5  0.3  4.5  31  3.8  4.4  3.9  0.1  3.1  3.6  34  -0.3 
31  24  4.2 
Russian  Unity  280  .  1.1  -0.4  3.9  41  -1.6  -6.4  43  -7.1  4.6  -31  .  6.5  4.6  31  4.2  47  -8.2  .  7.4  43  .  61  39  . 44  32 
low  675  2.0  -1.3  -0.0  1.2  2.5  3.2  -0.3  -1.0  -1.0  to  0.1  1.2  4.3  3.5  1.0  -to  .  2.5  4.0  -1.0  3.2  1.0  -0.7  F  value  32.7  83.4  30.2  148.7  55.0  72.5  120.2  158.9  200.1  115.6  145.1  185.0  5.1  1.6  54.3  46.3  141.8  109.7  79.4  34  95.1  65.0 
p  value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  O.  ODO  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.195  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.015  0.000  0.000 
>rl6ttL 
nom.  nkiatur.  120  .  2.2  -3.6  .  2.1  .  4.1  1.3  .  4.3  .  1.0  48  .  8.0  .  1.5  -5.1  -6.1  39  37  0.7  .  1.1  .  3.6  2.7  4.1  6.1  -46  3.4 
cadres  217  1.3  -1.1  -1.3  0.2  2.6  -4.2  47  -1.5  "4.1  2.6  .  1.9  0.0  4.7  32  1.0  3.3  .  3.0  34  3.3  31  0.7  47 
military  47  0.9  1.8  -1.0  -0.4  3.1  -4.9  0.1  0.2  -4.0  0.0  .  0,9  .  1.5  5.6  3.6  0.9  .  12  3.3  3.3  3.8  4.9  -2.6  3.4 
managers  211  1.9  .  4.5  -0.9  -0.7  0.3  -5.6  3.2  -3.2  -4.6  2.3  4.0  -0.4  5.3  3.1  -0.3  3.6  4.4  3.0  3.1  2.6  .  0.6  4.7 
Intelligentsia  120  1.3  3.1  0.4  5.9  5.6  -1.1  31  24  4.3  0.3  4.5  5.9  3.3  2.7  5.0  0.9  0.7  6.9  3.1  2.6  4.6  3.1 
technicians  134  4.8  1.4  .  0.3  5.0  4.1  41  2.0  0.2  2.7  6.9  3.0  8.3  6.0  2.3  3.6  .  0.2  .  1.5  6.6  0.9  2.6  4.3  2.2 
workers  56  3.8  4..  3  43  2.7  4.5  3.2  0.6  -0.8  1.7  4.4  3.2  4.4  5.0  2.0  -0.5  .  1.7  3.7  4.9  0.0  32  3.6  to 
tow  015  1.6  -1.1  -1.0  1.2  2.1  3.6  -0.1  -1.2  3.2  3.0  43  1.0  4.7  30  1.5  "3.0  "2.6  4.0  41  3.4  0.6  .  0.2 
F  v"  6.7  15.6  1.4  25.2  7.3  5.3  10.7  1.1  37.6  13.8  21.0  30.0  1.0  0.0  1.4  5.4  5.3  5.0  16.6  1.7  20.7  0.1 
p  value  0.000  0  000  0.223  0.000  0000 
.  000  0.000  0000  04000  0.000  0000  0000  0.177  7  0000  0000  0,110 
ePC  IM  mberehla 
member  809  1.9  "21  .  1.2  0.1  2.2  4.7  .  1.0  -2.0  3.6  2.2  -1.3  . 0.1  4.8  33  0.1  41  47  3.6  43  3.6  .  0.2  .  1.3 
nan"member  253  3.2  4.6  1.0  1.9  5.6  0.9  4.4  3.5  7.2  0.1  5.8  6.2  4.1  2.4  6.2  1.3  to  6.3  6.3  2.1  6.6  6.6  Tvalue  -1.9  "11.4  3.6  .  13.5  -5.9  "9.6  -0.3  .  9.1  .  16.6  .  10.4  -132  -146  1.4  1.5  .  7.3  4.3  -8.3  .  6.7  -14.6  2.4  .  11.7  .  11.0  value  006  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  000  00  00  0,00  0,00  0  00  400 
- 
1  0.13  000  <Psnona  Fuctarss  - 
90gdaL 
trials  1006  21  .  0.4  -0.6  1.6  3.1  -3.5  0.2  .  0.6  -1.3  36  0.5  I's  4.6  31  1.5  .  1.7  43  4.3  .  1.2  3.3  1.4  0.4  Iwnais  58  3.9  -1.4  .  2.7  3.5  2.1  -1.1  2.3  -1.5  -0.2  3.6  2.0  2.1  5.6  2.6  to  . 
1.6  .  2.3  27  .  1.1  3.4  19  .  0.5  Tvalue  -1.4  0.8  1.8  .  1.5  0.9  "2.1  .  1.7  1.0  -0.9  -0.2  .  1.1  43  .  1.0  0.6  -01  -0.1  0.0  1.9  .9  0  .0  2  .  1.2  0.6  p  value 
G 
0.154  0.408  0.089  0.112  0.379  0.032  0.080  0.309  0.393  0.881  0.201  0.004  0.343  0.872  0.801  0.094  0.963  0.085  .  0.902  .  0.525  0.220  0.438 
enamuon 




.2  4  6  3  40 
p  value  Od  l  E  i  0.000  0.000  0.561  0.000  0.009  0.003  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.596  0.000  0.004  0,009  0.016  .  0.123  0.000  . 
0.016 
. 
0.000  0.000  n  a  thn  c 
Russian  633  3.4  -0.1  .  0.6  2.1  3.0  -2.9  0.2  -0.5  -0.6  3.1  1.1  2.2  4.6  2.9  to  .  1,4  .1  9  4  3  -0  6  2  0  1  1  0.7 
others  229  L6  .  1.7  -1.0  1.2  3.0  -5.2  0.5  -0.6  .  2.6  31  -1.1  0.6  4.6  3.6  1.2  47  . 
-4  2  .  4  2  . 
.2  6  .  4  1  .  0  6  47  T  value  1.1  2.4  0.7  1.4  0.0  38  -0.6  0.2  3.0  1.0  3.2  17  -0.3  -0.0  1.2  1.0  .  3.5  .  0  2  .  534  0  . 
"1  9 
.  1.9  1.9 
value  0  281  0  019  . 509  0.155  . 999  0,0001  0  542  03  4bQ3 
_ 
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Appendix  6.3.  The  Voting  Patterns  of  SIBFE  Deputies  (the  Russian  CPD) 
Lend  Reform  Eco  Slluadon  Confidence  Pftaldencv  Balance  of  Power  the  Iesu.  3 
N  Pt  T4  U3  Q2  I  T2  U2  T1  U1  1  RI  R2  2  S3  I  T3  I  Y5  L14  US  P  R 
"  "  +  "  f  f  "  f  +  f  f 
cRaalonel  Factors 
rcon.  rnle  Structure 
r  ual  regions  26  4.2  . 0.8  1.2  0.4  3.6  04.5  1.2  0.8  -4.2 
1.9  0.0  0.0  4.6  -0.4 
4.6  0.8  0.0  3.8  0..  e  .  0.4  1.2  -1.  $ 
resource  regions  61  3.1  -2.1  .  3.2  21  5.1  -4.0  -0.7  -1.3  -2.0  3.3  . 0.5  1.3  6.6  46  1.0  -1.3  04.2  5.5  -2.0  46  0.7  2.3 
hubigats  raglans  48  4.8  0.9  1.1  1.7  4.1  -2.2  3.5  1.1  44  3.5  1.5  0.9  3.0  5.0  3.0  0.1  -0.4  5.0  0.0  2.0  2.2  .  1.1 
residua  regions  101  1.2  -2.8  -0.8  0.5  3.6  -4.4  -0.1  1.1  .  1.3  1.3  -0.1  0.2  1.5  5.0  -0.4  .  4.4  04.4  3.0  -2.2  4.8  0.2  -1.3  total  234  2.7  -1.7  -0.8  1.2  4.1  -3.8  0.0  0.4  "2.0  23  -0.1  0.6  3.7  4.3  1.2  -2.0  -2.4  4,4  -1.9  3.6  0.6  -0.3 
F  value  1.9  2.0  2.9  0.5  0.5  0.8  2.1  1.2  0.7  1.0  0.7  0.3  8.2  3.9  3.0  4.9  2.0  1.2  1.2  4.0  0.5  2.3 
p  4510. 




0.135  0.113  0.034 
ouaea  from  Kamchatl 
0.830  0.669  0.485 
11 
0.103  0.322  0.540  0.376  0.593  0160  0.000  0.010  0.030  0.003  0.111  0.290  0.318  0.003  0.  666  0.075 
f  8  6.3  -1.3  -1.3  5.0  2.5  -6.3  -3.8  -3.8  0.0  6.3  0.0  .  2.5  7.5  7.5  .  1.3  -1.3  -2.5  6.3  -2.5  2.5  -1.3  1.3 
well  developed  10  2.9  4.4  -25  2.3  6.0  -3.3  0.9  0.1  -1.0  2.6  0.0  26  5.1  4.9  1.3  -14  -2.5  4.2  -1.4  6.1  1,3  2.1 
moderately  developed 
under-dw.  bped  77  4.2  0.3  -0.4  1.7  3.4  -3.6  21  0.9  -1.7  1.8  -0.1  0.8  2.4  5.0  1.4  -2.2  -2.0  3.0  -1.0  2.2  1.3  -1.1 
poorly  developed  at  .  0.2  .  2.2  0.2  44  3.3  -5.1  -0.6  1.0  -3.5  1.6  -1,0  -4.6  2.2  4.0  24  -2.5  -3.7  3.9  -4.1  3.3  1.0  -2.7 
total  206  2.7  -1.7  -1.0  1.3  3.0  f.  0  0.7  0.5  -2.3  2.2  -0.3  0.7  3.6  4,5  1.5  -2.3  -2.6  Cl  -2.0  3.5  1.1  -0.3 
F  value  2.6  2.3  1.2  2.4  0.8  0.7  1.4  0.8  2.6  0.7  0.1  2.0  2.8  0.5  0.4  0.1  0.4  0.3  1.4  2.0  0.2  4.8 
p  volu. 
F  l  d 
0.039  0.081 
h 
0.327  0,066  0.491  0.537  0.240  0.498  0.039  0.544  0.943  0.056  0.042  0.008  0.739  0.983  0.747  0.830  0.242  0.114  0.  097  0.004 
e  Living  condistions  R 




u  ta 
4.6  -3.2  -0.4  4.0  3.5  -3.5  -0.2  0.0  0.8  3.6  00  2.0  0.4  5.4  1.4  4.4  -0.8  3.1  -1.4  5.2  1.0  3.0 
stagnated  regions  140  2.5  -0.6  -0.7  0.6  3.8  4.9  0.6  0.4  -2.9  1.4  -0.9  0.6  2.6  4.3  1.4  -1.9  -2.9  4.4  49  2.5  1.2  -1.7 
stagnated  republics  9  -22  .  1.1  -4.4  0.0  2.2  4.6  2.2  -1.1  4.4  2.2  0.0  -12  1.1  3.3  4.4  3.3  -22  22  -22  2.2  1.1  0.0 
adapted  republics  10  -2.0  -8.0  "0.0  -3.0  8.0  4.0  3.0  1.0  -6.0  6.0  4.0  -2.0  2.0  8.0  0.0  -7.0  -7.0  6.0  -8.0  10.0  1.0  3.0 
total  209  2.6  -1.5  -1.1  1.2  3.9  -3.5  0.6  0.4  "2.2  22  -0.2  0.7  3.6  4.7  1.4  -2.3  -2.0  4.2  -2.0  3.5  1.1  -0.3 
F  value  2.5  2.0  1.8  2.8  1.2  0.2  0.4  0.1  28  1.5  1.1  1.0  3.1  1.1  0.4  2.5  1.6  1.8  0.6  4.0  0.0  3.8 
p  value 
t  E 
0.050  0.109  0.147  0.043  0,306  0.900  0.738  0.050  0.039  0.103  0.364  0.397  0.027  0.342  0.738  0.056  0.198  0.144  0.509  0.004  0.999  0.011 
as  Srhads  vs  Far 
Siberia  171  2.2  .  2.4  -0.3  1.2  42  -4.5  0.1  0.5  -1.9  2.1  -0.9  0.0  3.8  4.4  0.0  -1.6  -2.5  4.0  .  2.3  3.2  0.3  -0.6 
For  East  03  4.0  0.3  -2.2  1.0  4.0  -1.7  1.9  0.2  -2.4  2.9  1.9  0.5  3.6  4.0  2.4  -3.0  -1.0  6.6  -0.8  4.8  2.2  0.3 
T  value  -1.3  "2.1  1.8  0.2  0.2  -2.3  -1.3  0.3  0.4  -0.6  -2.1  0.1  .  0.2  0.4  "1.2  1.0  -0.6  .  1.6  .  1.3  -1,4  .  1.5  -0.7 
p  value 
k 
0.195  0.035  0.119  0.831  0.849  0.021  0.194  0.757  0.711  0.553  0.040  0  899  0.650  0.671  0.225  0.303  0.628  0.103  0.189  0.164  0.147  0.505 
hs  'lumen  vi  Sa 
namen 
5  6.3  -1.3  -1.3  5.0  2.5  4.3  -3.8  -3.8  0.0  6.3  0.0  -2.5  1.5  7.5  -1.3  -1.3  -2.5  6.3  -2.5  2.5  -1.3 
1.3 
Sakha  10  "2.0  4.0  4.0  4.0  8.0  04.0  3.0  1.0  -5.0  0.0  4.0  -20  2.0  5.0  0.0  -7.0  .  7.0  5.0  4.0  10.0  1.0  3.0 
T  value  2.1  1.5  1.2  1.9  -2.1  -0.8  -1.5  -1.4  1.4  0.1  -0.9  -0.1  2.1  -0.2  .  0.3  1.5  1.2  -0.6  0.9  -3.4  -0.5  -0.4  p  vale. 
ll  0.057  0.157  0.250  0.070  0.057  0.440  0.141  0.195  0.170  0.942  0.357  0.915  0.057  0.554  0.766  0.163  0.235  0,537  0.405  0.004  0.615  0.657 
tirban-lura 
large  clan  127  4.3  4.6  -1.0  2.5  4.2  -2.0  1.4  1.2  -0.4  2.4  1.3  1.4  3.6  4.4  2.1  49  -1.8  4.4  -0.6 
2.7  1.6  1.2 
mldlum-sized  dad  39  2.1  "2.8  -2.1  -0.3  5.1  4.8  0.3  0.8  4.6  3.1  -2.1  -0.5  4.1  5.1  0.3  Al  -28  5.6  -2.8  5.0  1.0  -1.3 
smen  clan  48  1.3  -1.7  1.0  0.2  4.4  4.5  1.3  -0.4  -1.3  2.5  -0.8  0.6  4.2  3.5  1.0  06  -25  4.0  -2.0  4.8  -0.6  -2.3 
rural  areas  19  .  2.1  4.3  -2.1  -2.1  0.0  4.6  4.3  4.7  4,3  -0.5  .  3.7  -2.1  21  4.2  -3.2  4.7  43  2.6  -5.6 
2.1  -0.5  -3.2 
total  233  2.7  -1.8  -0.8  1.2  4.1  -3.8  0.8  0.4  -2.0  23  .  0.1  0.6  3.1  4.3  1.1  -2.0  44  4.4  -1.8  3.8  0.9  -0.3 
Fvalu.  3.6  2.7  1.2  2.5  2.3  4.5  3.0  2.0  5.4  01  27  1.2  0.4  0.3  2.0  2.7  2.0  1,2  1.2  4.9  0.5  2.3 
pvalu. 
l  St  t 
0.015  0.046  0.294  0.081  0.081  0.004  0.031  0.112  0.001  0.490  0,044  0.327  0.770  0.805  0.106  0.045  0.117  0.299  0.318  0.003  0.665  0.075 
Federa  a  us 
autonomous  59  1.2  -1.5  -0.8  0.7  6.3  -5.1  1.7  2.0  -20  4.2  -0.2  -0.2  1.2  4.2  1.7  04.1  "3.0  6.1  -2.0  6.3  0.1  -0.2 
non-autonomous  175  3.2  "1.7  -0.8  1.3  3.4  as  0.2  -0.1  -to  1.7  -0.1  0.9  4.5  4.3  1.0  -1.7  -1.6  3.8  -1.6  21  0.9  -0.4  T  value  -1.5  0.2  0.0  -0.5  2.6  -1.5  1.0  1.7  0.0  2.0  0.0  -0.8  -2.9  -0.1  0.5  -1.0  -1.5  2.3  -02  3.3  -0.1  0.2 
p  value 
0.143  0  881  0  978  0  830  0.009  0.144  0  297  0  094  0  961  0.04  0968  0.443  0004  0.931  0  e025  0  30  en  0.001  e.  0  bee 
eFUnetlanaa  Factoraa 
Pai  I  al  Ala 
Coaltlon  for  Reform  25  6.4  3.6  8.2  9.2  0.0  4.1  7.2  16  6.4  10.0  6.4  0.6  4.8  -0.8  7.2  3.6  8.2  6.8  4.4  0.0  10.0  6.0 
Democratic  Centre  27  1.6  3.0  -1.1  tat  6.7  42  4.6  5.1  "2.6  3.7  1.9  1.1  1.9  4.4  4.1  47  -0.2 
72  -3.7 
4.6  3.7  0.0 
Craseva  Strength  36  1.2  -1.1  -0.5  4.7  4.7  .  4.3  3.3  0.5  0.5  5.0  2.2  2.5  5.4  7.1  -0.6  04.6  42  3.5  1.7  5.0  5.0  0.9 
Russian  Unity  66  -1.5  "7.5  -52  04.9  -1.0  -7.0  -7.0  -e.  8  4.0  .  4.3  -6.1  04.2  1.2  e.  0  04.7  -5.4  -7.8  -0.1  -7.0  5.0  -4.8  4.9 
Dep.  not  In  the  blocs  79  3.5  -0.1  1.5  3.0  8.2  -4.4  1.5  1.5  -0.5  4.1  0.5  1.6  5.1  3.2  3.6  0.3  -26  6.2  -0.  e  2.6  4.1  1.7 
tom  233  2.7  "1.6  -0.8  1.2  4.1  -3.7  0.6  0.3  -20  2.4  4.1  0.6  0.  e  4.3  1.3  41  043  4.3  -1.9 
3.1  2.4  -0.3  F  value  7.9  15.0  14.5  26.8  16.4  13.4  24.3  38.3  20.4  24.6  10.9  18.3  3.5  5.0  12.0  7.3  20.6  20.6  13.1  3.0  15.6  19.3 
P  value  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0,000  0.000  01000  0.000  0.009  0.000  0,000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.020  0.000  0.000 
nom.  nldatura  29  .  2.0  4.8  -3.2  -5.2  2.1  4.8  -0.3  .  1.1  .  7.6  -21  -4.6  .  4.6  3.1  5.9  0.7  -1,7  -044  2.0  -7.9  3.4  4.5  -4.5 
cadres  50  3.0  -0.4  -1.8  1.6  6.3  4.7  0.2  1.4  4.6  3.2  44  -0.2  4.5  4.3  1.6  -1,6  -1.6 
6.1  4.6  3.6  2.8  0.2 
military  10  2.0  -2.0  -4.0  -6.0  5.0  -7.0  -2.0  -2.0  4.0  -2.0  -6,0  .  7.0  6.0  4.0  0.0  40  4.0  1.0  -3.0  7.0  -4.0  4.0 
manna"  49  1.4  3.0  -0.2  -0.4  1.6  -0.9  -2.0  -2.0  4.5  23  -1.4  -0.0  4.3  4.7  -2.4  -2.2  -4.5  3.7  -4.7  4.1  0.4  -1.6 
Intelligentsia  22  6.4  1.4  -0.5  4.1  4.3  -0.5  2.9  1.4  1.4  4.1  2.3  3.2  1.9  5.7  2.9  .  1.4  .  1.9  29  2.3  3.2  1,8  0.9 
technicians  34  2.8  -1.5 
-0.9  3.8  2.0  -3.5  2.0  0.0  0.0  3.5  0.9  3.0  4.4  2.1  4.7  42  0.3  0.2  -0.6  2.6  1.5  0.3 
wakes  to  0.3  -1.4  .  1.9  25  5.0  4.1  0.6  0.0  OA  3.1  2.6  5.0  1.3  4.4  -23  45  -3.1  2.5  1.3  3.8  1.0  3.1 
tom  210  2.3  -21  -1.4  0.6  3.6  -4.3  0.2  0.0  47  2.1  48  0.0  3.8  4.4  0.6  -2.2  -2.9  4.2  -27  3.7  0,3  -1.0  F  value  2.9  1.7  0.7  5.1  2.2  2.2  1.3  1.0  3.9  21  24  5.0  0.7  0.9  2.9  0.1  1.9  1.9  5.0  0.6  3.4  2.8 
p 
value 
hi  b  l 
0.010  0.133  0.676  0.000  0.040  0.041  0.272  0.409  0.001  0.055  0.030  0.000  0.612  0.510  0.010  0.990  0.085  0.077  0.000  0.814  0.003  0.012 
a  f:  PSt  Uam  ers 
number  151  1.4  41  -1.3  -0.6  3.1  -4.8  -0.3  -0.8  -4.3  104  . 2.0  -1.4  3.5  4.7  0.3  46  4e  3.9  .  17  4.1  04.7  -2.3 
non-member  53  7.0  3.4  1.3  7.0  7.4  -0.4  3.8  3.5  6.8  6.4  62  7.4  4.3  28  4.0  0.2  21  6.0  4.3  21  6.6  6.2 
T  value  .  4.0  4.0  "22  -5.9  -3.8  -3.6  .  2.9  04.3  -1.9  -4.1  -6.2  .  6.9  04.7  1,6  -2.6  -20  . 4,4  41  4.3  1.6  -4.6  4.4 
p  valve  . 
000  0.000  0.030 
. 




000  0000  0  000  0000  0463  0,101  0.01  0  0,043 
cPar  n  "lrlFF.  ctorea 
a9at19c 
mal.  223  2.8  -1.6  -0.1  1.3  4.2  4.0  0.5  0.5  -2.0 
24 
-0.2  0.7  3.6  4.4  1.2  -1,6  44  4.4  -1.1  3.6  0.9  42 
female  11  4.5  -27  -3.8  -0.9  1.8  -0.0  2.1  -1.8  .  1.8  0.0  0.9  -0.9  6.5  2.7  1.6  4.8  .  0.9  3.6  4.4  3.6  -1.6  -27  T  value  -0.1  0.4  1.1  08  1.1  -12  -0.8  0.9  -0.1  0.9  -0.4  0.6  -0.6  0.7  -0.2  1.3  -0.6  0.4  1.7  0.0  1.0  0.9 
P  value 
r  i 
0,491  0.684  0.253  0.424  0.290  0.236  0.439  0.371  0.045  0.382  0.702  0.565  0.425  0.473  0.511  0.196  0.677  0.597  0.083  0.909  0.323  0.376 
-arst  on 
und.  r45  103  5.6  0.0  -0.4  3.7  6.4  -23  1.5  1.1  0.3  3.1  1.9  2.4  3.2  3.5  1.7  -1.3  4.2  4.4  -0.2  3.2  2.4  1.9 
OW  45  131  0.2  -20  -1.3  -0.6  3.0  4.0  -0.2  .  0.6  -3.6  12  -1.6  -0.6  4.0  8.0  0.6  04.6  .  4.2  4.4  04.2  4.0  4.6  .  2.1  14510.  4.9  2.6  0.6  4.1  2.5  2.5  1.4  z1  3.4  3.2  3.1  2.6  -0.8  .  1.6  0.7  1.1  3,5  0.0  26  -0,8  2.5  3.6 
pvalu.  0,000  0.011  0.437  0.000  0.013  0.012  0.166  0.035  0.001  0,029  0.002  0.005  0.412  0.136  0.464  0.216  0.001  0.904  0.009  0.431  0.016  0.001 
Emaic9dain 
Russian  111  3.6  -0.9  -0.5  1.9  4.1  04.4  0.9  0.6  04.3  26  0.5  1.4  3.6  4.5  tat  -1.5  .  1.8  4.1  -1.3  3.0  1.3  . 0.1  others  63  0.3  -3.5  .  1.9  .  1.0  4.0  41  -0.3  0.0  . 4.0  1.6  .  1.7  -1.6  3.4  3.9  4.3  04.2  -4.5  6.0  -3.5  4.3  . 0.6  04.1 
T  value  24  20  1.2  2.3  0.1  1.2  0.9  0.5  2.0  0.6  1.6  2.3  0.3  0.5  -0.1  1.3  25  .  0.9  1.7  -2.0  1.6  01 
value  0015  0.049  . 239  05  0139  0.242  0.362  0542  0  4  oto  02  9  0100  e  .  364  0.055  0,042  0  , 137  0431 (Appendix)  387 
Appendix  6.4.  The  Voting  Patterns  of  Siberian  Deputies  (the  Russian  CPD) 
lend  Reform  Ern  Situation  Confidence  sden  B  alance  Power  or  bsu 
N  P1  14  U3  02  T2  U  Tt  U  1  RI  4  R  1 
f  r  f  f  f  r  f  f  f  f  f 
- 
caolonal  Factor 
Fmnamlr  Structure 
rural  regions  28  4.2  .  0.8  1.2  0.4  3.8  -3.5  1.2  08  -4.2  1,9  0.0  0.0  4.8  -0.4  4.8  0.8  0.0  3.8  4.8  -0.4  1.2 
resource  regions  45  4.2  -2.7  .  2.3  2.9  4.2  -4.5  -1.1  -23  .  1.8  2.2  -2.2  1.8  7.1  4.9  0.0  0.0  4.0  5.0  -1.8  3.8  -0.2  2.0 
hub/gate  regions  10  .  1.1  .  2.8  2.2  0.0  5.6  .  4.4  -0.0  -0.6  -2.8  2.8  "1.1  -0.0  2.6  7.2  0.0  3.3  4.9  25  49  2.8  -1.1  -2.8 
residual  regions  82  1.2  .  2.1  -02  0.7  4.0  -4.8  0.0  2.2  -1.0  2.0  -0.4  0.6  1.6  3.1  -0.4  -4.4  -2.6  3.7  -1,8  4.3  0.6  -1.2 
tow  171  22  -24  -0.3  1.2  4.2  -4.5  0.1  0.5  49  21  -0.9  0.6  3.6  4.4  0.5  .  1.0  "2.5  4.0  -23  3.2  0.3  -0.0 
F  value  23  0.4  1.7  0.8  0.3  0.2  0.5  2.9  0.9  0.1  0.5  0.3  8.0  5.3  2.0  0.1  0.0  0.6  0.6  3.0  0.3  1,8 
p  value  0.080  0.775  0.160  0.509  0.843  0.901  0.695  0.035  0.468  0.985  0,079  0.804  0.001  0.002  0.113  0.001  0.422  0.625  0.008  0.032  0  821  0.144 
L1yIno  Coudlattons 
highly  developed  8  6.3  .  1.3  .  1.3  5.0  2.5  -0.3  -3.8  -3.8  0.0  6.3  0.0  -28  7.5  7.5  -1.3  -1.3  -2.  $  6.3  "2.6  2.5  -1.3  1.3 
well  developed  57  3.3  -3.5  .  1.8  2.8  4.2  -3.0  0.5  -0.4  -0.4  1.8  "1.1  3.2  5.4  4.7  1.1  "1.0  -2.0  3.0  -1.2  4.2  0.9  2.6 
tinder-developed  44  1.0  .  0.9  -0.9  1.4  3.3  -6.0  0.0  0.5  -0.9  0.7  "1.8  0.0  0.5  5.3  -0.0  -23  4.2  3.0  -0.0  2.0  -0.7  -0.0 
poorly  developed  44  0.5  -1.4  0.9  "0.9  4.5  .  5.2  0,0  1,8  3.5  3.0  -0.5  -1.1  3.3  3.3  3.2  -2.3  42  4.1  -3.9  2.5  1.8  -2.  S 
total  153  2.2  .  2.0  .  0.7  1.4  3,9  -4.7 
0.0  0.3  -20  20  -1.0  0.7  3.5  4.0  1.0  -2.0  4.0  3.7  "2.5  3.0  0.6  .  0.6 
F  value  1.4  0.9  0.9  21  0.4  1.4  0.5  1.2  3.0  1.2  0.2  27  4.3  1,5  1.7  0.1  0.0  0.8  0.8  0.9  0.7  4.3 
p  value 
Llvlno  eondls  Iona  &  Fe  deral  s 
0247  0.467  0.433 
tatu 
0.107  0.707  0.247  0.690  0.316  0.032  0.317  0.893  0.040  0.005  0.151  0.177  0.954  0,542  0.637  0.467  0.451  0.569  0.006 
adopted  region  47  4.3  -3.8  -0.2  3.6  3.2  4.0  -0.2  0.2  0.6  3.4  0.2  1.7  8.2  6.0  0.9  -3.4  -1.1  3.0  -21  5.1  0.4  3.0 
stagnated  regions  97  1.5  4.3  .  0.6  0.5  4.5  -5.4  -0.1  0.5  -3.0  1.2  "1.3  0.5  24  4.5  0.7  -1.8  4.0  4.2  48  21  0.6  "2.3 
stagnated  republics  9  -2.2  -1.1  -4.4  0.0  2.2  -5.8  2.2  -1.1  -4.4  22  0.0  -2.2  1.1  3.3  4.4  3.3  -22  22  43  2.2  1.1  0.0 
tow  153  22  -2.0  -0.7  1.4  3.0  .  4.7  0.0  0.3  "2.0  20  .  1.0  0.7  3.5  4,9  1.0  .  2.0  4.0  3.7  "2.5  3.0  0.6  -0.5 
F  value  2.5  1.4  1.0  2.2  0.8  1.4  0.3  0.2  28  1.0  0.8  0.8  4.2  0.9  0.7  2.3  1.8  0.7  0.1  3.0  0.0  5.5 
p  value  0.061  0.239  0.380  0.112  0.443  0.241  0.767  0.856  0.007  0.379  0.441  0.431  0.017  0.402  0.504  0.108  0.187  0,523  0407  0.053  0.978  0.005 
Man  va  Sian.  realer 
adapted  regions  47  4.3  4.8  -02  3.6  3.2  4.0  -0.2  0.2  0.6  3.4  0.2  1.7  6.2  6.0  0.9  44  .  1.1  3.0  "2.1  5.1  0.4  3.0 
stagnated  regions  97  1.5  -1.3  -0.5  0.5  4.5  -5.4  -0.1  0.5  4.0  1.2  -1.  e  0.5  24  4.5  0.7  -1.8  -4.0  4.2  -2.8  2.1  0.0  -2.3 
T  value  1.7  "1.7  0.3  21  4.0  1.6  -0.1  -0.2  2.2  1.4  1.2  0.8  27  1.1  0.1  -1.0  1.9  -0.9  0.4  2.5  .  0.1  3.3 
p  value  0.097  0.096  0.785  0.041  0.313  0.104  0.949  0.848  0.030  0.162  0.225  0.444  0.007  0.254  0.041  0.302  0,062  0.307  0.072  0.014  0906  0.001 
Fat  and  West  Sib 
Eutern  07  3.0  -2.0  0.6  1.3  4.2  -3.0 
0.4  0.9  -0.8  2.0  0.2  0.9  3.4  3.9  0.4  -0.7  -0  8  3.8  .  24  1.6  .  0.2  -0.6 
Western  74  1.2  -2.2  -1.5  1.1  4.2  -5.8  -0.3  0.0  4.2  2.3  -2.3  0.3  3.9  5,1  1.2  -2.8  -4.6  4.2  -23  5.3  0.0  .  0.3 
T  value  1.3  -0.3  1.7  0.2  0.0  1.5  0.5  0.7  1.7  -0.3  1.8  0.5  -0.5  .  1.1  -0.0  1.5  3.0  -0.5  .  0.1  4.4  -0.8  -0.1 
p  value  0.212  0.741  0.001  0.845  0.984  0.107  0.632  0,474  0.095  0.800  0.071  0.823  0.645  0.269  0.574  0.131  0.003  0.832  0.956  0.001  0.407  0.958 
large  dries  94  4.0  .  1.0  .  0.3  3.0  4.5  .  2.0  1.2  1.9  -0.2  2.6  1.1  2.2  3.4  4.9  1.0  -1.3  4.5  4.1  4.0  2.2  1.7  1.3 
midlum-sized  cities  25  0.8  -4.0  .  1.2  0.0  4,8  -1.2  .  0.4  -0.8  -5.6  2.8  .  4.0  -1.0  4.8  4.8  -0.4  -4.0  -2.6  5.6  -2.6  0.0  0.4  -2.0 
ama9  does  36  0.8  -2.5  1.4  -0.6  4.4  -5.8  0.8  0.0  -0.8  1.9  -1.9  -0.3  3.9  3.8  1.1  0.6  -3.3  3.3  -3.6  3.9  42  .  26 
rural  areas  15  -2.7  -8.0  -2.7  "2.7  0.0  4.7  .  6.7  .  4.7  -8.0  "1.3  -4.7  -2.7  27  5.3  -4.1  -4.7  46.7  2.0  4.1  2.7  "20  .  4.0 
total  170  23  -24  -0.3  1.3  4.1  -4.6  0.2  0.5  -1.8  2.1  .  0.8  0.7  3.0  4.5  0.7  .  1.8  -26  4.0  4.3  3.2  0.4  -0.6 
F  value  3.3  3.4  1.1  3.2  1.9  4.8  3.3  3.0  4.9  0.9  3.7  2.8  0.3  0.8  2.2  1,9  1.6  1.0  24  2.1  21  3.0 
0  value  0.023  0.020  0.371  0.026  0.128  0.003  0.021  0.031  0.003  0.427  0.013  0.055  0,814  0.471  0.080  0.131  0.100  0.373  0,070  0.107  0.104  0.030 
Federal  Statue 
autonomous  42  1.4  .  1.2  1.0  1.2  0.0  -6,7  1.9  3.3  -1.6  4.3  -1.4  0.5  0.5  3.6  2.4  -24  -2.9  8.5  -1.2  5.7  1.0  -1.0 
non-autonomous  129  25  -28  "0.7  1.2  3.0  -4.1  -0.5  -0.4  -1.9  1,4  -0.7  0.7  4.6  4.7  0.2  -1.4  -2.4  3.8  -27  2.4  0.1  -0.5 
Tvalue  -0.6  1.1  1.1  0.0  1.9  -1.2  1.5  2.5  0.0  1.9  -0.5  -0.1  4.1  -0.0  1.3  -06  -0.3  1.7  1.0  27  0.3  -0.3 
value  0.521  0.290  0.252  0.974  0  059  0.240  0  140  0.012  0.979  0.058  849  0  665  0  002  7  0,180  545  . 
790  0.  02  6  0  $85  16 
MM.  nstlnnal  Factor 
Political  Blocs 
Coalition  for  Reform  18  5.6  1.0  5.1  10.0  8.8  4.3  8.6  7.1  1.5  10.0  6.8  9.4  1.9  1.3  5.6  3.8  9.0  8.1  4.4  1.3  8.6  8.9 
Democratic  Contra  16  1.3  4.4  0.3  .  0.6  4.4  -3.5  2.5  4.8  4.8  11  -1.3  0.6  1.3  1.3  6.0  -4.4  -0.6 
6.1  -0.0  4.4  1.0  -1.9 
Creative  Strength  24  7.1  -2.5  0.0  5.0  5.4  .  5.2  3.3  1.4  4.2  5.0  29  2.9  8.4  6.3  "1.7  4.6  "3.4  3.1  0.6  5.4  1.7  3.3 
Russian  Unity  50  -12  -7.5  -4.1  -4.8  0.0  -72  "7.3  4.0  -8.8  .  4.4  4.4  -4.2  2.2  6.4  -3.0  All  .  72  0.0  .  6.4  3.6  -5.6  -6.4 
Dad.  not  In  the  blocs  84  2.7  "1.0  25  3.0  6.0  -5.4  2.3  29  -0.5  4.1  -0.2  1.0  5.0  4.8  3.4  0.3  .  21  1.1  -1.4  2.5  20  0.0 
total  170  2.3  -2.4  -0.2  1.3  4.2  -4.4  0.2  0.4  -1.8  2.2  -0.8  0.7  3.6  4.4  0.6  -1.7  .  25  3.9  4.4  3.3  0.4  -0,0 
Fvalue  4.4  10.1  6.2  17.3  8.7  10.5  19.4  22.5  19.9  16.5  13.6  10.7  1.9  2.2  6.2  4.1  20.3  12.3  7.8  1.2  12,8  11.9 
p  value  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.110  0.070  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.307  0.000  0.000 
clue 
nomenklaturs  21  -2.4 
4.8  "2.0  -4.3  1.9  -5.5  0.5  0.0  4.7  4,4  -5.2  -4.8  3.3  8.7  1,0  .  1,0  .  4,0  2.0  .  7.8  1.4  -6.3  -4,8 
cadre  36  1.9  -1.7  "1.4  0.3  5.4  -4.0  .  0.3  0.9  4.1  1.0  -1.1  -0.3  4.6  3.7  1,7  47  .  2.0  5,1  3.0  3.6  1.1  46 
military  8  -2.0  -8.0  .  4.0  4.0  6.0  -8.0  -0.0  0.0  "10.0  0.0  -6.0  -8.0  4.0  8.0  -20  "20  .  8.0  2.0  4.0  8.0  -0.0  -10.0 
managers  41  0.7  4.9  0.0  0.0  2.2  -8.3  -22  -2.0  .  2.9  2.7  4.0  0.0  4.9  4.0  -27  .  22  -4.5  3.7  . 4.6  4.1  0.0  -2.0 
Intelllgentsis  18  5.7  1.8  .  0.6  3.0  2.9  -1.2  1.2  0.8  2.2  4.4  1.1  28  0.6  8.3  24  -1.5  -1.2  2.9  2.2  22  22  11.1 
technicians  16  0.0  4.1  -1.9  5.0  4.4  -0.3  1.0  1.0  -0.6  1.9  "1.3  1.9  5.0  2.8  5.0  .  1.0  .  0.6  8.0  -2.6  1.9  0.0  0.0 
workers  14  7.1  .  6.4  -0.7  2.1  5.0  -3.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  2.9  1.4  4.3  1.4  4.3  -29  "29  -20  1.4  0.7  3.8  0.7  2.1 
tow  151  1.7  4.0  -1.1  0.5  3.5  "5.4  -0.4  -0.1  .  2.6  1.9  -1.6  -0.1  3.8  4,5  0.3  .  1.9  42  3.6  -3.4  3.2  -0.2  "1.3 
Fvalue  2.8  1.9  0.3  3.2  1.1  2.8  0.9  0.6  2.5  1.2  1.4  3,0  1.0  0.8  It  0.1  0.6  0.9  3.6  0.9  2.0  2.1 
p  value  0,014  0.079  0.920  0.006  0.382  0.014  0.516  0.764  0.024  0266  0.219  0.008  0.400  0.130  0,039  0.006  0.475  0,473  0,002  0,408  0.064  0.060 
rPRtJ  Membrahta 
member  132  0.7  "3.9  -0.9  -0.8  3.0  -5.8  -1.2  -0.1  .  4.4  0.6  .  3.1  .  1.5  3.3  4.8  .  0.1  -2.2  .  4.3  3.3  AS  3.8  .  1.4  -2.0 
non.  membr,  30  7.4  2.8  1.5  7.9  7.9  -0.5  4.4  4.6  6.7  6.7  0.7  7.9  3.8  3.1  3.3  0.3  28  6.2  8.1  2.3  82  7.2 
T  value  -42  .  4.5  .  1.7  .  0.2  -4.0  49  -3.4  4.6  "1.4  4.9  -0.7  .  8.8  -02  1.3  -21  .  1.8  .  4,7  .  2.4  .  7.0  0.9  .  6.0  49 
value  0.000  0000  0098  0000  0.000  0.000 
. 
00  000  0000  0.000  0000  OOM  0827  (1141  0041  0,144  0000  Dol?  OM-0  0,343  0000  0000 
(Pereonal  Fedoras 
made  tee  21  "2.4  -0.2  1.1  4.1  -4.0  -0.1  0.5  -2.0  2.0  -1.0  0.8  3.5  4.8  0.5  -1.6  -2.5  3.9  4.2  3.3  0.3  -0.1 
female  5  6.0  -20  4,0  6.0  6.0  .  2.0  0.0  2.0  2.0  4.0  20  6.0  8.0  0.0  0.0  -4.0  to  6.0  4.0  0,0  0.0  3.0 
Tvalue  -0.9  -0.1  0.5  "1.3  -0.6  -0.7  .  1.5  -0.4  -0,0  -0,8  -0.7  "1.4  .  1.3  1.4  -1.6  0.6  -22  -0.7  1.0  1.0  0.1  -0.6 
p  value  0.352  0.914  0.636  0.200  0.557  0.473  0.146  0.593  0.351  0.610  0.470  0.159  0.196  0.154  0.073  0.555  0.026  0.469  0.337  0.304  0.041  0.519 
äan9r95an 
u  der45  78  5.4  -1.3  0.3  3.5  5.3  4.2  1.8  1.6  0.4  3.5  1.5  2.3  2.7  4.0  0.6  -0.6  0.0  4.0  -0.6  2.9  1.1  1.7 
over  45  93  -0.4  3.3  -0.9  -0.8  3.2  -68  -1.3  -0.8  -.  e  1.0  .  2.9  -0.8  4.4  4.8  0.1  -2.4  .  4.9  3.9  "0.9  3.4  "1.0  .  2.5 
Tvalue  4.3  1.5  0.9  3.2  1.9  22  22  1.8  2.9  1,9  3.3  2.3  .  1.4  -0.8  0.1  1.3  3.8  0.1  2.6  -0.6  2.0  3,0 
P  value  0.000  0,130  0.363  0.002  0.058  0.033  0.029  0.071  0.004  0.056  0.001  0.020  0.151  0,442  0.938  0,203  01000  0.934  0,011  0.662  0.048  0.003 
Ethnic  Cd010 
Russian  125  29  -1.0  -0.4  1.0  4.4  4.4  0.4  0.5  "1.0  28  -0.1  1.4  3.7  8.2  0.3  .  1.1  .  2.0  3.  7  .  2.2  2.7  0.6  00 
others  40  0.4  4.8  .  0.2  -0.7  3.6  4.1  -0.7  0.7  -4.3 
I 
1.1  4.0  "1.3 
1 
3.3  2.2  1.8  -3.9  -4.2  4.  4  48  4,6  -0.3  42 
T  value  1.5  1.3  -0.1  1.8  0.7  0.5  0,7  -0.1  21  0.9  1.0  1.8  0.3  2.4  -0.9  1.1  1.4  .  0.  6  0.4  .  1.6  0.4  1.4 
value  O  123  0  200  0.897  . 081  . 
51  801  003 
. 
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Appendix  6.5.  The  Voting  Patterns  of  Far  Eastern  Deputies  (the  Russian  CPD) 
Land  Refonn  Eco  Situation  Confldence  Presldan  Balance  of  Power  th«  I.  ar 
N  Pt  T4  U3  02  T2  U2  TI  1  RI  R2  0J  3  33  T  U4  P2  PR 
"  ý  +  +  4  "  +  "  ý  ý  r  f  " 
<Raolonel  Ff(!  araa 
Economic  c_tructun  In 
motao.  reglons 
o  vat 
1e 
realnnal 
0.0  0.6  -5.6  0.0  7.5  -2.5  06  1.3  -2.6  8,3  4.4  0.8  8.0  3.6  1.3  -a0  a.  e  6.0  4,8  4,1  3.1  3.1 
lwbrgate  r.  gtms  28  82  3.2  0.4  2.5  3.2  -0.7  8.1  2.1  -2.1  3.9  3.2  1,  e  4.  e  3.6  6.0  -1.1  1.1  84  2.3  1.4  4.3  0.0 
nsidual  r.  gbns  /9  1.1  a.  2  42  -0.5  2.1  -2.6  42  47  -2.6  4e  -2.1  -1.8  1.8  4.7  -0,  e  .  4.2  48  3.2  -31  6.8  -t.  e  a.  e 
tow  63  4.0  0.3  -2.2  1.0  4.0  -1.7 
1.9  0.2  -2.4  2.0  1.9  0.3  3.  e  4.0  2.4  40  -1.9  6.6  -3.  e  4.  e  2.2  0.3 
F  valu.  e.  9  3.2  2.5  0.7  2.1  0.4  6.6  2.7  0.0  4.3  2.6  0.7  1.2  0.1  2.7  12  4,7  2.0  3.3  6.1  te  1.1 
p  value 
(  lth  d 
0.002  0.049  0.084 
t  dl 
0,497  0.132  0.698  0.003  0.073  0.983  0.015  0,079  0.503  0.301  0.887  0,076  0.290  0.013  0.147  0.045  0.009  0.  082  0.  341 
nn  (.  11t09  Pandle6ona 
wee  dweloped 
fi 
13 
ava  ooe 
0,8  -3.1  44  0.0  8.6  4.6  2.3  2.3  -3.8  8.9  4.5  0.0  3.8  8.4  2.3  42  -4.6  8.0  -13  9.2  3.1  3.1 
moderately  dev.  loped  3  -3.3  10.0  -0,7  0.0  3.3  8.7  -0.7  43  3.3  3.3  3.3  3.3  10.0  -3.3  -3.3  0.0  0.0  8.7  43  3.3  3.3  3.3 
under-dw.  loped  33  7.8  1.8  0.3  2.1  3.6  -0.3  4.5  1.5  -2.7  3.3  2.1  1.6  4.8  3.3  4.6  -11  0.0  6.2  1.3  2.4  3.0  0.0 
poorly  dev.  laped  7  d.  3  -7.1  -4.3  -4.3  -4,3  -4.3  -4.3  -4.3  -5.7  47  -4.3  -4.3  -4.3  8.  e  -2.9  -4.3  -7.1  2.9  47  8.1  4,3  -4.3 
total  56  3.9  0.0  -2.0  0.7  3.8  -1.4  2.3  0.7  -3.0  3.0  2.0  0.7  3.8  4.1  2.7  .  1.2  44  5.4  -0.5  4.8  2.7  0.4 
F  vslue  6.0  4.4  1.7  1.0  4.1  2.0  3.0  1.2  0.6  3.9  1.4  0.0  3.9  1.0  2.2  0.8  2.2  0.8  1.7  3.3  1.1  1.0 
pvalue 
rIvin-  r!  nndtatlona  (nn  htahd 
0.001  0.008  0.172 
avaonad.  aYdud 
0.422  0.012  0.122  0.038  0.327  0.523  0.013  0.248  0.453  0.014  0.146  0.099  0.488  0,101  0.808  0.188  0.026  0.185  0.  391 
weg  developed  13  0.6  4.1  -5.4  0.0  8.5  4.6  2.3  2.3  48  e.  8  4.8  0.0  3.  e  5.4  2.3  42  4.6  e.  0  -2.3  9.2  3.1  3.1 
und«-developed  33  7.  e  1.8  0.3  2.1  3.6  .  0.3  4.5  1.6  a.  7  3.3  2.1  1.8  4.8  3.3  4.5  -2.1  0.9  5.2  1.6  2.4  3.9  0.0 
poorly  dwebped  7  -4.3  -7.1  -4.3  -4.3  4.3  -4.3  -4.3  -43  -8.7  -8.7  -4.3  -4,3  -4.3  8.0  -2.9  43  -7.1  2.9  47  6.8  .  4.3  -4.3 
total  53  4.3  -0.6  -1.7  0.8  3.8  -1.9  2.8  0.0  -3.4  3.0  1.9  0.0  3.4  4,5  3.0  -3.4  -1.5  5.3  -0.4  4.0  2.8  0.2 
F  value  9.0  4.1  2.1  1.4  6.0  1.5  2.8  14  0.3  62  2.2  1.2  4,3  1.5  2.3  1.0  3.3  0.0  2.3  4.8  2.8  1.4 
p  value 
---ndle  Mna  SF  edera  a 
0.000  0.023  0.131 
Ltua  (no  aLnnoted  r 
0.249 
eoal 
0.005  0.226  0.089  0.255  0.707  0.004  0.127  0.299  0.016  0.243  0.088  0.364  0.046  0.431  0.114  0.012  0.087  0.235 
adapted  r.  9100e  3  10.0  8.7  43  10.0  10.0  .  10.0  0.0  6.7  3.3  10.0  1K7  a7  10.0  43  10.0  -13  3.3  13  10.0  e.  7  10.0  3.3 
euw,  et.  dr.  9bn.  43  4.9  0.0  49  0.9  2.3  .  0.5  2.3  0.2  -2.8  1.9  1.2  0.9  3.7  3,7  2.8  -2.3  -08  4.0  0.0  3.5  2.6  -0.5 
adapted  republic*  10  -2.0  -8.0  -6.0  3.0  8.0  40  3.0  1.0  40  6.0  4.0  "2.0  2.0  8.0  0.0  -7.0 
d.  0  8,0  -e,  0  10.0  1.0  3.0 
IOW  56  3.9  0.0  -2.0  0.1  3.  e  -1.4  2.3  0.7  40  3.0  2.0  0.1  3.  e  4.1  2.1  -12  -1,4  5.4  -0.8 
4.8  2.1  0.4 
F  velu.  3.5  3.8  1.3  2.4  2.9  2.0  0.1  0,7  1.3  2.1  0.  e  1.0  1.2  2.7  1.7  1.2  2.6  1.1  4.4  3.1  1.2  0.7 
p  value  0.039  0.033  0.289  0.099  0.064  0.147  0.891  0.487  0269  0.132  0.475  0.372  0.296  0.079  0.105  0.321  0.093  0.355  0.018  0.054  0.310  0.508 
uffi:  an  va  danlren  
stagnated  ngWne  43  4.9  0.9  -0.9  0.0  2.3  -0.5  2.3  0.2  -28  1.9  1.2  0.9  3.7  3.7  2.8  -2.3  -0.6  4,9  0.0  3.5  2.6  "0.5 
adapted  republla  10  -2.0  -8.0  -8.0  -3.0  8.0  .  1.0  3.0  1.0  -8.0  5.0  4.0  -2.0  2.0  8.0  0.0  A.  0  -7.0  a0  40  10.0  1.0  3.0 
T  value  2.3  2.3  1,6  1.2  -1.0  0.8  -0,2  -0.2  1,0  -1.4  -0.8  0.0  0.6  -1.6  0.0  1.5  2.1  -1.4  2.0  -2.4  0.6  -1.0 
pvalue  0.025  0.026  0.118  0.232  0.057  0.407  0.840  0.810  0.301  0.172  0.403  0.300  0.537  0.110  0.353  0,128  0.045  0.166  0.054  0.019  0.831  0.304 
LIbeO  ORll 
IerOe  dUee  33  4.8  0.6  -2.7  1.2  3.8  43  2.1  -0.6  -0.9  2.1  2.1  -0.0  4.2  3.0  3.3  48  -2.4  5.5  0.8  3.0  1.2  0.9 
mk9wn-.  ized  dUa  14  4.3  -0.7  -3.6  -0.7  5.7  "13  1.4  3.8  47  3.5  1.4  1.4  2.9  5.7  1.4  43  -2.0  6,7  4.9  6.1  2.1  0.0 
smell  dues  12  2.6  0.8  0.0  2.5  4.2  -8.0  2.5  -1.7  -2.5  4.2  2.5  3.3  5.0  e.  /  0.8  0.5  0,0  8.5  -0.8  75  4.2  48 
rural  arm  4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -2.6  2.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.5  -5.0  0.0  5.0  -2.5  0,0  e.  0  0.0 
tow  63  4.0  0.3  -2.2  1.0  4.0  -1.7  1.9  0.2  -2.4  2.9  1.9  0.5  36  4.0  2.4  40  -1.9  5,8  -0.  e  4.8  2.2  0.3 
F  value  0.5  0.1  0.5  0.3  0.5  1.0  0.1  0.9  0.0  0.2  0.1  0.6  0.5  0.9  0.3  1.0  0.3  0.0  0.3  1.1  0.4  0.1 
p  value  0.701  0.988  0.708  0.844  0.674  0.384  0.980  0.429  0.442  0.893  0.969  0.502  0.654  0.455  0.816  0.410  0.828  0.906  0.667  0.345  0.729  0.058 
Faderal  Status 
autonornou.  17  o.  e  -2.4  -5.3  -0.6  7.1  45  1.2  -1.2  -2.4  4.1  2.9  -1,  e  2.9  a9  0.0  -4.7  -84  7.8  .  4.1  7.6  0.0  1,8 
norwut000moue  46  5.2  1.3  -1.1 
1.5  2.6  -1.1 
2.2  0.7  -2.4  2.4  1.5  1.3  4.1  3,3  3.3  -2,4  42  4.8  0.7  3.7  3.0  42 
Tv.  lue  -1.9  "1.4  -1.7  -0.8  1.6  -1.0  -0.4  -0.7  0.0  0.7  0.5  -1.1  46  1.1  -1.4  49  -2.5  1,6  .  1.9  1.8  42  0.1 
p  value  0  068  0.153  0  095  0  428  0  073  317  0.714  0.473  0988  0479  0  602  0  262  0  56  60  182  0  365  011  0.117  0065  0  082  0  40 
. 457 
ýyggýna  Factona 
ErgS  I  nt  rl  Blou 
co.  lluonlorRebrm  9  7.  e  8.7  8.9  1.8  e.  7  8.6  4.4  e.  5  10,0  10,0  7.  e  10.0  10.0  -4.4  10.0  3.3  e,  9  10.0  4.4  -2.2  10.0  10,0 
D«nooraue  c.  no-.  11  1.8  0.9  4e  3.6  10.0  -2.5  8.2  5.8  .  0.9  4.5  6.4  1.8  2.7  9.1  2.7  .  17  0.0  9.1  41  5.5  0,0  2.1 
cr.  ewe 
s9engbt  12  1.5  1.7  -2.5  4.2  3.3  -10.0  3.3  -2.5 
45  5.0  0.5  1.7  0.6  9.1  1.7  -13  415  5.0  3.3  4.2  4.2  4,6 
Ruaal«+Unly  16  -2.6  -1.5  -9.3  -9.4  4.4  -1.8  43  -10.0 
44  40  -5.  o  41  -2.0  8.0  -3.1  -9.4  -10.0  -0.7  -e.  8  9.4  41 
4e.  7 
Dep,  not  In  to  blocs  16  1.3  3.3  -0.9  3.3  1.3  0.2  3.3  -1.8  41  4.0  3.3  2.0  6.3  -1.8  4.0  0.0  -4.6 
3.8  2.7  4.0  2.7  4.7 
tow  63  4.0  0.3  -2.2  1.0  4.0  -1.7  1.9  0.2  -2.4  2.9  1.9  0.5  3.8  4.0  2.4  40  49  5.6  -0.6  48  2.2  0.3 
Fvelue  4.3  6.2  0.2  12.0  10.0  2.8  5.0  23.3  12.4  7.7  4.6  8.3  6.3  14.0  4.4  4.4  9.9  112  88  18  3.0  13.8 
pvalu.  0.003  0.000  0,000  0.000  0,000  0.044  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.004  0.004  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.010  0.004  0.000 
CJeLL 
nomenklatun  8  48  -3.8  -e.  3  -7.5  2.5  -2.5  -2.3  43.8  -10.0  -1,3  .  1.8  -6.0  2.5  6.3  0.0  -3.8  -86  6,0  -a0  8.0  43  48 
lutdree  14  5.1  2.9  -2.9  5.7  8.0  -2.9  1.4  2.0  44  8,4  1.4  0.0  4.3  8,7  2.1  -2.1  0.7  7.1  0.1  3.  e  3.0  2.1 
military  0  6.0  4.0  4.0  -4.0  4.0  All  2.0  4,0  40  -4.0  -4.0  -0.0  8.0  0.0  2.0  .  40  .  4.0  0.0  0.0  8.0  -2.0  40 
managen  8  5.0  48  -1.3  -2.5  0.0  0.0  -1.3  -2.5  43  0.0  1,3  -18  1.3  5.0  -1.3  -2.3  4.5  3.8  -8.0  38  2.5  0.0 
knallgentela  4  5.0  0.0  0.0  6.0  10.0  2.5  10,0  5.0  -2.8  2.8  7.5  8.0  7.5  1.8  6.0  0.0  -8.0  2.8  2.0  7.5  0.0  0.0 
4chnk4ane  15  5.0  0.0  0.0  2.8  1.1  -1.1  3.3  0.0  0.6  5.0  2.8  3,9  3A  1.7  4.4  4.4  1.1  7.2  1.1  3.3  28  0.8 
vrtxken  2  0.0  10.0  -10.0  5.0  10.0  0.0  0.0  5.0  6.0  e.  0  10,0  10.0  0.0  8.0  0.0  0.0  -5.0  10.0  6.0  8.0  10.0  10.0 
Iat.  1  60  3.9  0.3  -2.4  1.0  4.1  47  1.7  0.0  -19  2.9  1.4  0.2  3.1  4,1  2.2  -3.1  -2.0  5.8  -1.0  4.7  1.1  0.0 
F  value  1.3  1.3  0.8  3.0  2.2  0.5  1.0  1.1  2.1  1.7  1.3  2.2  0.3  0.6  0.8  0.2  1.8  1.8  1.8  0.8  2.0  1.1 
pvalue 
hm  b 
0.271  0.287  0.558  0.014  0.081  0,820  0.435  0.301  0.086  0.120  0.275  0.060  0.822  0.584  0.742  0.870  0.189  0.178  0,007  0.740  0.084  0.404 
er>s  cpsl  LMam 
member  49  3.5  -1.0  -3.1  0.0  3.  e  42  1.6  -0.2  -4.1  2.0  1.0  .  1.0  3.3  4,6  1.4  4.0  -2.4  5.5  .  1.4  5.7  1.4  -0,8 
non-memb«  14  5.1  5.0  0.7  4.3  e.  1  0.0  2.1  1.4  3.6  5.7  5.0  5.7  at  2.1  5.7  0.0  0.0  5.1  11  1.4  8.0  3.4 
Tvalu.  -0.  e  -2.3  -1.4  -1.8  -0.  e  -0,9 
-0.1  -0.6  -t9  44  "1.4  -2.4  .  1,1  1.0  .  1.7  .  1.4  0.9  -0.1  .  1.3  1.8  -1.3  -1,5 
value  0.409  0.026  162  0.129  0370  9  0916  0.549  0005  01511 
. 
186  0019  a  0,342  0j53  0300  2917  1  199  0077  0,11)c  0148 
seau9galF.  ecstuat 
-  . 
male  57  4.0  0.1  -1.9  1.8  4.6 
-1.9  2.1  0.1  -21  3.  e  2.1  1.2  3,9  3.0  10  -3.  e  -1.4  11.0  0.0  44  2.8  1.1 
female  6  3,3  43  -a0  -0.7  -1.7  0.0  0.0  -6.0  40  0..  3  0,0  47  3.3  8.0  a.  3  47  41  1.1  47  6.1  43  41 
T  value  0.2  1.0  0.8  2.2  1.8  10.5  0.5  1.5  0.7  1.9  0.5  2.0  0.2  -0.3  1.1  1.1  1.3  1.8  1.7  -0.8  14  1.8 
p  valu.  0.855  0.299  0.425  0.033  0.082  0.802  0.609  0.136  0.403  0,060  0.609  0.054  0.872  0.747  0,056  0.206  0.100  0.120  0.060  0.544  0.115  0.068 
>"aoua0on 
llrld«45  25  1.2  4.0  -2.4  4.4  5.0  0.4  0.8  1.6  0.0  4.4  32  2.5  4.8  2.0  4,4  -3.2  -0.8  5.8  0.5  4.0  4.4  2.5 
ev«46  36  1.5  -2.1  -2.1  -1.3  2.6  -3.2  2.8  -0.8  .  1.0  1,6  1,1  -1.1  12  6.3  1,1  -20  -2.8  8,5  -1.0  5.3  0.6  43 
Tvekr.  2.4  2.5  -0.1  2.5  1.6  1.8  47  1.0  1.7  1,2  0.0  1.8  0,8  -1.0  1.8  -0.1  0.8  0.0  1.0  -0.  e  1.8  1,7 
pvalu.  0,018  0,001  0.898  0.018  0.117  0,106  0,458  0.300  0.003  0240  0.383  0.110  0.399  0.120  0.130  0.608  0.449  0.965  0.315  0.644  0,123  0,093 
E6,  ^I0.  od_ln 
Ruaalan  46  5.4  1.5  -0.7  2.0  2.3  -0.9  2.4  0.9  -2-2  2.8  2.0  1.6  3.9  2.4  3.3  -2.6  -0.2  6.2  1.1  3.9  3.1  0.2 
o0en  n  0.0  -2.9  -8.5  -1.6  5.3  .  4.1  0.8  -1.8  . 3.9  2.9  1.8  -2.4  3.6  112  0,0  . 4.1  4.3  1  5  -e.  3  7.1  -11  1.8 
T  value  2.2  1.8  2.4  1.4  -0.5  1.4  0.1  1.0  0.3  0.0  0.1  1.4  0.2  -36  1.4  08  2.5  -0.  7  2.5  -1.4  2.2  -0.7 
value  0.030  0080  0.020  Q. 
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Appendix  8.1.  Discord  between  Factional  Leaders  and  SIBFE  Deputies  in  the  Russian 
CPD 
Within  the  Leadership  SIBFE  Deputies 
Political  Leading  2nd-  6th  7th  2nd-  6th  7th 
Factions  Figures  5th  5th 
CPD  CPD  CPD  CPD  CPD  CPD 
(12)  (5)  (5)  NMMNM 





Agreement  for 
the  Progress 
GROUP 
Left  Centre 
Free  Russia 
Motherland 
Sovereignty  & 
Equality 
GROUP  3  (CS) 
Workers'  Union 
Smena 
Industrial  Union 
GROUP  4  (RU) 
Fatherland 
Agrarian  Union 
Rossia 
Communists  of 
Russia 
Grout  5  (Others) 
Non-Party 
Deputies 
S.  N.  Iushenkov  (11)  (2) 
V.  K.  Varov  7.3  0.0 
B.  A.  Denisenko  8.2  5.0 
S.  F.  Zasukin  6.4  5.0 
V.  V.  Volkov*  (10)  (4) 
G.  P.  lakumin  6.0  7.5 
L.  A.  Ponomariov  5.0  0.0 
Iu.  M.  Nesterov*  (10)  (5) 
V.  Sheinis  5.0  6.0 
V.  Lysenko  3.0  10.0 
E.  V.  Basin*  (9) 
B.  E.  Nemtsov  2.2 
S.  V.  Stepashin  4.4 
I.  V.  Vinogradova*  (12) 
N.  I.  Travkin  0.0 
N.  T.  Riabov  1.7 
V.  I.  Morokin*  (12) 
U.  E.  Temirov*  (10) 
R.  G.  Abdulatipov  2.0 










-  13  2.3 
(4)  (5)  3  3.3 
2.5  -2.0 
0.0  6.0 
6.7  12  -0.4 
(5)  (5)  10  4.0  6.0  11  4.2 
6.0  .  2.0 
8.0  0.0 
(5)  (5)  6  -0.3 
(2)  (1)  14  2.6  3.6  18  5.6 
0.0 
V.  V.  Chemov*  (9)  (5) 
E.  I.  Ostpenko  -6.7  -2.0 
A.  L.  Golovin*  (7)  (3) 
S.  A.  Polozkov  5.7  10.0 
I.  V.  Muravbiov  5.7  6.7 
lu.  G.  Gekht*  (8)  (3) 
V.  V.  Bespalov  -1.3__  3.3 
A.  M.  Tuleev*  (9)  (5) 
V.  A.  Achalov  2.2  8.0 
M.  I.  Lapshin*  (11)  (5) 
S.  N.  Baburin*  (7)  (2) 
N.  A.  Pavlov  4.3  10.0 
S.  P.  Goriavcheva  7.1  10.0 
1.  V.  Fedoseev  5.7  0.0 
I.  P.  Rybkin*  (12)  (2) 
V.  V.  Chikin  5.0  10.0 
lu.  M.  Voronin  3.3  -10.0 
(5)  12  5.3  4.3  15  2.4 
0.0 
(4)  6  0.0  3.9  13  2.5 
5.0 
7.5 
(5)  18  2.9  1.9  9  4.0 
0.0 
(5)  11  0.9  3.1  10  6.6 
6.0 
(5)  23  4.7  5.7  24  4.9 




(4)  13  6.7  9.6  13  7.7 
10.0 
2.5 
V.  O.  Ispravnikov*  (7)  (2)  "  10  7.0  2.5  "" 
Civic  Union  M.  G.  Astafev*  (7)  (1)  -8  -0.2  -6.3  - 
Scores  indicate  distance  from  leading  figures,  ranging  from  +10  for  the  identical  vote  with  the  factional 
leader  to  -10  for  the  contradictory  vote.  If  a  leader  abstained  from  voting,  then  the  case  is  dropped.  If  an 
ordinary  member  abstained  from  voting,  0  point  is  given. 
Figures  in  brackets  indicate  the  valid  number  of  votes  included  in  the  calculation. 
Leading  figures  in  V.  D.  Gelbras  (ed.  ),  Kto  est  chto  (Moskva:  Satallakhu,  1993),  pp.  16-65. (Appendix)  392 
Appendix  8.2.  Regional  Differentiation  of  Voters'  Support  for  Eltsin  in  the 
Presidential  Elections  and  Referendums  (1990-1993) 
95%  Confidence 
Regional  N  Mean  Std.  Std.  rval  for  Mean 
Groups  Dev.  Error  Lower  Upper  Min.  Max. 
Bound  Bound 
Raf-mdum  (Mar  rh  1441  on  the  Russian  oresidencvl 
Higher  7  79.99  3.02  1.14  77.19  82.78 
High  17  71.60  2.46  0.60  70.33  72.87 
Average  24  66.48  4.95  1.01  64.39  68.58 
Low  5  56.58  3.03  1.35  52.80  60.32 
Decreasing  28  65.69  4.84  0.91  63.81  67.57 
Sharply  dec.  2  71.85  1.48  1.05  58.31  84.99 
Increasing  1  39.80  . 
Total  84  87.59  7.18  0.78  66.03  69.15 
Sum  of  Mean 
F  Sip.  Square  dt  Square 
77.10  88.00  Between  Groups  2893.49  8  482.25  26.78  0.000 
64.10  74.60  WIthin  Groups  1386.84  77  18.01 
55.70  73.90  Total  4280.32  83 
52.40  59.90 
54.40  72.80 
70.80  72.70 
39.80  39.80 
39.80  86.00 
Presidential  Election  (June  19911 
Higher  7  72.71  8.30  2.38  66.88  78.54 
High  17  59.70  4.94  1.20  57.16  62.24 
Average  24  47.04  7.29  1.49  43.97  50.12 
Low  5  32.99  6.13  2.74  25.38  40.81 
Decreasing  28  52.64  8.13  1.16  50.28  55.01 
Sharply  dec.  2  83.82  2.88  2.04  37.90  89.74 
Increasing  1  17.45  . 
Total  84  52.82  11.44  1.25  50.34  55.30 
Refemdum  (April  199?  on  the  confidence  In  the  President) 
Higher  7  78.06  5.33  2.01  73.13  82.99 
High  17  67.94  4.67  1.13  85.53  70.34 
Average  24  60.88  5.34  1.09  58.63  83.14 
Low  5  47.28  3.87  1.73  42.47  52.09 
Decreasing  28  47.05  5.84  1.10  44.79  49.32 
Sharply  dec.  2  20.05  8.27  5.65  -54.28  94.38 
Increasing  1  48.90  . 
Total  84  57.21  12.88  1.40  54.41  60.00 
Refemdum  IAorfl  1991  Ives'  for  question  1.2.  and  4  dI'no'  for  sues  Ion  3) 
Higher  7  51.26  4.76  1.80  46.85  55.66 
High  17  45.16  3.15  0.76  43.54  46.78 
Average  24  40.05  7.31  1.49  36.97  43.14 
Low  5  36.28  1.81  0.72  34.28  38.28 
Decreasing  28  38.67  2.64  0.50  35.64  37.69 
Sharply  dec.  2  19.35  7.42  5.25  -47.36  86.08 
Increasing  1  34.30  . 
Total  84  40.11  7.27  0.79  38.53  41.88 
Referendum  (Oaremher  1993-  on  the  Gonstttutlent 
Higher  7  74.86  4.43  1.67  70.77 
High  17  65.05  7.09  1,72  61.40 
Average  24  63.04  7.71  1.57  59.78 
Low  5  53.38  3.43  1.53  49.12 
Decreasing  28  47.12  6.32  1.19  44.87 
Sharply  dec.  2  23.96  4.94  3.49  "20.38 
Increasing  1  67.63  . 
Total  84  57.67  12.37  1.35  5499 
67.23  84.80  Between  Groups  7834.97  6  1305.83  33.28  0.000 
50.43  69.93  WIthin  Groups  3023.17  77  39.26 
31.05  56.41  Total  10858.14  83 
22.39  37.72 
37.57  63.88 
61.78  65.86 
17.45  17.45 
17.45  84.80 
71.50  84.40  Between  Groups  11533.70  6  1922.28  66.52  0.000 
60.90  76.80  Within  Groups  2225.27  77  28.90 
48.70  70.50  Total  13758.98  83 
43.20  51.80 
35.80  55.50 
14.20  25.90 
48.90  48.90 









78.96  87.53 
68.89  54.87 
68.29  48.37 
57.64  47.45 
49.57  38.14 
68.30  20.47 
67.63 
60.38  20.47 
60.40  Between  Groups  2803.83  6  433.97  18.80  0.000 
50.30  Within  Groups  1777.10  77  23.08 






78.37  Between  Groups  9260.33  6  1544.39  34.59  0.000 
79.04  Within  Groups  3438.14  77  44.65 






"  In  the  analysis,  regions  that  boycotted  March  1991  referendum  (RSFSR  question)  were  excluded. Bibliography 
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